ML20126F400
| ML20126F400 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 02/26/1981 |
| From: | Tedesco R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Aswell D LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8103130065 | |
| Download: ML20126F400 (8) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
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.j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 k*.v..#
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l Docket No. 50-382 FEB 2 61981 e
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Mr. D. L. Aswell j
Vice President, Power Production b' %l'/4//
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Louisiana Power & Light Company 142 Delaronde Street New Orleans, Louisiana 70174 2,,
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Dear Mr. Aswell:
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SUBJECT:
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION We have determined that certain additional information is required in order to permit us to complete our review of your application for an operating license for Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3.
The enclosed requests for additional information on fire protection were prepared by the Power Systems Branch.
Please advise us of the date you expect to provide responses to the enclosed request.
If you require clarification, please contact the staff's assigned project manager.
l Sincerely, l
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NWe w Robert L. Tedesco Assist 6at Director for Licensing Division of Licensing
Enclosure:
Request for Additional Information cc w/ enclosure:
See next page 4-810313 0 ous
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THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS lil p
POOR QUALITY PAGES
Mr. D. L. Aswell Vice President, Power Production Louisiana Power & Light Company 142 Delaronde Street New Orleans, Louisiana 70174 cc:
W. Malcolm Stevensen, Esq.
Monroe & Lemann 1424 Whitney Building
'New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 Mr. E. Blake Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
20036 Mr. D. B. Lester Production Engineer Louisiana Power & Light Company 142 Delaronde Street New Orleans, Louisiana 70174 Lyman L. Jones, Jr., Esq.
Gillespie & Jones P. O. Box 9216 Metairie, Louisiana 70005 Luke Fontana, Esq.
Gillespie & Jones 824 Esplanade Avenue New Orleans, Louisiana 70116 Stephen M. Irving, Esq.
One American Place, Suite 1601 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70825 Resident Inspector /Waterford NPS P. O. Box 822
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Killona, Louisiana 70066 i
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. ' E ti! 0h L UPPL D'~ hT/.'. '4;i ti ! O:;5 P0as. t u. e.: n.uCH 040.148 2n accordence with section 9.5.1, Erzn:h fichnical Position ASB 9.5-1, position C.4.r.(1) of NRC Standard Review P1:n and section III.G of new Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50, it is the staff's pssition that cabling for redundant safe shutdown systems should be separat14 by walls having a three-hour fire rating or equivalent protection (see sectien III.G.2 of Appendix R).
That is, cabling D
rer,u' red for or associated with the pr...,hry method of shutdortn, si,ould be physically separated by the equivalent of a.three-hour rated fire barrier from cablir g required for or associated with the redundant or alternate method of shutd:wn. To assure that redundant shutdown cable systems and all other cable systems that are associated with the shutdown cable systems are separated from each other so that both are not subject to da. mage from a single fire hazard, de require the following information for each system needed to bring the plant to a safe shutdown.
1.
Provide a table that lists all equipment including instrumentation and vital -
support system equipment required to achieve and maintain hot and/or cold shutdown.
For each equipment listed:
Differentiate betwsen equipment required to achieve and maintain hot a.
shutdown and equipment requircd to achieve and maintain cold shutdown, i
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b.
Define each equipment's location by fire area, Define each equipment's redundant counterpart.
c.
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d d.1dentify each equipment's essential cabling (instrumenta'tton, control,andpower).
For each cable identified: (1) Describe the cable routing (by fire area) from source to termination, and (2) Identify each fire area location where the cables are separated
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by less than a wall having a three-hour _ fire rating from cables for any redundant shutdown system, and D
e.
List any problem areas identiff"ed by item 1.d.(2) above that will be corrected in accordance with Section III.G.3 cf Appendix R l
f (i.e., alternate or dedicated shutdown capability).
2.
Provide a table that lists Class 1E and Ibn-Class 1E cables that are associated with the essential safe shutdown systems identified in item 1 i
a bove.
For each cable listed: (*SeenoteonPage3).
a.
