ML20003E385

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Revised Pages 3/4 4-48 & 5-4 to Amend 36 for License NPF-3, Correcting Administrative Errors
ML20003E385
Person / Time
Site: Davis Besse Cleveland Electric icon.png
Issue date: 03/20/1981
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20003E386 List:
References
NUDOCS 8104030256
Download: ML20003E385 (4)


Text

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POST-AC';IDENT IDNITORING lilSTRUNENTATION k

MINIMUM C

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CHANNELS INSTRUMENT OPERABLE 1.

SG Outlet Steam Pressure 1/ Steam Generator 2.

RC Loop Outlet Temperature 2/ Loop 3.

RC Loop Pressure 2/ Loop 4.

Pressurtzer Level 2

5.

SG Startup Range Level 2/ Steam Generator 6.

Auxiliary Feedwater Status 1/AFW System 7.

Containment Vessel flydrogen 2

y 8.

Containment Vessel Post-Accident Radiation 2

9.

Containment Vessel isolation Status 1/ Valve 10.

SFAS Status 1/ Channel

11. Safety Features Equipment SIatus 1/ System
12. RPS Status 1/ Channel
13. SFRCS Status 1/ Channel
14. High Pressure Injection F!ow 1/ Channel

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TABLE 3.3-10 (Continued)

POST-ACCIDENT _ MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION it!NIMUM CHANNELS INSTRtMENT OPERABLE

15. Low Pressure injection (DilR) Flow 1/ Channel
16. IIPI System Pump and Valve Status 1/ System Y

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17. LPI System Pump and Valve Status 1/ System
18. Containment Spray Pump and Valve Status 1/ System
19. CoreFloodVaiveStatus 1/ System Elg
20. BWST Valve Status 1/ System W

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21. Containment Emergency Sump Valve Status 1/ Valve a

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22. Containment Air Recirculation Fan Status 1/ Fan M
23. Containment Air Cooling Fan Status 1/ Fan
24. EVS Fan and Damper Status 1/ System
25. BWST Level 3

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6 EMERSENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T;yg > 230*F LIMITING CONDIT'ON FOR OPERATION 3.5.2 Two independent ECCS subsystarts shall be OPERAELE with each subsystem comprised of:

a.

One OPERA 5LE high pressure injection (HPI) putr.:.

b.

One OPERA 8LE low pressure injection (LPI) pump, c.

One OPERA 8LE decay heat cooler, and d.

An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the borated water storage tank (8WST) on a safety injection signal and manually transferring suction to the containment sump l

during ths recirculation phase of operation.

APPLICA51LITY: MCDES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

a.

With one ECCS subsystem inocerable, restore the inoperable subsysten to OPERA 3LE status witnin 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in HCT SHL'TDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

I b.

In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Rea: tor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Conrnission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 l

within 90 days describing the circums'_ances of the actuatierr and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.

SURVEILLANCE RE001REMENT5 4.5.2 Each ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

I a.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

i DAVIS-BESEE, i.' NIT 1 3/45-3 Amendment No. 36 l

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS NSURVEILLANCEREOUIREMENTS b.

At least once per 18 months, or prior to operation after ECCS piping has been drained by verifying that the ECCS piping is full of water by venting the ECCS pump casings and discharge piping high points.

c.

By a visual inspection which verifies that no loose debris (rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the containment which could be transported to the containment emergency sump a;d cause restriction of the pump suction during LOCA conditions.

This visual inspection shall be performed:

1.

For all accessible areas of the containment prior to establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, and 2.

Of the areas affected within containment at the completion of each containment entry when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established.

d.

At least once per 18 months by:

1.

Verifying that the interlocks:

a) Close DH-11 and DH-12 and deenergize the pressurizer heaters, if either DH-ll or DH-12 is open and a simulated reactor coolant system pressure which is greater than the trip setpoint (<438 psig) is applied.

b) Prevent the opening of DH-il and DH-12 when a simulated or actual reactor coolant system pressure which is greater than the trip setpoint (<438 psig) is applied.

2.

A visual inspection of the containment emergency sump which verifies that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by_ debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or corrosion.

3.

Verifying a total leak rate < 20 gallons per hour for the LPI. system at:

a) Normal ~ operating pressure or hydrostatic test pressure

'of 1 150 psig for those parts of the system downstream of the pump suction isolation valve, and b) 1 45 psig for the piping from.the containment emergency sump isolation valve to the pump suction isolation valve.

4.

Verifying that a minimum of 72 cubic feet of solid granular trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate-(TSP) is contained within the TSP storage baskets.

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 5-4 Amendment No. 3, 75, 28 J