ML19350B675
| ML19350B675 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 03/10/1981 |
| From: | Tedesco R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Aswell D LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8103230270 | |
| Download: ML19350B675 (8) | |
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UNITED s IATEs E 5 ') s V(,/,j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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WASH eNGTON, D. C. 20555
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MAR 101981 Docket No. 50-382 s
Mr. D. L. Aswell Vice President, Power Production Louisiana Power & Light Company 142 Delaronde Street New Orleans, Louisiana 70174
Dear Mr. Aswell:
SUBJECT:
REVISED REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION By letter dated February 26, 1981, we transmitted a request for additional information on fire protection. The question numbered 040.148 has been slightly revised.
Please respond to the enclosed revised question 040.148.
Sincerely, FN w Robert L. Tedesco Assistant Director for Licensing Division of Licensing
Enclosure:
Request for Additional Information cc w/ enclosure:
See next page V
e 8103230 Y
Mr. D. L. Aswell Vice President, Power Production Louisiana Power & Light Company 142 Delaronde Street New Orleans, Louisiana.70174 MAR I0 1S$1 W. Malcolm Stevenson, Esq.
cc:
Montce & Lemann 1424 Whitney Building New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 Mr. E. Blake Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
20036 Mr. D. B. Lester Production Engineer Louisiana Power & Light Company 142 Delaronde Street New Orleans, Louisiana 70174 Lyman L. Jones, Jr., Esq.
Gillespie & Jones P. O. Box 9216 Metairie, Louisiana 70005 Luke Fontana, Esq.
Gillespie & Jones 824 Esplanade Avenue New Orleans,' Louisiana 70116 Stephen M. Irving, Esq.
One American Place, Suite 1601
_. Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70825 Louisiana Office of Conservation ATTN: Administrator Nuclear Energy Division-P. O. Box 14690
- Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70808 President, Polica Jury St. Charles ~Parrish
, Hahnville, Louisiana 70057
' ;-L U. S'. Environmental Protection Agency
.1.1. ' ATTN:.EIS Coordinator.
Region VI Office 1201 Elm Street First International Building Dallas,' Texas 75270 Sb
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F; AE PROTECT 10h 5UPPLEMitiTAL Q'Jf 5710NS POWER SYSTEMS BRANCH 040.148 In accordance with section 9.5.1, Branch fe*chnical Position ASB 9 51
, position C.4.a.(1) of NRC Standard Review Plan and section III.G of new Appendix 10 CFR Part 50, it is the staff's position that cabling for redundant safe shutdown systems should be separated by walls having a three-hour fi or equivalent protection (see section III.G 2 of Appendix R).That is, cabling required for or associated with the primary method of shutdown, should be physically separated by the equivalent oba. three-hour rated fire bar-ier from cabling required for or associated with the redvadant or alternate method of shutdown.
To assure that redundant shutdown c.ible systems and til other cable systems that are associated with the shutdown caale systems are separated from each other so that both are not subject to damage from a single fire ha:ard we require the following information for each system needed to bring the plant to a safe shutdown.
1.
Provide a table that lists all equipment including instrumentation and vi a
support system equipment required to achieve and maintain hot and/or cold shutdown. For each equipment listed:
Differentiate between equipment required to achieve and maintain hot a.
1 shutdown and equipment required to achieve and maintain cold '.nutdo b.
Define each equipment's location by fire area.
Cefine each equipment's redundant counterpart.
c.
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d.
Identify each equipment's esser.tial cabling (instrumentation, control, and power). For each cable identified: (1) Describe the cable routing (by fire area) from tource to temination, and (2) Identify each fire area locatic where the cables are separated by less than a wall having a three-hour fire rating from cables for any redundant shutdown system, and List any problem areas identifi' d 'by item 1.d.(2) above that will e.
e be corrected in accordance with Section III.G.3 of Appendix R (i.e., alternate or dedicated shutdown capability).
2.
PrcYide a table that lists Class 1E and Non-Class lE cables that are associated with the essential safe shutdown syste: s identified in item 1 a bove. For each cable listed:
(* See note on Page 3).
