ML19347F454
| ML19347F454 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/15/1981 |
| From: | Swanson D, Swartz L NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8105190294 | |
| Download: ML19347F454 (79) | |
Text
e,. i Staff 5/15/81 m
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
[Sq flUCLEAR REGULATORY COMt11SSION p
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8
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IMU' 1 0 IOO1 1
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD u.s. gga In the !1atter of
)
gg METROPOLITAN EDIS0N COMPANY, Docket No. 50-289 ET AL.
(Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, )
Unit 1)
)
NRC STAFF PROPOSED FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARUING MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY 1.
In its August 9,1979 Order, the Commission stated that the licensee "shall demonstrate his managerial capability and resources to operate Unit I while maintaining Unit 2 in a safe configuration and carrying out planned decontamination and/or restoration activites." (Order Item 6, CLI-79-8, 10 NRC 141, 145.) The Commission clarified its concerns with the nanagement capability issue in a further Order dated March 6,1980 (CLI-80-5, 11 NRC 408.) This Order separated the management capability issue into thirteen items.E In addition to the issues raised by the y
These items will be referred to as "CLI-80-5 Issue Although certain items of the Category A recommendations in TabIe B-1 of NUREG-0578 also deal with staffing and qualifications of personnel, they will be grouped with other NUREG-0578 short-term items in the Staff's future proposed findings on Commission Order Item 8.
b 8195190294 u
Commission, the Licensing Board admitted four contentions submitted by Intervenors and developed its own Board Question.
2.
The findings of fact set forth below are organized in tenns of the first eleven issues in the Commission's March 6,1980 Order.2_/ The contentions and the Board ' Question are discussed within the context of those Order issues.
3.
The licensee submitted direct testimony in response to ten of the management capability issues. The majority of the Staff's testimony on the eleven issues was submitted in "TMI-1 Restart, Evaluation of Licensee's Compliance with the Short and Long term Items of Section II of the NRC Order dated August 9,1979," NUREG-0680, and in Supplements 1, 2, and 3 of NUREG-0680.3/ The Staff also submitted supplemental testimony on the related contentions, CLI-80-S Issue 10, maintenance, and health physics issues. TMIA and Mrs. Aamodt presented direct evidence on their management capability contentions; TMIA, Mrs. Aamodt, and ANGRY cross-examined both the Staff and the licensee witnesses regarding their contentions.
l 2/
Only the first eleven issues in the Commission's March 6,1980 Order l
have been addressed.
Issue 12 deals with financial capability which l
was subsequently removed as an issue from this proceeding (CLI-81-3, 13 NRC slip op. at 9 (1981)).
Issue 13 is a general statement that l
"such other items as the Board deems relevant to the resolution of the issues set forth in this Order" should also be considered. The Board did raise a Board Question regarding the licensee's maintenance during 1978 which will be addressed in connection with CLI-80-5 Issue 2.
l 3/
NUREG-0680 (Staff exhibit 1) was received in evidence on April 23, l
1981 (Tr. 20122). NUREG-0680, Supplement 1 (Staff exhibit 4) was Supplement 2 (Staff exhibit 13)y 10,1981 (Tr.11941).and Supplement 3 (Staff ex received in evidence on Februar NUREG-0680, were received in evidence on April 23, 1981 (Tr.20122).
PROPOSED FIf4DItiGS OF FACT CLI-80-5 Issue 1:
Whether Metropolitan Edison's command and administrative structure, at both the plant and corporate levels, is appropriately organized to assure safe operation of Unit 1.
4.
The licensee's test'imony on Issue 1 was presented by Robert C.
Arnold, head of the GPU 11uclear Group (GPUtiG) (testimony follows Tr.
11434). The licensee also submitted testinony which was sponsored by William Wegner, a representative of Basic Energy Technology Associates (BETA) (follows Tr. 13284).
The Staff's testimony is contained in fiUREG-0680, Supplement 1, (Staff exhibit 4), Sections III.B.2 and III.B.3.a and Appendix B and in riUREG-0680, Supplement 2, (Staff exhibit 13),SectionIII.B.3.a.
No other testimony was filed on Issue 1, although ANGRY and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania did participate in cross-examination on the subject.
