ML19353A162

Forwards Supplemental Info to 801223 Response to NUREG-0737 Re post-TMI Action Items.Includes Info Re Shift Technical Advisor,Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Automatic Initiation & Flow Indication.Aperture Card in PDR

ML19353A162
Person / Time
Site:	Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date:	01/02/1981
From:	Withers B PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To:	Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-1.A.1.1, TASK-2.E.1.2, TASK-2.F.2, TASK-2.K.3.03, TASK-2.K.3.17, TASK-3.D.3.4, TASK-TM NUDOCS 8101070346
Download: ML19353A162 (39)

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Trojan Nuclear Plant Docket 50-344 License NPF-1

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u Mr. Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Dear Mr. Eisenhut:

Your letter of October 31 1980 transmitting NUREG-0737 regarding post-TMI Action Items requested a submittal of additional information on certain items by January 1, 1981. PGE's overall response to NUREG-0737 implementation schedules and scope was previously submitted to you on December 23, 1980.

Attached is the additional information on the following six items in NUREG-0737 which were requested in your letter of October 31, 1980:

1.

(Item I. A.1.1) SHIFT TECHNICAL ADVISOR.

2.

(Item II.E.1.2) AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM AUTOMATIC INITIATION AND FLOW INDICATION.

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(Item II.F.2) INSTRUMENTATION FOR DETECTION OF INADEQUATE

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CORE COOLING.

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(Item II.K.3.3) REPORTING OF SAFETY AND RELIEF VALVE

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f FAILURES AND CHALLENGES.

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(Item II.K.3.17) REPORT ON OUTAGES OF ECCS.

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(Item III.D.3.4) CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY REQUIREMENTS.

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Portkrid Gerioral E(m.Coiscsry 1

Mr. Darrell G. Eisenhut i

January 2, 1981 1

Page two d

i Furthermore, additional information is attached to supplement previous PGE responses of January 2, 1980 and April 25, 1960, which describes the modifications implemented at Trojan as a result of Plant shielding design review (Action Item II.B.2).

Sincerely, r

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-9 Bart D. Withers l

Vice President Nuclear Attachments c:

Mr. Lynn Frank, Director State of Oregon Department of Energy Mr. R. A. Clark, Chief i

Operating Reactors Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i

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ATTACHMENT 1 TROJAN NUCLEAR PLANT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IN RESPONSE TO NUREG-0737,

" CLARIFICATION OF TMI ACTION PLAN REQUIREMENTS" l

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Action Item I.A.I.1 - SHIFT TECHNICAL ADVISOR 1.

Shift Technical Advisor (STA) Program:

In reply to the NRC recommendations in NUREG-0578, the upgraded STA program will commence on January 1,1981 at the Trojan Plant. A description of the program has been submitted to the NRC in PCE's letters of October 17, 1979, November 20, 1979, and January 2, 1980.

The STA will provide the accident assessment function as well as the operational assessment function.

In order to accomplish these duties, a team of the STAS was established with six individuals who hold a bachelor's degree in a scientific or engineering discipline.

One member of the team will be assigned to function as the STA on the 12-hr. per day shift basis. The STA will be onsite during his shift when the Plant is in operational Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4 In the event of an accident, the STA will be available in the control room in 10 min. upon notification from the operating crew through a portable pager or a beeper.

2.

Current STA Training Program:

The STA training program consists of two major parts. The primary training tool is the use of the Westinghouse Shif t Technical Advisor Training Program conducted by Westinghouse at their facilities. The course is intended to provide engineers with sufficient knowledge to prepare for the STA duties, accident assessment function and opera-tional experience assessment functions. The course includes nuclear engineering and simulator training in the following areas: nuclear reactor theory, PWR core physics, basic PWR orientation, thermodynamics, heat transfer, fluid flow, detailed plant systems design lectures, nuclear engineering training, and simulator training. The classroom training was conducted over a 2-week period in Pittsburgh. The simulator training took place on the SMUPPS simulator during a second 2-week period.

The Westinghouse training program involves approximately 6 months of onsite/offsite instructions to provide suf ficient knowledge of plant system design and the principles of operation, including instrumenta-tion and protection system. The secondary training is the supple-mental instructions given by the Trojan Training Department in the areas specific to the Trojan Plant: Plant system design /laycut, Plant operating procedures, and Technical Specifications.

The six engineers designated to be the STAS have already completed the above described STA program. Annual retraining of the STAS is scheduled to commence in 1982. The retraining program will include approximately 40 hr. of simulator training and 24 to 48 hr. of classroom instructions in the areas of transient and accident coaly-ses, review of Licensee Event Reports, and other pertinent subjects.

3.

Long-Term STA Program:

PGE plans to study an ef fective mechanism of a long-term STA program in conjunction with the ongoing industry efforts by AIF and INPO.

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j One of the approaches being considered for a long-term solution is a program to upgrade the qualification of the Operations Shif t Super-i visors to have an engineering degree or equivalent. PGE has initi-aceM, ca a trial basis, an off-campus college degree program in coordination with colleges in the area Portland State University,

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Portland Community College, and Oregon State University. This pregten is aimed at giving Trojan operat!.ons personnel an opportunity to expand their academic qualifications and to obtain an eventual college degree in engineering without adding a significant burden to tanar Nork load. The program is aimed at obtaining a bachelor's cegrey in 6 to 8 yr. tovering comprehensive engineering fields.

ilowevar, this academic program is still a tentative plan and requires further evaluation to demonstrate its efficiency anc economical justitication.

Before, a decision is made to rep' lace the STA program with upgraded Shift Supervisors additional guidance is required to establish a pract.ical mechanism for the upgraded Shif t Supervisors to perfora cper.ational duties while being dedicated to the safety of the Plant l

and independent fras operations. Until the long-term STA program is established. P9% continues to meet the NRC requirements by implementation of the current STA program described above.

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KM/41m-66.28B4 l

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Action Item II.B.2 - DESIGN REVIEW OF PLANT SHIELDING FOR SYSTEMS WHICH MAY BE USED IN POST-ACCIDENT OPERATIONS PGE's January 2,1980 response to NUREG-0578, Item 2.1.6.B presented the preliminary conclusions of the design review of Trojan Plant shielding.

These preliminary conclusions were further described in our April 25, 1980 response to Section 2.1.6.B.