Define the cables' association to the safe shutdoun system (common power source, common raceway, separation less than IEEE Standard-384 guidelines, cables for equipment whose spurious operation will adversely affect shutdown systems, etc.),
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b.
Dascribe each associated cable routing (by fire area) fmm source l
to terminat.fon, and I
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Identify each location where the associated cables are separated l
by less than a wall having a three-hour fire rating from cables required for or associated with any redundant shutdown system.
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3.
Frovide one of the following for each of the circuits identified in item 2.c above:
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(a) The results of an analysis that demonstrates that failure caused by open, ground, or hot short of cables will not affect it's associated shutdown sistem,
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(b) Identify each circuit requiring a solution. in accor$nce with
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section III.G.3 of Appendix R, or.
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(c) Identify each cNcuitie'e~ ting' or that wil1 b'e mo'dified to meet the requirements of section III.G.2 of Appendix R (i.e., three-hour wa'11,
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20 feet of clear space with automatic fire suppression, or one-hour j
barrier with automatic fire suppression).
4.
To assure compliance with GDC 19, we require the following information be provided for the control room.
If credit is to be taken for an alternate or dedicated shutdown method for other fire areas ~(as identified by item
~ 1.e or 3.b above) in accordance with section III.G'.3 'of new Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50, the following infornation will also be regfred for each of these plant areas.
a.
A table that Ifsts all equipment including instr =.entation and vital support system equipment that are required by the primary cethod of achieving and maintaining, hot and/or cold shutdown.
- NOTE Option 3a is considered to be one method of meeting the requirements of Section II.G.3 Appendix R.
If option 3a is selected the information requested in items 2a and 2c above should be provided in general terms and the infor-mation requested by 2b need not be provided.
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A b.
A table that lists all equipment ipgluding instrumentation and vital support system equipment that are required by the alternate, dedicated, or remote method of achieving and rafntaining hot and/or cold shutdown.
Identify each alternate shutdown equipment listed ir, item 4.b above c.
D with essential cables (i'nstrumentation, control, and powar) that tra locatad in the fire area containi'ng,the primary shutdown equipment.
R,r each equipment listed provide one of the follcwing:
I (1) Detailed electrical schematic crawings that show the essential I
cables that are duplicated elsewhere and.are electrically isolated from the subject fire areas, or i
(2) The results of an analysis that demnstrates that failure l
(open, ground, or hot short) of each cable identified will not affect the capability to achieve and maintain hot or -
cold shutdown.
i d.
ProYide a table that lists Class lE And f!on-Class 1E cables that t.re I
a'ssociated with the alternate, dedicated,or rte.ote method of shutdora.
For each item listed, identify each associated cable located in the fire area containing the primary shutdown equipment. Fcr each cable'so identified provide the results of an analysis that demonstrates that failure (open, ground, or hot short) of the associated cable will not adversely affect the alternate, dedicated.or remte method of shutdown.
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i 5.
The residual heat removal systed is generally a low pressure system that interfaces with the high pressure pridary coolant system. To preclude a LOCA through this interface, we require compliance with the recommenda-1 tions of Branch Technical Position RSB 5-1.
Thus, this interface most likely consists of two redundani.and independent trotor operated valves with diverse interlocks in accordance with Branch Technical Position' ICSB 3.
These D
twa motor operated valves and their 4ssocitted cable may be subject to a single fire hazard.
It is our concerd that this single fire could cause the two valves to open resulting in a fire-initiated LOCA through the subject high-low pressure system interface. To assure that this interface and other high-low pressure interfaces are adequately protected from the effects of a single fire, we require the following information:
a.
Identify each high-low pressure interface that uses redundant electrically controlled devices (such as two series trotor operated valves) to isolate or preclude rupture of any primary coolant boundary.
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b.
Identify each device's essential cabling (power and control) and i
describe the cable routing (by fire area) from source to termination.
l c.
Identify each location where the identified cables are separated 1
by.less than a wall having a three-hour fire rating'from, cables for the redundant device.
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- d.,For the areas identified in item Sic ibove (if any), provide the bases and justification as to the' acceptability of the existing l
design or any proposed modifications.
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