ML19351F659
| ML19351F659 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 09/30/1979 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19351F658 | List: |
| References | |
| NUREG-0610, NUREG-0610-DRFT, NUREG-610, NUREG-610-DRFT, NUDOCS 8101130689 | |
| Download: ML19351F659 (19) | |
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NUREG-0610' U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DRAFT EMERGENCY, ACTION LEVEL GUIDELINES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS September 1979 0FFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COP 9 FISSION 1
$101i30 M i
For interim use and comment - 9/14/79 BASIS FOR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FOR NUCLEAR POWER FACILITl q This document is provided for interim use during the initial phases of the NRC effort to promptly improve emergency preparedness at operating nuclear power plants. Changes to the dccument can be expected as experience is gained in its use and public coments are received. Further, the Comission has initiated a rulemaking procedure, now scheouled for completion in January 1980 in the area of Emergency Planning and Preparedness. Additional requirements are to be expected when rulemaking is completed and some modifications to this document may be necessary.
Four classes of Emergency Action Levels are established which replace the classes in Regulatory Guide 1.101, each with associated examples of initiating conditions.
The classes are:
Notification of Unusual Event Alert Site Emergency General Emergency The rationale for the notification and alert classes is to provide early and prompt notification of minor events whicn could lead to more serious consequences given operator error or equipment failure or which might be indicative of more serious conditions which are not yet fully realized. A gradation is provided to assure fuller response preparations for more serious indicators. The site emergency class reflects conditions where some significant releases are likely or are occurring but where a core melt situation is not indicated based on current information.
In this situation full mobilization of emergency personnel in the near site environs is indicated as well as dispatch of monitoring teams and associated comunications. The general eme'rgency class involves actual or iminent substantial core degradation or melting with the potential for loss of containment.
The immediate action for this class. is sheltering (staying inside) rather than evacuation until an assessment can be made that (1) an evacuation is indicated and (2) an evacuation, if indicated, can be completed prior to significant release and transport of radioactive material to the affected areas.
The example initiating conditions listed after the imediate actions for each class are to form the basis for establishment by each licensee of the specific plant instrumentation readings which, if exceeded, will initiate the emergency class.
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l Some background information on release potential and expected frequencies for the various classes is provided in this material. Note that there is a wide band of uncertainty associated with the frequency estimates. The release potential.given reflects the amount that could be released over a -long time period or under favorable meteorolcgical conditions without exceed.ing the exposure criteria of a more severe class. Release of these amounts in a l
short time period under unfavorable meteorological dispersion conditions might trigger the criteria of a more severe class.
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State and/or Local Offsite Licensee Acti g Authority Actions Class Notification of unusual event 1.
Promptly inform State and/or local 1.
Provide fire or security offsite authoritier, of nature of assistance if requested Class Description unusual condition as soon as discovered 2.
Standby until verbal Unusual events are in process or have 2.
Augment on-shift resources closecut occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety 3.
Assess and respond or of the plant.
4.
Close out with verbal summary to 3.
Escalate to a more severe Purpose offsite authorities; followed by class written sumary within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Purpose of offsite notification is to (1) assure that the first step in any or response later found to be necessary has been carried oat, (2) provide 5.
Escalate to a more severe class current infonnation on unusual events, and (3) provide a periodic unscheduled test of the offsite comunication link.
Release Potential No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of s'afety systuns occurs.
Ex[ected Frequency Once or twice per year per unit.
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1 EXAMPLE INITIATING CONDITIONS:
NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT 1.
ECCS initiated 2.
Radiological effluent technical specification limits exceeded 3.
Fuel damage indication.
Exa.aples:
a.
High offgas at BWR air ejector monitor (greater than 500,000 pci/sec; corresponding to 16 isotopes decayed to 30 minutes; or an increase of 100,000 pci/sec within a 30 minute time period) b.
High coolant activity sample (e.g., exceeding coolant technical speci-fications for iodine spike) c.
Failed fus1 monitor (PWR) indicates increase greater than 0.1% equivalent fuel failures within 30 minutes.
4.
Abnormal coolant temperature and/or pressure or abnormal fuel temperatures 5.
Exceeding either primary / secondary leak rate technical specification or primary system leak rate tech
- cal specification 6.
Failure of a safety or relief valve to close 7.
Loss of offsite power or loss of or. site AC power capability 8.
Loss of containment integrity requiring shutdown by technical specifications 9.
Loss of engineered safety feature or fire protection system function requiring shutdown by technical specifications (e.g., because of malfunction, personnel error or procedural inadequacy) 10.
