ML19350E531
| ML19350E531 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 03/09/1981 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-1832, NUDOCS 8106230237 | |
| Download: ML19350E531 (28) | |
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.t l4 DATE ISSUED:
3/9/81 kCAS-l$50-NUTES OF THE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON THE Thf VIRGIL C. SUMMER OPERATING LICENSE PLANT REVIEW FEBRUARY 26-27, 1981 COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA On February 26-27, 1981 the ACRS Summer Plant Subcommittee held a meeting in Columbia, South Carolina.
The purpose of the meeting was to begin review of the application of the South Carolina Electric and Gas Company (SCE&G) for a license to operate the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Power Plant. The principal attendees of the meeting are noted below:
Attendees:
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ACRS NRC
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D. Okrent, Subcommittee Chairman W. Kane D. Moeller A. Schwencer n1 J. Ray P. Sobel
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E18E*-'10 D. Ward C. Newton (LASL) u.s mnru nmwm, '
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T. Long, Consultant A. Murphy P. Pomeroy, Consultant R. McMullen G. Thompson, Consultant
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M. Trifunac, Consultant USGS M. White, Consultant G. Dorn Z. Zudans, Consultant R. Morris
- P. Boehnert, ACRS Staff
- Designated Federal Employee SCEAG M. Whitaker R. Whorton S. Alexander P. Talwani J. McWharter R. McGuire W. Smith R. Sheldon T. C. Nichols
- 0. Bradham L. Storz R. Crowley K. Beale S. Cunningham A complete list of attendees is attached to the office copy of these minutes.
Introductory Remarks - D. Okrent, Subcommittee Chairman Dr. Okrent called the meeting to order at 2:05 pm. The Chairman explained the l
purpose of the meeting and the procedures for conducting the meeting and noted that Mr. Paul Bochnert was the Designated Federal Employee.
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Virgil C. Summer Mtg Feb~26-27, 1981 Dr. 0krent also noted that comments had been received prior to the meeting by Mr. Michael Lowe representing the Palmetto Alliance, Inc. (attached). Dr.
Okrent also said that Ms. Ruth Thomas had requested time to make an oral statement.
NRC Overview of Summer OL Review - W. Kane, NRC Mr. William Kane, NRC Summer Plant Prcject Manager, provided an overview of the Summer OL review. Mr. Kane showed. a slide of seventeen outstanding issues (Fig. 1).
It was noted that three.of these (compliance of Appendix G to 10 CFR 50, financial qualifications, and reactor coolant vent) are now resolved. Mr.
Kane also said that he also hopes to have another three to four issues resolved prior to the full Committee in March.
Dr. Okrent suggested that in order to make more effective use of the full Committee's time, the NRC provide a written summary of the status of the outstanding issues, highlighting the significant outstanding issues.
Dr.
Moeller suggested that the Staff provide a categorization of the outstanding
-issues. These should be grouped as follows:
(1) issues where the Applicant has submitted information but the Staff has completed its evaluation, (2) information remains to be submitted by the Applicant, (3) the Staff's position on a particular issue has not been firmly set, or (4) there is an honest difference of opinion between the Staff and the Applicant.
Dr. Okrent asked a number of questions regarding specific statements in the SER.
As a result of these questions, the Staff will provide infomation on the following items:
'What is the threshold for NRC Staff action regarding continued plant operation based on monitoring of the Monticello Reservoir induced seismic activities?
'Concerning environmental qualification of equipment, does the Staff review the qualification tests, or the actual records of the 'ests?
'What.is the sensitivity concerning the analysis of the probable maximum flood?.
.L Virgil C. Summer Mtg i3-Feb 26-27, 1981
' Provide a summary of the experience both Lere and overseas on questions that have arisen concerning maximum detectable flaw sizes in vessels and other critical equipment and what, if anything, the NRC Staff-feels should be done in this area.
'In the areas where the Staff has accepted the Applicant's position that differs from the general design criteria what's the degree of equivalence to the GDC?
'Is there sufficient protection against the possibility of the RHR pumps taking function from a dry scurce?
'Concerning the reliability of the AC and DC power systems, how does the Summar power systems compare to the reference system cited in NUREG-0666 "A Probabilistic Safety Analysis of DC Power Supplier Requirements in Nuciear Pcwer Plants?"
'The NRC Staff is requiring the Applicant to provide a reliability study on the load sequencer.
What is an adequate reliability for this sequencer?
'Does NRC evaluate design as well as operational errors?
'Dr. Zudans raised a question concerning the relief valve setting on the plant and also asked if the Staff has a position regarding two-phase flow through these valves.
The NRC Staf_f stated that they would respond to these items in the near future.
^ al Statement from a Member of the Public Ruth Thomas provided an oral statement (attached) that essentially consisted of a list of questions she felt deserved the attention of the ACRS.
Ms. Thomas while a member of the South Carolina Environmental Quality Control Advisory Committee stated that she made these statements on behalf of herself.
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.n Virgil C. Summer Mtg Feb 26-27, 1981
,Dr. Okrent suggested that the NRC and/or SCE&G respond to Ms. Thomas' questions as they believe appropriate.
SCE8G Overview - M. Whitaker Mr. Mark Whitaker representing South Carolina Electric and Gas Company provided a brief overview of the Summer plant.
The plant is located approximately 26 miles northwest of Columbia, South Carolina and is situated on a man-made reservoir (Monticello).
The reservoir is used for plant cooling water, in addition a pump storage project is located on the reservoir.
In response to a question from Mr. Ray, Mr. Whitaker said that the pump storage project can, if necessary, provide backup power to the nuclear plant.
Mr. Whitaker also noted that the piani. uses a Westinghouse three-loop NSSS.
Mr. Whitaker also provided details on the location of the emergency o, eratino facility as well as site related and meteorological information.
