ML19350E317
| ML19350E317 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 06/12/1981 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19350E311 | List: |
| References | |
| IEB-79-06A, IEB-79-06B, IEB-79-6A, NUDOCS 8106170294 | |
| Download: ML19350E317 (2) | |
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UNITE 0 STATES j[
^' g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f T. 5-a g
.C W ASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 t
- %, % ' gh SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE 1F NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION C]'
FOR FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE, UNIT.10.1
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DOCKET i:0. 50-335 INTRODUCTION.
,On March 28, 1979 the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2 (TMI-2) experienced core damage which resulted from a series of events which were initiated by a loss of feedwater transient. Several aspects of the acci-dent have generic applicability at operating Combustion Engineering (CE) reactors. IE Bulletin 79-06 was sent to all CE operating plant licensees.
The purpose of the Bulletin was to provide information concerning the accident at TMI-2 and to request certain actions be taken by licensees to preclude a similar occurrence at their facilities. This bulletin was superseded and expanded by IE Bulletin 79-06A a'nd by IE Bulletin 79-06B. By letters dated April 24, May 25 and 29 and August 10, 1979, Florida Poyer and Light Company
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(FP&L Co. or licensee) 1rovided responses in conformance with the requirements of the Bulletins..
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EVALUATION In the two year period since the Bulletins have been implemented we have observed, in addition to our review of the responses enumerated above, that the licensee has complied with all the following provisions of the l
Bulletins:
- Understanding of the TMI-7 sequence of events.
- Review Plant Procedures for coping with accidents and transients.
- By review of procedures and training instructions:
(1) to avoid overriding automatic action of ESF, 1
(2) to keep high pressure injection (HPI) system in operation for at least 20 minutes and to maintain 50*F subcooling margin, (3) to correlate HPI initiation with reactor coolant pump (RCP) opera-tion, and (4) tu train operators not to rely on pressurizer level only, to detai-mine primary coolant inventory.
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- Verification of emergency feedwater (EFW) valve positions and all safety-related valve positions to ensure proper operation of EFW and ESF.
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. - By review of containment isolation initiation and design for avoidance of isolating if nes that are needed to avoid degraded core cooling capability.
- By preparing and implementir.g procedures for all valves which could defeat or compromise flow of EFW.
- By reviewing operating modes and procedures to prevent inadvertent pumping of radioactive gasses and liquids out of the primarj containment.
By reviewing procedures related to maintenance and test of safety-related systems to:
(1) verify operability of redundant system prior to removal of.'any system from s'ervice, (2) verify operability of all systems following maintenar,ce or testing, and (3) verification to operating personnel whenever a system is removed from or returned to service.
- By developing procedures and training operators to establish and maintain natural circulation.
- By training operatnes to take into account reactor vessel integrity con-siderations during any accident or transient.
- By performing analyses and design modifications to reduce the likelihood.
of automatic PORY actuation during anticipated transients.
- By providing procedures and training.perators for a prompt manual reactor trip for transients that result in a pressure increase in the reactor coolant system.
- By providing for prompt reporting within one hour of the time the reactor is not in a controlled or expected candition of operation.
. - By proposing any needed. Technical Specification changes to implement any of the above parts of the Bulletins.
CONCLUSIONS _
Based on our review of the information provided by the licensee in response to IE Bulletins79-06A and 79-06B, we conclude that the licensee has acceptably responded to these Bulletins. The actions taken by the licensee demonstrate its understanding of the concerns and implications of the TMI-2 accident as they relate to the St. Lucie, Unit No.1.
These actions have resulted in added assurance for the cont':'2ed protection of the public health and safety during plant operation.
Dated: JUN 121381
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