ML19354D820
| ML19354D820 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 01/12/1990 |
| From: | Ray Azua, Bitter S, Bundy H, Johnson W, Murphy M, Joel Wiebe Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19354D816 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-1.C.2, TASK-TM 50-445-89-86, 50-446-89-86, GL-83-28, NUDOCS 9001220190 | |
| Download: ML19354D820 (20) | |
See also: IR 05000445/1989086
Text
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APPENDIX B
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U.
S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
= OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
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NRC Inspection Report:
50-445/89-86
Permits: CPPR-126
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50-446/89-86
CPPR-127
Dockets: 50-445
Construction Permit
50-446
Expiration Date:
Unit 1: August 1, 1991
Unit 2: August 1, 1992
Applicant:
TU Electric
Skyway Tower
400 North Olive Street
Lock Box 81
Dallas, Texas
75201
Facility Name:
Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES),
Units 1 and 2
Inspection At:
Comanche Peak Site, Glen Rose, Texas
Inspection Conducted:
December 6, 1989, through January 2, 1990
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Inspectors:-
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S. D. Bitter, Resident Inspector,
Date
Operations
(IfD
'/)2/90
mmn
W. D. Jq[rhson, Senior Resident Inspector,
Date
Operations
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Wm $
///1}96
M. E. Mufphy, Reacgor Inspector, Region IV
Date
9001
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190 0
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R. V. ptua, Reactgt Inspector, Region IV
'Date
W
Ill 2) 9 0
H.,F.
NUndy, Reactor Inspector, Region IV
'Date
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Consultant
J. L. Birmingham, RTS
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Reviewed'by:
M
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S. Wiebe, Senior Project Inspector
'Date
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Inspection S
ary
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Inspection Conducted:
December 6, 1989, through January 2, 1990
(Report 50-445/89-86, 50-446/89-86)
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Areas Inspected: . Unannounced resident safety inspection of
. applicant action on previous inspection findings; follow-up on
violations / deviations;.onsite follow-up of event reports (10 CFR
Part.50.55(e]); in-office review of event reports (10 CFR Part 21);
TMI action' items (Safety Issue Management Item I.C.2, closed);
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. safety ~ evaluation report follow-up; inspection of applicant's
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program'related to Generic Letter 83-28; startup test procedure
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review; initial fuel loading procedure-review; fitness-for-duty
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. training;-and plant tours and general inspection activities.
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' Result.g:
Within the' areas inspected, the~ applicant's programs and
implementation of those programs _were adequate in all areas with one
,
exception, temporary modifications.
Several examples of
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unauthorized temporary. modifications were-identified during a-
walkdown.by the senior. resident 1 nspector.
These examples included
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instances where the applicant had installed extra fittings and
valves on drain lines,. vent lines, and a sample line.
The
preoperational. program is essentially complete; several remaining
open-items dealing with it were not addressed in this inspection
period.
The applicant continues to make satisfactory progress in
preparing programs and procedures.for the startup of Unit 1
-(paragraph 9). -During the inspection, one violation concerning
temporary modifications (paragraph 12.a) was identified.
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DETAILS
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Persons Contacted
- J. W. Beck, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering, TU Electric
- 0.
Bhatty, Issue Interface Coordinator, TU Electric
- M.
R. Blevins, Manager of Nuclear Operations Support,
TU Electric
- H.
D. Bruner, Senior Vice President, TU Electric
- A.
R. Buhl, IAG
- W. J. Cahill, Executive Vice President, Nuclear, TU Electric
- H. M. Carmichael, Senior Quality Assurance (QA) Program
Manager, CECO
- J. T. Conly, APE-Licensing, Stone and Webster Engineering
Corporation (SWEC)
- D.
E. Deviney, Deputy Director, QA, TU Electric
,
- F.
Dunham, QA Issue Interface, TU Electric
.
- J.
C. Finneran, Jr., Manager, Civil Engineering,
TU Electric
- J.
L. French, Independent Advisory Group
- B.
P. Garde, Attorney, CASE
- W.
G. Guldemond, Manager of Site Licensing, TU Electric
- T.
L. Heatherly, Licensing Compliance Engineer,
TU Electric
- J. C. Hicks, Licensing Compliance Manager, TU Electric
- C.
B. Hogg, Chief Engineer, TU Electric
- J.
L. LaMarca, Manager of Electrical and I&C Engineering,
TU Electric
- F. W. Madden, Mechanical Engineerlag Manager, TU Electric
- J. W. Muffett, Manager of Project Engineering, TU Electric
- S.
S.
Palmer, Project Manager, TU Electric
- P. Raysircar, Deputy Director / Senior Engineer Manager, CECO
- J. D. Redding, Executive Assistant, TU Electric
- M.