Presented below is a list of shielding modifications which are scheduled to be completed prior to January 1,1982. These design changes were developed as a result of detailed evaluations of each potential modifica-tion identified in our previous responses. A complete list of scheduled shielding modifications are as follows:

1.

Installation of valve reach rods for draining radio-active waste gas surge tank and installation of steel plate shielding for radaste gas surge tank cubicle 2.

Installation of shielding for CVCS letdown line and holdup tanks to permit access at radwaste control panel 3.

Installation of reach rods for Residual Heat Removal System letdown valves 4.

Relocation of Containment Atmosphere. Hydrogen sample lines 5.

Modification to facilitate remote handling of con-taminated filters.

Plant procedures are being developed to maximize containment of reactor coolant in the event of severe core damage when the RCS remains intact.

This action in conjunction with a more detailed evaluation of the systems required to bring the reactor to cold shutdown has allowed some of the potential modifications identified in our January 2,1980 response to be eliminated from this final list. The new procedures will be in place at Trojan by January 1, 1982.

KM/41m-66.28B10

Action Item II.E.1.2 - AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM AUTOMATIC INITIATION AND FLOW INDICATION Description of the Trojan plant AFW system design has been submitted to the NRC in the PGE letters dated October 17, November 26, and December 14, 1979, and January 2, April 25, 1980.

Part 1: Auxiliarv Feedwater System Automatic Initiation In addition to above PGE submittals, the PGE letter of December 14, 1979 provided a detailed description of power supply and testing requirements for automatic initiation.

Pertinent drawings were also submitted to the NRC in the December 14, 1979 PGE letter. The following is a list of drawings submitted:

E-332 Schematic Diagram, AFW Pump Diesel Controls E-333 Schematic Diagram, AFW Pump Turbine Control Valves, Sheet 1 E-326 Schematic Diagram, AFW Pump Turbine Control Valves, Sheet 2 E-373 Schematic Diagram, AFW Pump Auto Start and Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation E-372 Schematic Diagram, AFW Pump Turbine Steam Inlet Valves E-1722 Schematic Diagram, Pressure Loop for AFW Pump Speed Control E-1133 Logic Diagram, AFW Pump West, P102A-Channel A (Steam-Driven)

E-1134 Logic Diagram, AFW Pump East, P102B-Channel B (Diesel-Driven)

E-1159 Logic Diagram, Steam Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Steam

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Inlet Valves l

E-637 Schematic Diagram, Instrument Loop Controller l

E-1285 Logic Diagram, AFW Control Valves 1

f M-12-36 Schematic and Wiring Diagram, AFW Pump Diesel Control E-1 Single Line Diagram, Plant Auxiliary Power System In accordance with NRC requirements in NUREG-0737 regarding compliance to IEEE 279-1971, the following is the applicable sections of the FSAR discussing eacn section of the LEEE standard:

i Section 4.1 General Functional Requirement - FSAR 7.3.1.1 and 7.3.1.2 and 6.6 l

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Section 4.2 Single Failure Criteria - FSAR 7.0.2.1.1 Section 4.3 Quality of Components and Modules - FSAR 7.3.2.1.2 Section 4.4 Equipment Qualification - FSAR 7.3.2.1.2 Section 4.6 Channel Independence - FSAR 7.3.2.1.3 Section 4.7 Control and Protection System Interaction -

FSAR 7.3.2.1.4.

Regarding isolation devices (IEEE-279, Section 4.7.2).

Section 4.9 Capability for Sensor Checks - FSAR 7.3.2.1.5 Section 4.10 Capability for Test and Calibration - FSAR 7.3.2.1.5 Section 4.11 Channel Bypass - FSAR 7.2.2.2.1.8 Section 4.12 Operation Bypass - FSAR 7.2.2.2.1.8 Section 4.13 Indication of Bypass - FSAR 7.2.2.2.1.8

.Section 4.17 Manual Initiation - FSAR 7.2.2.2.1.11 Part 2: Auxiliary Feedwater System Flow Rate Indicatign, As described in Part 1 above, a description of the Trojan Plant AFW System design has already been provided to the NRC.

Particularly, the PGE letter of April 25, 1980 provided supplemental information regarding safety grade flow indications. Attached is a copy of the pertinent drawing (E-2178) and interim drawing change notice E-694, 2 pages) regarding the flow rate indications.

The existing system has four indicators (one per steam generator) on local panel C-160 and four indicators on control room panel C-05.

Work is J

in progress to add four indicators on control room panel C-19 with channelized cabling and power supplies so that the indicators on control

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room panel C-05 will be Train A which is fed from bus Y-Il and the I

indicators on panel C-19 will be Train B f ed f rom bus Y-22.

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indicators and associated transmitters will maintain an accuracy of + 2 l

percent of span. This modification is expected for completion by July 1, i

1981.

The indicators on local panel C-160 will also be train separated with the Train A indicators fed from bus Y-ll and Train B indicators fed frot bus Y-22.

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Action Item II.F.2 - INSTRUMENTATION FOR DETECTION OF INADEQUATE CORE COOLING l

In response to the NRC requirements in NUREG-0737 to provide new instru-mentation for an unambiguous indication of inadequate core cooling (ICC),

PGE has committed to install the Westinghouse Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation System (RVLIS) at Trojan. A copy of the detailed design description, " Summary Report, Westinghouse Reactor Vessel Level Instru-mentation System for Monitoring Inadequate Core Cooling", has been submit-ted to the NRC for information by W stinghouse letter NS-TMA-2358 e

(R. A. Wiesemann's letter to D. G. Eisenhut dated December 23, 1980):

additional copies of the report can be submitted to the NRC upon request.

The information provided in the summary report includes the detailed system design description, accident analysis with available test data to support the design, proposed test programs to verify the adequacy of design, and procedure guidelines for the use of the vessel level instru-mentation. This summary report satisfies the request for information in NUREG-0737 except implementation schedules.

It is currently expected that the installation of the vessel level instru-mentation system will be compleceu by January 1,1982.

The scheduled Plant outage in Spring 1981 will be utilized to complete in-Containment work, followed by outside-Containment modifications, preoperational testing and necessary calibrations in Fall 1981:

this schedule is based on the expected equipment delivery in Spring 1981.

As discussed in the analysis section of the aforementioned sunnary report, the RVLIS will supplement the existing instrumentation at Trojan to provide necessary information for detection of inadequate core cooling conditions. Trojan already has the primary coolant subcooling margin monitors as described in PGE's responses to the NRC of January 2,1980 and April 25, 1980, and the Plant Operating Procedures will be revised to include an ICC Procedure which will be based on the Westinghouse Procedure Guidelines.

