ML20002E247
| ML20002E247 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 12/05/1980 |
| From: | Axelson W, Nicholson N, Paperiello C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20002E243 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-346-80-31, NUDOCS 8101260729 | |
| Download: ML20002E247 (13) | |
See also: IR 05000346/1980031
Text
.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-346/80-31
Docket No. 50-346
License No. NPF-3
Licensee: Toledo Edison Company
Edison Plaza
300 Madison Avenue
Toledo, Ohio 43652
Facility Name: Davis-Besse Nuclear Station
Inspection At: Davis-Besse Nuclear Station, Oak Harbor, Ohio
Inspection Conducted: November 5-7, 1980
/
Inspectors:
W. L. Ax
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N. A. Nicholson
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Approved By:
. Pa riello, Acting Chief
.
Environmental and Special
Projects Section
Inspection Summary
Inspection on November 5-7, 1980 (Report No. 80-31)
Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of Davis-Besse emergency
exercise involving observations by thirteen NRC representatives of key functions
and locations during the exercise. The inspection involved 66 inspector-hours
onsite by three hTC inspectors.
Results:
No items of noncompliance were noted. Specific deficiencies identified
during the exercise are noted in Paragraph 4.
810ne07ff
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_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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1.
Persons Contacted
NRC Observers
- W. L. Axelson, Emergency Planning Program Office, NRR
- R. DeFayette, Emergency Preparedness Development Branch, Floater
- Daniel Garner, Division of Licensing, NRR, Toledo Edison HQ
Emergency Center
- T. Kevern, Emergency Preparedness Licensing Branch, Technical Support Center
- N. A. Nicholson, Environmental and Special Projects Section, Region III,
Offsite Radiation Monitoring Team
- Frank Pagano, Emergency Preparedness Licensing Branch, Emergency
Control Center
- C. J. Paperiello, Chief, Environmental and Special Projects Section,
Region III, Technical Support Center and Emergency Control Center
- Don Perrotti, Emergency preparedness Licensing Branch, Offsite
Radiation Monitoring Team
- Luis Reyes, Senior Resident Inspector, Inspection and Enforcement
- Walter Rogers, Resident Inspector, Floater
Marvin Smith, Battelle Northwest Pacific Laboratories, Consultant NRC,
4
Magruder Hospital
- Richard Starostecki, SAI, NRC Consultant, Floater
- Richard Van Niel, Emergency Planning Program Office, NRR, Floater
- Attended exit interview on November 6,1980.
Toledo Edison Participants
David Briden, Chemist and Health Physicist, Emergency Control Center
Roger Buchrer, Medial Relations Supervisor, Public Information Center
a
'
R. P. Crouse, Vice-President, Nuclear
Charles Daft, Quality Assurance Director
Bruce Freaca, Nuclear Training
James Hickey, Nuclear Training Manager, Emergency Control Center
Judith Hirsch, Emergency Planning Supervisor, Emergency Control Center
David Huffman, Station Administrative Coordinator
Terry Murray, Station Superintendent
Ted Myers, Nuclear Licensing Manager, Technical Support Center
W. C. Rowles, Nuclear Services Director
C. P. Wells, Staff Assistant, Nuclear
The above personnel attended the exit interview November 6,1980.
2.
General
An exercise of the Davis-Besse Emergency Plan was conducted at Davis-Besse
Nuclear Station on November 6, 1980, testing both medical and technical
responses. The exercise involved a contaminated victim and a major radio-
iodine release. Attachment I describes the scenario.
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_
.
.
3.
General Observations
a.
Procedures
This exercise was conducted in accordance with NUREG-0654 and
the Davis-Besse Nuclear Station Emergency Plan.
b.
Coordination
The response was well coordinated, orderly, and timely with the
exceptions noted in Paragraph 4.
c.
Observers
Licensee observers monitored and critiqued this drill along
with 25 FEMA and 13 NRC observers. Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) observers followed State of Ohio and Ottawa
County responses.
d.
Critique
The licensee held a critique immediately following the exercise
the afternoon of November 6, 1980, and identified the major
deficiencies as discussed in the exit interview.
e.