Fire lasting more than 10 minutes 11.
Indications or alarms on process or effluent parameters not functional in control room to an extent requiring plant shutdown or other significant loss of assessment or comunication capability (e.g., plant computer, all meteorological instrumentation)
- 12. Security threat or attempted entry or attempted sabotage
- 13. Natural phenomenon being experienced or projected beyond usual levels a.
Any earthquake b.
50 year flood or low water, tsunami, hurricane surge, seiche c.
Any tornado near site d.
Any hurricane,
- 14. Other hazards being experienced or projected a.
Aircraft crash on-site or unusual aircraft activity over facility b.
Train derailment on-site c.
Near or onsite explosion d.
Near or onsite toxic or flammable gas release s.
Turbine failure l
- 15. Other plant conditions exist that warrant increased awareness on the part of State and/or local offsite authorities or require plant shutdown under technical specification requirements or involve other than normal controlled shutdown (e.g., cooldown rate exceeding technical specification limits, pipe cracking fcund during operation)
- 16. Transportation of contaminated injured individual from site to offsite hospital
- 17. Rapid depressurization of PWR secondary side.
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State and/or Local Offsite Class Licensee Actions Authority Actions Alert 1.
Promptly inform State and/or local 1.
Provide fire or security authorities of alert status and reason assistance if requested Class Description for alert as soon as discovered 2.
Augment resources by activating Events are in process or have 2.
Augment resources by activating on-site near-site E0C and any other occurred which ir.volve an actual technical support center, on-site primary response centers or potential substantial operations center and near-site degradation of the level emergency operations center (E0C) 3.
Alert to standby status key of safety of the plant.
emergency personnel including 3.
Assess and respond monitoring teams and Purpose associated communications 4.
Dispatch on-site monitoring teams and Purpose of offsite alert is associated comunications 4.
Provide confirmatory offsite to (1) assure that emergency radiation monitoring and personnel are readily available 5.
Provide periodic plant status updates ingestion pathway dose to respond if' situation-to offsite authorities (at least every projections if actual releases becomes more serious or to 15 minutes) substantially exceed technical perform confirmatory radiation specification limits monitoring if required, (2) 6.
Provide periodic meteorological assess-provide offsite authorities ments to offsite authorities and, if 5.
Maintain alert status until current status information, any releases are occurring, dose estimates verbal closeout and (3) provide possible for actual releases unscheduled tests of response
-or center activation.
7.
Close out by verbal sumary to offsite authorities followed by written sumary 6.
Escalate to a more severe class Release Potential within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Limited releases of up to 10 or curies of I-131 equivalent or up to 104 curies of Xe-133 8.
Escalate to a more severe class equivalent.
Expected Frequency Once in 10 to 100 years per unit.
EXAMPLE INITIATING CONDITIONS: ALERT l
e 1.
Severe loss of fuel cladding a.
iitgh offgas at BWR air ejector monitor (greater than 5 ci/sec; corresponding to 16 isotopes decayed 30 minutes) b.
Very high coolant activity sample (e.g., 300 pci/cc equivalent of I-131) c.
Failed fuel monitor (PWR) indicates increase greater than 1% fuel failures within 30 minutes or 5% total fuel failures.
2.
Rapid gross failure of one steam generator tube with loss of offsite power 3.
Rapid failure of more than 10 steam generator tubes (e.g., several hundred gpm primary to secondary leak rate) 4.
Steam line break with significant (e.g., greater than 10 gpm) primary to secondary leak rate or MSIV malfunction 5.
Primary coolant leak rate greater than 50 gpm 6.
High radiation levels or high airborne contamisation which indicate a severe degradation in the control of radioactive materials (e.g., increase of factor of 1000 in direct radiation readings) 7.
Loss of offsite power and loss of all onsite AC power 8.
Loss of all onsite DC power 9.
Coolant pump seizure leading to fuel failure 10.
Loss of functions needed for plant cold shutdown
- 11. Failure of the reactor protection system to initiate and complete a scram which brings the reactor subcritical
- 12. Fuel damage accident with release of radioactivity to containment or fuel handling building
- 13. Fire potentially affecting safety systems
- 14. All alarms (annunciators) lost
- 15. Radiological effluents greater than 10 times technical specification instantaneous limits (an instantaneous rate which, if continued over 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, would result in about 1 mr at the site boundary under average meteorological conditions)
- 16. Ongoing security compromise 7-m m
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- 17. Severe natural phenomena being experienced or projected a.,
Earthquake greater than OBE levels b.
