ML19351A497
| ML19351A497 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/24/1989 |
| From: | Baker E, Naidu K Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19351A491 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-QA-99901171 99901171-89-01, 99901171-89-1, NUDOCS 8912190058 | |
| Download: ML19351A497 (14) | |
Text
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4l ORGANIZATION: THE SHEFFER CORPORATION CINCINNATI, OHIO j
REPORT INSPECTION INSPECTION i
NO.: 99901171/89-01 DATE:
September 12-15, 1989 ON-SITE HOURS:
54 CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS: The Sheffer Corporation 6990 Cornell Road i
Cincinnati, Ohio 45242
.i ORGANIZATIONAL CONTACT:
E. Brown l
TELEPHONE NUMBER:
(513)793-2770 NUCLEAR INDUSTRY ACTIVITY: P.anufacturer of valve actuators I
f ASSIGNED INS!'ECTOR:
M
- [81[
l K. R. Naidu, Reactive Inspection Section No. 1 VIB Date l
1 OTHERINSPECTOR(S):
H. Wescott, VIB o
APPROVED BY:
40 M
- NN E. T. Baker, Chief, Reactive Inspection Section No.1, VI Da'te.
INSPECTION BASES AND SCOPE:
A.
BASES: 10 CFR Part 21 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.
B.
SCOPE: Review the implementation of the quality assurance prograu in selected areas and observe activities related to the manufacture, assembly, and test of pneumatic-hydraulic valve actuators intended for installation at the Hope Creek nuclear power plant.
PLAliT SITE APPLICABILITY: All plants which utilize valve actuators supplied by R. A. Hiller Company, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
8912190058 891211 t'
kh 01
ORGANIZATION: THE SHEFFER CORPORATION CINCINNATI, OHIO i
REPORT INSFECTION NO.:- 99901171/89-01 RESULTS:
PAGE 2 of 14 1
A.
VIOLATIONS:
1.
Contrary to Section 21.6 of 10 CFR Part 21, The Sheffer Corporation (TSC) did not post current copies of 10 CFR Part 21 regulations, or Section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (Violation 89-01-01) 2.
Contrary to Section 21.21 of 10 CFR Part 21, TSC had not developed appropriate procedures to evaluate and report deviations or defects detected in valve actuators manufactured and supplied to nuclear power plants.
(Violation 89-01-02)
B.
NONCONFORMANCES:.
Contrary to Criterion 11 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. TSC did not establish an adequate qualit assurance manual (y assurance program as documented in their quality QAM), Revision 1,datedFebruary 22, 1983, as evidenced by the following examples:
1.
Contrary to Criterion 1 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, the authority and duties of persons performing activities related to quality in the manufacture of s6fety-related components were not clearly es-tablished and delineated in writing.
Furthermore, a current organizational chart was not available.
(Nonconformance 89-01-03) 2.
Contrary to Criterion vil of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, measures were not established to verify that documentary evidence, such as Certified Material Test Reports received with purchased material, was complete, traceable, and acceptable. (Nonconformance 89-01-04) 3.
Contrary to Criterion Vill of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, and paragraph 4.1 of Section B of the TSC QAM, TSC personnel were indicoting acceptable in-process inspection results by marking the work piece rather than completing the appropriate sheet or ticket.
l (Nonconformance 89-01-05) 4.
Contrary to Criterion XV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, and paragraph 3.2 of Section C of the TSC QAM, a Quality Control Inspection Report was not initiated when the threads on one of the eight holes in an end plate for a valve actuator were galled.
(Nonconformance 89-01-06) 5.
Contrary to Criterion IV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, the TSC QAM does not require that the quality assurance requirements received with the customer purchase order be imposed in turn on their 1
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' ORGANIZATION: THE SHEFFER CORPORATION CINCINNATI, OHIO REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99901171/89-01 RESULTS:
PAGE 3 of 14 subvendors for the supply of materials. Consequently TSC issued purchase orders to distributors and subvendors without invoking all the quality requirements irnposed on TSC.