Based on the modifications already implemented and the proposed procedure changes, no additional modifications or upgrading of the existing instrumentation is planned at this time.

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KM/41m-66.28B7

1 Action Item II.K.3.3 - REPORTING SAFETY AND RELIEF VALVE FAILURES AND CHALLENGES In NUREG-0737, you requested that we provide a report to the NRC identify-ing the operational history of the pressurizer relief valves and safety valves regarding their challenges and failures in closing.

Based on our review of the Trojan Plant Operations Record fron April 1, 1980 to December 31, 1980, which is the requirement of NUREG-0737, there have been no challenges or failures in closing of the pressurizer relief and safety valves.

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KM/41m-66.28B8 l

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Action Item II.K.3.17 - REPORT ON OUTAGES OF EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS We have reviewed the historical outages of the ECC Systems and prepared a summary table (Table 1).

This table covers the period between November 23, 1975 (initial fuel loading) to December 3,1980 and contains the ECC System and/or component involved, the outage date and duration, the cause of the outage, and the corrective action. The information contained in the table was obtained from the Trajan P lat *, eqtipment clearance and release forms, control room opera tiat 10gs, autnge reports of 1978, 1979 and 1980, and the maintenance recae4 ; filing 5;brary.

The scope of this review was limiud to the ECC System components which are required to be operational at certain modes of operation by the Trojan Technical Specifications (Appendix A to the Operating License).

An exception to the scope is the RHR System, which was included in the table regardless r f the operational modes. All occurrences that rendered an ECC System cou onent inoperable, thus making its corresponding train r

inoperable, are included in the table if the outage time was greater than 1/2 hr.

Outage times less than 1/2 hr. were excluded from the table since the cumulative outage time is negligible and the reason for the outage was merely for additional verification of equipment operability /

inoperability for personnel safety reasons. A summary of the cumulative outage time of the ECC System is also provided in Table 2.

01/ilm-66.2839

TABLE 1 Page 1 of 11 Trojan Nuclear Plant - ECC System / Component Outages COMPotlEtiT/TRAlti DATE/DURATIOri CAUSE CORRECTIVE ACTI0t3 P-202B E RilR Pump 12/3/75 - 1220 Suction S/U strainers still Strainers removed.

12/4/75 - 0735 installed.

P-202A W RIIR Pump 12/4/75 - 1230 Suction S/U strainers still Strainers removed.

12/5/75 - C630 installed.

)K)-3703 Ri!R outlet 12/4/75 - 1945 Excessive packing leakage.

Adjusted packing.

Isol.

12/11/75 - 0915 E-212B E lulR llX.

12/6/75 - 1300 Inlet flange to llX primary side Cleaned, lubed, reassembled and tor < pied 12/6/75 - 1900 leaking.

to specs.

E-212A W RilR llX.

12/6/75 - 1905 Inlet flange to llX primary side Cleaned, lubed, reassembled and torqued 1

i 12/6/75 - 2330 leaking.

to specs.

E-212B E RilR llX.

12/8/75 - 1300 IlX flange bolts needed tightening.

Tightened flange bolts.

12/8/75 - 1955 E-212A W RilR llX.

12/8/85 - 2030 IlX flange bolts needed tightening.

Tightened flange bolts.

12/10/75 - 1845 HO-8804B llX OUT TO 12/14/75 - 1045 Valve strokes open but brk. trips Replaced Ifue disc brake.

CilG 12/14/75 - 1130 when trying to close.

"B" ECCS Train 12/16/75 - 0030 "B" SW & CCW out for maintenance.

Restored.

12/17/75 - 0130

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"A" ECCS Train 12/17/75 - 0135 "A" SW & CCW out for maintenance.

Restored.

12/18/75 - 0155 P-205B CCP 1/8/76 - 0830 Several leaks (loose flanges and Tightened fILtIngs and torqued flanges.

1/8/76 - 1825 fittings)

P-205B CCP 1/22/76 ain ue broken coupling.

Replaced coupling and realigned.

- 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br /> 1/27/76 8485A CllG Line Discl 1/27/76 - 1055 Packing gland leak.

Tightened packing.

1/28/76 - 1130

TABLE 1 Page 2 of 11 Trojan Nuclear Plant - ECC System / Component Outages CottPONENT/TRAlti DATE/ DURATION CAUSE CORRECTIVE ACTinti P-205B CCP 1/27/76 - 0900 Alignment check.

Aligned.

1/27/76 - 2220 P-205B CCP 1/28/76 - 1125 Outboard mechanical seal leaks.

Replaced seal.

1/28/76 - 1600 CV-8146 CliG Line Iso 1/31/76 - 0740 Leak in valve body.

Replaced bonnet gasket.

1.00P 1 - Cold leg 1/31/76 - 2145 HO-8106 CilG Line Iso 2/1/76 - 1020 Try to backseat - failed to close.

Filed mounting bracket end piece at Channel "A" 2/3/76 - 1500 roller arm.

HO-8701 RilR Inlet 2/3/76 - 1115 Went closed. Packing leaking.

Added two additional packing rings.

Isol.

2/3/76 - 1600 P-205B CCP 2/12/76 - 0830 Alignment check.

Aligned.

2/12/76 - 1510 P-2058 CCP 2/19/76 - 0930 Coupling check.

Checked / tightened.

2/20/76 - 2325 PSV-8856A LP SI line 3/4/76 - 1300 Relieves at too low of a pressure.

Lapped seat.

from RIIR 3/5/75 - 1700 P-202A RilR

'4112/76 - 2200 I.cakage.

Replaced shaft seal and gasket.

3/16/76 - 1000 P-202B RilR 3/18/76 - 0600 Motor throwing oil. Crack in Repaired case with epoxy.

3/20/76 - 1900 casting.

"A" DBA SEQ.

3/17/76 - 0830 Test.

Restored.

3/17/76 - 1120 "B" DBA SEQ.

3/22/76 - 1405 Test.

Restored.

3/22/76 - 1803 Charging Pomps (All) 4/1/76 - 1110 No suction line up.

Corrected.

4/1/76 - 2025 P-205B CCP 5/10/76 - 0710 To replace PI-188.

Replaced / restored.