Referring to the NRC list of open items, Mr. Whitaker said that three have been closed out, two should be closed out in one month, nine require providing information to the NRC Staff, and three others are presently under Staff i
review.
Plant Seismology and Geology - S. Alexander, SCE&G Dr. Alexander provided an Executive Summary of the SCE&G findings.regarding the nature and extent of reservoir-induced seismicity and implications with respect to future seismic activity that'might affect the Summer plant.
The significant conclusions regarding the plant seismicity issues included:
(1) Induced seismicity is limited in both space and time to superficial zones beneath and in the immediate vicinity of the reservoir. -
(2) Accurate hypocenter depths determined from the 10-station network (magnetic tape data) are all shallow (<3 km), and the largest magnitude that has occurred is ML = 2.8.
Virgil C. Summer Mtg
. Feb 26-27, 1981 4
1 (3) Because of the lateral heterogeneities in rock properties and stress conditions observed to exist, only small faults (*1 km or less) can experience movements in any one earthquake occurrence:
this implies that there is an upper bound of M N4.0 on the size (magnitude) t earthquake that can occur under the prevailing conditions at Monticello reservoir.
(4) Focal mechanisms for induced earthquakes and hydrofacturing data from two deep (1 km) wells indicate in situ stress conditions favoring thrust-type faulting at shallow depths.
(5) In situ stress measurements in the two deep boreholes indicace ydriable stress levels both vertically and laterally; absolute horizontal stress differences (maximum-minimum) reported by Zoback range from a few bars to approximately 100 bars.
The observed data imply the existence of a stress barrier at varying depths beneath the site that will limit the vertical extent of reservoir.-induced seismicity.
(6) The distribution of fracture density and fracture orientations observed in the two boreholes is nonuniform and is characterized by local concentra-tions of fractures in limited depth intervals with different dominar,t orientations in each; focal mechanisms of nearby induced earthquakes have nodal planes generally corresponding to these orientations.
(7) Geologic maps, surface magnetic and aeromagnetic anomaly maps, gravity anomaly maps, and radiometric maps all indicate significant lateral variations in rock properties at shallow depths beneath the site.
These variations are associated with the upper portions of plutons that have intruded ir*o the older metamorphic rocks of th'e piedmont province and that are now near the s'urface of this area.
(8) The closed spatial association of the clusters of well-located induced seismic events with bourdaries of plutonic bodies as indicated by cor-relative geological geophysical data (Item 7 above) and the association i
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Virgil C. Summer Mtg -
Feb 26-27, 1981 of specific focal mechanisms with different orientations of fractures observed in the two boreholes (Item 6 above) makes a strong case that the effect of the reservoir impoundment has been to relieve local remnant stresses around the plutons that have, over geologic time, been brought near the surface in this area (i.e., into a stress environment different from that in which the plutons were initially emplaced).
These stresses are highly variable from one point to another over the area.
(9) The lateral and vertical heterogeneity in: rock properties, stress levels and orientations, permeability, and induced seismic activity, coupled with the limited spatial extent laterally and with depth of the induced activity, all point to the conclusion that the effects of reser-voir impoundment are surficial (top 2 to 3 kn.) and reflect minor local adjustments where the effective stress has changed as the bore pressure from reservoir loading has changed.
(10) Limited data on the distribution of permeability indicates that there are significant lateral and vertical variations, with higher permeabili-ties associated with zones of higher fracture density in the boreholes.
There is a general decrease of penneability with depth towards the bottom of borehole No. 2, the only one with complete data available.
(11) The initial spectral analysis of several of the induced earthquakes indicates average stress drops of a few bars:
based on the analyses of
'threestrongmotionrecords,anappropriateAdforestimationofground motion is 25 bars.
(12) Frequency-of-occurrence vs magnitude plots for induced activity at Monti-cello (and elsewhere) are highly atypical compared to the natural tectonic behavior in the region and (elsewhere). The transient nature of the induced activity (non-steady-state) in both time and space, high "B" values, and limits on possible fault size mentioned above, all suggest that the usual extrapolations of frequency-of-occurrence vs magnitude plots for tectonic scrthquakes to infer the occurrence rates for larger
4 Virgil C. Summer Feb 26-27, 1981 events are not valid and should not be used.
Instead a maximum cut-off.
negnitude is likely in this setting, estimated to be M sv4.0.. The g
spatial scale of local heterogeneities in rock properties and the stress regime at Monticello reservoir (1 km or smaller) implies maximum fault dimensions consistent with this bound.
(13) Overall, this evaluation has revealed that the effects of reservoir impouldment are very limited in extent laterally and in depth and that these surficial effects are highly unlikely to increase the probability of a large tectonic event (Intensity VII) at the site.
(14) Near-field ground motion spectra under'various assumptions of magnitude and location were generated and evaluated vis a vis the design spectra for the plant structure.
The tie between local magnitude estimates and ground motion at tne site was made using the strong motion spectra for the largest induced earthquake at Monticello reservoir PfL = 2.8).
These results together with a rcexamination of both the regional seismi-city in the Piedmont Province and new hypotheses concerning the Charleston earthquake (reported separately in accompanying submission) shows that the Virgil C. Summer plant design is adequate.
There was extensive Subcommittee discussion concerning the above findings.
In response to a question from Dr. Pomeroy concerning SCE&G's position that a ML
= 4.0 s the largest earthquake that can be induced by the reservoir (Item 3 above), Dr. Alexander said that he believed that the return period for a magnitude 4.0 is 150 years at the site and that a magnitude 4.5 return period would le at 1500 years. Drs. Long and Trifunac questioned the statement that a stress barrier would limit the vertical extent of reservoir induced seismicity (Item 5 above).
Discussion of Reservoir Induced Seismicity - P. Taiwani Dr. P. Talwani representing SCE&G discussed the results of their investigations of seismic activity induced by the Monticello reservoir.