(Nonconforniance 89-01-07) 6.
Contrary to Criterion Xll of 10 CFR 50, Appendix L, and the recommendation of Ametek, Mansfield & Green, the manuf acturer of the deadweight tester used to calibrate pressure gages, TSC did not calibrate the deadweight tester annually.
Instead, the initial calibration interval was extendea f or several years without technical justification.
(Nonconformance 89-01-08)
C.
UNRESOLVED ITEt:S:
One unresolved item is identified in paragraph 3.f.2.
This item relates to the use of drawings and procedures by Automatic Valve Company (AVC).
The drawings and procedures were not approved by General Electric Company (GE) as required by GE's P0. GE procured four pneumatic control assen611es from AVC for installation on actuators intended for the Hope Creek nuclear power plant. This unresolved item will be reviewed during a separate inspection at GE, San Jose, California.
D.
DETAILS:
1.
Background Information a.
General Information TSC, located in Cincinnati, Ohio, specializes in the p
manufacture of actuators, conenercially known as cylinders.
A typical cylinder has an inlet and outlet port to admit air to operate a piston inside the cylinder. The piston rod, which extends outside the cylinder, strokes the valve.
R. A. Hiller Company (RAH), Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, is a distributor of TSC products.
RAH provided the application engineering to develop the cylinders into a sophisticated, electrically operated, pneumatic-hydraulic actuator capable of being operated remotely. To achieve this performance, RAH provides the design input and procures the additional components required for this purpose and supplies them to TSC. TSC is a vendor to RAH.
RAH supplied various types of valve actuators to valve manufacturers, including American Warming, Anchor Darling, Atwood and Morrill, Kerotest, Pacific Valves, William Powell, Rockwell/ Edwards, and Velan.
In addition to these types of valve actuators, l
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' ORGANIZATION: THE SHEFFER CORPORATION CINCINNAT1, OHIO
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REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99901171/89-01 RESULTS:
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TSC also manufactures actuators which are extensively used i
in the commercial operations.
For actuators intended for nuclear power plants, TSC provides RAH the calculations, materials list, and design drawings necessary to assemble actuators to perform functions specified in the technical specifications. The final assen.bly and acceptance tests are performed at TSC to verify that the valve actuators meet the technical specifications.
b.
Raw material used by TSC The raw material procured by TSC for the nianufacture of actuators includes steel plates conforming to ASTH-A-36, chrome-plated AISI-C 1050 rods, cylinders conforming to AISI C1018-1035 or C1035-1045, and non-metallic elastomer i
seals and gaskets. The characteristics of the steel are stencilled along the length in many cases and the suppliers provide Certified Mill Test Reports (CMTRs). TSC does not transfer the heat cooe numbers to maintain the traceability of the material throughout the entire machining process. All the actuator components are painted with a coat of paint, specified in the individual P0, prior to shipment.
c.
Exclusive arrangement with RAH Due to an exclusive business arrangement with RAH, TSC does not directly provide actuators, spares, or refurbishing activities to nuclear power plants, valve manufacturers, or other suppliers to nuclear power plants. All business is conducted through RAH, the prime contractor. All actuators returned from nuclear power plants are sent to TSC which disassembles, inspects, and documents the as-received condition of the actuators.
d.
Problems identified in the past To date no specific failures have been identified with the valve actuators manufactured by TSC.
However, solenoid operated valves assembled on the actuators and hydraulic oil used in the actuators have been the subject of problems and are discussed in the following documents:
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ORGANIZATION: THE SHEFFER CORPORATION CINCINNAT1, OHIO
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l REPORT INSPECTION NO.:
99901171/89-01 RESULTS:
PAGE 5 of 14 l
(1) GEServiceInformationLetter(SIL)No.329datedJune 1980, recomended the use of SF 1147 type hydraulic
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fluid which is known to withstand heat and radiation without deleterious effects, (2) NRCInformationNotice(IN)82-25informedusersofa potential problem with RAH actuators which could prevent fail safe closure of air operated isolation valves from going to their fail safe condition when the instrument air header (supplying air to the actuators) was slowly depressurized.