J. Riggs, Plant Evaluation Manager, Operations, TU Electric
- A.
B. Scott, Vice President, Nuclear Operations, TU Electric
- J.
C. Smith, Plant Operations Staff, TU Electric
- R.
L. Spence, TU/QA Senior Advisor, TU Electric
- P.
B. Stevens,= Manager of Operations Support Engineering,
TU Electric
- C.
L. Terry, Manager of Projects, TU Electric
- R. D. Walker, Manager of Nuclear Licensing, TU Electric
- R.
G. Withrow, EA Manager, TU Electric
- D.
R. Woodlan, Docket Licensing Manager, TU Electric
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The NRC inspector also interviewed other applicant employees
during this-inspection period.
- Denotes personnel present at the January 2, 1990, exit
interview.
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2.
Applicant Action on previcus Inspection Findings (92701)
(Closed) open Item (445/8436-0-04):
Natural circulation / boron
mixing test.
This item had remained open because the applicant
had not submitted adequate justification for referencing other
plant natural circulation / boron mixing tests.
The applicant
has now provided information which confirms that the Diablo
Canyon test results are applicable to Comanche Peak.
This item
is considered closed.
3.
Follow-up on Violations / Deviations (92702)
(Closed) Violation (445/8940-V-01):
Failuro to document
"as-found" deficiencies associated with Weidmuller terminal
block connections.
The cause of this violation was the
inappropriate application of a procedure provision that allowed
not identifying on a test deficiency report (TDR) minor
deficiencies which could be corrected by " calibration,
adjustment, or replacement of consumable materials."
As a
result, loose terminal screws were tightened as specified by
the procedure but were not documented as required by
administrative procedures.
The applicant reviewed other
deficiency documentation procedures to determine if other
procedures exist which allow correction of deficiencies without
documenting the deficiency.
No significant concerns were
noted.
Since the Unit 1 preoperational test program is essentially
complete, the applicant determined that it is not effective or
practical to apply corrective steps to the Unit 1 startup
program.
The applicant has included this issue in their
. commitment tracking system to ensure that the Unit 2
preoperaticnal test procedures include clarification with
regard to documentation of deficiencies and that training on
this subject is provided to personnel involved in the Unit 2
preoperational testing activities.
The inspector concluded that there is reasonable assurance that
this corrective action will prevent further violations.
The
violation is considered closed.
4.
Onsite Follow-up of Event Reports (10 CFP part 50.55(e))
(92700)
a.
(Closed) Construction Deficiency (SDAR CP-89-28):
" Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Air Start Valve."
This
deficiency originated during testing of the Unit 1 Train B
EDG.
Specifically, in June 1989, prior to running the
Unit 1 Train B EDG, the applicant attempted to air-roll
it.
The purpose was to check for evidence of water in the
cylinders and intake manifold as required by procedure.
During the attempt, the diesel engine failed to roll when
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the air was admitted.
Even when the diesel had been
barred (manually rotated to a different crank angle), it
could not be rolled with air.
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Subsequent troubleshooting revealed that several air-start
valves were sticking open.
This resulted in an abnormal
air admission soquences thus, the diesel could not be
air-rolled.
After engineering and vendor review, the
applicant concluded that there were two reasons for the
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sticking air-start valves.
First, combustion products
were found on the valve stems and lower guides.
Second,
narrow ring grooves were found on the lower guides of
several air-start valves.
The applicant has further determined that it is probable
that the accumulation of combustion products is related to
a particular installation deficiency that was identified
on the Unit 1 Train B and the Unit 2 Train A EDGs.
This
deficiency involves the absence of a 1/4-inch drain line
off the bottom of the air-start header downstream of the
solenoid operated block valves.
Having this line would
ensure complete depressurization of the air-start header
downstream of the block valves after the EDG has been
started.
In addition, the applicant is aware of seat
leakage on the solenoid operated block valves.
This seat
leakage, together with the absence of drain lines, results
in a continuous pressurization of the air-start header
whether the EDG is operating or not.
The constant
pressurization could be responsible for forcing combustion
products into the stem and lower guide areas of the
air-starting valves.
The ring grooves could worsen the
problem by providing a place for the combustion products
to stick.
However, the applicant does not believe that
the narrow ring grooves, by themselves, would cause valve
sticking.
The applicant has concluded that the absence of a drain
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line on the Unit 1 Train B and Unit 2 Train A EDGs is a
construction deficiency reportable under the provisions of
Installation of the drain line has
been completed on the Unit 1 Train B EDG and is scheduled
to be' completed on the Unit 2 Train A EDG prior to its
operation.