Define the cables' association to the safe shutdown system (ccm,an a.
power source, comon raceway, separatten less than IEEE Standard-384 guidelines, cables for equipment whose spurious operation i
will adversely affect shutdown systems, etc.),
i b.
Describe each associated cable routing (by fire area) from source to terminat fon,' and Identify each location where the associated cables are separated c.
by less than a wall having a three-hour fire rating from cables required for or associated with any redundant shutdown system.
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P00R BRIGINE
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3.
Provide one of the following for each of the circuits identified in item 2,. c a bov e :
(a) The results of an analysis that demonstrates that failure caused by open, ground. or hot short of cables will not affect it's associated shutdown sistem,
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(b) Identify each circuit requiring a solution in accordance with section III.G.3 of Appendix R, or
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(c) Identify each circuit meeting or that will be mcdified to meet the l
requirements of section III.G.2 of AppO;.ndix R (i.e., three-hour wall.
20 feet of clear space with automatic fire suppression, or one-hour barrier with automatic fire suppression).
4 To assure compliance with GDC 19, we require the following information be provided for the control room.
If credit is to be taken for an alternate
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or dedicated shutdown method for other fire areas ~(as identified by item 1.e or 3.b abov t) in accordance with section III.G'.3 ' f new Appendix R o
to 10 CFR Part U, the following infom.ation will also be required for each of these plant areas.
A table that lists all equipment including instrumentation and vital-a.
support system equipment that are required by the primary cethod of achieving al.d maintaining. hot and/or cold shutdown.
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- NOTE Option 3a is considered to be one method of meeting the requirements of Section II.G.3 Appendix R.
If option 3a is selected the information recuested in items 2a and 2c above should be provided in general terms and the infor-mation requested by 25 need not be provided.
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4-P00R OR.S NAL b.
A table that lists all equipment in'cluding instrumentation and vital support system equipment that are required by the alternate, dedicated, or reccte cethod of achieving and rafntaining hot and/or Cold shutdorm.
Identify each alternate shutdown equipment listed in ite c.
4.b at:ye with essential cables (instrumentation, control, and p wer) that are located in the fire area containing,the pricary shutdown equipeent.
- or each e:;aipment listed :covide one of the follcwing:
(1) Detailed electrical schematic crawings that sh:w the essential cables that are duplicated elsewhere and are electrically isolated fro: the subject fire areas, or 4
i (2) The results of an analysis that derenstrates that failure (open, ground, or hot short) of each cable identified will not affect the capability to achieve and maintain tot or cold shutdown.
d.
Provide a table that lists Class 1E and 5:n-Class lE cables that are associated with the alternate, dedicated,or re cte method of shutdown.
For_ each item listed, identify each associated cable located in the fire area containing the pric:ary shutdown equipment. For each cable so identified provide the results 'of an analysis that deronstrates that failure (op; t, ground, or hot short) of the essociated cable will not adversely affect the. alternate. dedicated.or remote method of shutdtwn.
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. 5.
The residual heat removal syst'es is s,enerally a low pressure system that interfaces with the high pressure pricary coolant system.
To preclude a LOCA through this interface, we require compliance with the re:or..enda-tions of Branch Technical position RSS 5-1.
Thus, this interface most likely consists of two redundani.and independent motor operated valves with diverse interlocks in accordance with Branch Technical Position IC55 3.
These two motor operated valves and ' heir associated cable cay be subject to a single fire hazard.
It is our concern' that this single fire could cause the two valves to open resulting in a fire-initiated LOCA through the i
subject high-low pressure. syste= interface. To assure that this interface and other high-low pressure interfaces are adequately protected from the effects of a single fire, we require the following information:
Identify each high-lcw pressure interface that uses redundant a.
electrically controlled devices (such as two series actor operated valves) to isolate or preclude rupture of any primary coolant boundary.
b.
Identify each device's essential cabling (power and control) and describe the cable routing (by fire area) from source to termination.
Identify each location where the identified cables are separated c.
by.less than a wall haying a threc-hour fire rating from, cables for the redundant device.
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For the areas identified in item 5.c above (if any), pecvide the bases and justification as to the', acceptability of the existing design or any propched codifications.
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