(3)
IN 88-43 discussed the failures of ASCO type solenoid operated valves (SOVs) (assembled on RAH actuators) which resulted in MSly operating problems 61 the Perry Nuclear Power Station.
(4) GE SIL No. 481, dated February 14, 1989, informed users of improper functioning of ASCO type SOVs installed on MSIV actuators manufactured by RAH.
(5)
IN 89-66 alerted users to problems related to elastomers used inside ASCO type 50Vs (assembled on RAH actuators) which may affect the operability of MSIVs or similarly tiesigned components.
a (6) TSC Service Manager stated that he observed deterioration of the chrome inside the pneumatic cylinders during the disassembly of pneumatic-hydraulic MSly actuators re-turned from nuclear power plants. He stated that impu-rities in the station air supply were the principal culprits.
Since the air inside the actuator stagnates for extended periods of time during the operation of the plant, impurities such as moisture condense on the chrome i
plating inside the pneumatic cylinder and cause pitting on the chrome.
The elastomer seal rings on the pneumatic piston are damaged when they move over the pitted surfaces.
2.
Review of the TSC Quality Assurance Program The inspectors reviewed the current TSC quality assurance manual (QAM), Revision 1,dotedFebruary 22, 1983, and determined that the program states that it meets the requirements of MIL-1-45208A.
However, the quality assurance program described in the QAM did not meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion II, in the following areas:
i ORGANIZATION: THE SHEFFER CORPORATION CINCINNATI, OH10 i
REPORT INSPECTION l
NO : 99901171/89-01 RESULTS:
PAGE 6 of 14 a.
A current organization chart including description of the i
authority and duties of persons and organizations performing activities affecting quality was not available during the l
inspection. The inspectors informed TSC personnel that the above was a nonconformence.
(Nonconformance 89-01-03) b.
A review of the provisions related to assurance that purchased l
material, equipment and services conform to the procurement documents, indicateo that the acceptance / rejection criteria f or accepting Certifico Material Test Reports (CMTRs) and Certificates of Conformance (CoC) were not clearly described.
As a result, CMTRs supplied by the Central Steel and Wire Company, the steel supplier, were accepted, even though some of them were not signed and dated.
Furthermore, TSC had not previously verified that the distributor had back-up documents for the CMTRs traceable to the steel mill where the steel 4
was produced.
(See paragraph 3b of this report for additional details).
The inspectors informed the T5C staff that inadequate review of documentary evidence which substantiates that the purchased material conforms to procurement requirements was a nonconformance.
(Nonconformance 89-01-04) c.
TSC, in Section B of the QA Manual, describes the in-process inspections performed on machined parts. The inspectors observed QC inspectors performing inspections on machined parts and documenting their acceptance on the piece itself with a pen. This signature is invariably erased during the next mochining process. Paragraph 4.1 of Section B of the TSC QA Manual, requires the use of Material Control Trip Tickets and Green Move Tickets to identify acceptable mate-rial as it moves from one operation to another. These Material Control Trip Tickets and Green Move Tickets have provisions for QC inspectors to document the results of their inspections during the various manufacturing steps. However, the NRC inspectors observed that neither Material Control Trip Tickets nor Green Move Tickets were being used during the manuf acture of components for safety-related actuators intended for Hope Creek. The TSC staff statea that they would consider implementing a traveller to document inspec-tion if required by RAH. The NRC inspectors informed TSC staff that the their inspectors were not complying with paragraph 4.1 of the TSC QAM.
d.
During the manufacture of components for Hope Creek, the threads on one of the eight holes of an end plate was deter-mined to be galled.
The end plate was for the pneumatic cylinder. Normally, TSC would scrap the end plate and obtain
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ORGANIZATION: THE SHEFFER COPIORATION CINCINNAT1, OHIO REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99901171/89-01 RESULTS:
PAGE 7 of 14 i
r a new plate from the vendor. However, due to the urgency, I
TSC obtained concurrence from GE to use an insert.