Metropolitan Ec son (Met Ed) has been and continues to be 5.
i responsible for the operation of both T!!I-1 and TMI-2. Staff Ex. 4, at 4.
Since the THI-2 accident, liet Ed has made significaat organizational changes to provide strengthened management and technical support for THI, including Unit 1.
Staff Ex. 4, at 4-5; Arnold, ff. Tr.11434, at 2.
At l
the corporate level, the General Public Utilities fluclear Group (GPUf4G) l has been established through which Met Ed will implement its operating i
and management responsibilities for if11-1. Staff Ex. 4, at 5; Arnold, j
ff. Tr.11434, at 9, GPUNG was formed by combining technical and 1
l uanagement resources from Jersey Central Power and Light Company (JCP&L),
Met Ed, and GPU Service Corporation into a single organizational entity.
Staff Ex. 4, at 5; Arnold, ff. Tr. 11434, at 8-9.
The licensee has plans r
to establish a GPU Nuclear Corporation (GPUNC) which would replace GPUNG.
Staff Ex. 4, at 7; Arnold, ff. Tr.11434, at 10; Tr.11435-7 (Arnold).
While such a change would have little or no effect upon the organizational structure, adoption of such a plan would require prior
~
approval of the involved state public utility commissions and of the NRC.
Staff Ex. 4, at 7; Arnold, ff. Tr.11434, at 10. GPUNG will be able to function in the ways described and there will be no adverse effects on operations until the necessary approvals are obtained. Tr. 11526 (Arnold). The GPUNC is proposed by the licensee to be the legal entity which would provide the technical and managerial resources for the operation of TMI-1. Staff Ex. 14, at 21. The change to GPUNC from GPUNG would involve no change in the ownership of THI-1 and no changes to the facility, and the existing functions of GPUNG would remain unchanged.
Id. With respect to TMI-1, the only changes are position titles, with no changes in personnel or position qualifications. The Staff concluded that a changeover from GPUNG to GPUNC is therefore acceptable.
Id_. Et 22.
6.
In mid-1977, the GPU Service Corporation embarked on a major program to expand and strengthen the in-house technical capabilities of the organization. Arnold, ff. Tr. 11434, at 6.
At about the same time, the finn of Booz, Allen & Hamilton conducted a nanagement audit, the results of which were made available to the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission. Tr.11493 (Arnold). The major recommendation of the Booz, Allen audit was that the in-house technical capabilities should be increased. Tr. 11499 (Arnold). The first phase of the GPU Service Corporation's program was endorsed, after some minor modifications, by
Booz, Allen in their report following the audit. Arnold, ff. Tr. 11434, at 7.
Planning for the consolidation of the GPU Service Corporation and the operating cmnpanies' organizations was not complete at the time of the accident.
Tr.11503 (Arnold); Arnold, ff. Tr.11434, at 6.
7.
The Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission recently caused another I
management audit of GPU to be perfomed. Tr. 11501 (Arnold). The fim perfoming the audit, Theodore Barry Associates, endorsed foming the GPUtic. Tr.11501 (Arnold).
8.
Tne GPUllG Executive Office consists of Mr. Arnold (Chief Operating Executive) and Mr. R. C. Clark (Deputy) and is responsible for the nanagement of TMI-1 operations, TMI-2 activities, Oyster Creek operations, and support activities for the three nuclear facilities.
Staff Ex. 4, at 5; Arnold, ff. Tr. 11434, at 9-10.
The support activities are divided into six main areas: Technicai Functions,fluclear l
Assurance, Administration, Comunications, Radiological and Environmental Controls, and Maintenance and Construction. Staff Ex. 4, at 5; Arnold, ff. Tr. 11434, at 10.
Each division is headed by a Director.
Staff Ex.
4, at 5-6; Arnold, ff. Tr.11434, at 9-10.
The Director of THI-1, Director of TMI-2, and Director of Oyster Creek also report to the GPUl4G Executive Office.
Staff Ex. 4, at 6; Arnold, ff. Tr.11434, at 10, 22.
l 9.
The Director of Technical Functions is responsible for providing a centralized technical capability to support nuclear generating facilities.
