ML19351A056
| ML19351A056 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 06/17/1981 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18046A742 | List: |
| References | |
| IEB-79-06, IEB-79-06B, IEB-79-6, IEB-79-6B, NUDOCS 8106250165 | |
| Download: ML19351A056 (2) | |
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UNITED STATES 8
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION a
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I WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REl,CTOR REGULATION FOR
.O CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY PALISADES PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-255.
l INTRODUCTION On March 28, 1979 the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2 (TMI-2) experienced core damage which resulted from a series of events which were initiated by a loss of feedwater transient. Several aspects of the acci-dent have generic applicability at operating Combustion Engineering reactors.
On April ll,1979, IE Bulletin 79-06 was sent to all Combustion Engineering operating plant licensees. The purpose of the Bulletin was to provide information concerning the accident at-TMI-2 and to request certain actions be taken by licensees to preclude a similar occurrence at their facilities.
l This bulletin was superseded and expanded by IE Bulletin 79-06B dated April 14,1979. By letters dated April 27, May 18, June 5, August 8,
, August 10, August 16 August 21, and Sdptember 13, 1979, Consumers Power Company provided responses in conformance with the requir,ement: of the Bulletins.
EVALUATION In the two-year period since the Bulletins have been implemented we have observed, in addition to our rc. view of the responses enumerated above, that the licensee has complied with all the following provisions of the Bulletins:
- Understanding of the TMI-2 sequence of events.
- Review Plant Procedures for coping with accidents and transients.
- By) review of procedures and training instructions:
l (1 to avoid overriding automatic action of ESF, (2) to keep high pressure injection (HPI) system in operation for at least 20 minutes and to maintain 50 F subcooling margin, (3) to correlate HPI initiation with reactor coolant pump (RCP) opera-j l
tion, and (4) to train operators not to rely on pressurizer level only to deter-mine primary coolant inventory
- Verification of emergency feedwater (EFW) valve positions and all safety-related valve positions to ensure proper operation of EFW and ESF.
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By review of containment isolation initiation and design for avoidance of isolating lines that are needed to avoid degraded core cooling capability.
By preparing and implementing procedures for all valves which could defeat or compromise flow of EFW.
l By reviewing operating modes and procedures to prevent inadvertent pumping of radioactive gasses and liquids out of the primary containment.
By reviewing procedures related to maintenanca and test of. safety-related systems to:
(1) verify operability of redundant system prior to removal of any system from service, (2) verify operability of all systems following maintenance or testing, and (3) verification to operating personnel whenever a system'is removed from of returned to service.
By developing procedures and training operators to establish and maintain j
natural circulation.
By training operators to take into account reactor vessel integrity con-siderations,during any accident or transient.
By performing analyses and design modifications to reduce the likelihood-l-
of automatic PORV actuation during anticipated transients.
By providing procedures and training operators for a prompt manual reactor trip for transients that result in a pressure increase in the reactor coolant system.
l By providing for prompt reporting within one hour of the time the reactor l-l is not in a controlled or expected condition of operation.
By proposing any needed Technical Specification changes to implement any of. the above parts of the Bulletins.
f CONCLUSIONS Based on our review of the information provided by the licensee in. response to these IE Bulletins, we conclude that the licensee has acceptably responded to.these Bulletins. The actions taken by the' licensee demonstrate its understanding of the concerns and implications of the TMI-2 accident as they l
relate to the Palisades Plant. These actions have resulted in added assurance l
for the continued protection of the public health and safety during plant j
operation.
b Dated: June 17,1981 l
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