During i
the tapping operations, the tap galled two or three threads in one of the eight holes of an end plate of a valve actuator, i
serial No. 1329757. With the verbal consent of GE TSC enlarged the hole and inserted a helicoil. GE 60cumented thisdeviationintheirDeviationDispositionRequest(DDR) 31975. The DDR was included in the qu611ty records for the l
Hope Creek actuators. The inspectors informed TSC that fail-ure to implement the requirements stated in paragraph 3.2 of Section C of the TSC QAM, by not initiating a Quality Control Inspection Record to cocument the deviation, was a nonconformorice.
(Nonconformance 89-01-06) e.
TSC does not convey the quality requirements imposed in the I
cuu omer P0s to their distributors and subvendors. The cus-tomer P0s require TSC to have and maintain a quality assurance program meeting the requirements of ANSI 45.2 1977 or 10 CFR 50 i
Appendix B; compliance to the reporting requirements of 10 CFR Part 21; supply steel meeting industry standards; and supply elastomers and seal material capable of withstanding adverse environmental conditions without deleterious effects. The TSC P0s required certificates of compliance (CoC) from their dis-tributors and subvendors. TSC does not audit their subvendors periodically to establish that the subvendors implement accept-able quality assurance programs which enable them to manufac-ture components of consistent quality or that they possess documentation to support their Cots. One nonconformance is identified in this area.
(Nonconformance 89-01-07) l 3.
Review of Activities Related to Hope Creek Actuators l
a.
The inspectors reviewed the TSC internal order A0W 22936, which was generated to reflect the requirements of RAH P0 1060-9, dated August 30, 1989.
The RAH PO reflected the technical requirements of GE P0 205-89 D 844, dated July 3, 1989, to RAH to design, manufacture, test, and supply four SA-A102 Model pneumatic-hydraulic actuators.
These actuaturs were intended to replace the existing MSIV actuators.
In addition to the above, GE purchased " Pneumatic Control Assemblies" (PCA), manufactured and supplied by Automatic Valve Company (AVC), Novi, Michigan, intended for installation on the RAH actuators.
The GE P0 required the actuators to rneet the qualification requirements of IEEE-323-74 and 344-75.
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ORGANIZATION: THE SHEFFER CORPORATION CINCINNATI, OHIO l
REPORT INSPECTION NO.:
99901171/89-01 RESULTS:
PAGE B of 14 l
AVC shipped the PCAs to TSC with a GE Product Quality Certificate (PQC). PQC No. B1 555 stated that four PCAs iden-tified as MPL 21-F002/F023 were manufactured by AVC under a controlled quality assurance program and are in conformance with GE P0 205-89D 861. This portion of the certificate was signed by AVC's Quality Control Supervisor.
Below this state-ment, there was a GE Quality Assurance representative's endortenent to the effect that the supporting evidence for the supplier's certification was reviewed and that no product nonconformances were found.
b.
To verify the documentation relative to the neaterial purchased by TSC, the inspectors reviewed the Certified Material lest Reports (CMTRs) provided by Central Steel and Wire Company, (CSWC), Cincinnati, Ohio, the distributor of the steel mate-rial used in the volve actuators. TSC required CSWC to provide material with Cots. The review identified the following:
(1) A CMTR dated September 7,1985, from Nelsen Steel Company, Franklin P. ark, Illinois, provided the chemical and physical test results for 0.5" diameter AISI C-1144 rod.
It identified the heat number as 611LO91 and stated that the rod was manufactured by Bethlehem Steel Company.
This CMTR was not dated and a rubber stamped signature was affixed to the CMTR instead of an actual signature.
(2) A CMTR from Fort Howard Steel Company, Green Bay, Wisconsin, provided the chemical test results for 1.25" diameter CL144 round steel identified with heat number 24466.
(3) A CMTR from Fort Howard Steel Company, Green Bay, Wisconsin, provided the chemical test results for three bundles of 1.5"x2.5" C 11L17 type flat steel, heat nunibers T 6909 and T 6742.