Flood, low water, tsunami, hurricane surge, seiche near design levels c.
Any tornado striking facility d.
Hurricane winds near design basis level
- 18. Other hazards being experienced or projected a.
Aircraft crash on facility b.
Missile impacts from whatever source on facility c.
Known explosion damage to facility affecting plant operation d.
Entry into facility environs of toxic or flammable gases e.
Turbine failure causi19 casing penetration
- 19. Other plant conditions ex'ist that warrant precautionary activation of technical support center and near-site emergency operations center
- 20. Evacuation of control room anticipated or-required with control of shutdown systems established from local stations
State and/or Local Offsite Class Licensee Actions Authority Actions Site Emergency 1.
Promptly inform State and/or local off-1.
Provide any assistance site authorities of site emergency status requested Class Description d rea on for emergency as soon as dis-n tification of emergency Events are in process or have 2.
Augment resources by activating on-site status and provide public occurred which involve actual technical support center, on-site periodic updates or likely major failures of emergency operations center and near-plant functions needed for site emergency operations center (E0C) 3.
Augment resources by activating protection of the public.
near-site E0C and any other 3.
Assess and respond primary response centers Purpose 4.
Dispatch key emergency personnel 4.
Dispatch on-site and offsite monitoring including monitoring teams and Purpose of the site emergency teams and associated communications associated comunications warning is to (1) assure that response centers are manned, 5.
Provide a dedicated individual for plant Alert to standby status other (2) assure that monitoring teams status updates to offsite authorities emergency personnel (e.g.,
are dispatched, (3) assure that and periodic press briefings (perhaps those needed for evacuation) personnel required for evacuation joint with offsite authorities) and dispatch personnel to near-of near-site areas are at duty site duty stations stations if situation becomes 6.
Make senior technical and management 6.
Provide offsite monitorin9 more serious, (4) provide staff onsite available for consultation resu l b nsee nd others e
current information for and with NRC and State on a periodic basis consultation with offsite authorities and public, and 7.
Provide meteorological and dose estimates 7.
Continuously assess infonnation (5) provide possible unscheduled to offsite authorities for actual from licensee and offsite test of response capabilities releases via a dedicated individual monitoring with regard to in U. S.
or automated data transmission changes to protective actions already initiated for public and Release Potential 8.
Provide release and dose projections mobilizing evacuation resources based on available plant condition 8.
Recommend placing milk animals Releases of up to 1000 ci of information and foreseeable contingencies within 2 miles on stored feed I-131 equivalent or up to and assess need to extend 106 ci of Xe-133 equivalent.
9.
Close out or recomend reduction in distance emergency class by briefing of offsite Expected Frequency authorities at EOC and by phone followed 9.
Provide press briefings, perhaps by written sumary within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> with licensee Once in one hundred to once
- 10. Maintain site emergency status or in 5000 years per unit.
until closecut or reduction of emergency class
- 10. Escalate to general emergency class 9E.
- 11. Escalate to general emergency class
EXAMPLE INITIATING CONDITIONS:
SITE EMERGENCY 1.
Known loss of coolant accident greater than makeup pump capacity 2.
Degraded core with possible los., af coolable geometry (indicators should include inctrumentation to detect inadequate core cooling, coolant activity and/or containment radioactivity levels) 3.
Rapid failure of more than 10 steam generator tubes with loss of offsite power 4.
BWR steam line break outside containment without isolation 5.
PWR steam line break with greater than 50 gpm primary to secondary leakage and indication of fuel damage 6.
Loss of offsite power and loss of onsite AC power for more than 15 minutes 7.
Loss of all vital onsite DC power for more than 15 minutes 8.
Loss of functions needed for plant hot shutdown 9.
Major damage to spent fuel in containment or fuel handling building (e.g.,
large object damages fuel or water loss below fuel level)
- 10. Fire affecting safety systems j
- 11. All alarms (annunciators) lost for more than 15 minutes and plant is not in cold shutdown or plant transient initiated while all alarms lost 12.
a.
Effluent monitors detect levels corresponding to greater than i
j 50 mr/hr for 1/2 hour or greater than 500 mr/hr W.B. for two minutes (or five timesThese levels to the thyroid) at the site boundary for adverse meteorology b.
These dose rates are projected based on other plant parameters (e.g., radiation level in containment with leak rate appropriate for existing containment pressure) or are measured in the environs l
13.
Imminent loss of physical control of the plant
- 14. Severe natural phenomena being experienced or projected with plant not in cold shutdown
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Earthquake greater than SSE levels b.