Staff Ex. 4, at 5; Arnold, ff. Tr.11434, at 12. This-capability includes licensing; general mechanical, civil, electrical, and instrumentation; and engineering nechanics support to assist in the r
l solution of plant operating problems.
Staff b. 4, at 5.
In addition, 1
l the Director of Technical Functions is responsible for providing support in the areas of nuclear fuel. nanagenent, process computer, contrcl and safety analysis, and plant operational analysis.
Staff Ex. 4, at 5; Arnold, ff. Tr.11434, at 13. The Technical Functions group is divided into five departments:' Licensing, Systems Engineering, Engineering and Design, Project Engineering and TMI-2 Recovery Engineering. Staff Ex. 4, at 5; Arnold, ff. Tr. 11434, at 13. Managers of these Departments and the Director of the Technical Functions Division each possess at least a bachelor's degree in engineering or science and have from t.ine to 24 years of nuclear experience. Staff Ex. 4, at 5; Arnold, ff. Tr.11434, at 12-13.
- 10. The Director of Nuclesr Assurance has overall authority and direct responsibility for all Nuclear Assurance activities. Staff Ex. 4, at 5.
The Division has expertise in nuclear quality assurance, emergency planning coordination, technical training, and analytical laboratory services. Staff Ex. 4, at 5; Arnold, ff. Tr.11434, at 15. The Nuclear Assurance Division is divided into three departments:
Quality Assurance, Nuclear Safety Assessment, and Training and Education.
Staff Ex. 4, at 5; Arnold, ff. Tr.11434, at 15. The site emergency planning function is under the direct control of the Nuclear Assurance Director.
Staff Ex. 4, at 5.
- 11. The Director of Administration has overall authority and direct responsibility in the areas of personnel resource management, legal services, information management, budgeting and cost-control, security, facilities management, industrial safety, and labor relations.
Staff Ex.
4, at 7; Arnold, ff. Tr.11434, at 25-26. The Director of Communications
7_
is responsible for communications with the news media, state and local government officials, citizens groups, and individuals concerning plant operations. Staff Ex. 4, at 7; Arnold, ff. Tr. 114343, at 25.
- 12. The Director of Radiological and Environmental Control is
.;ponsible for the onsite and offsite radiological and environmental controls.
Staff Ex. 4, at 7; Arnold, ff. Tr.11434, at 14. The Unit 1 Radiological Controls Organization provides for the areas of Radiological Control Program design, support, and enforcement as detailed in the Radiological Protection Plan, implementing procedures, and the Bioassay and Respiratory Protection programs. Arnold, ff. Tr.11434, at 14. This Division will also conduct surveys and assessments related to protective controls in ordar to assure that radiological work is accomplished in compliance with approved procedures and applicable regulations and is consistent with good radiological work practices. Arnold, ff. Tr.11434, 1
at 14.
- 13. The Director of flaintenance and Construction is responsible for major corrective maintenance and assigned plant modifications, repair, and construction activities. Staff Ex. 4, at 7; Arnold, ff. Tr. 11434, 1
at 27-28.
This Division monitors, evaluates, and assures that maintenance activities at each of the nuclear facilities are being performed in accordance with established policies, procedures and good maintenance practices. Arnold, ff. Tr. 11434, at 27. The maintenance and constru: tion group provides resources over and above those assigned to unit operations. Staff Ex. 4, at 7; Arnold, ff. Tr. 11434, at 26-27.
- 14. The Director of Till-1 reports and is accountable to the Executive 1
Office of GPUNG. Arnold, ff. Tr. 11434, at 10. The Director is i
n
-e~
r v
e n
e responsible for day-to-day operations at TMI-1, including compliance with Till-1 technical specifications and regulatory requirements. Arnold, ff.
Tr. 11434, at 10. Under the Director are three managers who function in the areas of operations and maintenance, plant engineering, and administration and services. Staff Ex. 4, at 6, 8-9; Arnold, ff. Tr.
11434, at 11. The Director of Oyster Creek is responsible for similar functions at that facility.
Staff Ex. 4, at 6; Arnold, ff. Tr. 11434, at
- 24. The Director of THI-2 is responsible for operation, maintenance, plant engineering and decontamination of Unit 2.
Staff Ex. 4, at 6; Arnold, ff. Tr. 11434, at 22-24.