In addition to these actions, the EDG
operating procedures have been revised to ensure that the
drain lines remain unobstructed; the drain lines
themselves will be checked for air flow during every
engine run.
The applicant has committed to remove and
inspect the air-start valves on each EDG at every other
refueling outage.
Finally, the applicant has replaced the
sticking air-starting valves.
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The inspector has reviewed the applicant's actions in
addressing these deficie.ncies and has no further
questions.
This item is c.'osed.
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b.
(Closed) Construction Deficiency (SDAR CP-87-104):
" Safety System Setpoint Calculation Errors."
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this item was addressed in Inspection Report 50-445/89-37;
50-446/89-37, it remained open pending NRC verification
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that the generic aspects of the issue had been adequately
addressed.
In addressing the generic aspects, the
applicant-first identified those specific setpoints
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affected.
Then, the applicant issued a design basis
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document that controls setpoint revisions,
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The inspector has reviewed these actions.
He concluded
that because the applicant identified the affected
setpoints, and because the the applicant tock action to
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prevent recurrence of the problem, the generic aspects
have been adequately addressed.
The inspector has no
further questions; this item is closed.
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5.
In-Office Review of Event Reports (10 CFR Part 21) (907121
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The inspector reviewed 10 CFR Part 21 reports to determine if
additional reactive inspection effort or other NRC response is
warranted; if corrective action discussed in the report appears
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appropriate; if the information satisfies reporting
requirements; if generic issues are present; if the event is
appropriate for classification as an abnormal occurrence
pursuant to'Section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act of
1974; and if the event is appropriate for licensing board,
appeal panel, or commission notification.
The following reports with Region IV tracking numbers were
-determined not to warrant additional NRC action:
RIV
Related CPSES
Tracking
No.
Company
Date
Report
86-02
Georgia Power
09/05/86
N/A
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86-03
Ind.& Michigan Elec.
09/18/86
N/A
86-04
Georgia Power
09/05/86
N/A
86-05
Synchro-Start Products
08/25/86
N/A
86-06
Crane Co.
09/02/86
N/A
86-08
Dresser V&C Division
09/16/86
N/A
86-09
,Valcor Engineering
07/31/86
N/A
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86-10
Dresser Industries
06/28/85
N/A
86-11
G.A. Technologies
09/18/86
N/A
86-12
Delta Controls
09/03/86
N/A
86-14
Westinghouse Elec.
02/20/86
86-15
ITT Fluid Technology
10/10/86
N/A
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RIV
Related CPSES
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Tracking
No.
Company
Date
Report
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87-01
Brown Boveri
10/07/86
N/A
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87-02
Virginia Elec. Power
01/28/87
N/A
87-04
Ind.& Michigan Elec.
12/20/85
N/A
87-05
Florida P&L Co.
07/08/86
N/A
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87-06
Portland Gen.Elec.
07/25/86
N/A
87-07
Promatec
02/17/86
N/A
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87-08
Gulf States Utilities
11/16/87
N/A
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87-10
Update to 86-07 and will be tracked as 86-07.
87-12
Atwood & Morrill Co.
undated
N/A
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87-13
Gibbs & Hill
03/17/86
CP-86-26,27,28,29
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87-14
Transamerica Delaval
03/10/86
87-15
Rockwell International
12/16/86
N/A
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87-16
Limitorque-
12/19/86
N/A
87-17
Commonwealth Edison
12/09/86
N/A
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87-18
Pacific Gas & Electric
12/12/86
N/A
87-19
Vermont Yank.Nuc. Power
11/10/86
N/A
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87-20
Auto. Sprinkler C.of Am.
12/01/86
N/A
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87-22
DRAVO
01/30/87
N/A
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87-23
Soliteck
08/11/86
N/A
87-24
Enerfab, Inc.
08/13/86
N/A
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87-25
QA Technologies, Inc.
02/23/87
87-26
Cooper-Bessemer
12/19/86
N/A
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87-27
08/13/85
N/A
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-87-29
Toledo Edison
02/03/87
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87-31
Auto. Valve Corp.
12/19/86
N/A
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87-32
Boston Edison
01/26/87
N/A
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87-33
Tubeturns, Inc.
02/16/87
N/A
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87-34
Brown Boveri
02/11/87
N/A
87-35
Foxboro Corporation
02/17/87
N/A
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87-36
S.M.U.D.
02/10/87
N/A
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87-37
Northeast Utilities
02/13/87
N/A
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87-39
IMO Delaval
03/11/87
87-40
Northeast Utilities
03/04/87
N/A
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87-41
Cooper-Bessemer
01/12/87
N/A
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87-43
Virginia Elec. Power
02/20/87
N/A
87-44
Arizona Nuc.Pwr.Proj.