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Virgil C. Summer Mtg Feb 26-27, 1981 Dr. Talwant noted that the observed seismicity is:
1.
Induced by the reservoir 2.
Decreasing with time L
2.0)
Occurs episodic-in discreet swarms; 77% of the larger events (M 2
3.
occurred in three swarms which applies heterogeneous geologic / stress conditions underline the reservoir area.
4.
Confined epicentrally, i.e.. activity began in discreet locations -
spread - and coalesced into clusters. Most epicentral growth was completed by the end of the first year of impoundment. This implies break' locations are controlled by local geology and there is no evidence for through-going faults in the area.
5.
Shallow in origin (< 3 km); 98". of all earthquakes have epicenters less than or equal to 2 km in depth, there has been no systematic shallowing or deepening with time.
6.
Small in magnitude, the n ximum magnitude seen in 2.8.
There has been no change in maximum magnitude in three years of monitoring.
7.
Random in nature; there has been no systematic relationship between
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depth and magnitude. This implies heterogeneity in the fracture distribution of the geologic medium.
During discussion of the details supporting the above arguments, Dr. Okrent observed that there appeared in some instances to be a paucity of data to allc; one to draw specific conclusions supporting the Applicant's arguments.
Discussion of Maximum Magnitude of Induced Earthquake at Monticello Reservoir -
S. Alexander, R. McGuire, P. Talwani Dr. Alexander said that SCESG would present an interpretation of statistical and physical inferences that argue that the maximum reservoir induced earthquake
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Virgil C. Summer Mtg '
Feb 26-27, 1981 would be no_ larger than M f 4.0.
Dr. Okrent asked what was the Appli-L cant's confidence level that within the next 100 years in ~ this specific geological province'an M of 4 would not be exceeded. Dr. Alexander said g
he could not assign a specific confidence value for that estimate; he termed
-it an upper bound of the estimated magnitude.
Dr. Alexander also said that l
.an event significantly greater than 4.0 magnitude would be highly unusua.
Dr. McGuire discussed the statistical inferences that SCE8G believes supports their position that the maximum reservoir-induced earthquake is a magnitude of 4.0.
He presented a set of models that could be used to determine the probability of future earthquake magnitudes based on an extrapolation of past seismological data. The three models discussed included: (1)the log-bilinear, untruncated model, (2) the log-linear truncated model, (3) the log quadratic', untruncated model. Using these three models, one can extra-polate a return period of a magnitiude 4.0 earthquake of between 14 and' 1600 years. The Applicant believes the last model is most representive of the data seen to date (1600 year return period).
Dr. Trifunac asked how one could use the Applicant's model to determine that the maximum magnitude is a 4.0.
Discussion of this portion was deferred to an upcoming discussion of the estimation of ground motion probabilities.
Dr. Talwani provided discussion of the estimation of a maximum magnitude for the induced earthquake for inferences based on physical arguments.
He said that the inferred size of the f'racture surface based on accumulated data and estimations of b-value curves imply a fracture surface of less than or equal to 0.5 km. An estimate of the average stress drop based on SMA, digital, and regional data argues that the average stress drop is approximately 25 bars.
The Applicant used Brune's model for an estimate of the seismic moment and using Thatcher and Hank's relation estimated the maximuni ML to be less than or equal to 4.0.
During the above discussion Dr. Okrent requested that the Applicant provide an estimate of how many total reservoir-years of seismic monitoring are available, and based on that, how many magnitudes 4, 5, 6, etc. earthquakes have been seen in these reservoirs.
The Applicant said they would attempt l
to provide that data on Friday.
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Virgil C. Summer Mtg Feb 26-27, 1981 Dr. McGuire provided discussion on the estimation of return periods (in years) for various accelerations using the different seismicity models described above. Dr. McGuire concluded that the return period associated with the 0.159 peak acceleration is on the oroer of 6000 years or greater irrespective of the largest quake that could be induced by the reservoir.
NRC Review of Reservoir-Induced Seismicity - C. Newton, LASL Dr. Carl Newton of Los Alamos Laboratories acted as a consultant to the NRC for the review of the reservoir-induced seismicity.
Dr. Newton made the following points in his presentation:
'There are no capable faults within the hydrologic regime of the reservoir.
' Reservoir data and extrapolation of that data lead one to conclude that maximum M would be less than or equal 4.5.
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'The depth of focus for most of the seen earthquakes today is less than 2 km.
' Measured stress drops are low (25 bars or less)
'There is decreasing seismic activity Dr. Newton concluded that a magnitude 4.5 earthquake is a conservative value for this reservoir.
Dr. Okrent asked Dr. Newton for a definition of the term " conservative" as he used it.
Dr. Newton replied that a 4.5 was considered prudent because the return period of a 4.0 event is less than 40 years in some of the models described earlier.
In response to another (;uestion from Dr. Okrent, Dr. Newton said that independent calculations he had performed show that the 0,15g acceleration is an adeque.e SSE value.
Virgil' C. Summer Mtg Feb 26-27, 1981 i
Prior to recessing the Subcommittee for the day, Dr. Okrent requested that j
the Applicant address the ch:nce of significant damage to the plant for' earthquakes with a magnitude of '4.0 to 5.5.
That is:
at what point does one become concerned about inflicting damage on the plant or vital components.
Investigations of the Wateree Creek Fault - W. Smith, SCE&G Dr. Smith gave a brief presentation on the Applicant's investigation of the Wateree Creek Fault.
This fault was discovered in early 1980.
The fault -
trends northwards towards the plant site, however, the fault cannot be The mapped any closer than approximately 8 km. south of the plant site.
fault has not been defined as capable per Appendix A of Part 100.
The USGS is continuing its investigation of this fault, and the Applicant will continue to monitor this investigation.