- 15. The organizational and staffing changes at TMI since the TMI-2 accident have resulted in the integration of TMI responsibilities and support resources under unified management control while providing for the separation of Unit 1 and 2 activities.
Staff Ex. 4, at 11.
These changes are expected to provide improved management capability and control and improved focus of technical expertise on the TMI Station and on TMI-1. Staff Ex. 4, at 11.
In addition to changes in organizat'on and staffing, Met Ed has established an Onsite Emergency Organization, an Offsite Emergency Organization, and a Long-Term Recovery Organization.
Staff Ex. 4, at 11. These organizations will provide technical resources needed to cope with incidents of various nagnitudes.
Staff Ex. 4, at 11.
l
- 16. The NRC Staff performed an inspection at the TMI-1 site and the licensee's corporate office on July 23-25, 1980 to assess the organizational status relative to a draft version of " Guidelines for Utility Management Structure and Technical Resources," NUREG-0731. Staff Ex. 4, at 7.
The results of this inspection were published as "IE i
Inspection Report Humber 50-289/80-19." Staff Ex. 4, at 7.
Based on this inspection and on a review of the licensee's Restart Report, the Staff has found that GPUNG meets the draf t guidelines for offsite organization structure and resources described in NUREG-0731. Staff Ex.
4, at 7.
The Staff also.found that the revised organization for the operation of THI-1 meets the draft guidelines for onsite (plant staff) organizational structure and resources described in NUREG-0731. Staff Ex. 4, at 10. Therefore, the Staff concluded that the licensee's connand and administrative structure, at both the plant and.the corporate levels, is appropriately organized to assure safe operation of TMI-1. Staff Ex.
4, at 23, 17.
In addition, BETA, Inc. performed an independent assessment of GPU/Het Ed aanagenent capability and technical resources. Wegner, ff.
Tr.13284, at 1.
Based on this assessment, BETA concluded that the new organization and management of the GPU nuclear plants through the single, unified structure is probably the most effective way a nuclear utility Juld be handled. Wegner, ff. Tr. 13284, at 11-12.
- 18. Although intervenors did not offer any testimony on this issue, the Commonwealth, Board, and to a minor extent others, examined Mr. Arnold (Tr. 11482-507), the BETA representatives (Tr. 13285-324), and Staff witnesses (Tr. 11982-91) regarding the licensee's organization.
The Board does not consider that the cross-examination revealed any serious weaknesses in the organizational structure.
- 19. The Board finds, based on the evidence presented, that the licensee's command and administrative structure at both the plant and the corporate levels is appropriately organized to assure safe operation at Till-1 under the management structure established with GPUNG or under the proposed GPUNC.
CLI-80-5 Issue 2:
Whether the operations and technical staff of Unit 1 is qualified to operate Unit 1 safely (the adequacy of the facility's maintenance program should be among the matters considered by the Board).
CLI-80-5 Issue 11:
Whether Metropolitan Edison possesses sufficient in-house technical capability to ensure the simultaneous safe operation of Unit 1 and clean-up of Unit 2.
If Metropolitan Edison posssess insufficient technical resources, the Board should examine arrangements, if any, which Metropolitan Edison has made with its vendor and architect-engineer to supply the necessary technical expertise.
A.
Qualifications of Licensee's Staff
- 20. The general subject of the qualifications and adequacy of the operations and technical staff for THI-1 is also addressed by ANGRY contention 4 which states:
"The licensee lacks the management capability to operate a Nuclear Generating Station without endangering the public health and safety.
Subissues of Order Item 2 involving training of the TMI-1 operators and the licensee's maintenance practices are addressed later in this section.
- 21. The licensee presented numerous panels of witnesses sponsoring written testimony on the adequacy and qualifications of the operations and technical staff.
Included were the following pieces of testimony, each dated December 22, 1980:
" Licensee's Testimony of Mr. Robert C. Arcald Regarding CLI-80-5, Issue (1), ANGRY Contention No. IV, an<1 Sholly Contention No. 14(a)
(Licensee's Command and Administrative Structure)," following Tr.