(4) A CMTR from Industrial Hard Chrome, Limited Elk Grove Village, Illinois, documented the test results for 2.5" diameter industrial hard chrome plated bars, heat number 8878581. The CMTR stated that the material was hardened 0.05 inches to 0.09 inches deep, 50 to 60 Rockwell C.
For items 2, 3 and 4, CSWC personnel were unable to trace the mdterial supplied to the steel mill where the material was
- produced, l
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.a ORGANIZATION: THE SHEFFER CORPORATION CINCINNAT1, OHIO REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99901171/89-01 RESULTS:
PAGE 9 of 14 c.
The inspectors reviewed a typical TSC P0 to procure elastomer material. TSC issues the P0 to the local distributor and requires the material to be suppliec directly to TSC with CoCs. The inspectors determined that TSC did not impose the quality requirements required by their customer purchase order on their subvendors for the supply of elastomers and gaskets.
For instance, TSC issued P0 150675 dated September 5, 1989, to Southern Ohio Steel Company (505C),to supply seal material.
The TSC PO did not contain any of the quality assurance re-quirements imposed by their customer's P0. The TSC PO required SOSC to supply various seal material such as:
(1) Sixteen pieces of Polypak tube B, 2.5" inner diameter (10) x 3" outside diameter (OD) x 3/8" depth, Parker compound V 42 6695 flurocarbon Viton 0 rings with cure date and material certificates. This material is used for rod seals.
(2) Four pieces of Parbak 3.25" 10 x 3.5" OD x 1/16" thick, size 236, Viton back-up rings for the piston rod back-up ring.
(3)-Eightpiecesof 3.125" 10 x 3.5" OD x 3/16 cross section
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Quad 0-rings manufactured from Minnesota Rubber Compound 514 AD Flurocarbon Viton. The 0-ring provides 6 seal in the accumulator. The top of the accumulator piston is l
pressurized with nitrogen-to allow for expansion of the hydraulic fluid due to temperature changes, l
The inspectors informed TSC representatives that the quality assurance requirements contained in the customer P0 were not, in turn, imposed on their subvendors to provide assurance that the material supplied meets the applicable industry standards and is readily traceable to production lots to establish the cure dates and radiation resistance requirements (Nonconformance 89-01-07) l 4
Observation of the Assembly of Hope Creek Actuators L
a.
Assembly of the actuators The inspectors observed the partial assembly of a Hope Creek actuator. This included assenbly of the hydraulic tube, con-necting the piston to the piston rod, attaching the piston seals to the piston, and attaching the pneumatic bottom cap.
After the hydraulic cylinder was assembled, the unit was tested for leaks as described in paragraph 4b.
The partial assembly was degreased and p inted. After curing the paint 1
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ORGANIZATION: THE SHEFFER CORPORATION CINCINNAT1, OHIO i
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PAGE 10 of 14 s
overnight, the assembly was completed. The inspectors were l
not able to witness the complete assembly of the actuator.
i b.
Observation of tests on Hope Creek actuators The inspectors observed the tests performed on the pneumatic and hydraulic cylinders to verify that they do not leak.
Each side of the piston in the pneumatic cylinder was i
subjected to 120 psig air pressure and a commercially available bubble solution was applied to visually detect leaks. No leaks were detected.
Each side of the piston in the hydraulic cylinder was subjected to 5000 psig hydraulic pressure and similarly tested for leaks. No leaks were observed. A test procedure approved by RAH was used during the test. Representatives from GE San Jose and Hope Creek witnessed the pressure tests. The minimuu air pressure required to extend and retract the piston was measured to be 0.7 psig. The inspectors observed that the pressure gauges t
used during the test had been calibrated.
5.
Review of Documents Supplied by Automatic Valve Company ( AVC) a.
Backgrcund
[
AVC supplied to TSC four PCAs in response to a GE PO to AVC.
Tne PCAs were to be assenbled on the RAH actuators.
A GE QC representative, who was present at TSC on September 14 and 15,1989, informed the NRC inspectors that he witnessed l
the acceptance tests on the PCAs at AVC in Michigan.
b.