Dr. A. Murphy's (NRC Staff) Opinio'n of Maximum Magnitude of Induced Earth-quake at Monticello Reservoir Dr. A. Murphy (NRC/RES) stated that he disagrees with the NRC Staff position that 4.5 is the maximum magnitude of the reservoir-induced earthquake. Dr.
Murphy believes that a magnitude of 5.3 is a more suitably conservative value. Dr. Murphy's objections to the magnitude 4.0 and 4.5 values is his belief that a rupture source of 3 km instead of I should be assumed and the value for the stress drop should be assumed greater than 25 bars.
Dr.
Murphy noted that measurements by Fletcher (USGS) indicates the stress drops in the area of the reservoir could be on the order of 200 bars.
During additional discussion, it was noted that it is not unusual for stress drop measurements to vary by a factor of 2 to 3.
Dr. Murphy also noted that, in general, he believes the Applicant is pushing the state-of-the-art
.in this area and he considers their wo'rk as something of a research program.
Mr. Morris (USGS) made a statement that Dr. Fletcher's measurements have not had the benefit of peer review.
n Virgil C.' Summer'Mtg Feb 26-27, 1981 P
LNRC Review of Plant Seismoloqy - P. Sobel, NRC
- Ms. P. Sobel discussed the Staff's review of the Summer plant seismology. Ms.
Sobel noted the_ following points in her presentation:
'An SSE of 0.159 for rock foundations and 0.25g for soft foundations is adequately conservative for this-plant.
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'A magnitude 4.5 earthquake is the maximum reservoir-induced event to be used in the evaluation of the SEE spectra.
'There may be possible exceedance of the SSE at high frequencies which will be addressed in the SER Supplement.
Concerning this point, Dr.
Okrent requested that NRC address the implications of this exceedance at the next Subcommittee meeting (March 11,1981).
'NRC has recommended, and the Applicant has agreed, to continue seismic monitoring of the reservoir for at least two years.
' Seismic and geologic evidence supports a local source mechanism for
' the Charleston Earthquake activity.
Concerning the possible association of the Wateree Creek Fault with reservoir-induced seismicity, Ms. Sobel said that there are arguments both in favor and against such an association.
On balance, the Staff accepts the Applicant's arguments against the association, and noted that there is no geologic evidences that the fault is capable.
The Subcommittee questioned Ms. Sobel concerning the basis for the Staff positien of a 4.5 M for a maximum res'ervoir-induced earthquake.
The L
Staff's argument rests on the following points:
'An absence of faults with late Cenozoic displacement implies magni-tudes less than 5.0.
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Virgil C. Summer Mtg -
Feb 26-07, 1981 r,
'An MM Intensity VI is the maximum intensity observed at Piedmont reservoirs (approximately magnitude 4.0).
'Other points supporting the position is that there is a limited spacial extent of the induced seismicity, and Dr. Newton of LASL recommended a' magnitude 4.5.
.In response to Dr. Okrent's earlier request, the Applicant noted that in the Piedmont areas there are approximately 450 reservoir years with known reservoir-induced seismicity out of a total studied reservoir years of 1400 to 1800.
Applicant's Conclusions Regarding Reservoir-Induced Seismicity - S. Alexander Dr. Alexander reiterated the Applicant's conclusions regarding reservoir-induced seismicity.
He noted that in some 1500 reservoir years of observation there has never been an Mt greater than a 4.5 induced event.
He also noted that strong motion data indicated that the SSE accelerations for damaging events have return time of at least 6500 years.
Subcommi': tee Consultant's Comments on Reservoir-Induced Seismicity The cons;1tants noted below provided comments on the Applicant's presentation regarding reservoir-induced seismicity.
Dr. Long - Concerning reservoir-induced seismicity, Dr. Long had two problems with the presentatins:
(1) data presented does not adequately define all the structures within a reasonable radius of the plant, i.e., the existence
-of larger and perhaps unreleased zones of stress have not been precluded, (2) he is not convinced that the so-called. tress barriers cannot be pene-trated nor is he convinced the barriers are necessarily static. Dr. Long noted that the data presented today was similar to data seen at other reservoirs where earthquakes greater than 4.0 are believed to have been
' induced.
Concerning the question of the values of stress drops, Dr. Long felt that a 10-25 bar drop was a realistic maximum value for a large event.
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Virgil C. Summer Mtg Feb 26-27, 1981
't Dr. ~Pomeroy - Quesi.ioned the applicability of Dr. Talwaaf's techniques to this particular reservoir.
He also noted that the data is of a short time span and there is a large amount of uncertainty in the calculatians presented.
He felt that the Applicant's model would describe a typical earthquake in the area, but he was not sure how this would relate to a maximum earthiuake.
i He feels the maxinun induced event which should be considered is the maximum tectonic event for.the region.
Dr. Thompson - Characterized the physical models presented by the Applicant on reservoir-induced seismicity as interesting and testable.
He felt that the largest induced earthquakes which should be considered would be equivalent to the largest event in the tectonic region.
Dr. Trifunac ' Believes that the Applicant's techniques are proper and the quality of the work is good, but he noted that-the data is limited and not conclusive. He feels it is very difficult to try and distinguish between a magnitude 4.5 and magnitude 5.0 event.
Dr. Okrent requested that the above consultants provide an answer to the question:
"If you were to make an estimate of the reservoir-induced earth-quake which might occur at the site during the next 30 years, with the probability of not being exceed of 90T., 997., etc what would this value be, ~and what confidence would you attach to such an estimate?"
Discussion of Charleston 1886 Earthquake Investigations - J. McWhorter, SCE&G Dr. _McWhorter discussed the geologic history of the Charleston, South Carolina area and detailed three hypotheses concerning the origin of the 1886 Charleston earthquake.