03/11/87
N/A
87-45
Birmingham Willamette
03/20/87
N/A
87-47
IMO Delaval
03/31/87
N/A
87-48
Pennsylvania P&L
04/24/87
N/A
87-49
Frank Electric Corp.
04/21/87
N/A
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87-50
NAMCO
04/16/87
N/A
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87-52
S.M.U.D.
04/06/87
N/A
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87-53
Paul-Munroe Ener. Prod.
07/23/87
N/A
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87-55A
S.M.U.D.
04/24/87
N/A
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87-56
ITT Corp.
05/07/87
N/A
87-57
Dragon Valves, Inc.
01/28/87
N/A
87-58
Dresser V&C Division
02/03/87
N/A
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Related CPSES
Tracking
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Company
Date
Report
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87-59
ANSUL
04/22/87
N/A
87-60
Stone & Webster
06/10/87
N/A
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87-61
Boston Edison Co.
05/30/87
N/A
87-62
Vitro Corp.
06/16/87
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87-63
IMO Delaval
05/28/87
87-65
Public Service of Col.
06/05/87
N/A
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87-66
Dow Corning
06/22/87
N/A
87-67
Carolina P&L
07/01/87
87-68
Wisconsin Electric
06/25/87
N/A
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87-69
Ind.& Michigan Elec.
07/31/87
N/A
87-70
IMO Delaval
08/05/87
N/A
87-71
IMO Delaval
08/07/87
N/A
87-72
Arizona Nuc.Pwr.Proj.
07/17/87
N/A
87-73
Florida Power Corp.
07/24/87
N/A
87-74
Northern States Pwr.
11/13/87
N/A
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87-75
Gibert Asso.
11/16/87
N/A
87-77
Precision Heat Treating
10/21/87
N/A
87-78
Telemecanique, Inc.
10/09/87
N/A
87-79
Stone & Webster
10/22/87
N/A
87-81
Philadelphia Elec.
10/19/87
N/A
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87-82
Westinghouse Elec.
10/16/87
87-85
Colt Industries
09/24/87
N/A
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87-87
Morrison Knudsen
09/04/87
N/A
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87-89
Gilbert / Commonwealth
08/12/87
N/A
88-03
Gulf States Utilities
01/19/88
N/A
88-04'
Vermont Yank.Nuc. Power
09/10/86
N/A
88-05
Kaman Instrumentation
02/22/88
N/A
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88-07
Gamma-Metrics
05/10/88
88-09
Bingham International
05/04/88
N/A
88-10
Combustion Engineering
08/05/88
N/A
88-11
08/16/88
N/A
88-12
IMO Delaval
10/05/88
88-13
Morrison Knudsen
10/12/88
N/A
88-14
Cooper-Bessemer
10/04/88
N/A
88-15
Xomox Corp.
09/30/88
88-18
11/03/88
N/A
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88-20
Niagara Mohawk Power
11/21/88
N/A
89-01
Cooper-Bessemer
01/18/89
N/A
89-03
IMO Delaval
12/20/88
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89-06
06/01/89
N/A
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89-07
Nebraska Public Power
06/08/89
N/A
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89-08
Westinghouse Electric
06/09/89
N/A
89-09
Cooper Industries
06/15/89
N/A
89-10
PUN Steels
07/17/89
N/A
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89-13
08/28/89
N/A
89-15
Cooper-Bessemer
09/28/89
N/A
89-16
Cooper Industries
09/13/89
N/A
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The following reports without Region IV tracking numbers were
determined not to warrant additional NRC action:
Related CPSES
Company
Date
10CFR50.55(e) Report
02/02/82
Transamerica Delaval
01/22/85
Westinghouse Electric
03/25/85
HUB Inc.
04/05/85
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Transamerica Delaval
05/17/85
Westinghouse Electric
05/17/85
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American Air Filter
09/03/85
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WFI Nuclear Products
01/20/86
12/17/86
Rockwell International
05/08/87
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Westinghouse Electric
07/17/87
XOMOX Corp.
11/05/87
04/08/88
Westinghouse Electric
05/11/88
IMO Delaval
09/29/88
ABB Asea Brown Boveri
01/13/89
N/A
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ABB Asea Brown Boveri
03/20/89
OP-89-12
NPS Industries
05/11/89
Forrento Electronics
07/26/89
Power Conversion Products
12/27/89
6.
TMI 3ption Items (SIMS)* (25565)
- The Safety Issue Management System (SIMS) tracking number is
the same as the TMI Action Item number.
(Closed) TMI Action Item I.C.2:
" Shift Relief and Turnover
Procedures."
