ML20003G020
| ML20003G020 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 04/10/1981 |
| From: | Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| REF-PT21-81-406-000 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, PT21-81-406, PT21-81-406-000, SQRD-50-328-81, NUDOCS 8104280064 | |
| Download: ML20003G020 (3) | |
Text
__.
PART 21 IIE RIFICATI
!O. f/ W6 dod CCFPA't' kVE.WA mlE OF LERFA DPHET10. O ~ 3 #
i D4rt DISTRIBlHED ORIGIRai Te 0RT7 SlPPIBENTARf DISTRIBUTION:
REACTORCiD REL CYCE &
SAFEC41ARDS (S)
IE FIES FATERIALS 00 IE FILES EES - M IEFILES AD/SG AD/ FREI AD/RDI REGIONS I,II,III,IV,V PEGIONSI,II,lII,lV,V REG 106 I,II,III,IV,V VSO3R BR. R-IV VEiO3R BR. R-IV VB03R BR, R-IV
.LOFB / FPA l4G 5715 tbES / FOS SS-395 gag /91 AE0D 146 7602 LCEB/I'PA 1,tB 5715 rg,ES / SG SS-881 N
AEDD liG 75'I2 Citcdum mna 7zrl LrEB / FPA l4G 5/35 NRR/DSI ASLBP FM 450 AEOD M B 7602 l
NRR/ DST ctfod SAo/SP tiG-7210A ASLBP' p x rnrro w r E/W 450 -
l NRR/D3L CEhTRAL FILES 016 CENTRAL FILES 016 ASLBP EM 450 CENTRAL FIES ( GR3N)
CENTPA1. FILES (DiRP10 CSfiRALFILES 016 PDR CENTRAL FILES SS-395 EhTRAL FIES (DiR0fD IPDR PDR O ' f try PDR TERA WR 3
b 4g fd L%
~
14 e
' ACTION:
s PRELIMINARY EVALUATION OF THE'KiTACHED RE...
J TES LEAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR l
FOLLOWJ? AS SH3hN BELOW:
i
}
NRR]
IESS.E GTHER EES s' e ~ e -
P00R ORIGINAL
~
ezy. sg
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
-l0
-00g CHATTAROOGA. TENNESSEE 37401 7
1100 Chestnut Street Tower II April 10, 1981 SQRD-50-328/81-23 Mr. James P.
'Reilly, Director Office of Insp tion and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Re latory Conunission Region II - Suite 100 101 Marietta Street Atlanta, Georgia 30 3
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - POSSIBLE ERROR IN SIS PREOPERATIONAL TEST -
SQRD-50-328/81 FINAL REPORT The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-0IE Inspector R. V. Crlenjak on March 11, 1981, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR SQN NEB 8115. Enclosed is our final report. We consider 10 CFR 21 applicable to this deficiency.
If you have any questions, please get in touch with D. L. Lambert at FTS 857-2581.
Very truly yours, l
TELHESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY L. M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Regulation and Safety Enclosure
/
l cc:
Mr. Victor Stello, Director (Enclosure),V Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Co=miasion Washington, DC 20555 l
An E:;ua! Opportunity E9oto/er o -._,._.
~
ENCLOSURE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 9,
POS3IBLE ERROR IN SIS PREOPERATIONAL TEST SQRD-50-328/81-23 10 CFR 50.55(e)
FINAL REPORT Description of Deficiency The Westinghouse-supplied scoping documents for the Safety Injection System preoperational tests do not specifically require that the position of all check valves important to the test results be checked.
As a result, apparently. acceptable flow rates could have been measured from the combination of flow to the reactoi coolant system and through partially opened check valves.
During plant operation with the check valves in the proper positions,.the flow rate to the reactor coolant system during a LOCA could have been less than the value used in the plant safety analysis due to higher system resistance.
Safety Ieplications The flow rate from the Safety Injection System during a LOCA could have been less than that clai=ed in the plant safety analysis, which could have adversely affected the safety of the plant.
Corrective Action TVA has reviewed the following safety injection system (SIS) preoperational test instructions:
~
W-6.1C SIS - Centrifugal Charging Pump and Related SIS Performance W-6.1 D SIS - Safety Injection Pump and Related SIS Performance W-6.1E SIS - Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pu=p and Related SIS Performance The possible failure of a check valve to close does not affect the acceptability of the results of W-6.1C and W-6.1D since injection fion.
is measured downstream of any flow path to the idle punp's dischargo and miniflow check valves.
Test W-6.1E requires that injection flow be ceasur.
at the RHR pu=p discharge and at flow ele =ents in the branch lines which feed the four cold leg injection lines. The branch line flow ele =ents are downstream of any flow path to the idle pu=p's discharge check valve.
A deficiency was written during the W-6.1E test because the accuracy of one of the branch line flow ele ents is suspect.
Had this flow instrurentation been accurate, the actual flow rate to the reactor vessel could have been verified. TVA will resolve this deficiency by reviewing available data to verify that this branch line has an adequate flow rate.
If this data cannot verify an adequate flow rate, the test will be rerun to include verification that no leakage exists through any check valve. This test will utilize the idle pump's discharge flow meter which is located upstrea= of the check valve. Verification of adequate flow rate will be co:pleted before initial criticality.
Surveillance instructions will be written to include check valve position verification for future SIS tests.