The three hypotheses discussed were:
(1) sub-horizontal decollement, (2) reactivation of steep basement faults, and (3) stress amplification (at margins of mafic plutons). Dr. McWhorter concluded'that there is not sufficient data at this time to make a conclusive determination as to whether or not you can consider the Charleston event as occurring anywhere but in or around the Charleston area.
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. Virgil C. Summer Mtg Feb 26-27, 1981
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- Dr. McGuire discussed the probabilities of SSE intensity seen at the site as
- a result of tectonic activity (including Charleston).
He said that the range of return times for the SSE intensity range from 1700 to 10,000 years; however, on a conservative. basis, the number would be from 1700 to 4500
-years.
USGS Summary of Charleston Area Investigations -~ G. Dorn, USGS Dr. Dorn provided a detailed discussion of the results of investigations conducted in and around the Charleston area over the last 8 years.
The
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presentation focused on the results of bore-hole drillings.
Dr. Thompson asked for the estimate of the return interval of the Charleston earthquake.
Dr. Dorn's answer indicated'that the return interval is on the order of
.a million years, if one assumes the recently found fault is the source.
Mr. McMullen (NRC) discussed the Staff's review of the Applicant's evaluation of the above USGS research in the Charleston area.
He reviewed the three hypotheses discussed above and noted that none of these hypotheses provides
. a definitive explanation of the geologic and seismologic events occurring in and around the Charleston area.
The Staff concludes that the 1886 Charleston earthquake can be reasonably related to complex geologic structure unique to that region. Mr. McMullen also noted that the USGS supports this position via a letter to the NRC that is appended to the SER.
Dr. Pomeroy suggested that the research effort in the Charleston area be continued.
Dr. Okrent requested that the seismic consultants present provide answers to the following questions:
(1) What is your opinion of the probability of exceedance of the SSE at the Summer site?, and (2) What is your opinion of the return interval of an earthquake generating somewhat larger accelerations than 0.2, and what is the uncertainty in your estimate of such accelerations?
9 Dr. Okrent requested that the consultants provide this information to the Designated Federal Employee by March 10, 1981.
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Virgil C. Summer Mtg Feb 26-27, 1981
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Prior to his departure, Dr. Okrent suggested that at the full Committee meetng on Friday, March 13, 1981, the Applicant provide a 20 minute summary on the reservoir-induced seismicity: question and' a 20 minute summary on the other seismic questions (Charleston, Wateree Creek Fault, etc.).
He also requested that Dr. McWhorter's presentation on the estimation of ground motion probabilities be included in the presentations.
Concerniig the NRC Staff presentations, Dr. Okrent suggested that the Staff provid;. a 20 minute presentation on reservoir-induced seismicity highlighting both the Staff and Dr. Murphy's. position on this question.
Seismic-Induced Systems Interactions - R. Sheldon
- Mr. Sheldon discussed the study conducted by the Applicant to analyze seismic-induced systems interactions. The study was based on a target-source methodology si.milar to that used at Diablo Canyon.
Structural, mechanical, and electrical sources were' considered.
The targets were defined as all essential structures, systems, and components required to safely shut down the plant. The study consisted of postulating rupture of high energy sources and protecting vulnerable' targets, conducting plant walkdowns to identify other sources, and desk studies of additional evaluaton of systems interactions.
In response to a question from Mr. Ward, Mr. Sheldon said that two to three man / months were expended on the plant walkdowns.
In response to a question to the NRC Staff, Mr. Kane responded that this effort was small in comparison to the Diablo Canyon effort.
Mr. Ray asked if electromagnetic interactions were studied. The Applicant responded that they were not, however, a separation audit was recently completed, involving about five percent of the total circuits in the plant.
SCE8G Organization - T.Nichols Mr. Nichols reviewed the corporate organization of the South Carolina Electric and Gas Company (Fig. 2). The shaded blocks indicated positions that impact on daily operations of the plant.
Blocks 12-14 represent the heart of the operating organizations.
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' Virgil C. Summer Mtg. Feb 26-27, 1981 In response to questions from the Subcommittee, Mr. Kane (NRC) said that NP,C is satisfied with the quality assurance organization. A change in the organization was made at NRC behest in regard to responsibility for nuclear engineering which was placed under Mr. Nichols. Mr. Kane also noted that the
- NRR/IE. audit found the physical arrangement of the organization satisfactory.
The Subcommittee questioned the relationship of the QA and QC organizations.
In response, Mr. Whitaker noted that the corporate organization is in a period of transition as a result of last July's NRC audit.
He said that the nuclear
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operations group is now an integrated self-sustaining organization.
Mr. Nichols closed by stating SCE&G is projecting a fuel load readiness date during the third quarter of 1981, and expects an operating license by December 1981.
Plant Onsite Organization - 0. Bradham, SCE8G Mr. Bradham, Station Manager, reviewed the details of the onsite organiza-tion (Fig. 3).. Presently, the organization consists of 228 out of an authorized total of 244 people.
The organization is divided into four main areas; operations, maintenance, technical support, and administration.
In response to a question from Mr. Ward regarding the role of the shift
- technical advisor, Mr. Bradham said that in the long term their plan is to rotate shift technical advisors into the onsite engineering function both to enhance career development and challenge them with design work.
Loss of Onsite AC Power and Loss of Onsite DC Power - L. Storz, SCE8G Mr. Storz discussed the plant capability assuming loss of all onsite AC and all onsite DC power sources.
Concerning the loss of site AC, Mr. Storz said emergency lighting capability would last for.two hours and ten minutes, and that the condensate storage tank demineralized water supply would last for 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br />.
In addition, the diesel fire pump can be used to provide an unlimited supply of raw water. Mr. Storz also said that assuming a seal leak rate of 5 gpm per reactor coolant pump, the core wtuld still remain cool, covered, and undamaged for eight days (boiling would be seen in the core).