Documentation
Written licensee documentation is not available at this time.
The licensee will be asked to submit a written critique and
documentation describing the implemented corrective action.
4.
Specific Deficiencies Noted
.
Suggested necessary improvements presented by the NRC observers
during exit interview are as follows:
(1) training for the radiation
monitoring teams covering survey techniques and for telephone communica-
tions covering technical topics; (2) revision of radioiodine analysis
procedures; (3) a more realistic incident to test the licensee
operator's response in technical areas; and (4) better defined task
assignments for the Technical Support Center and Emergency Control
Center Managers.
5.
Specific Observations
a.
Control Room
Observers stated the operators responded well to cues, even
though the type of accident used for this exercise did not
adequately test the operators' technical abilities. Problems
noted include (1) posting of meteorological data near instruments
before the exercise was initiated and (2) announcements were
.
-3-
.
not prefaced with "This is a drill," particularly the notification
of Magruder Hospital to prepare for a contaminated victim.
b.
Telephone communicators in this area need more technical training
to adequately relay pertinent information.
At critical points,
management level personnel did not discuss decision making
criteria with each other, but passed this information through
communicators.
It was not clear who was in charge of this center.
c.
Emergency Control Center (ECC)
The Emergency Control Center is temporarily located in a converted
barn south of the plant. A lack of clear communication between
the Emergency Duty Officer (EDO) and the Technical Support
Center was prevalent; one notable result was a twelve minute
delay in declaring a Site Emergency.
Some information was
passed to offsite government agencies without units. The noise
level from fan-air blown heaters in this building made communications
and normal operating procedures very difficult.
Even though
the licensee will be moving into a new facility in March 1981,
replacement of the existing heating system was suggested. The
SAM-2 counting system was not dispatched with the offsite
radiation monitoring teams, but remained in this center; a
table had to be arranged to set up these devices.
d.
Radiation Monitoring Teams
The two offsite Radiation Monitoring Teams were poorly managed;
a health physics coordinator is needed to direct the teams full
time. At one point, Team I was confused with the onsite monitoring
team and was to be dispatched for onsite surveys. This confusion
resulted in a 15 minute delay for offsite dispatch. Team
members need more training covering survey techniques, e.g. ,
air samples for radioiodine were taken on the ground and radiation
meters were not turned on when transversing the plume.
The
communication system with the ECC was poor; the teams used
walkie-talkies instead of the car radios. At one point, Team 2
stopped to use a telephone, losing 25 minutes. Neither team took
Potassium Iodine (KI) into the field. At the time of dispatch,
Team 2 was unaware of the exact location of their survey vehicle.
e.
Operations Support Center
Two major problems were identified at this center. The personnel
accountability system is poor; workers inside the plant could
not be accounted for within 30 minutes. Approximately nine
people could not be accounted for at 11:00 a.m., two hours into
the reactor drill. The issue of KI capsules for emergency
workers was not addressed.
-4-
.
f.
Magruder Hospital
The medical staff performed well to cues. Facilities used
(autopsy room) were limited; only one patient can be decontaminated
at a time. For an incident occurring during off-shift hours,
hospital staff estimate a minimum of 20 minutes would be required
to assemble a medical team. Based on the exercise, patient
decontamination could begin less than one hour after first
notification; this includes off-shift assembly and preparation
times.
Surveys were adequate, both of the ambulance and driver before
release, and of medical personnel attending the victim at the
close of the exercise. Whole body and extremity monitors were
used. Problems noted include (1) poor isolation of the patient;
wind from an open outside door blew over the patient into the
hospital corridor, and (2) hospital staff did not use step-off
pads.
g.
Toledo Edison Emergency Support Center
Control of the secured area in the headquarters office was
good; no unauthorized personnel gained access to this area.
"
Communications between the Technical Support Center, the Emergency
Control Center, and the headquarters office were poor. There
was confusion regarding the exact time a Site Emergency was
declared.
h.
Public Information Center
.
This center was established at the Jefferson Junior High School
1
in Port Clinton.