Review of drawings supplied by AVC with the PCAs The inspector reviewed the following AVC drawings:
B 6930-075 - Solenoid Manifold Assembly B 6930-070 - Solenoid Manifold Assembly B 4988-060 - Junction Box Assembly (4
C 5140-375 - Manifold Assembly (3 sheets)
(5 C 6752 - Special 2-way Poppet valve with Viton Seals (2 sheets)
In the columns of Drawings 1, 2, and 3, reserved for the signatures of the individuals who prepared and approved the respective drawing, the initials of the individual
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ORGANIZATION: THE SHEffER CORPORATION
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CINCINNAT1, OHIO REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99901171/89-01 RESULTS:
PAGE 11 of 14 who drafted the drawing were printed and not signed; the l
column reserved for the person who checked the drawing was neither signed nor dated.
Drawing C 5140-375, Revision A, was a modification to Drawing C 5140-020, Revision C, which was originally sup-plied to Hope Creek. The modification was necessary to i
accommodate the RAH actuator.
A new machined 4-way air
. control valve replaced the originally supplied 4-way cast valve. AVC made this modification because leaks were detected on the cast valve. The inspectors reviewed Drawings C 5140-200 for the 4-way valve with Viton seals and C 5140 8H for the 3-way valve with Viton seals.
The qualified life of the Viton seals is 5 years.
A Hope Creek EQ engineer, who was present at TSC during the assenibly and test of the actuators, stated that a program is in place at Hope Creek to replace the seals during every maintenance outage to maintain the environmentally qualified life of the actuator.
The above mentioned crawings did not have any evidence, such as a GE approval stamp, to denote that these draw-l ings were reviewed and approved. Such a review and ap-proval is required by GE's Quality Assurance Require-ment I for Materials Services Quality, Revision 7, dated June 28, 1989. Paragraph 2.2.1 of the above docu.
ment states "unless authorized by the Buyer and specifi-l cally controlled by Seller's QA program, fabrication, I
and/or work affected by a document subject to Buyer's approval shall not be started until the applicable pro-cedures, drawings, or design data have been approved or approved with comments by the Buyer."
Paragraph 2.2.2 states "all procedures, drawings, and/or other submittals required for approval and/or information l
shall be identified in documentation provided by the Buyer."
The use of unapproved drawings and procedures by AVC is t.onsidered an unresolved item and will be reviewed at GE.
c.
List of documents supplied by AVC The list of quality cor. trol documents applicable to PCAs supplied by AVC (without MSIV opening speed control) included the following:
ORGANIZATION: THE SHEffER CORPORATION CINCINNAT1, OHIO j
i REPORT-INSPECTION NO.: 99901171/89-01 RESULTS:
PAGE 12 of 14
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(1) Checklist and certification for MSly PCAs without opening speed controls.
(2) Generic Terminology listing the terms utilized by AVC to aid in determining the proper description of products and services.
(3) Cylinder leak test D-CN 414CA, dated August 16, 1989, to assure the integrity of the seels in the MSIV cylinder prior to the installation of the MSIV control panel.
l (4) Checklist and certification for MSIV pneumatic i
control panels.
(5)
Installation instructions for MSly pneumatic manifolds without opening speed control.
6.
Review of Material Returned from Brunswick Nuclear Power Plant The TSC internal work order A0W-15480, dated June 7,1989, acknowl-edged RAH P0 HA-1048-9, dated Mey 31, 1989, to rebuild two SA-A075 tandem actuators.
These actuators were previously supplied to ac.
l tuate MSIVs at Brunswick.
TSC receiving record, dated May 23, 1969, acknowledges the receipt of two SA-A075 tube actuators identified with serial numbers 1113333 and 1113334 Discussions with the TSC l
service manager indicated that the actuators were received without the air package.
it is the normal practice for TSC to disassemble actuators and degrease the components prior to visual inspections.
l The degreased parts are inspected for the following attributes:
a.