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p Virgil C. Summer Mtg Feb 26-27, 1981 s
_Mr. -Storz said that an SCE&G reliability analysis of offsite power systems predicts a loss of power from equipment failure at the site once in 3200 reactor' years and that the probability of the station losing all off-site power at some random future time is approximately 3x10-6 Mr. Storz also noted that the pump storage facility located at the 'other end of Monticello reservoir has a direct hookup to the Summer plant and has black-start capability (does not need electrical power to start' generation).
Addressing loss of on-site DC power Mr. Storz said it was assumed that vital AC buses are not lost. Mass inventory control of the RCS can be accomplished but some manual control is required.
For control of safeguard systems, there is no loss of functional capability, however, again, some manual control is* required.
Plant Decay Heat Removal Capabilities - R. Crowley Mr. Crowley revieM the decay heat removal capabilities of the Summer plant including decay heat removal with loss of offsite power. Mr. Crowley made the following points in his presentation:
' Systems required to maintain het standby are safety grade-Seismic Category 1
'The plant can remain in hot standby or hot shutdown condition for an extended period of time using the emergency feedwater system and steam generator safeties and PORVs.
' Evaluation has shown that cooldown can be accomplished to a large extent using only Seismic-Category 1 systems and equipment.
'The ' plant can be maintained in a safe hot standby condition and taken to RHR initiation in approximately 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> if credit is taken for limited manual actions outside the control room and it is assumed that antite AC power is available.
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Virgil C. Summer Mtg Fcb 26-27, 1981 Emergency Planning - K. Beale
.Mr. ' Kent Beale outlined the basic elements of the plant emergency plan including the coordination between the state and local authorities.
Mr. Beale also discussed details of the station radiation emergency plan which includes four classifications of emergency situations (unusual event, alert, site emergency, general emergency).
Various emergency action levels (EAL) define which emer-
-gency situation classification one is facing.
The various notification require-ments for. state and local emergency agencies were also described.
Dr. Moeller addressed a series of questions to the Applicant noted below:
'Have you analyzed incidents of failures of waste gas storage tanks?
'Concerning emergency planning, is your public alert siren system seismic Category'17
'Is the meteorological tower resistent to a major seismic event?
'Will the fixed-field radiation monitoring system withstand a major seismic event?
'Are the offsite laboratory test facilities susceptible to a major seismic event?
'Are there bridges that must be crossed in evacuation routes that are susceptible to major seismic events?
The Applicant said he would address these questions at the next Subcommittee meeting.
Comments on Summer Plant Steam Generators - D. Rawlings, Westinghouse Mr. Rawlings commented on the steam generators to be used in the Summer nuclear plant. The comments centered on the objection to the proposed NRC requirement to install inspection ports for detection of U-bend cracking and denting
. phenomena.
Mr. Rawlings said U-bend cracking has not been seen in the aodel D-3 steam generator used at Summer and that the denting phenomenon wou!' not be d
detected by the installation of inspection _ ports.
7 Virgil C. Summer Mtg Feb 26-27, 1981 Emergency Procedures for an Earthquake - R. Crowley Mr. Crowley discussed the action to be taken following an earthquake at the plant site. He said that the control room operators would first detrmine whether or not an OBE had been exceed based on seismic instrumentation and
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alarms located in the control room.
The plant would be shut down if the OBE had been exceeded.
The emergency plan would also be put into effect.
The plant would remain shut down until the necessary inspections and evaluations could be made.
' Control Room Human Factors Consideration - S. Cunningham Mr. Cunningham discussed the redesign of the control room as a result of human factors studies conducted by both the Applicant and the NRC Staff. The human factors review is being conducted in two phases.
Pnase one will include installation of new equipment as a result of the TMI requirement as well as rearrangement of existing instrumentation to improve operator function.
The second phase of the program addresses the long term requirements of NUREG-0660 and NUREG-0737 for a comprehensive review of the control room using the NRC evaluation criteria.
This evaluation should be complete in 1982.
Prior to adjournnent, Mr. Ward requested that at the next meeting the Applicant elaborate on the makeup and. unction of the nuclear safety review group referred to in the discussion on plant organization as well as how the three safety review committees listed in the organization interact.
The meeting was adjourned at 6:00 pm February 27, 1981.
NOTE: Additional details can be obtained from the transcript located in the Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D;C.
20555.
The transcript can also be obtained, at cost, from the Alderson Reporting, Inc., 400 Virginia Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C.
e 8
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DUTSTANDING ISSUES 1.6.1 STABILITY OF SUBSURFACE MATERIALS AND FOUNDATIONS OF'THE SERVICE WATER PUMPHOUSE AND INTAKE STRUCTURE 1.6.2 SLOPE STABILITY OF THE WEST EM3ANKMENT OF THE SERVICE WATER POND 1.6.3 SEISMIC SYSTEM AND Su63Y: TEM ANALYSIS 1.6.4 SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF SEISMIC CATEGORY I INSTRU-MENTAT10N AND ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 3.6.5 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL. EQUIPMENT 1.6.6 PRESERVICE INSPECTION PROGRAM 1.6.7 COMPLI ANCE WITH APPENDlX r: TO 10 CFR PART 50 1.6.8 CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW 1.6.9 USE OF A LOAD SEQUENCER WITH 0FFSITE POWER 1.6.10 FIRE PROTECTION 1.6.11 EMERGENCY PLANNING 1.6.12 Q-LIST 1.6.13 FINANCIAL QUALIFICATIONS 1.6.14 ADDITIONAL ITEMS IN NUREG-0737 1.6.15 JOINT IE/NRR AUDIT 1.6.16 INADEQUATE CORE COOLING INSTRUMENTS 1.6.17 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS R&tyE /
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- COMMENTS FROM'THE FALMETT0' ALLIANCE, INC.-
BY MICHAEL LOWE ON V.C. SUMMER OPERATING LICENSE APPLICATION REVIEW BY THE-NRC ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS FIRST LET ME APOLOGIZE AND ISSUE A COMPLAINT IN ONE SENTENCE.
