ML19352A568
| ML19352A568 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000516, 05000517 |
| Issue date: | 05/24/1977 |
| From: | Novarro J LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18025B195 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-80-587 NUDOCS 8104170224 | |
| Download: ML19352A568 (3) | |
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TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH P. NOVARRO b
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1 ATWS COSTS 4
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Item I.A.5 is a Board request concerning anticipated transients without scram (ATWS).
This' testimony supplements our July 23, 1976 testimony on I.A.5, and is submitted in response to a question on ATWS costs that arose during testimony by NRC Staff witnesses Novak and Thadani on March 29, 1977.
As counsel for the Applicant then stated:
It seems.
that what we're interested in here is.
a realistic view of the cost at Jamesport of implementing ATWS [as] proposed by the Staff.
[T]he Applicant is will-ing to.
present testimony.
on that subject Tr. 7008.
The testimony below responds to this commitment.
To mitigate the consequences of ATWS events, it appears that the NRC Staff's basic concerns would be met if the James-port Station were designed to provide diverse power interruption to rods, diverse initiation of the signal that starts the auxiliary feedwater system, and diverse initiation of the signal 6
that trips the turbine.
These safeguards could be achieved by currently existing sensors that would initiate a signal if the level drops to a low-low reading in any steam generator.
This signal would be processed by hardware diverse from the solid state protection system and would initiate auxiliary feedwater and trip the turbine.
Also, equipment would be provided such that each of the trip signals currently processed through the i
810.4170ff/
. solid state protection system, which already interrupt power to the control rod drive mechanism by using the reactor trip breakers, will also trip power to the motor-generator set, powering the control rod drive mechanisms (CRDM's), thereby providing diverse means of interrupting power to the CRDM's.
The necessary equipment consists principally of a three-bay cabinet and its internals, which are capable of receiving, processing and sending the required signals.
Each Jamesport unit will need this equipment, at an estimated cost of $300,000 per unit.
Installation costs of $100,000 per unit l
are anticipated.
Engineering costs will be $50,000 for Unit 1 but need not be repeated for Unit 2.
It also appears that the Staff will require that every FWR applicant perform analyses to demonstrate that, in the event of an ATWS at the station in question, automatic contain-ment isolation would not be necessary to meet dose limits, the auxiliary feedwater valves would be sufficiently open to allow the required auxiliary feedwater flow, and the effects on the
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piping between the pressurizer relief valves and pressurizer g,
l relief tank and on the tank itself would not produce more severe consequences than those predicted by the worst loading conditions otherwise analyzed.
l We are confident that, in the event of an ATWS, the dose limits could be met without automatic contain=ent isola-tion and there would be adequate auxiliary feedwater flow.
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Additional piping and/or restraints between the pressurizer l
relief valves and pressurizer relief tank, and strengthened foundations for the tank itself, might be required.
If so, the cost per unit is estimated to range from $50,000 to
$300,000, and this expense would be added to those identified above.
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