This item required specific items to be included
in the shift turnover checklists used by the shift supervisors,
control room operators, and the auxiliary operators.
In
addition to establishing checklist requirements, this item
requires the establishment of a system to evaluate the
effectiveness of the shift and relief turnover procedure.
The inspector has reviewed the shift turnover checklists that
were submitted by the applicant.
These checklists adequately
address the criteria called for in NUREG-037, " Clarification of
TMI Action Plan Requirements."
Furthermore, the inspector
reviewed the system for evaluating the effectiveness of the
shift and relief turnover procedures.
This, also, was
acceptable to the inspector.
In summary, the inspector has reviewed the procedures,
checklists, and systems that address the shift turnover
process.
He is satisfied that the provisions of NUREG-0737
have been met.
There are no further questions.
This item is
closed.
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Safety Evaluation Report Follow-up (92719)
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Section 3.6 of a future Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report
(SSER) will document a commitment that plant procedures will
specify that the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps will be
used for startup, shutdown, and hot standby conditions and that
the turbine-driven pump will not be used during normal
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operation.
To verify that this commitment has been
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implemented, the NRC inspector reviewed the following
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procedures:
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IPO-002A, Revision 4, " Plant Startup From Hot Standby
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to Minimum Load."
IPO-004A, Revision 4, " Plant Shutdown From Minimum
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Load to Hot Standby."
IPO-005A, Revision 5,." Plant Cooldown From Hot
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Standby to Cold Shutdown."
IPO-007A, Revision 4, " Maintaining Hot Standby."
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Each of these procedures contained the following precaution:
Theturbine-drivenadxiliaryfeedwaterpumpshouldnotbe
used during normal plant operation, except for
surveillance testing, due to environmental qualification
and high energy line break design constraints which
require the steam supply piping be depressurized during
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normal plant operation.
Section 3.10.2 of a future SSER will state that the motor
starters for Class 1E motors have thermal overload relays that
provide for alarm function only.
It will further state that
operations personnel in the control room monitor motor-operated
valve (MOV) performance during testing and can trip the valve
operator in the event of an anomaly during a test.
The NRC
inspector noted that five annunciators on alarm panel 1-ALB-10B
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provide alarms for various MOV thermal overload relay
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actuations.
The windows of interest were 1.20, 2.20, 3.20,
-4.19, and 4.20.
The associated alarm procedures list the
inputs for each alarm and require that the component supply
breaker be opened if an energized component's thermal overload
relay has actuated.
These procedures also provide guidance to
assist the operator in determining which component caused the
alarm.
The two operators questioned on this subject were
familiar with the thermal overload setup on the MOVs of
interest and were aware of the associated annunciators and
their response procedures.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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8.
Inspection of Applicant's Program Related to Generic Letter
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83-28 (25564)
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During this inspection period, an assessment of the applicant's
programs related to equipment classification, vendor interface,
and maintenance programs was performed.
The purpose of the
assessment was to verify the conformance of the applicant's
program for those areas to existing requirements and to the
requirements in NRC Generic Letter (GL) 83-28, " Required
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Actions Based on Generic Implementation of Salem ATWS Events."
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Guidance contained in Temporary Instruction 2515/64, "Near Term
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Inspection Follow-up to Generic Letter 83-28" was utilized, in
,
part, for this inspection.
The inspector reviewed the applicant's current procedural
program to determine w'2 ether the program provided for the
following
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a.-
Equipment Classification,
1.
Management oversight of activities affecting
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safety-related structures, systems, or components
(S/S/Cs).
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2.
Indoctrination and training of individuals
responsible for designating the safety classification
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of S/S/Cs prior to procurement, maintenance, or
modification activities.
]
3.
Written directives to control activities affecting
safety-related S/S/Cs.
4.
Indoctrination and training of personnel performing
.
work activities impacting safety-related S/S/cs.
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5.
Planned and periodic audits of activities impacting
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safety-related S/S/Cs.
6.
Controls to assure that cer.ditions adverse to quality
(failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, defective
material and equipment, and nonctnformances) are
promptly identified, corrected, ard trended.
7.
Review and evaluation of information concerning the
.
malfunctioning of equipment designated safety-related
to determine if that equipment can be expected to
perform its safety function reliably,
b.
Vendor Interface.
A program to assure that vendor information for
safety-related components is complete, current, and
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controlled.
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c.
Post-Maintenance Testing
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1.
Written procedures for initiating requests for
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post-maintenance testing.
2.
Criteria and responsibilities for review and approval
of maintenance.
3.
Criteria and responsibilities that form the basis for
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designating the activity as safety /nonsafety-related.
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4.
Criteria and responsibilities for performing
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inspection of post-maintenance testing activities.
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5.