I APOLOGIZE FOR NOT DELIVERING THESE COMMENTS IN PERSON DUE TO A PRIOR COMMITMENT AND. COMPLAIN ABOUT THE VERY SHORT PERIOD OF PRIOR' NOTIFICATION GIVEN THE PUBLIC OF THIS MEETING.
THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE REVIEW WAS PRINTED IN THE FEBRUARY 20TH EDITION OF THE COLUMBIA RECORD.SIX DAYS IS NOT SUFFICIENT TIME TO PRODUCE COMMENTS ON SUCH AN EXTENSIVE ISSUE AS.THE.0PERATING LICENSE OF A 950 MEGAWATT NUCLEAR REACTOR.
THEREFORE-l WILL BE BRIEF AND LIMIT MY COMMENTS TO A SINGLE ISSUE - THE CAPACITY FOR STORAGE OF SPENT FUEL DISCHARGED FROM THE V.S. SUMMER PLANT.
S.C.E.86. REPORTS DESIGN CAPACITY FOR STORAGE OF SPENT FUEL AT THE V.C'. SUMMER PLANT WILL EQUAL APPROXIMATELY 10 YEARS OF OPERATION.
I SUBMIT THIS WILL BE INADEQUATE AND WILL PRESEnf A SAFETY HAZARD HWHICH THIS COMMITTEE SHOULD ADDRESS IN DEPTH FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
- ACCORDING TO ALLIED GENERAL NUCLEAR SERVICES STUDIES, THE REPROCESSING OF IRRADIATED NUCLEAR FUE' FROM COMMERCI AL GENERATOR'3 WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE UNTIL 1990, AT THE EARLIEST.
(SCOPING STUDIES OF THE... DISPOSING OF THE IMI-2 SPENT FUEL CORE, ACNS 35900-1.5-79, SEPTEMBER 1980).
- THERE IS LITTLE EVIDENCE OF A FEDERAL COMMITTMENT TO TEMPORARY OR INTERIM STORAGE OF IRRADIATED NUCLEAR FUEL.
- IF A FEDERAL COMMITTMENT EXISTS (AND THE STRENGTH OF THIS COMMITTMENT IS SCARCELY EVIDENT), IT IS TO THE PERMANENT DISPOSAL OF flIGH LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE.
EVEN N: TuE FASTEST POLITICAL AND-TECHNICAL TRACK ULTIMATE DISPOSAL IS DECADES IN THE FUTURE.
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GivEN THE V.C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION IS "0N LINE" AND OPERATIONAL BY 1982, THE NUMBER OF PREVIOUSLY OPERATING REACTORS EXPERIENCING FUEL STORAGE CAPACITY PROBLEMS BY 1992 WILL MAKE VCSUS LOW ON THE PRIORITY LIST AND NEAR THE END OF THE LINE FOR WHATEVER SOLUTION TO I
WASTE STORAGE OF DISPOSAL ULTIMATELY EMERGES.
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THE SEISMOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SITE DICTATE CONCERN
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OVER THE LONG TERM $TORAGE OF SPENT FUEL ON-SITE.
HIGHLY COMPACTED MODES OF STORAGE SHOULD BE VIEWED WITH SPECIAL CONCERN.
WE URGE YOU TO INVESTIGATE THESE ISSUES WITH THE RESOURCES AT YOUR DISPOSAL.
THE SAFE OPERATION OF THE SUMMER PLANT IS CONTINGENT UPON THE SAFE STORAGE AND DISPOSAL OF THE RADI0 ACTIVE MATERIALS CREATED IN THE PROCESS.
WE BELIEVE A REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE SAFE AND ADEQUATE STORAGE CAPACITY FOR THE ESTIMATED USEFUL LIFE OF THE PLANT IS BOTH PRUDENT AND REALISTIC.
Ti'ANK YOU F0R YOUR ATTENTION.
I WO'JLD BE INTERESTED IN YOUR COMMENTS, PLEASE DON'T HESITATE TO CONTACT ME FOR FURTHER INFORMATION.
MICHAEL LOWE PALMETTO ALLIANCE, INC.
2135 1/2 DEVINE STREET COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA 29205 (803) 254-8132 FEBRUARY 26, 1981 l
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Auvis'try CTar.itta cn L;.ctor Sciegasrcs rolotcu to Virgil C. Sumu Nuclear Statien Feoruary 26, 1961 t
anc Feoruary 27th Capital Inn, 1901 Assemoly St., Columala, S. C.
Introcuction:
hy nu.e is auth Thomas. Ly aucress is 1339 Sinkler Road, Columoia, S.C.,
2%06.
I'm glac to have the opportunity to atteno this meeting.
I have an interest in the Virgal Sum.:.er Nuclear Plant as a customer of South Carolina Ilectric anc Gas Con.pany ( SC:8.C) anu as a resioent of a city within 26 miles of the power plant.
I have stuuieo the Summer Plant as well as such relatec huojects as repro-cessing, transportation of nuclear materials anu the hancling of rauioactive wastes.
For tne past ten years, I have continuec to seek out factual inforn.ation.
I have workec with state anc national organizations anc am presently a member of the South Carolina 2nvironmental quality Control (EQC) Auviscry Conzaittee.
Cuestions 2elatec to Instrumentation anu Plant Controls:
1.
'Jhat stucies are being anc have been cione of uesign oasis accicents anc how to avoic then., since Three Mile Islanu (TEI)?
2.
What cesign changes have oeen incorpo.atec into the Suc2.er Nuclear Plant as a result of n:I?
.as a result of accicents anc near accicents at other nuclear power plants?
3.