11434;
" Licensee's Testimony of Henry D. Hukill, Ronald J. Toole, Michael J. Ross, and Joseph J. Colitz Regarding CLI-80-5 Issues (2) and (5), ANGRY Contention No. IV, and Sholly Contention No.14(a), (S) and (e) (TMI-1 Unit Organization and Technical Resources),"
following Tr.11617; and
" Licensee's Testimony of Richard Wilson in Response to CLI-80-5, Issue (11), Sholly Contention No.14(b) and ANGRY Contention No. IV (Technical Resources and Capability)," following Tr. 117222 22.
In addition, the li.ceasee presented testimony on the subject of operator training which reiates generally to ANGRY Contention 4, and which is discussed below.
23.
Intervenor ANGRY did not present any affinnative evidence in support of its Contention 4, but did engage in brief cross-examination ^f the Staff (Tr. 12043-45 (Crocker, Allenspach)).
The Board concludes that ANGRY did not establish a case on its contention based on its cross-exanination, and that ANGRY therefore did not meet its burden of going forward with its presentation on this issue.
- 24. The Staff presented its direct testimony in Supplement 1 of its Evaluation Report (Staff Ex. 4) at Sections III.B.2 and 3, sponsored by Lawrence P. Crocker, Frederick R. Allenspach, and Donald R. Haverkamp; in "NRC Staff Testimony of Richard R. Keimig Relative to Management Capability To Operate a Nuclear Generating Station (ANGRY Contention 4),"
following Tr.11946; and in "NRC Staff Testimony of Lawrence P. Crocker and Frederick R. Allenspach Relating to Contention Aamodt #2," following Tr. 12653.0 25.
As stated previously, tne licensee and Staff testified to the significant organizational changes that have been made ~since the TMI-2 4/
Although the Crocker/Allenspach testimony specifically addressed Aamodt Contention 2, it also described personnel qualifications and the Staff's evaluation of them.
0 accident.
Arnold, ff.11434, at 10-30; Staff Ex. 4, 9 III.B.3.a.
As stated, the GPUNG was established and through this entity Met Ed implements operating and management responsibilities for TMI-1. The GPUNG was formed by combining technical and management resources from Jersey Central Power and' Light Company (JCP&L), Met Ed and GPU Service Corporation Generations Division into a single organizational entity.
Arnold, ff.11434, at 8, 9; Staff Ex. 4 at 4, 5.
- 26. The position of Chief Operating Executive of GPUNG is filled by Robert C. Arnold, who will also continue his duties as an officer of Met Ed.
Mr. Arnold's qualifications for assuming this position are set forth in his testimony. Arnold, ff.11434, at 1.
Mr. Arnold is currently Senior Vice President of Met Ed and JCP&L, Vice President of GPUSC, and will be President of GPUNC. He had 10 years of experience in the Navy devoted to nuclear power, and has been in charge of TMI since the accident at Unit 2.
Arnold, ff.11434, at 1.
The position of Deputy Chief Operating Executive is filled by Philip R. Clark. Together, they constitute the Executive Office of GPUNG, which is responsible for the management of TMI-1 activities, Oyster Creek (0C) operations, and the support activities for the facilities.
Staff Ex. 4, at 5.
Mr. Clark gained about 25 years of nuclear power experience in the Navy (Arnold, ff.11434, at 9) and his qualifications were discussed on the record.
Tr.11516-21 ( Arnold).
Tha Board finds that Mr. Arnold and Mr. Clark are qualified to run the Executive Office.
27.
Reporting to the Executive Office are the directors of the six divisions of GPUNG described earlier, as well as the directors in charge of each of the three units in the GPU system (TMI-1, TMI-2 and OC).
The qualifications of the six directors of the GPUNG divisions are discussed by Mr. Arnold in his testimony (Arnold, ff.11434, at 12-28) and there was some examination of their qualifications during the hearing.
Tr.
11524-6 (Arnold); Tr. 11624-25 (Toole); and Tr. 11794-6 (Herbein); see al ;o Tr.11954-66 (Crocker).
Henry D. Hukill is the Director of TMI-1, and has overall direction of day-to-day TMI-1 operations, responsibility for compliance with TMI-1 technical specifications and regulatory requirements, as well as the direction of the TMI-1 managers. Arnold, f f. 11434, a t 10. Mr. Hukill's qualifications for this position are discussed by both fir. Arnold (Id. at 11; see also Tr. 11521-24, 11581 (Arnold)) and ttr. Hukill (Hukill, et al, ff.11617 at 5-7 and Tr.11619-23 (Hukill)).