Methods for performing functional testing of
structures, systems, or components following
maintenance, before they are returned to service.
6.
Administrative controls for post-maintenance testing
activities requiring that records be prepared,
assembled, and reviewed for transfer to records
storage, and that those records contain the
following:
(a)
Approvals of maintenance requests.
(b)
Identification of the personnel who performed
the maintenance task.
(c)
Identification of the personnel who inspected
the maintenance work.
The inspector determined that the applicant's written program
included the above requirements.
NRC inspections of the
applicant's programs for procurement, maintenance, audits
surveillance testing and calibration control, records, and test
and experiments were performed and reported in NRC Inspection
Reports 50-445/89-18, 50-446/89-18 and 50-445/89-32,
50-446/89-32.
An NRC inspection of the applicant's
environmental qualification program was performed and reported
in NRC Inspection Report 50-445/89-60; 50-446/89-60.
Those
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inspections found the applicant's program implementation to be
generally satisfactory.
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No violations or deviations were identified during this
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inspection.
No further NRC inspection under this temporary
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instruction is planned.
Procedures reviewed during this
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inspection were:
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NEO-1.08
Management of Contracts
Revision 0
NEO-3.02
Conditional Release
Revision 4
NEO-3.03
Plant Design Modifications
Revision 4
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NEO-3.05
Reporting and control of
Revision 9
Nonconformances
NEO-3.06
Reporting and Control of
Revision 5
Deficiencies
NEO-3.07
Quality Assurance Audit Program
Revision 3
NEO-3.14
Evaluation and Verification of
Revision 2
Vendor Activities
NEO-6.02
Preparation and Review of
Revision 4
Procurement Documantation
NQA-6.02
Quality Review of Procurement
Revision 2
Documents
MMO-6.02
Preparation of Procurement
Revision 2
Documents
MMO-6.02-02
Procurement Engineering Review
Revision 2
and Processing of Procurement
Documents
MMO-6.04
CPSES Master Parts List (MPL)
Revision 1
ECE-5.01-05
Classification of Components
Revision 0
ECE-5.04
Master Equipment List
Revision 1
ECE-5.19
Review of Vendor Documents-
Revision 2
ECE-5.19-02
Vendor Technical Manual Review
Revision 0
STA-206
Control of Vendor Technical
Revision 13
Manuals
STA-309
Master Equipment List
Revision 1
STA-403
Identification of Quality Related
Revision 6
Equipment
STA-514
Nuclear Plant Reliability Data
Revision 0
System Program
'STA-606
Work Requests and Work Orders
Revision 11
STA-623
Post-Work Test Program
Revision 3
STA-677
Preventive Maintenance Program
Revision 1
STA-816
Format and Content of
Revision 0
Performance and Test Procedures
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9.
Startup Test Procedure Review (72400, 72564, 72566, 72570,
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72572, 72576, 72578, 72582
To ascertain program compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.68 and
the FSAR, Chapter 14,.the inspectors reviewed the following
procedures
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STA-818, " Conduct of Initial Startup Testing,"
.
Revision O.
STA-816, " Format and Content of Performance ard Test
.
Procedures," Revision 0.
,
STA-817, " Review, Approval, Revision of and Changes
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to Initial Startup Tests and Results," Revision 0.
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This review determined that the procedures appeared to reflect
an acceptable program.
However,.the inspector noted that the
word "should" was used extensively in procedure STA-818.
In
several instances it appeared that the word "shall" would have
)
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been more appropriate.
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To ascertain compliance with specific test requirements in
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Regulatory Guide 1.68, Chapter 14 of the FSAR, and the proposed
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Technical Specifications (TSs), the inspectors reviewed the
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procedures listed at the end of this section.
The inspectors
found the procedures to be technically accurate and responsive
to tasting requirements.
The acceptance criteria listed in the.
.
applicable procedures met the requirements set forth in the
draft-TS.
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The inspectors noted some errors, omissions, and occasional
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editorial problems.
These findings are noted as follows:
NUC-116 - The word " expiration" appears on the title
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page tchere " effective" should be.
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Sample graphs provided in some of the procedures were
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of poor quality and were hard to read.
(See NUC-104,
NUC-207, and NUC-116.)
NUC-116 - Section 11.0 does not clearly describe how
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the required curves should be drawn.
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NUC-111 - There were no sign-off lines on the data
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sheets for the calculation checker as required by
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STA-816, step 6.16.4.
ISU-101A - The " note" following step 11.9.3 states
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that "The following 3 steps can be .
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only 2 steps following the " note."
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ISU-240A (and subsequent procedures) - No sources or
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explanation of their development is provided for the
uncertainty factors used in the computations.