Information should be issued at the time of
receipt rather than delaying a news release until a schedule
'
briefing. Technical information needed to be put into layman's
terms. Higher level licensee management should be in the
center to address questions and concerns.
6.
Exit Interview
An exit interview was held with licensee management on November 6, 1980.
Suggested improvements discussed are addressed in Patagraph 4.
Attachment: Exercise Scenario
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TECo/0C/ODSA
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1980 Emerg. Exercise
es ev
.
STATION SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
.-
!
$
hpprox.
Planned
j
Fine of
Exercise
Onsite
i
. j Day
Time-Minutes
Scenario
Cue Cards
8:00 a.m.
T-0
A maintenance individual falla and
CC-1
breaks his are and is reported to be
contaminated with detectable levels of
radioactive material.
The Control
Room is informed and the First Aid
Team responds.
Note:
The source of radioactive
material contamination is activated
corrosion products and was originated
from the maintenance activity in which
the person was en; aged at the time of
his injury.
The contamination level
is low and not hazardous.
T-5 to 10
Carroll Township EMS and Magruder
Hospital get notified.
An Unusual
Event is declared ( )The Station Emer-
gency Call System
is activated.
T-30 to 45
Ambulance transports accident victim
'
from the plant to the hospital.
T-45
The Radwa '.= Exhaust Ventilation
CC-2
Radiation Monitor alarms in the
Control Room reading 10,000 cpm.
RE 8407 starts increasing.
An A ert_
is declared 3)The Station Emergency
Call System
is activated again to
, update information.
Note: Within the next 60 minutes,
the Station Operar.4ons Support Center,
Technical Suppor~. R.f tler and Emergency
Control Cente; sht.1d be activated.
The Emergev , Loy.;al Center could then
j
send init. d as:
i.o the State and
,
g
County Eme;;,ency pps-rations Centers !
using the Essential Icfstmation Form}
and the teleprinter.
I
1
Footnotes:
(1) See page 18.
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Attachment A
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TEco/oC/oD:A
Suud
1980 Emerg. Exercise
.:s
o
.
Approx.
Planned
.
Time of
Exercise
Onsite
j
, Day
Time-Minutes
Scenario
?
Cue Cards
I
!
I
T-5'O to 60
The Construction Office Building is
l
alerted to the problem.
Security
restricts site access.
9:00 a.m.
T-60
The Station Vent Radiation monitors
CC-3
alara (RE 4024B and 2025B) at 800 eps,
Onsite Radiation Monitoring Teams are
dispatched.
Station assembly is
announced.
T-70
The Station Vent Monitors reach 1000
CC-4
cpa and the Control Rooa Emergency
Ventilation System initiates.
Opera-
tors attempt to manually secure the
Auxiliary Building ventilation, but
are cued that it cannot be done.
Note:
During this period of time, if
CC-5
Station meteorology is asked for it
is as follows:
Wind Direction - to the south southwer;
Wind Speed - 1 meter per second
Stability Class - F
9:15 a.m.
T-60 to 75
The Chemistry Labcratory sends a man
CC-6
in by the Station Vent to start the
Emergency Sampling System.
T-80 to 100 Radiation Monitoring Teams onsite
report radiation readings indicate
background levels.
T-110
Station Vent Radiation Monitor pegs
CC-7
high in a short period of time.
RE
8407 reads 100 ar/hr. A Site Energency
is declared.
Plant operators begin a
plant shutdown.
The Station Emergency
CallSystemisact{ygtedagainto
update information
i
I
T-112
A two mile precautionary evacuation i
is recommended.
l
Footnotes:
,
l
(1) See page 13.
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Attachment A
1
1
n
TECo/0C/0DSA
1980 Emerg. Exercise
.
Approx.
Planned
Time of
Exercise
Onsite
!
Day
Time-Minutes
Scenario
j
Cue Cards
I
i
g
T-115
A Chemistry and Radiation Tester
CC-8
1
attempts to change the filter cart-
ridge on the Emergency Sampling System
but finds that radiation levels are too
high to enter the area.
Offsite Radia-
tion Monitoring Tr:ms are dispatched.
10:00 a.m.
T-120
A sac:ple is drawn remotely frco the
CC-9
Ea.ergency S:mpling System for analysis.
