ML20003E118
| ML20003E118 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 03/20/1981 |
| From: | Tedesco R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Tauber H DETROIT EDISON CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8104020277 | |
| Download: ML20003E118 (8) | |
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r Docket No. 50-341 IO.R 2 0 79g; Mr. Harry Tauber
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Dear Mr. Tauber:
SUBJECT:
REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IN FERMI 2 OPERATING LICEN APPLICATION As a result of our continuing review of the operating license application for the Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant Unit 2, we have developed the enclosed requests for additional information.
Please amend your application to comply with the requirements listed in the enclosure. Our review schedule is based on the assumption that the additional information will be available for our review by May 1,1981.
If you wish clarification of the requests or if you cannot mee. these dates, please telephone the Licensing Project Manager, L. Kintner, within 7 @ "s after receipt of this letter.
Sincerely,
'b Robert L. Tedesco Assistant Director for Licensing Division of Licensing
Enclosures:
Requests for Additional Information cc w/ enclosures:
See next page
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Nr. Harry Tauber Vice President Engineering & Constructicn Detroit Edison Company 2000 Second Avenue Detroit, Michigan 48225 Eugene B. Thomas, Jr., Esq.
David E. Howell, Esq.
cc:
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae 21916 John R 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N. W.
Hazel Park, v.ichigan 43030 Washington, D. C.
20036 Mr. Bruce Little Peter A. Marquardt, Esq.
Co-Counsel U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Cc mission Resident inspector's Office Th'e Detroit Edison Company 6:50 W. Dixie Highway 2000 Second Avenue Newport, Michigan 48155 Detroit, Michigan 48225 Mr. William J. Fahrner Project Manager - Fermi 2 The Detroit Edison Ccmpany 2000 Second Avenue Detroit, Michigan 48225 Mr. Larry E. Schuerman Licensing Engineer - Fermi 2 Detroit Edison Company 2000.econd Avenue Detroit, Michigan 48226 Charles Bechhoefer, Esq.,-Chairman Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Panel U. S.. Nuclear Regulatory Coar.ission Washington, D. C.
20555 Dr. David R. Schink Department of Oceanography Texas A & M University College Station, Texas 778?0 Mr. Frederick J. Shen Atomic Safety 1 Licensing Board Panel U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 4
ENCLOSURE 1 REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IN THE SAFETY REVIEW ENRICO rERMI ATOMIC POWER PLANT UNIT 2 DOCKET NO. 50-341 Requests by the following branches in NRC cre included in this enclosure.
Requests and pages are numbered sequentially with respect to previously transmitted requests.
Branch Pace No.
' Mechanical. Engineering Branch 110-14' Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch 222-42 through 222-45
110-14 110.0 MECHANICAL ENGINEERING BRANCH
'110.19 It is the staff's position that all essential safety-related instrumentation lines should be included in the vibration monitoring program during pre-operational or start-up testing. We require that either a visual or instrumented inspection (as appropriate) be con-ducted to identify any excessive vibration that will res;1t in fatigue failure.
Provide a list of all safety-related small bore piping and instrumentation lines that will be included in the initial test vibration monitoring program.
The essential instrumentation lines to be inspected should include (but are not ifmited to) the following:
a) Reactor pressure vessel level indicator instrumentation lines (used for monitoring both steam and water levels).
b) Main steam instrumentation lines for monitoring main steam flow (used to actuate main steam isolation valves during high steam flow).
c) Reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) instrumentation lines on the RCIC steam line outside containment (used to monitor high steam flow and actuate isolation).
d) Control rod drive lines inside containment (not normally pressurized but required for scram).
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222-42 222.0 Instrumentation & Control Systems Branch 222.51 Loss of Non-Class 1E Instrumentation and Control Pcwer System Bus During Power Operation (IE Bulletin 79-27)
If reactor controls and vital instruments derive power from common electrical distribution systems, the failure of such electrical distribution systems may result in an event requiring operator action concurrent with failure of important instrumentation upon which these operator actions should be based.
This concern was addressed in IE Bulletin 79-27. On November 30, 1979, IE Bulletin 79-27 was sent to operating license (OL) holders, the near term OL applicants (North Anna 2, Diablo Canyon, McGuire, Salem 2, Sequoyah, and Zimmer),
and other holders of construction permits (CP), including Detroit Edison Company for the Fermi 2 CP.
Of these recipients, the CP holders were not given explicit direction for making a submittal as part of the licensing review. However, they were informed that the issue would be addressed later.
Provide your response to IE Bulletin 79-27 with two exceptions.
- First, the 90 day limit in Item 4 is not applicable. Second, your response should be in the form of an amendment to the FSAR.
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222-43 222.52
_ Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Reset Controls (IE Bulletin 80-06)
If safety equipment does not remain in its emergency mode upon reset of an engineered safeguards actuation signal, system modification, design change or other corrective action shoul.d be planned to assure that protective action of the affected equipment is not compromised once the associated actuation signal is reset. This issue was addressed in IE Bulletin 80-06.
IE Bulletin 80-06 required that reviews be conducted to determine which, if any, safety functions might be un-Lvailable after reset, and what changes could be implemented to correct the problem. With minor modifications the wording of the original Bulletin 80-06 is an appropriate basis for the current OL applicants to review their systems. A copy of IE Bulletin 80-06 was previously sent to Detroit Edison for the Fermi 2 CP.
Provide your response to IE Bulletin 80-06 with two exceptions. First, the 90-day limit for response in Item 4 is not apolicable. Second, your response should be in the form of an amendment to the FSAR.
222-44
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222.53.
Qualification of Control Systems (IE Information Notice 79-22)
If control systems are exposed to the environment resulting from the rupture of reactor coolant lines, steamlines or feedwater lines, the control systems may malfunction in a manner which would cause consequences to be more severe than calculated in safety analyses. This concern was addressed in IE Information Notice 79-22.
Provide the results of an analysis of interactions between non-safety grade or control equipment to demonstrate they will not cause consequences more severe than-those found in safety analyses when subjected to the harsh environment of a high energy line break.
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222-45 222.54 Control System Failures The analyses reported in Chapter 15 of the FSAR are intended to demonstrate the adequacy of safety systems in mitigating anticipated operational occurrences and accidents.
Based on the conservative assumptions made in defining these design-basis events and the detailed review of the analyses by the staff, it is likely that they adequately bound the consequences of single control system failures.
To provide assurance that the design b_ asis event analyses adegaately bound other more fundamental credible failures you are requested to provide the following informatien:
(1)
Identify those control systems whose failure or malfunction could seriously impact plant safety.
(2)
Indicate which, if any, of the control s receive power from common power sources.ystems identified in (1)
The power sources considered should-include all power sources whose failure or malfunction could lead to failure or malfunction of more than one control system and should extend to the effects of cascading power losses due to the failure of higher level distribution panels and load centers.
(3) -Indicate which,if any, of the control systems identified in (1) receive input signals from common sensors. The sensors considered should include, but should not necessarily be limited to, common hydraulic headers or impulse lines feeding pressure, temperature, level or other signals to two or more control systems.
(4)- Provide justification that any simultaneous malfunctions of the control systems identified in (2) and (3) resulting from failures or malfunctions of the applicable common power source or sensor are bounded by the analyses in Chapter 15 and would not require action or response beyond the capability of operators or safety systems.