5/10/76 - 1400

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0 0

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TABI.E I Page 4 of I!

Trojan Nuclear Plant - ECC System /Componenc Outages C0!!PONENT/ TRAIN DATE/ DURATION CAllSE CORRECTIVE ACTION P-203B SIP 12/14/76 - 1125 Cliange oil.

Changed oil.

12/14/76 - 1310 P-205B CCP 12/14/76 - 1310 Cliange oil.

Changed oil.

12/14/76 - 1355 PSV-8856B RIIR 2/2/77 - 0820 I.ca ks.

Iteplaced flange gasked.

2/2/77 - 1300 P-202B RilR 2/23/77 - 0840 Test.

tiegger motor.

2/23/77 - 0910 P-205B CCP 2/23/77 - 0900 Test.

Hegger motor.

2/23/77 - 1005 P-203B SIP 2/23/77 - 1325 Test.

Hegger motor.

2/23/77 - 1355 P-202A RilR 2/25/77 - 1100 Test.

Hegger motor.

2/25/77 - 1125 2

P-203A SIP 2/25/77 - 1125 Test.

Hegger motor.

2/25/77 - 1155 P-205A CCP 2/25/77 - 1230 Test.

Hegger motor.

2/25/77 - 1315 "A" RilR Train 3/1/77 - 1110 Stroke valves per Tecli. Specs.

Completed.

3/1/77 - 1630 "A" RilR Train 3/2/77 - 0900 Vent and drain piping Installation Installed.

3/3/77 - 1030 "B" HilR Tra in 3/9/77 - 1130 Stroke valves per Tecle. Specs.

Completed.

3/9/77 - 1530 "B"

RilR Train

.3/10/77 - 0825 Vent / Drain installation.

Installed.

3/10/77 - 1610 MO-87003 RIIR Suctioni 3/11/77 - 0730 Test.

Valve stroked / completed test.

3/11/77 - 1126

TAllI.E I Page 5 of 11 Trojan Nuclear Plant - ECC System / Component Outages COMPONENT / TRAIN DATE/DURATIOri CAUSE CORRECTIVE ACTIOff P-203A SIP 4/5/77 - 0900 Test.

Motor tested / completed test.

4/5/77 - 1540 "15" SI Train 4/11/77 - 1340 Electrical PMs.

Completed.

4/11/77 - 1620 "B" ECCS Train 4/11/77 - 1445 Service water strainer repair on Strainer repaired.

4/11/77 - 2305 "B"

train.

MO-8809B LPSI from 4/18/77 - 1000 Electrical maintenance.

Completed.

RilR to RCS 4/18/77 - 1335 P-205A CCP 4/15/77 - 1537 Halutenance.

Change oil line relief.

4/15/77 - 1615 "A" ECCS Train 5/2/77 - 0800 "A" CCW Train out for maintenance.

Restored.

5/2/77 - 1400 CV-9146 - CV-8147 5/14/77 - 0930 Mainteneence.

Repacked.

5/16/77 - 1530 CV-8146 5/31/77 - 1100 Maintenance.

Repair operator.

5/31/77 - 1335 "A" ECCS Train 6/3/77 - 1015 DBA sequencer test.

Test completed.

6/4/77 - 1245 "15" ECCS Train 6/4/77 - 1550 DBA sequencer test.

Test completed.

6/5/77 - 0910 "B" HilR Train 6/6/77 - 0910 Test.

Cycled valves and tested torque switches.

6/6/77 - 1110 "A"

HilR Train 6/6/77 - 1140 Test.

Cycled valves and tested torque switches.

6/6/77 - 1410 P-205A CCP 6/29/77 - 0830 Leaky lube oil.

Replaced lube oil piping.

6/30/77 - 1450 P-205A CCP 7/1/77 - 1535 Pump wil not turn - shaft severed.

Reassembled pump with used rotating element.

7/4/77 - 0955

TA131.E 1 Page 6 of 11 Trojan Nuclear Plant - ECC System / Component Outages CO?!PONENT/TitAIN DATE/DuitATION CAllSE CORRECTIVE ACTION P-202B RilR 8/26/77 - 1230 Maintenance.

Repaired seal leakoff 1inc.

8/26/77 - 1545 P-202A RilR 8/31/77 - 1050 Maintenance.

Tygon seal removed.

8/31/77 - 1222 P-20211 RllR 9/1/77 - 0900 Maintenance.

Ilartipipe leakof f.

9/1/77 - 1000 P-2038 SIP 9/14/77 - 1020 Maintenance.

I.cak at inlet side of seal cooling ilX.

9/14/77 - 1320 coupling cleaned / repaired.

8728B "B" RilR 9/26/77 Inadvertently locked closed.

Tagged incorrectly. Retagged and opened.

- 480 hrs.

10/16/77 P-203A SIP 10/21/77 - 1400 Change oil.

Changed oil.

10/21/77 - 1800 P-203B SIP 10/21/77 - 1050 Change oil.

Changed oil.

10/21/77 - 1345 P-203A SIP 12/30/77 - 0900 Change oil.

Changed oil.

12/30/77 - 1340 ekb8923B 1/31/78 - 1035 Maintenance.

PHs.

HO-882tB 1/31/78 - 1550 SI Suction / Discharge Ho-8870A 1/4/78 ay a

p n.

a e s em us ia

/

que wit h reset.

- 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

1/4/78 HO-8923A 2/7/78 - 1600 Maintenance.

PHs.

MO-R82iA 2/8/78 - 1220 SI Suction /Dischargi "A" HilR Train 2/9/78 - 1015 Halutenance on HO-8811A.

PHs.

2/9/78 - 1545 "B"

RilR Train 2/9/78 - 1600 Maintenance on HO-8811B.

PMs.

2/10/78 - 1400

TABl.E 1 Page 7 of 1I I

Trojan Nuclear Plant - ECC System / Component Outages COflPOf1Ef3T/TRAlti DATE/DURATI0tt CAUSE CORRECTIVE ACTION P-203B SIP 2/27/78 - 0930 Test.

Hegger motor.

2/27/78 - 1010 "A" ECCS Train 3/25/78 - 1425 "A" CCW Train out of service.

Repaired HilR llX Relief PSV-3323A.

3/28/78 - 0840 "A"

RilR Train 4/21/78 - 1645 LLRT/Haintenance.

Completed I.LRT/Ck. switches.