1
Radiation surveys indicate that the
Counting Room is available to perforu
the analysis.
Station personnel are
returned to their normal activities
except those required to conduct the
remainder of the drill with offsite
agencies.
T-140
Another sample is drawn remotely fro:
the Emergency Sampling System for
analysis.
T-145
Area Radiation Monitors for the
CC-10
Auxiliary Building indicate a slight
decrease in level.
10:35 a.m.
T-155
Initial Emergency Sampling System
CC-11
analyses at3 confirmed and reported
to the Control Room as a .55 ci/sec
release from the Station Vent.
Followup analysis results indicate
that the release ended r.t 10:30 a.m.
T-158
a General Emergp_cy,is declared ag
the Station Emergency Call System
is sctivated.
Station personnel
determine the time of release as
being 1 bour and 30 minutes long.
t
y
T-160 to 200 Radiation Monitoring Teams are
1
maneuvered to follow the plume travel,
ootnotes:
,
II) See page 18.
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Attachment A
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TECo/oC/ocsA
6
,
1980 Emerg. Exercue
.
Approx.
Planned
Time of
Exercise
Onsite
j
Dav
Time-Mir.utes
Scenar:--.0
Cue Cards
,
. _ -
g
--
ill2:00 p.m.
'T-240
Radiation Moritoring Teaca report
CC-12
'
'
'
significant radiation levels four
miles from the plant along the pitze
centerline.
T-300
Radiation Monitoring Teams Report
CC-13
above background radiation levels
6.5 miles from the plant along the
plume centerline. Remainder of
Station personnel return to normal
duties except those assigned to off-
site and Emergency Control Center
duties.
1:30 p.m.
T-690
Due to the length of time of response
(Simulated
team involvement, a shift change in
Time Jump) personnel is required.
2:00 p.m.
T-720
Radiation Monitoring Teams near the
CC-14
plume centerline report insignificant
radiation levels indicating the plun:e
has dissipated.
2:30 p.m.
T-750
Reentry and recovery phase begins for
members of the public who were affected.
3:30 p.m.
T-810
All Radiation Mcnitoring Team readings
indicate background.
Reent.ry and
recovery activities are fully inple-
mented for the pablic.
4:00 p.=.
T-840
Upon satisfactory completion of all
activities by all the participants
involved, the exercise shall be ended.
I
1
4
1
4i
1
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Attachment A
D
D
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b
TEco/0C/0DSA
eu ev J u
esJuu
..
23
1980 Emerg. Exercise
.
OFFSITE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
k
pprox.
Planned
i
ime of
Txercise
Offsite
i Day
Time-Minutes
Scenario
Cue Cards
Y
8:10 a.m.
T-5 to 10
The NRC is notified of an Unusual
Event by the Davis-Besse Control
Room over the NRC Emergency Notifi-
cation System " red" phone.
T-5 to 10
The Ottawa County Sheriff's Dispatcher
is notified of the Unusual Event and
verifies it by making a phone call
backtotheplagg)isactivatedand
The County Unusual
Event call list
the Carroll Township EMS is paged to
respond.
Magruder Hospital is notified
to receive a radioactively contaminated
accident victim.
T-45 to 60 The Sheriff's Dispatcher is notified
of an Alert condition at Davis-Besse
and{grifiesit.
The County Alert call
list
is then activated.
Note:
Within the next 60 minutes, the
County Emergency Operations Center
should be activated.
T-50 to 60 The Sheriff notifies the State Disaster
Services Agency. The State should verify
thisbycgingtheplant. The State call list is then activated and a primary group of State response personnel go to a standby status. 9:00 a.m. T-60 to 75 The Carroll Township EMS ambulance arrives at Magruder Hospital with the contaminated accident victim. Ij T-70 The County Engineer readies his , department for establishing roadblocks g at a two mile radius of Davis-Besse { if required. Footnotes: I ( See page 18. -14- Attachment B
- . O**
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T 'j' a TEco/0C/0LSA b*
1980 Emerg. Exercise , . Approx. Planned ' ) Time of Exercise Offsite ! [ Day Time-Minutes Scenario ) { Cue Cards i - g t-75 Additiggjlplant related response f groups are informed of the Alert ' condition at Davis-Besse by Toledo Edison. Note: At about this time the Station Emergency Control Center and the State and County Emergency Operations Centers should make contact with each other over the dedicated 3-way tele- phone conferencing line. 9:20 a.m. T-80 to 120 A Public Information Center should be established in the Jr. High School in Port Clinton.