The Board concludes that these directors are well qualified to assume their duties with TMI-1, as well as with GPUNG and, if the requisite approvals are obtained, with GPUNC.
See also Tr. 11987 (Crocker).
28.
Following the accident, the licensee concentrated resources to support TMI, including the integration of management and technical esources into what is now the GPUNG.
Arnold, ff.11434, at 8.
tiew personnel, particularly in the top levels of management at TMI-1 and in the support divisions, have been recruited by the licensee from outside of the GPU organizations.
In addition, personnel previously assigned to other GPU activities were brought to TMI-1 and assigned to Unit 1.
The organizational modification described above, with emphasis on on-site technical support and management control, and the development of direct lines of communication between on-site technical and management personnel and off-site support organizations, enable the Unit I staff to make better use of the extensive technical support staff'available to it from other elements of the GPUNG.
I;uxill, et al., ff.11617, at 2-3.
29.
The NRC conducted extensive inspections of the qualifications and adequacy of staffing of management and technical groups supporting the operation of TMI-1.
Although _ the details of the inspections are more ful'.y set forth in our discussion of Order Item 3 below, we note that members of both IE and NRR conducted an inspection on July 23-25, 1980 at the TMI-1 site and at corporate offices in order to assess the status of compliance of the licensee with the NRC's criteria for utility nanagement and technical competence.
IE Inspection Report 50-289/80-19 dated September 29, 1980, the "Near Term Operating License" review (NT0L report), summarized at Appendix B of Staff Ex. 4.
The Staff found no itms of noncompliance, nor were there any unresolved items identified, although certain items remained open pending submittals or actions by the licensee.
Staff Ex. 4, Appendix B, at 1, 2.
In addition, a special management appraisal was conducted by the Performance Appraisal Branch of IE (PAB), which included an appraisal of the licensee's management on a national perspective.
IE Inspection Report 50-289/80-21 dated October 16,1980 (PAB Report), summarized at Appendix B of Staff Ex. 4 at 3-14.
l The results of the inspections, and a summary of IE's evaluation of the l
l Tf11-1 management, is contained in Appendix B of Supp.1, and is discussed below in connection with Order Item 3.
The overall Staff conclusion was l
that the technical resources for TMI-1 are more than adequate and that the on-site staffing is sufficient to cope with emergencies. Tr.
11954-56,11982-86 and 12054-56 (Crocker and Keimig.)
- 30.
In response to ANGRY Contention 4, Staff witnesses Richard Keimig of the Region I office of IE testified that licensee management responded well to items of noncompliance found as a result of the TMI-2 accident, was committed to changes in management and management controls to upgrade its n; clear program, and was taking corrective actions with regard to specific items of noncompliance.
Keimig, ff. 11946, at 4-5.
- 31. Staff witnesses Lawrence Crocker and Frederick R. Allenspach testified to the approach used by the Staff for providing the acceptable level of assurance that the TMI-1 personnel are qualified to perfom their functions at the facility. They indicated that the standards against which personnel at TMI-1 were evaluated were modified after the accident.
Revisions to ANSI /ANS N18.1-1971, now designated ANSI /ANS 3.1-1978, have resulted in a more clearly defined listing of personnel qualification requirements, an upgrading of a number of specific qualification requirements, particularly in the area of eductition and experience, more definitive guidance on training and retraining programs, and the addition of qualification requirements for individuals directing preoperational and startup tests. Crocker and Allenspach, ff.12653, at 5, 6.
- 32. The licensee has committed to upgrade the qualification requirements for plant personnel so that they meet the standards of ANSI /ANS 3.1-1978, l
l and both the licensee and the Staff testified that the TMI-1 employees meet those qualifications where applicable.
Hukill, et al, ff.11617, at 3; Crocker and Allenspach, ff.12653, at 5.
33.
In addition the Staff testified that the NT0L inspection team concluded that the GPUNG and TMI-1 organizational structures and i
L technical resources were in confonnance with the Staff's guidelines set forth in draft NUREG-0737.