ISU-260A - Prerequisite 10.6 says "The plant is ready
.
to increase power to greater than 75% in accordance
with IPO-003A."
Precaution and Limitations,
paragraph 9.2.2 says that "80% reactor power as
indicated by any nuclear instrumentation power range
"
channel shall not be exceeded .
. . .
Prerequisite 10 6 should reflect this limitation.
These comments were discussed with an applicant representative.
The applicant representative stated that some of these items
had been noted and were being clarified, and that some
procedures were in the process of being revised.
The
inspectors were informed that the remaining comments would be
reviewed and considered in subsequent procedure revisions.
No violations or deviations were noted in this program area.
The following procedures were reviewed during this inspection:
ISU-010A
Revision 2
Post Core Load Precritical Test Sequence
ISU-101A
Revision 2
Initial Criticality and Low Power Test-
Sequence
NUC-106
Revision 1
Initial Criticality
NUC-111
Revision 1
Inverse Count Rate Ratio Monitoring
~ISU-204A
Revision 3
Operational Alignment of Nuclear
Instrumentation
ISU-015A
Revision 4
Reactor Trip System Tests
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ISU-222A
Revision 3
Turbine Generator Trip With Coincident
,
ISU-022A
Revision 2
Reactor Coolant System Leakage Rate Test
EGT-712A
Revision 4
Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation
Valve Leakage Testing
NUC-104
Revision 4
Boron Endpoint Determination and
Differential Boron Worth
NUC-116'
Revision 2
Determination of Operating Limits to
Ensure a Negative MTC
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NUC-203
Revision 2
Incore/Excore Detector Calibration
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ISU-240A
Revision 1
50% Reactor Power Test Sequence
ISU-260A
Revision 1
75% Reactor Power Test Sequence
q..
ISU-280A Revision 1
100% Reactor Power Test Sequence
ISU-224A
Revision 2
Thermal Power Measurement and Statepoint
Data Collection
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NUC-102
Revision 3
Incore Flux Mapping System Operating
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Instructions
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NUC-107
Revision 4
Calibration of the Reactivity Computer
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NUC-108
Revision 4
Reactivity Computer Checkout
NUC-109
Revision 3
Determination-of Core Power Range for
Physics Testing
NUC-115
Revision 1
Onsite Execution of the Conform Core
Physics Code
NUC-201
Revision 4
Surveillance of Core Power Distribution
Factors
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NUC-204
Revision 3
Target Axial Flux Difference
NUC-205
Revision 4
Core Reactivity Balance
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10.
Initial Fuel Loading Procedure Review (72500)
This inspection effort was continued from previous inspection
periods.
.The following items remained to be addressed by the
applicant.
Procedure revisions were in progress to address
most of these. items.
Addition of a prerequisite to verify that the
.
containment purge system had been recently tested and
verified operable prior to commencing fuel loading.
Establishment of administrative controls over the
.
number of personnel and type of activities to be
performed in the containment, fuel building, and
control room during fuel loading operations.
Designation of the technical support manager as the
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person responsible for coordinating fuel loading, and
designating Westinghouse as providing technical
assistance.
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Including the weight of a fuel assembly with a
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silver-indium-cadmium control rod assembly in
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Procedure RFO-302.
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Revision of RFO-102A to correct typographical errors
.
and to include steps to verify that certain Technical
- Specification requirements are met periodically
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during fuel loading.
Procedure NUC-111, " Inverse Count Rate Ratio Monitoring" was
revised'(Revision 2) to include an attachment providing
expected detector responses during initial core loading.
This
procedure also specifies action to be taken if the measured
data deviates from predicted.
Procedure ISU-001A, " Initial
Fuel Load Sequence," was revised (Revision 3, change 1) to
include a requirement 'or a quality control inspector to
perform a general vists.1 inspection of each fuel assembly as it
is removed from storage.
This inspection will verify
,
cleanliness and assembly condition,
The following procedures were reviewed in the process of this
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inspection
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Procedure
Revision
Title
NUC-111
1&2
Inverse Count Rate Ratio Monitoring
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ISU-001A
3 & 3, chg.1
Initial Fuel Load Sequence
ISU-003A
5
Core Loading Instrumentation'and
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Neutron Source Checks
.
ISU-006A
3
RCS and Secondary Chemistry
RFO-101
1&2
Refueling Organization
RFO-102A
2
Refueling Operation
RFO-106
4, chg.1
Development and Implementation of the
Reload Fuel Shuffle Sequence Plan
RFO-204
2
Verification of Core Loading Pattern
RFO-302
4
Handling of Fuel Assemblies
No violations or deviations were identified.
This inspection
effort will be continued in the next inspection period.
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11.
