ML19351F815
| ML19351F815 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/19/1980 |
| From: | Heltemes C NRC OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD) |
| To: | Hartfield R NRC OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND PROGRAM ANALYSIS (MPA) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8102200223 | |
| Download: ML19351F815 (6) | |
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e DEC 191980 MEMCRAf'DUM FCR:
Richard A. Hartfield, Chief Licensee Operations Evaluation Branch Office of !!anagement and Program Analys FROM:
C. J. Heltemes, Jr., Deputy Director Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data
SUBJECT:
DRAFT POWER REACTOR EVEllTS VCLUf:E 2, l10. 6 In respense to your Decenter 5,1980 request, cnclosed are AE00's conments on the subject draft.
Original sis:ed ty:
C. J. Helte=es, Jr.
C. J. Heltemes, Jr., Deputy Director Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data
Enclosures:
1.
AECD Major Corrents 2.
Editorial Comments on l
Personnel Overexposures cc w/ enclosures:
P. Bobe, MPA; J. Crooks, MPA l
Distribution:
Central File 6'j AE00 Reading File AE00 Chron. File H0rnstein, AE00 g
e CJHeltemes, AE00 4
CMichelsen, AE00 i'
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AE00 Ceccents on Draft Pcwer Reactor Events CONCER" OVER LICENSED OPERATOR PERFORMANCE Page 2 - There are several statements in the writeup which, if correct, are of great importance; nowever, their origin is not provided in the referenced document (10/20/30 letter, Stello to Cornon-wealth Edison)or in other documents rei0ted to the event (the 10/24/80 IE inspection report, or the 9/17/80 OIA investigation report).
We suggest that you either reference the source of the following statements or delete them:
1 "The two coerators were issued letters of reprimand by the NRC....
2
"...an inspector's findings are sufficient to show noncompliance even in the face of licensee denial."
SMALL FIRES AND OVERHEATED COMPONENTS Page 4 - Last paragraph, 2nd and 3rd lines - the part is a compression disc, not a compressor disc.
Page 5 - Line 1 - same comment.
Page 4 - Last sentence - change the word " valve" to " motor" or " valve motor" since the " valve" itself was not energized.
PERSONNEL OVEREXPOSURES DURING STEAM GENERATOR REPAIR Page 6 - We suggest that several editorial changes be made - they appear in the enclosure.
TWO SAFETY INJECTIONS CAUSED BY INSTRUMENT SPIKES Page 9 - We suggest the title be changed to "Two Safety Injections Caused by Pressure Spikes."
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POTENTIAL DESIGN PROBLEM WITH SAFETY INJECTION LOAD SEQUENCES Page 14. Our review revealed the need for a najor rewrite. This has been discussed between AE00 (Ornstein) and MPA (Hartfield/ Crooks).
It is our understanding tnat, due to the extensive rewrite necessary, this item will not be included in the present issue of Power Reactor Events, but it will be reported in a subsequent issue.
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. Enclosure 2 The timing adjustments for the MSIVs were later successfully completed and the licensee commenced startup operations.
The li ensee and the valve manufact Jrer are pursuing the feasibility of using an Olternate oil."
PERSONNEL OVEREXPOSURE DURING STEAM GENERATOR REPAIR During a shutdown for refueling and steam generator repa,ir at San Onofre
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Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No.1,* an examination of the steam generators revealed that extensive repairs would-@e required.
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d repairs normally requireimany personnelQtries plnto the steam generator m < ma's,.
channel head area where high radiation levels ext t itch 15: personnel w
pef receive, exposures approaching or exceeding NRC limits in a few w.s 'o c m o d minutes.
Thus, careful radiation surveys e*e eequhd before workers
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are permitted to enter the channel heads.
During the initial periocs of S a G t :. u w.
work in the San Onofre Unit 1 steam generators, tne i+:ensee-failed to make adequate surveys.
Consequently, eleven individuals received radiation exposures in excess of NRC's 3 rem quarterly limit in the second :alendar F
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quarter, and four in the third quarter, of 1980.5 Qc vL 3
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- 0n September 3, 1980, the licensee reported to NRC that as many as 73 c ym, persons may have been exposed above tne NRC quarterly limit: curing :ne third. quarter of 1980.
That report resulted frcm a orel_imin. ary evalua.tionj of7adiat~ica to the head area versus chest exposures.s Following wnat
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- A 436 MWe PWR located 5 miles south of San Clemen9, California; operated
.by Southern California. Edison Company..
1 the licensee assumed to be standard industry practice,-ca-ennne:1 film ef e,,2..,,.L badges were worn only on the,chesttduring the repair work. tose))etailed a
radiation surveys indicated, however, that exposures to the head would have been from 1.2 to 2.8 times the chest exposure with an average factor of 1.62.
NRC requirements and good health physics practice i
dictate that personnel. dosimeters should be worn at or near the organ Amd 5 o, y t cs f Nc._
expectedtoreceivethehighestexposure)V Subsequent su,rveys and calculations i determined that, in fact, only the aforementioned 25 persons had been overexposed and that the highest individual exposure was 4.08 rems compared with the NRC limit of 3 rems per calendar quarter.
The licensee has taken immediate corrective action to provide appropriate personnel monitoring for all future steam generator entries.
Film hadges will be worn both on the chest and on the head with the higner of the two readings being assigned as the person's radiation exposure.
All the individuals expos d above the NRC limits were removed from radiation work until the fourth quarter of 1980.
Completion of the decontamination and repair work on tne steam generators M requiresthe use of transient workers. On September 13 anc 14,1930, Southern California Edison placed an advertisement in the San Diego
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Union newspaper, offering $100.00 a day for three days training and two days work involving exposure to radiation within federally permitted levels.
This matter'hes. attracted considerable media cttention on the West Coast.
The Governor of Californfi'has. expressed consider:ble interest, and some objection to the licensee's plans for transient A
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worker exposure. The Governor S(contacted the Region V MRC office for additional information, and W instructed his staff to develop h an evaluation of the risks of the radiation exposure',.
State of California personnel also plan to audit the training being given the transient workers by the licensee, with {pressQ intereshin training related to the risks to the worker from radiation exposure.
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FAILURE OF HPCI TO INJECT
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This event occurred at E. I. Hatch Jnit 1" on June 26, 1980, and involved failure of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) to inject.
Felicwing a turbine trip, the reactor scrammed from a main turbine stop valve fas closure.
The HPCI system received an automatic initiation signal on low reactor water level, but failed to inject into the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) because of steam line isolation from a high cifferential pressure signal.
This representad failure of a system to ccmplete its required protection function, as required by the technical specifications.6 i
The isolation was reset, but when the inocard isolation valve was opened, the cutboard isolation valve received another steam line high differential pressure isolation signal.
The isolation mode was again reset, and the isul4Livet vaivin vpesied.
7;e ;;FCI L;.u. u L;.. ticallj,t:rt:d :.d i..jc:t:d to the RPV, anet was used to control water level. The automatic depressurization system, core spray,'and low pressure coolant injection systems were operable.
The reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC), hcwever, was inoperable.
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