Crocker and Allenspach, ff. 12653, at 8, 9.
The NRC Staff concluded that the revised licensee organization adequately separates Unit 1 operation from Unit 2 recovery activities such that demands for the Unit 2 clean-up should have no impact on the safe operation of Unit 1 and that resources available to Unit I appear to be sufficient.
Staff Ex. 4, at 38.
This conclusion was based on the in-hoJse resources available to the licensee, without_ reliance on outside resources. Tr.11963 and 12054-56 (Crocker, Allenspach). The Board grees with the licensee and Staff that the qualifications of personnel at TMI-1 have been upgraded since the accident, and finds the quality and l
adequacy of staffing to be sufficient.
The Board's findings with respect to the training of staff for TMI-1 and the maintenance program for the facility are discussed below.
B.
Training of TMI-1 Staff
- 34. The subject of training of TMI-1 personnel can be separated into two categories:
the training of personnel not licensed by the NRC, and the l
training of plant operators who are licensed. The focus of the Board, as l
well as the examination of witnesses at the hearing, was primarily on the training of licensed plant operators.
With respect to unlicensed personnel, however, the Board finds that the licensee has implemented an adequate training program which complies with ANSI /ANS 3.1 (1978), which deals with training as well as selection and qualification of nuclear power plant personnel.
Hukill, et al, ff.11617 at 3; Crocker and Allenspach, ff. 12653, at 3-5.
In addition, the Staff NT0L investigation l
17 -
concluded that the training of plant staff for THI-1 met the guidelines set forth in NUREG-0731. Crocker and Allenspach, ff. 12653, at 8, 9.
- 35. The training and testing of licensed power plant operators was the subject of two contentions in this proceeding. They are:
CEA Contention #13!
l "CEA contends that there is a specific need for the establishment of p
training for operators that addresses the problem of a 'mindset' that denies information indicative of serious reactor problems."
Aamodt Contention #2:
"It is contended that TMI-1 should not open until the. performance of licensee technicians and management can be demonstrated to be upgraded as certified by an independent engineering firm. This upgrading should include 100% test performance of job description with provision for retraining and retest, or discharge of those who cannot consistently and confidently master all necessary information for safe conduct of their job description under all anticipated critical situations as well as routine situations."
36.
Pursuant to tne Commissian's August 9,1979 Order, section II.1.(e),
tne licensee was ordered to:
\\
(a) augment the retraining of all Reactor and Senior Reactor Operators assigned to the control room including training in the areas of natural circulation and small break loss of coolant accidents including revised procedures and the TMI-2 accident. All operators will also receive training at the B&W simulator on the TMI-2 accident and the licensee will conduct a 100 percent reexamination of all operators in these areas.
NRC will administer complete examinations to all licensed personnel in accordance with 10 C.F.R. 55.20-23.
37.
In order to satisfy these requirements for operator retraining and to enhance operator performance further, the licensee conducted an Operator Accelerated Retraining Program (0ARP).
See OARP Report, Licensee Ex. 27. The objectives of the OARP were to:
improve operator performance during small break loss of coolant accidents; assure that operators are able to recognize and respond to situations involving inadequate core cooling; generally improve operator performance during transients, including events that are exacerbated initially by inappropriate operator action; give operators an in-depth understanding of the THI-2 accident and " lessons learned"; assure that operators are knowledgeable of operating procedares and actions necessary upon initiation of the engineering safeguards features; assure that operators understand the manometer effects of water levels in the-reactor coolant system under different pressure and temperature conditions; assure understanding of the significance of simultaneous blocking of both auxiliary feedsater trains; assure understanding of the NRC prompt notification requirements; provide operators with an in-depth understanding of the methods required to establish ar.d maintain natural circulation; assure operators are knowledgeable of both short and long-tenn plant system modifications; provide operators with a review of major plant systems; provide specialized training on operations and procedural. guidance requirements; fully requalify operators through the administration of licensee and NRC-administered written and oral i
examinations; review with operators major administrative, nonaal, abnormal, and energency procedures; and provide to all licensed Unit 1 operators extensive experience on the B&W simulator, educating them on transients which ocurred during the TMI-2 accident, as well as other abnoraal reactor conditions.