Fitness for Duty Training (255104)
Two NRC resident inspectors attended a 40-minute segment of
general employee training covering fitness-for-duty policy
awareness and escort duties.
Tb: prasentation was in the form
of a lecture and a video tape.
While instructor performance
was considered to be very good, the overall quality of the
presentation was considered to be only fair.
This was due to
the cursory treatment given many of the topics in the short
time period allowed.
Attendance was recorded.
An opportunity
was provided for attendees to ask questions, but no test was
given.
Each attendee was given a fitness-for-duty manual to
keep for reference.
This manual contained good coverage of the
fitness-for-duty policy, implementation rules, testing
procedures, effects of drugs and alcohol, employee assistance,
escort duties, and the appeal process.
Attendees were required
to sign a statement acknowledging receipt of the manual an(.
their responsibility for compliance with the policy.
During a future inspection period, the NRC inspectors will
attend the applicant's fitness-for-duty training for
supervisory personnel.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12.
Plant Tours and General Inspection Activities (71302)
The inspectors conducted numerous plant tours during this
inspection period.
These tours provided coverage during
normal, off-normal, and bachshift working hours.
NRC
inspection activities included reviewing work documentation,
witnessing ongoing work activities, discussing plant status
with plant management, observing and interviewing shift
operations personnel, determining the readiness of Unit 1 for
fuel load and operations, observing housekeeping activities,
and inspecting for general safety compliance.
To support these activities, NRC inspectors attended
plan-of-the-day meetings, discussed plant status with
operations personnel, and attended meetings dealing with
-scheduled Unit 1 fuel load.
a.
During routine plant tours on December 21 and 22, 1989,
the inspector found the following temporary modifications
installed on systems which had been turned over to
operations without having been documented and evaluated as
Valve 1AF-135 had an elbow, two pipe nipples,
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and a reducer attached downstream.
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Valve 1AF-208 had a union and a pipe nipple
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attached downstream.
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Valve ICT-ll4 had tubing, a tee, two valves, and
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a pipe nipple attached downstream.
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Valve 1C0-028 had a ball valve, two reducers, a
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pipe nipple, and a hose connector attached
downstream.
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These modifications were not shown on the associatr.d flow
diagrams.
The valves involved are vents or drains, except'
for ICT-214, which is a local sample valve for the
refueling water storage tank.
The applicant's failure to
control temporary modifications as required by
Procedure STA-602 is an apparent violation
(445/8986-V-01).
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It should be noted that this violation is similar to
445/8972-V-02 which was identified in September 1989.
It
should also be noted that the system walkdowns required by
Section 6.9.4 of Procedure STA-602 have not been effective
in verifying that no unauthorized temporary modifications
exist.
The inspector noted that Teflon tape was used on fittings
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attached to valve ICC-028 and on the pipe cap downstream
of valve ISI-087.
Use of Teflon tape in the plant is
prohibited, with few exceptions, by applicant policies,
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In response to the temporary modification and Teflon tape
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findings, the applicant initiated a ONE Form.
plant
personnel performed walkdowns and identified a number of
'
other instances of undocumented attached fittings and use
of Teflon tape on fittings.
Action was initiated to
remove the fittings and tape.
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b.
During other plant tours, the inspectors noted the
following items and discussed them with applicant
personnel:
Storage racks are needed for the valve operating
.
tools used to operate remote valves with
extension shafts.
Handwheels used for operating remote valves with
.
extension shafts have been marked in various
ways to indicate the proper direction of
operation to open or close the associated
valves.
Consistency of the type of label and
its means of attachment would be desirable.
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In general, housekeeping conditions were good
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and improving.
Several specific cases of
leaking valves or inadequate housekeeping were
discussed with applicant personnel.
Corrective
action was promptly taken or initiated for these
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items.
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On December 27, 1989, the inspector noted that
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the level in the fuel oil stcrage tank for the
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B Train emergency diesel generator was below the
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minimum value required by the draft Technical
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Specifications.
This had been logged as such
for several shifts by the auxiliary operators,
"
but limiting condition for operation tracking
,
had not been initiated.
Applicant personnel
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initiated a ONE Form to document follow-up of
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this item.
Planned corrective actions include
adding the fuel oil storage tank levels to
Form OPT-102A-07, " Local shiftly Surveillance
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' Log."
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13.
Exit Meetino (30703)
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An exit meeting was conducted on January 2 , 1990, with the
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applicant's representatives identified in paragraph 1 of this
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report.
No written material was provided to the applicant by
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the inspectors during this reporting period.
The applicant did
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not-identify as proprietkry any of the materials provided to or
reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
During this
1
meeting, the NRC inspectors summarized the scope and findings
of the inspection.
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