Flood, low water, tsunami, hurricane surge, seiche greater than design levels or failure of protection of vital equipment at lower levels c.
Winds in excess of design levels l {-
- 15. Other hazards being experienced or projected with plant not in cold shutdown a.
Aircraft crash affecting vital structures by impact or fire b.
Severe damage to safe shutdown equipment from missiles or explosion Entry of toxic or flammable gases into vital areas c.
- 16. Other plant conditions exist that warrant activation of emergency centers and monitoring teams and a precautionary public notification
- 17. Evacuation of control room and control of shutdown systems not established from local stations in 15 minutes 9
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State and/or Local Offsite Class Licensee Actions Authority Actions General Emergency 1.
Promptly inform State and local offsite 1.
Provide any assistance requested authorities of general emergency status Class Description and reason for emergency as soon as 2*
Activate imediate public discovered (Parallel notification of notification of emergency status Ev:nts are in process'or have State / local) and provide public periodic occurred'which involve actual updates or iminent substantial core 2.
Augment resources by activating on-site 3.
Recomend sheltering for 2 mile d: gradation or melting with technical support center, on-site radius and 5 miles downwind potential for loss of contain-emergency operations center and near-and assess need to extend ment integrity.
site emergency operations center (E00) distances 4.
Augment resources by activating Purpose 3.
Assess and respond near-site E0C and any other Purpose of the general emergency 4.
Dispatch on-site and offsite monitoring primary response centers warning is to (1) initiate pre-teams and associated comunications 5.
Dispatch key emergency personnel datermined protective actions including monitoring teams and for public (2) provide 5.
Provide a dedicated individual for associated comunications continuous assessment of infoma-plant status updates to offsite 6.
spa tion from licensee and offsite authorities and periodic press o el o du y s t ns within
, measurements, (3) initiate briefings (perhaps joint with additional measures as indicated offsite authorities) 5 mile radius and alert all m
by event releases or potential others to standby status e
ralcases, and (4) provide 6.
Make senior technical and management staff 7.
Provide offsite monitoring current information fo. and onsite available for consultation with results to licensee and others consultation with offskte NRC and State on a periodic basis, and jointly assess these authorities and public.
8.
Continuously assess information 7.
Provide meteorological and dose estimates fo'rn Release Potential to offsite authorities for actual th regard o han s releases via a dedicated individual or Ralgases of more than 1000 ci of automated data transmission to protective actions already I-131 equivalent or more than initiated for public and 106 ci of Xe-133 equivalent.
8.
Provide release and dose projections mobilizing evacuation resources based on available plant condition 9.
Recomend placing milk animals Expected Frequency infomation and foreseeable contingencies within 10 miles on stored feed and assess need to extend Less than once in about 5000 9.
Close out or recomend reduction of distance years per unit. Life threatening emergency class by briefing of offsite
- 10. Provide press briefings, perhaps doses offsite (within 10 miles) authorities at E0C and by phone followed with licensee once in about 100,000 years by written summary within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> per unit.
- 11. Consider relocation to alternate E0C if actual dose accumulation in near-site E0C exceeds lower bound of EPA PAGs
- 12. Maintain general emergency status until closeout or reduction of emergency class
EXAMPLE INITIATING CONDITIONS: GENERAL EMERGENCY 1.
a.
Effluent monitors detect levels corresponding to 1 rem /hr W.B. or 5 rem /hr thyroid at the site boundary under actual meteurological conditions b.
These dose rates are projected based on other plant parameters (e.g.,
radiation levels in containment with leak rate appropriate for existing containment pressure with some confirmation from effluent nonitors) or are masured in the environs.
Note: Consider evacuation onl within about 2 miles of the site boundary unless these levels are exceeded by a factor of 10 or projected to continue for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> 2.
Loss of 2 of 3 fission product barriers with a potential loss of 3rd barrier, (e.g., loss of core geometry and primary coolant boundary and high potential for loss of containment).
Note:
Consider 2 mile precautionary evacuation.
If more than gap activity released, extend this to 5 miles downwind.
3.
Loss of physical control of the facility.
Note: Consider 2 mile precautionary evacuation.
4 Other plant conditions exist, from whatever source, that make release of large amounts of radioactivity in a short time period possible, e.g., any core melt situation.
See the specific PWR and BWR sequences.
Notes:
a.
For sequences where significant releases are not yet taking place and large amounts of fission products are not yet in the containment atmosphere, consider 2 mile precautionary evacuation.