Damage to the chrome plating and the threads on piston rods.
b.
Condition of the inside diameter of the cylinder and outside ciameters of the piston and rod. These dimensions are critical because they are moving parts and any damage, such es rust pits caused by moisture in the air supply system or condensation will cause the seals to leak.
The TSC Service Manager prepares a " Cylinder Repair Work Sheet" listing all the components needed to rebuild the cylinter. The inspectors reviewed sheet 3 of TSC Drawing SA-A075, titled, "20"/5" Core 3" Rod Tandem Cylinder with Accumulator," and sheet 4 of Draw-ing SA-A075 titled, " Air Control Circuit Assembly," and observed that all the components necessary to refurbish the units were high-lighted. The TSC Service Manager informed the inspectors that a l
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i ORGANIZATION: THE SHEFFER CORPORATION CINCINNAT1, OHIO i
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PAGE 13 of 14 i
recurring problem observed in the pneumatic-hydraulic MSly actuators is pitting on the chrome inside the hydraulic cylinder due to taois-1 ture in the air supply system.
The inspectors observed that mate-t rial returned from nuclear power plants was neither adequately identified with tags nor stored in a segregated area. The inspec-tors informed TSC personnel that it would be considered good house-Leeping practices to identify and segregate n.aterial returned from i
nuclear power plants.
7.
Review of Calibration Records The inspectors selectively reviewed pressure gauge calibration records to establish the current calibration date and verify that the standard used for calibration was traceable to the National Bureau of Standards (hCS). The calibration record for a Marshalltown pressure gauge No. 120988, indicated that the gauge was calibrated on July 28, 1989, by Temperature Pressure Flow Products in compli-ance with MIL Standard 45662 and with a standard traceable to NBS.
The inspectors reviewed the certificate of inspection for Starret/
Webber rectangular steel calibration blocks, Seria! No. 42567, which was certified by Quality Techniques, Inc. on June 17, 1985, and traceable to NBS.
4 The inspectors also reviewed calibration records for type AA test pressure gauge, FTC-120, manufactured by Halicoid, and two United States (U.S.) pressure gauges identified as FTC-131 and.
FTC-133. These gauges were calibrated with a dead weight tester which was calibrated by Ametek, Mansfield & Green Division Bolon, Ohio.
The certificate of calibration, traceable to NBS, certified l
that the dead weight tester was calibrated on November 25, 1981, l
with a reconenended recertification date of November 25, 1982. A TSC office memorandum, dated August 4,1987, stated that the dead weight tester was received in November 1981 and that the tester remained in storage until put into service in July 1985.
The r
i memorandum stated that the dead weight tester was due for calibra-l tion in November 1995 in accordance with Engineering Instruction l
El-1175 and did not provide any justification for not following l
the n.anufacturer's recommendation for annual calibration, l
Ametek, Mansfield & Green recommended an annual recalibration of the dead weight tester, which has not been performed to date.
TSC extended the recalibration until November 1995 without a technical justification. The calibration of the pressure gauges using the dead weight tester is indeterminate.
This item is considered to be a Nonconformance (89-01-08).
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ORGANIZATION: THE SHEFFER CORPORATION CINCINNAT1, OH10 REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99901171/89-01 RESULTS:
PAGE 14 of 14 F.
EXIT INTERVIEW:
The inspectors met with persons identified in Section G and discussed the scope and findings of the inspection.
G.
PERSONS CONTACTED:
The Sheffer Corporation R. Warner, President
- E. Brown, Quality Control Manager
- D. Selke, Engineering Manager
- D. O'Neill, Project Engineer C. Skorupa, Calibration Specialist R. Stesch, Service Manager R. A. Hiller Company, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
- M. Meketa, Quality Assurance Manager General Electric Nuclear Energy Company. San Jose, California
- J. F. Kikel, Senior Quality Control Representative Hope Creek, Nuclear Power Plant, New Jersey
- M.- Williams, Equipment Qualification Engineer 4
- Denotes the individuals who attended the exit meeting on September 15, 1989, j
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