4/24/78 - 2215 Alternated "A" and 4/26/78 - 2000 SBM switch replacement.

Replaced switches.

"B" RilR 4/29/78 - 1410 i

HO-8809A 1. PSI to RCS 5/15/78 - 2300 Maintenance.

Mech. Operator broken / replaced.

5/20/78 - 005 HO-8701 RilR Isol.

5/22/78 - 1600 Limit switch replacement.

Replaced.

5/23/78 - 1125 I

P-202B RilR 6/13/78 1930 Installed flange / connections for Test complete / restored.

6/21/78 - 1500 hydro.

P-202A RilR 6/23/78 - 0800 Installed flange / connections for Test complete / restored.

6/28/78 - 1430 hydro.

P-20211 RilR 7/17/78 en ea age.

Installed lock washers.

- 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

7/18/73 MO-8703 RilR outlet 12/12/78 - 0900 kolocate conduit.

Work completed.

isol.

12/13/78 - 1330 HO-8700 RilR Suction 1/3/79 - 0400 Interlock problem.

Corrected.

1/3/79 - 0455 "B" ECCS Train 1/22/79 - 0820 Test.

Hegger motors.

1/22/79 - 1030 P-202A RilR 2/6/79 - 0730 Seal leakage.

Seal replaced.

2/8/79 - 1420 P-203B SIP 2/'6/79 _ g,

Puap leaking oil.

Cleaned /tighened oil seal / piping.

1 g

2/27/79

TABLE I Page 8 of 11 Trojan Nuclear Plant - ECC System /Coiuponent Outages C0!!PONENT/ TRAIN DATE/ DURATION CAUSE CORRECTIVE ACTION HO-8807A 3/13/79 - 1400 Maintenance test.

PHs.

HO-88078 3/13/79 - 1605 Cross-over Valves P-205B CCP 3/25/79 - 1735 Maintenance (electrical).

PMs.

3/26/79 - 1052 HO-8804A RllR llX OUT 3/28/79 - 0930 Maintenance.

PMs.

3/28/79 - 1045 flo-8804B RilR llX OUT 3/28/79 - 1430 Maintenance.

PHs.

3/29/79 - 1115 P-203B SIP 4/2/79 - 0950 Maintenance.

PHa (electrical).

4/2/79 - 1420 P-2028 RilR 4/2/79 - 1000 Maintenance.

PHs (electrical).

4/2/79 - 1600 P-2038 SIP 4/4/79 - 0830 Maintenance.

PHs (electrical).

4/4/79 - 1235 ECCS "B" Train 5/5/79 - 0630 Maintenance.

PMs (electrical).

5/5/79 - 1900 P-203B SIP 8/10/79 - 1200 011 change.

Changed.

8/10/79 - 1355 P-205B CCP 8/13/79 - 1036 011 Change.

Changed.

8/13/79 - 1615 P-203A SIP 8/23/79 - 0835 011 Change.

Changed.

8/23/79 - 1020 P-205A CCP 8/27/79 - 0845 011 Change.

Changed.

8/27/79 - 1500 P-202B 9/25/79 - 0620 No lube oil in lower res.

Added oil.

9/25/79 - 1300

TABI.E 1 Page 9 of 11 Trojan Nuclear Plant - ECC System / Component Outages COMPONENT /')11AIN.

DATE/ DURATION CAUSE CORRECTIVE ACTION P-205A CCP 10/16/79 - 1255 011 change.

Changed.

10/16/79 - 1515 P-2058 CCP 10/17/79 - 0825 011 change.

Changed.

10/17/79 - 1005 P-202B RilR 10/17/79 - 1000 011 change.

Changed.

10/17/79 - 1525 P-202A RilR 11/27/79 - 0815 011 change.

Changed.

11/28/79 - 1800 P-203B SIP 2/20/80 - 0800 Test.

Hegger motor.

2/20/80 - 1415 P-205B CCP 2/25/80 - 0920 Test.

Megger motor.

2/25/80 - 1328 Ho-8716B 1. PSI from 3/4/80 - 1230 Maintenance.

Three-year inspection.

Ri!R llX.

3/4/80 - 1520 P-203A SIP 3/5/80 - 0815 Test.

Hegger motor / breaker ek.

3/5/80 - 1155 P-202A RilR 3/5/80 - 1125 Teet.

Hegger motor.

3/5/80 - 1600 HO-8716A LPSI from 3/5/80 - 1010 Halutenacce.

Three-year inspection.

RilR llX.

3/5/80 - 1535 MO-8802A SI to llot 3/6/80 - 1000 Halutenance.

Three-year inspection.

Leg 3/6/80 - 1152 HO-8802B SI to llot 3/6/80 - 1405 Maintenance.

Three-year inspection.

I.eg 3/6/80 - 1645 HO-88098 1. PSI from 3/7/80 - 0750 Maintenance.

Three-year inspection.

RilR to RCS 3/7/80 - 1255

TABl.E 1 Page 10 of 11 Trojan Nuclear Plant - ECC System / Component Outages COMPONEllT/ TRAIN DATE/ DURATION CAllSE CORRECTIVE ACTION P-205A CCP 3/10/80 - 0830 Maintenance.

PHs, 3/10/80 - 1230 HO-8809A I, PSI from 3/10/80 -1145 Maintenance.

Three-year inspection.

HilR to RCS 3/10/80 -1415 FCV-610 "A" RilR 3/10/80 - 0835 Maintenance.

Three-year inspection.

3/10/80 - 1130 FCV-611 "B" RilR 3/11/80 - 0900 Haintenance.

Three-year inspection.

3/11/80 - 1630 P-202B RilR 3/19/80 - 0810 Test.

Megger motor.

3/19/80 - 1055 P-205A CCP 3/20/80 - 1030 Repair 8480A.

Replaced gasket.

3/20/80 - 1413 P-205A CCP 4/7/80 - 1155 Replace pressure gage.

Replaced.

4/7/80 - 1645 RilR Inlet 4/30/80 - 0035 LLRT.

Completed.

5/4/80 - 0430 P-202B RilR 5/22/80 - 1355 Decouple switches.

Replaced.

5/23/80 - 1258 RilR - Alternate 5/23/80 - 1200 Limit Switch replacement.

Replaced.

Trains 6/14/80 - 2204 P-2028 RilR 5/25/80 - 1110 Starting problem.

Replaced shafL.