T-115 The Sheriff's. Dispatcher is informed that plant conditions have degraded to a Site Emergency and calls the plant to verify it. T-116 The Dispatcher receives verification from Davis-Besse of a Site Emergency and g County Site Emergency call list is activated. T-115 to 125 Additiggjlplanrelatedresponse groups are informed of the Site Emergency at Davis-Besse by Toledo Edison. 10:00 a.m. T-120 to 130 The Sheriff notifies the State Disaster Services Agency. The State verifies the Site Emergency g ealling the plant. The State call list is activated and designated State response personnel are g dispatched to Ottawa County. The State Emergency Operations Center is fully activated.
k i Footnotes: ( . (2) See page 18. I
(U See page 19. , l l -15 Attachment B ! - -
e . j TECo/0C/0DSA 1980 Ererg. Exercise Approx. Planned i Time of Exercise Offsite { g Day Time-Minutes Scenario j Cue Cards I i . 10:10 a.m. T-140 The Sheriff simulates initiating the Emergency Broadcast System and local sirens for public notification. Note: During this time, information and dose assessment data will be continuously transmitted between the Davis-Besse Emergency Control Center and the State and County Emergency Operations Centers using telephones backed-up by hard copy from teleprinters. T-150 Two sile precautionary road blocks are being transported to pre-designated sites as established by the County Engineer. Note: During this time, information and recommendations pertaining to protective actions to the public will be transmitted by radio to the County Emergency Operations Center, National Guard, Highway Patrol, and Coast Guard by the designated State Director from either the State Emergency Operations Center, helicopter or communications van. 10:40 a.m. T-160 The State and County Emergency Opera- tions Centers are informed of the General Emergency classification from the Davis-Besse Emergency Control Center. T-170 Evacuation of personnel in a five-mile sector of the plume pathway is recommended , and initiated. FieldMonitoringTeamsaremaneuvereh g
T- 175
to follow the plume travel. { _ T-180 to 200 Anevacuationcenterisestablishedfo receive evacuees who may need assistance or shelter. . -16- Attachment B l ,
c. 4 i " TECo/0C/0DSA - 1980 Esarg. Exercise Approx. Planned ! Time of Exercise Offsite i g_ Day Time-Minute. Scenario i Cue Cards i T-ISOto190 1, Additiglplant related response groups are informec' of the General Emergency condition at the Pavis- Besse power plant by Toledo Edis9n Con.pany perscunel. T-195 to 200 Actions are taken to prepare for the transport of persons from the Riverview Nursing Home if required. 12:00 p.m. T-240 Field Monitoring Teams report signif- CC-15 icant radiation levels four miles from the plant alocg the plume center- line. Evacuation is continued. T-300 Field Monitoring Teams report above ' CC-16 background radiation levels 6.5 miles fros the plant along the plume centerline. Evacuation is extended out to seven miles and sheltering is requested to ten miles. Roadblocks are moved accordingly. -1:30 p.m. T-690 Due to the length of time of response (Simulated team involvement, a shift change in Time Jump) personnel is required. 2:00 p.m. T-720 Field Monitoring Tears nest the plume CC-17 centerline report insignificant radi- ation levels indicating the plume has dissipated. Initial soil and water sample analysis results are available at this time. 2:30 p.m. T-750 Reentry and recovery phase begins for members of the public who were affected. , h'3:30 p.m. All Field Monitoring Team readings T-810 indicate background. Reentry and { recovery activities are fully l implemented. ' [ i 4:G0 p.m. T-840 Upon satisfactory completion of all i activities by all the participants involved, the exercise shall be ended. Footnotes: (3) See page 19. -17- Attachn e nt B }}