Uhy wasn't uore work cone on cesign basis acciuents anu how to avoic them prior to D.I?
4 Cic ti.c NRC"s cecision not to f ollow the recomencations of NRC saf ety engineer, Demetrios Basdekas, have anything to co with his not oeing cirect enough in nis 1976 reports on safety issues?
5.
Was the NRC's principal reason for not following Er. 3ascekas' acvice casec on the belief that "only a small,recuction in risk coulc result from im-protesents in plant controls"#or because the N2C thought that nuclear inJastry was goinp to voluntarily research cesign improvements to recuce accicent risks?
6.
What improvements in instrun.entation have oeen implemented since D.I which assist operators? Will they or nave they oeen carriec out at the Suncer Plant?
7.
Why was one of the instruments critical tc the operators at n.I plant locatec Dehino him?
E.
Who has the final say in such matters as-what alarms are usec, limiting the number of alarms, coorcinating the arrangement of instrua.ents for easy anc effective use?
9.
Does cn cperating group have the last woro on the acceptance of cesign plans?
- 10. Reports anc information regarcing the operation anc ocsig 1 of nuclear plants contain very little aoout the role of operators, supervisors, procuction people to cecision-making relateu to cesign, control room operation, emergency plan-ning ano other important consicerations. Vhat changes have been u. ace since n;I in the way of involving such people? At the Summer plant?
Report to Congress, NRC, NUR2G-043E, April 12,197E j
Jestin ny cf Rut'h Thon.as Fctruary.26 cnd 27, 1961 - bCf0ra th3 ACRS instrumenteti:n prcvioso to shrw stem trcval en remotely g..
- 11. At Thl, why w.sn't b
operates critical valves rath;r th:n instruments which cnly rccoro c sign 1 f roc. a solannin' Why weren't n;I owners ano operators alertec to this proolem by the N2C?
12.
By the ACRS?, By other utilities?
By manufacturers?
An anonymous letter to the NRC alerteo the agency to stress corrosion crack's 13.
in Westinghouse turoines. How can the reluctance of company officals to failures ano technical proolems relatec to the nuclear accit to equipment inoustry se overcome?
centrai comunication system is there f or notif ying nuclear power pla,nt, operators imeciately of problems which coulo af feet them? Which coulo leau What 14.
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to accioents?
'S umer plant have to ensure conect air flow
/c N os!"obYSd[ [ 8
. :2 16.
Does the Sumer plant have instrua.entation to measure the liquic in the reactor vessel?
17 Are on-site NRC inspectors expertenced procuction people?
If not, what,
,2 group of proouction ano operating personnel oo these inspectors consult,.,
with?
18.
Has a team of nuclear power plant operators ano proouction personnel lookeo into failures which coulo occur anu combinations of happenings (equipment failures, human errors, cesign miscalculations, etc.) in terms of tne possiole outcomes anc in terms of how to prevent a ouiluup of proolems?
19: How are operators, supervisors ano nuclear power plant employees seing trainec to hanule emergency situations? At Virgil Sumer?
20 How long is the training period?
21.
F.eeping clean areas in a nuclear plant free of centamination has not
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been successfully cone at a number of facilities.
22.
/ re operating personnel involveo in tne oevelopment of such procecures?
2.
In the case of crackea turoines, such as tnose of Turkey Point Nuclear 3
Plant, how cio the contamination reach tne steam generators?
2 '.
How clo the clean seconoary system at Turkey Point occome contaminates?
3 2.
What other nuclear power plants have experienceo turbine cracking in w
5 acottion to Zion Station Unit 1 ano Yankee-Rowe?
26 Has there been contamination of turbines at these Zion anc Yankee-Rowe plants?
Questions Relateo to !:onitoring, Emergency Planning ano the Hancling of Racioactive By-Prooucts 27.
At n.I, a helicopter was flown over the steck for the purpose of measuring rauiation ano contamination levels, curing the accioent. Why was it necessary to ootain cata in this way? Would such a methoo of monitoring be necessary in the event of an accioent at the Summer Nuclear Plant?
26.
Is there a system of continous monitoring of the of f-gases at the Summer Plant Is this in the stack?
29.
At how many locations is continuous monitoring and continuous printouting oi of radiation anu cortamination measurements plannec? At the fence? % mile beyonu?
I mile beyonu?
In how many airections?
30.
How of ten will the recoros of the Sumer nonitoring system be reac?
Daily?
- 31. Will these recoros be available to the public?
- 32. Will both alph. ano 'oeta be measured continously at the Summer plant?
Tcstimony cf Ruth Thomas Fcbruary 26 cnu 2U9FACR5
'33. Why has so.little progross in cmargsney plcnning teksn plcca wh n such plcn-ning_stcrtsd mort th:n tan yasrs cgo?
34 How many nuclear plants have writ _en sabotage ano air raio procecures?
- 35. Will the Summer plant be requireo to have these prior to startup?
- 36. What separation system has been or is being cevelopec to ensure that no long-lived rautoactive materials are mixeo in with wastes which are buried at such sites as Chem-Nuclear in Barnwell, S.C.?
37.
What plans are there for alternatives to burial of nuclear wastes in the event that lanc ourtal operations are closea cown? Summer plant plans?
3E.
What alternatives to transportation of nuclear waste by-procucts is being stucied anc consiuerec? By N2C?
By utilities?
By Summer plant?
39.
xplain how the research finatngs of John Stephen, Jr. anc Robert Pohl (Trace Elements in Reactor Steels: Implications for Decommissioning, haterials Science Center of Cornell University, August 1977) has changeu the plans for secommissioninf nuclear power plants?
the Summer plant?
40.
How woulc it oe possiole for instructions to oe given on evacaution if there is not continuous monitoring of rauiation, contamination and meterological conuttions?
/ NG AWL
/ Ruth Thomas' I
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