6/11/80 - 1121 "A" ECCS Train 6/11/80 - 1255 CCW & SW out for maintenance.

Completed.

7/4/80 - 1115 "B" ECCS Train 7/4/80 - 1430 CCW & SW out for maintenance.

Completed.

7/9/80 - 1200

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-i TABLE 2

SUMMARY

OF INDIVIDUAL ECCS OUTAGE TIME ECCS System / Component Duration of Outage (Hours) 1.

Pumps and P-202A/RRR 435 Heat Exchangers P-202B/RRR 374 P-203A/SI 36 P-203B/SI 49 P-205A/CCP 130 P-205B/CCP 200 E-212A/RHR 50 E-212B/RHR 7

2.

Valves and "A" CCP Train 26 Piping "B" CCP Train 3

Casmon "A" 134 and "B" "A" RRR Train 549 i

"B" RRR Train 1005 Common "A" 301 and "B" l

"A" SI Train 32 "B" SI Train 12 3.

ECCS "A" ECCS[a}

653 Subsystems and "B" ECCS[a]

96 Ndscellaneous Items

-[a] The DBA sequencers of the ECCS are tested on an alternate basis every week for approximately one hour. This is not included in the total hours.

MDM/41m4A20 l

l r

n n

o Action Item III.D.3.4 - CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY REQUIREMENTS In response to the NRC requirement in NUREG-0737, a review of Trojan control room habitability has been conducted against the acceptance criteria of Standard Review Plan (SRP) 6.4.

The results of this rev12w are summarized below for each of the SRP 6.4 criteria.

Criterion 1.

Control Room Emergency Zone The control room emergency zone is shown in FSAR Figure 12.1-19 and includes the following:

a.

Instrumentation and controls necessary for a safe shutdown of the Plant including the critical document files.

b.

The computer console.

c.

The Shif t Supervisor 's office.

The operators' washroom and kitchen are not inside the emergency zone. Two portable toilets will be stored inside the control room emergency zone by January 1,1982 to provide sanitation fa-cilities for the operations crew.

Criterion 2.

Control Room Personnel Capacity The control room personnel will be rotated af ter an 8-hr work shif t.

Therefore, food is not stored in the control room for emergency use.

A new Technical Support Center will have emer-gency food supplies which could be transported to the control room, if needed.

Fresh water is normally supplied by the domestic water supply described in FSAR Section 9.2.4.

Emergency water supplies could be transported to the control room, if needed, in covered containers.

l Medical supplies stored in the control room consist of a trauma kit and a first-aid kit.

In addition, a Stokes stretcher is stored in the elevator lobby on the 93-f t (control room) elevation.

Fif ty to 100 units of potassium iodide (KI) are also stored in the control room to provide protection for operations personnel against radioiodine inhalation.

Criterion 3.

Ventilation System Criteria The Control Room Ventilation System is described in FSAR Sections 9.4.1.2.3 and 12.2.2.3.

l l

l l

a.

Isolation Dampars Low-leakage dampers are used to isolate the control room emergency zone from adjacent zones and the outside. FSAR Figure 9.4-1 shows the locations of these dampers.

The dampers are designed for a leakage rate of less than 1 per-cent, not to exceed 50 cfm.

b.

Single Failure The Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CB-1) consists of two redundant Seismic Category I trains as shown in FSAR Figure 9.4-1, which meets the single failure criteria.

c.

Pressurization Systems The Control Room Ventilation System is designed to maintain a 1/6-in. water gauge differential pressure with one train of the Emergency Ventilation System (CB-1) operating. A control room volume of 81,300 cu ft (FSAR Section 12.2.2.3) and a makeup ventilation flow rate of 150 cfm result in a net air Juakage race of 0.11 hr~l.

The Trojan Technical Specifications Section 4.7.6.1 requires that this pressuriza-tion level be verified at a frequency not to exceed once every 18 months.

Criterion 4.

Toxic Gas Protection Self-contained breathing apparatuses for the operations team are stored in the control room in the following quantities:

Scott Air Paks - 5 S tandby bottles - 8 About 20 additional standby bottles are stored in the maintenance tool room, and two bottles are stored at the Visitors Information Center. Assuming one extra air bottle for every three stored bottles, and a 30-min. air supply per bottle (for non-strenuous activities), this gives a maximum air supply of about 2.5-hr. for a 5 man operations team.

Additional, unlimited onsite replenishment capacity is avail-able from a trailer-mounted air bottle charger, which can be moved to an uncontaminated location if required.

Criterion 5.

Emergency Standby Filters The Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CB-1) contains two redundant filter trains consisting of a pre-filter, High-Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filter, and an activated

impreguated charcoal filter. This system is described in detail in FSAR Section 9.4.1.3.

Table 9.4-4 of the FSAR summarizes the compliance of the contrel room filters with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 0 (1973). FSAR Section 9.4.1.3 discusses areas where exceptions were taken to the regulatory positions of the guide. None of the exceptions will result in filter efficiencies less than those given in Regula-tory Guide 1.52, Rev. 2 (99 percent removal of particulates and 95 percent removal of elemental and organic iodines).

In addition, Technical Specifications Section 4.7.6.1 requires periodic testing of EEPA and charcoal filters to show a removal efficiency of 2,99 percent for particulates (HEPA), 2,99 percent for elemental iodine, and 2,90 percent for organic iodine at 130*C and 95 percent relative humidity.

Criterion 6.

Relative Location of Source and Control Room a.

Radiation Sources The control room emergency ventilation intake is located on the Control Building roof as shown in FSAR Figure 12.1-20.

This location is approximately 38 meters laterally from the Containment centerline and 40 meters vertically below the Containment vent. See the response to Criterion 8.a below for details of the radiation analysis.

b.

Toxic Gases The only significant storage of toxic gases onsite is in the Chlorine Building located near the Intake St ucture (see FSAR Figure 12.1-1).

This location is approximately 180 meters from the control room and 23 meters vertically below the control room ventilation ' intake. This meets the criteria of Regulatory Guide 1.95 for onsite chlorine

[

storage.

See response to Criteria 8.b below for offsite trans-portation and storage of toxic materials.

Criterion 7.

Radiation Shielding See discussion of radiation hazards below.

Criterion 8.

Radioactive and Toxic Gas Hazards a.

Radiation Hazards (1) Direct radiation outside control room.