Consider 5 mile downwind evacuation (450 to 900 sector) if large amounts of fission products are in the containment atmosphere.
Recomend sheltering in other parts of the plume exposure Emergency Planning Zone under this circumstance.
b.
For sequences where significant releases are not yet taking place and containment failure leading to a direct atmospheric release is likely in the sequence but not imminent and large amounts of fission products in addition to noble gases are in the containment atmosphere, consider precautionary evacuation to 5 miles and 10 mile downwind evacuation (450 to 900 sector).
c.
For sequences where large amounts of fission products other than noble gases are in the containment atmosphere and containment failure is judged iminent, recommend shelter for those areas where evacuation cannot completed before transport o'f activity to that location.
d.
As release infonnation becomes available adjust these actions in accordance with dose projections, time available to evacuate and estimated evacuation times given current conditions. - - -
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EXAMPLE PWR SEQUENCES 1.
Small and large LOCA's with failure of ECCS to perform leading to severe core degradation or melt. Ultimate failure of containment likely for melt sequences.
(Several hours available for response) 2.
Transient initiated by loss of feedwater and condensate systems (principal heat removal system) followed by failure of emergency feedwater system for extended period. Core melting possible in several hours. Ultimate failure of containment likely if core melts.
3.
Transient requiring operation of shutdown systems with failure to scram.
Core damage for some designs. Additional failure of core cooling and makeup systems would lead to core melt.
4.
Failure of offsite and onsite power along with total less of emergency feedwater makeup capability for several hours. Would lead to eventual core melt and likely failure of containment.
5.
Small LOCA and initially successful ECCS. Subsequent failure of containment heat removal systems over several hours could lead to core melt and likely failure of containment.
t NOTE: Most likely containment failure mode is meltthrough with release of gases
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only for dry containment; quicker and larger releases likely for ice condenser containments for melt sequences or for failure of containment isolation system for any PWR.
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i EXAMPLE BWR SEQUENCES i
i 1.
Transient (e.g., loss of offsite power) plus failure of requisite core shut down systems (e.g., scram or standby liquid control system). Could lead to ccre melt in several hours with containment failure likely. More severe consequences if pump trip does not function.
2.
Small or large LOCA's with failure of ECCS to perform leading to core melt l
j degradation or melt. Loss of containment integrity may be imminent.
3.
Small or large LOCA occurs and containment performance is unsuccessful affecting longer term success of the ECCS. Could lead to core degradation or melt in several hours without containment boundary.
I 4.
Shutdown occurs but requisite decay heat removal systems (e.g., RHR) or non-safety systems heat removal means are rendered unavailable. Core degradation or melt could occur in about ten hours with subsequent containment failure.
5.
Any major internal or external events (e.g., fires, earthquakes, etc.) which could cause massive common damage to plant systems resulting in any of the above.
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NUREG-0610 BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET k
- 4. TlTLE AND SUBTITLE LAdd Volume Na, of wormronte)
- 2. (Leue blank)
DRAFT EMERGENCY ACTION LEEL GUIDELINES FOR NUCLEAR 3
RECtPIENT'S ACCESSION NO.
1 POE R P W TS
- 7. AUTHOR (S)
- 5. DATE REPORT COMPLE TED
+
l YEAR MONTH
]
September 1979 i
j
- 9. PE RFORMING ORGANI2ATION N AME AND MAILING ADDRESS (include lep Code /
DATE REPORT ISSUED l
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
""5 ember 39f9 Sep i
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
- 8. ILeave blankt
[
- 12. SPONSORING ORGANIZATION NAME AND MAILING ADDRESS (include lep Codel i
Same as 9. above.
- 11. CONTRACT NO.
i
- 13. TYPE OF REPORT PE RIOD COVE RE D (inclusere dares) k j
Draft guidelines j
- 15. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
- 14. (Leave um&J e
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- 16. ABSTR ACT 000 words or less)
The USNRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has developed draft Emergency Action Level Guidelines to improve the emergency preparedness capabilities around opera-ting nuclear power plants. The included draft guidelines are for interim tJse and establish four classes of Emergency Action Levels replacing the classes in Regu-latory Guide 1.101. The new classes are Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, i
Site Emergency, and General Emergency.
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- 17. KEY WORDS AND DOCUMENT ANALYSIS 17a. DESCalPTORS i
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i 17b. IDENTIFIERS /OPEN-ENDED TERMS 4
- 18. AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
- 19. SECURITY CLASS (This report /.
- 21. NO. OF P AGES Uncla cti fied Unlimited availability.
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