Section 15.5.6.7 of the FSAR describes the analysis of doses to control room personnel from Containment

shine and direct radiation from gaseous fission products outside the control room. Control room shielding is discussed in FSAR Section 12.1.2.6.

The Containment source term utilized is given in Regulatory Guide 1.4.

The atmospheric dispersion factors for the fission product cloud external to the Containment are given in FSAR Section 15.5-1.

These factors are lower than the factors calculated using the model in Murphy and Campe(l).

[See 8.a.(2) below.] Howevt r the contribution of the total whole body dose fr;.3 the external cloud shine pathway is negligible. The maximum whole body doses from these pathways are as follows (from FSAR Table 15.5-10):

Containment shine 0.080 rem External cloud shine 0.001 rem Total 0.081 rem (2) Radiation inside control room.

An updated control room radiation analysis has been performed utilizing the assumptions outlined in " Nuclear Power Plants Control Room Ventilation System for Meetin General Design Criteria 19" by Murphy and Campe(g). Assumptions used are as follows:

(a) Source terms as in Regulatory Guide 1.4.

(b) Atmospheric dispersion factors (sec/ meter 3):

0-2 hr:

3.75 E-3 2-8 hr:

3.75 E-3 8-24 hr:

2.21 E-3 1-4 days:

1.41 E-3 4-30 days: 6.19 E-4 (c) Occupancy factors:

0-24 hr:

1.0 (continuous occupancy) 1-4 days:

0.6 4-30 days:

0.4 (d) Control room ventilation rates:

Normal - 3,200 cfm Makeup - 150 cfm (filtered)

Ingriss/ egress - 10 cfm (unfiltered)

(e) Control room filter iodine efficiency = 95 percent for elemental and organic iodine; 99 percent for particulate iodine.

(f) Control room volume = 61,300 cu f t.

The results of this analysis are as follows:

Gamma whole body dose = 1.03 rem Beta skin dose = 21.0 rem Thyroid dose = 27.2 rem Adding the direct radiation components described in a. (1) above:

Gamma whole body dose = 1.1 rem Beta skin dose = 21.0 rem Thyroid dose = 27.2 rem These doses are less than the General Design Criteria 19

limits, b.

Toxic Gas Hazards (1) Onsite storage.

The only significant toxic gas stored onsite is chlorine.

Chlorine is stored in sixteen 1-ton cylinders in the Chlorine Building (see FSAR Figures 12.1-1 and 1.2-19).

FSAR Section 9.3.6 describes the Chlorine system in detail.

The Control Room Normal Ventilation System (CB-2) is equipped with redundant chlorine detectors installed in the outside air intake duct. These detectors will initiate isolation of the control room intake within 3 see when chlorine concentration exceeds 1.0 ppm by volume. In addition, the Chlorine Building is equipped with a chlorine detector which alarms in the control room to allow necessary operator action before the chlorine gas can reach the control room (FS AR Section 9.4.1.2.1).

The Chlorine Detection System described above and in 'FSAR Section 9.4.1.2.1 meets the criteria in Regulatory Guide 1.95.

In addition, a Plant emer-gency instruction describes the emergency procedures to be activated in the event of a chlorine release.

The only other significant toxic materials stored at the Trojan Plant are the acid (15,000 gal) and caustic

(4,150 gal) storage tanks located at Elevation 45 ft of the Turbine Building (see FSAR Figures 1.2-2 and 9.2-8).

The principal hazard that would occur from this storage is if the acid (sulfuric acid) and caustic were somehow mixed; sulfur dioxide could then be formed by the reaction. PGE has reviewed the Trojan design for acid and caustic storage and has concluded that this type of accident does not present a credible hazard at Trojan for the following reasons:

1.

The tanks are in separate, danmed compartments so overflow of the tanks will not result in mixing of the acid and caustic.

2.

There is very little potential for mixing the acid and caustic when filling the tanks. The filling connections are outside on the south side of the Turbine Building.

In addition, the acid and caustic

' filling lines have different size connections so the tanks should not be filled with the wrong chemical.

Sulfuric acid by itself normally presents a minimal airborne hazard due to its high boiling pcint (330*C) and extremely low vapor pressure (<1 mm Hg at 140*C);

only when heated will toxic vapors be released. A fire is the only practical mechanism by which sulfuric acid vapors could be released. The presence of a fire, particularly if smoke were being blown toward the control room, would alert the control room operations crew to don self-contained breathing apparatuses. Therefore, no specific protective actions are needed against sulfuric acid stored on site.

In addition to the above chemicals, smaller quantities of some other toxic substances are also stored at the Trojan Plant. These include hydrazine and morphaline, stored in 150 gal. tanks on Elevation 45-ft. of the Turbine Building (see FSAR Figures 10.4-10 and 1.2-2),

and also in 42 gal, drums in the onsite warehouse.

Both of these chemicals are liquids with low vapor pressures, and like sulfuric acid, could only constitute a hazard in the event of a fire. Therefore, no specific protective actions are needed against thcse substances.

(2) Offsite storage and transport.

A survey has been conducted to identify the toxic materials stored or transported within 5 miles of the Trojan Plant as

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required in Regulatory Guide 1.78.

Four storage locations were identified within 5 miles of Trojan: Longview Fibre Company (5 miles north-northeast), Kalama Chemical Company (2 miles southeast), Virginia Chemical Company (3 miles southeast) and All Pure Chemical Company (3 miles southeast).

Table 3 gives the amounts and identities of toxic chemicals stored at these locations as determined through contacts with these companies. Using Regulatory Guide 1.78 criteria (Table C-2) for consideration of chemical storage for the Trojan control room design (normal ventilation rate of 2.4 hr-1 with no detectors for gases other than chlorine),

it was determined that the sulfuric acid and sulfur dioxide stared at Longview Fibre, the sulfur dioxide stored at Virginia Chemical and the toluene stored at Kalama Chemical required additional analysis.

The principal transportation routes within 5 miles of the Trojan Plant are (see FSAR Figure 2.2-3):

Columbia River (at the closest point to control room):

400 meters U. S. Highway 30:

800 meters Interstate 5:

2,000 meters Burlington Northern Railroad west of Plant:

150 meters Railroad east of Columbia River:

1,800 meters Since the railroads ara closer to the Plant than the highways and since railroad shipments of toxic chemicals are larger than highway shipments, it was concluded that the railroads are the critical land transportation routes from the standpoint of control room habitability.

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l In addition, a survey of major chemical shippers using the Columbia River indicated that the principal toxic chemical shipped by river is anhydrous ammonia, with a frequency of 10 to 15 shipments per year (2). This frequency of shipment is less than the minimum required in Regulatory Guide 1.78 (50 per year) for considera-tion in the toxic gas analysis.

It was determined that the only toxic chemical shipped by the Burlington Northern Railroad on the west side of the Plant with sufficient frequency to require analysis is t

chlorine (about 200 shipments per year)(3). Since the Plant complies with Regulatory Guide 1.95 concerning i

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'I chlorine (see b.(1) above], no further analysis was necessary.

The remaining transportation route for toxic chemicals is the railroad on the east side of the Columbia River, used by the Burlington Northern and Union Pacific Railroads.

The current results of a survey of traffic on this route are given in Table 4(3.4 7).

This survey is still 3

incomplete and will be completed by February 1,1981.

The following chemicals were determined to' be shipped with a frequency and in weights sufficient to require analysis, given the incomplete nature of the survey:

Chlorine [see response to b.(1) above]

Sulfur dioxide Sulfuric acid Methanol.

Anhydrous ammonia is also shipped along the railroad' east of the Columbia River. However, the available data, though incomplete, ind icates that the frequency of shipment may be lower thsa the lower limit of 30 shipments per year given in Regulatory Guide 1.78.

Therefore, a decision to include ammonia in this analysis has been deferred pending the final results of the traffic survey.

Table 5 gives toxicity and minimum detectable limits for the chemicals analyzed.

The analysis was per-formed for an instantaneous release of the contents of the maximum size storage or transportation container.

Since an unlimited supply of replacement Scott Air Pak bottles is available onsite for the operations team, (see response to Criterion 4), no accidents involving long-term releases of toxic gases were analyzed.

Source term assumptions for the analysis were developed I

using the techniques published by Wing (5).

For gases stored under pressure (ie, sulfur dioxide and chlorine),

l a fraction of the source, determined by a thermodynamic mass balance, was assumed to vaporize instantaneously, and the remainder to boil off with time.

For liquids, l

the accident source was assumed to evaporate due to forced convection with a wind velocity of 1.1 m/sec.

Meteorological models were based on Regulatory Guide 1.78, Appendix B, for puff releases, and Regulatory Guide 1.4 for continuous releases. Fif th percentile site meteorology was assumed (Pasquill F,1.1 m/sec wind speed (see FSAR Page 2.3-24 )]. A control room ventilation rate of 0.24 hr.-l (3200 cfm) was assumed.

4 Credit was taken for operators ecognizing toxic gases at the minimum detectable limit and donning self-contained breathing apparatuses within 2 min thereaf ter.

If the results of the analysis determined that toxic levels (i.e., 2-min. limits) would be reached in the control room before operators could don breathing apparatuses (i.e., less than 2 min. af ter the minimum detectable level is reached), additional protective measures were required for that particular substance.

The results of this survey and analysis at this time indicate that, in addition to chlorine, sul'ur dioxide transportation by railroad along the east side of the Columbia River presents a sufficient potential hazard to the control room operators to require additional protective measures at the Trojan. Plant. The re fo re,

PGE will install redundant sulfur dioxide de tectors in the Control Room Ventilation System. The detectors will alarm and isolate the Control Room Ventila-tion System (C3-2) at a level of 1 ppm (or the minimum detection level available if greater than 1 ppm).

This modification will be completed by January 1,1983.

In addition, emergency procedures for dealing with sulfur dioxide releases will be written and implemented by January 1,1983.

Due to the difficulty of obtaining detailed data on railroac transportation of toxic materials, the survey of railroad transportation has not been completed.

This survey will be completed by February 1,1981.

If additional significant findings are made, a revised analysis will be subuitted by March 1,1981.

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TABLE 3 Toxic Chemicals Stored 'dithin 5 Miles of the Trojan Plant Ameunt Company Location Chemical Stored Longview Fibre 5 miles NNE Sulfuric Acid 13,500 gal Chlorine tank cars (180,000 lb ea)

Sulfur Dioxide 73,000 lb Ammonia 13,000 gal Kalama chemical 2 miles SE Toluene 5,000,000 gal Company All Pure Chemical 3 miles SE Chlorine 1 tank car (180,000 lb)

Company Virginia chemical 3 miles SE Sulfur Dioxide 300,000 lb Company 41m-66.28B20 i

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TABLE 4 Toxic Chemicals Transported Within 5 Miles of the Trojan Plant Largest Frequency Container Route Chemical (Shipments per Year)

(Tons)

Columbia River Ammonia 10-15 23,000 short tons (ship)

Surlington Northern Chlorine 200 90 Railroad west of Plant Railroad east of Chlorine

>30 [a]

90 Columbia River Ammonia

[b]

90 Sulfuric Acid

>30 [a]

-90 Sulfur Dioxide

>30 [a]

90 Methanol

>30 [a]

90 Interstate 5 Sulfuric Acid

>15 23

[a] Incomplete data.

(b] Frequency of shipment not yet determined.

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TABLE 5 Toxicity Limits for Toxic Chemicals Toxicity Limits (mg/m3)

Minimum Detectable Limit Chemical 2 Min (a) 1 Hr(b) 8 Hr(c)

(mg/m3)(c)

Chlorine 45 12 3

Not available Ammonia 70 39 18 0.14 Toluene 753 753 377 1.88 Sulfur Dioxide 26 13 13 1.3 Methanol 1,300 520 260 0.13 (a)

Reference:

Regulatory Guide 1.78.

(b)

Reference:

(1).

(c)

Reference:

(6).

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REFERENCES (1) Murphy, K. G. and Campe, K.

M., " Nuclear Power Plant Control Rocm Ventilation System Design for Meeting General Design Criteria 19",

13th AEC Air Cleaning Conference, August 1974 (2) Telephone communication with Union, Chemicals Division, Union Oil Company.

(3) Telephone communications with Burlington Northern Railroad.

(4) Telephone communications with Union Pacific Railroad.

(5) '41ng, J.,

" Toxic Vapor Concentration in the Control Room of a Nuclear Power Plant Following a Postulated Accidental Release" (Draf t), U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Accident Analysis Branch, April 1976.

(6) 1973 OSHA Concentration Limits For Gases.

(7) Telephone communication with Virginia Chemical Company.

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