Long, et al, ff. 12,140, at 33, 39,
- 38. The OARP content and length was developed by Met Ed and GPU Service Corporation witr. assistance from NUS Corporation. To accomplish the auguented retraining required by the OARP, the station training department has been increased in size fron 6 to 11 positions with l
l 1
authorization to fill Id positions.
In addition, the instruction provided by the THI training department was supplemented with that provided by personnel drawn from the TMI staff, GPU Service Corporation, Babcock and Wilcox, Gilbert Associates, Inc., General Physics, and NUS Corporation. Staff Ex.~ 1, at C6-6.
The 0ARP was presented from August, 1979 through ilarch 1980 to all TMI-1 licensed control room operators (CR0s) and senior reactor operators (SR0s), and the shift technical advisors (STAS) in training. The program consisted of approximately 60 individual lessons or practice sessions. Teaching techniques included classroom presentations, TMI-1 control roaa training sessions, and simulator training sessions at the B&W simulator in Lynchburg, Virginia.
Shifts pa-ticipated as a group; consequently, Licensee was able to focus upon both the activities of the operators, such as an individual manipulating the reactor controls, and the aspects of operations which involve team effort and coordination. The program was divided into seven subject area modules including one week at the simulator.
Each module consisted of four to five days of training, eight hours each day.
Subject matter included the traditional areas of review, such as plant systems and radiation monitoring. However, particular emphasis was placed upon accident and safety analysis.
Long, et al, ff. 12,140 at 39, 40.
- 39. At the end of the program, 0ARP participants took written and oral examinations designed and administered by PQS Corporation, an independent consulting firm which provides reactor training progran reviews and audits.
Individuals who did not score above 70% on any section of the exams, or who failed to achieve an overall score of 80% received remedial requalification training. Long, et al, ff.12140, at 40. Witnesses Kelly, President of PQS Corporation, described the testing.that he performed of the 0ARP graduates. He concluded that overall, the TMI-1 licensed CR0s and SR0s demonstrate a high degree of knowledge of how to safely and effectively o~perate the facility. He attributed this conclusion in large part to the scope and depth of the 0ARP program and to the manner in which it was conducted by conscientious instructors. He testified that, based on his knowledge of, and experience with, licensed operators throughout the industry, he judged the TMI-1 operators collectively to be retrained and evaluated to a much greater extent relative to what he judges to be an industry norm.
Kelly, ff. 12,409, at 10.
- 40. An additional one week training session on Decision Analysis which was developed by tanagement Analysis Company (ftAC) of San Diego, California, was given to all SR0s and STAS. Decision Analysis trains individuals to handle complex situations for which written procedures do not exist; to develop a technique to cope with uncertainty, stress, and conflicting information, and to make decisions in the face of such circumstances; and to make " good" decisions, i.e., to consider fully and understand the significance of alternatives, and to factor in the most important considerations.
Decision Analysis training develops in control roon supervisory personnel -- i.e., SR0s and STAS -- the tools and sensitivity to make the right decisions under highly adverse l
circumstances, and to do so in a systematic and thoughtful manner.
- Long, et al, ff. 12,140 at 40, 41.
l l
i l
41.
In order to assess the effectiveness of the 0ARP, Licensee sought the assistance of five highly qualified individuals, expert in relevant fields, to conduct a review analogous to accreditation reviews carried out by professional organizations. The Committee members were Dr. Julien M. Christensen, Director" of the Human Factor Division, Stevens, Scheidler, Stevens and Vossler, Inc., Dayton, Ohio, representing human factors engineering; Dr. Eric F. Gardner, Professor of Psychology and Education of Syrcause University, Syracuse, New York, representing educational psychology; Dr. William R. Kimel, Dean of the College of Engineering at the University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri, representing nuclear engineering education; Mr. Richard J. Marzec, Manager of Technical Training for Duke Power Company, Charlotte, North Carolina, representing nuclear power plant operator training; and Dr.
Robert E. Uhrig, Vice President, Advanced Systems & Technology for l
l Florida Power & Light Company, Miami, Florida, representing nuclear power generation.
The OARP Review Committee familiarized themselves with the basic philosophy of accreditation, including the quality required of an engineering program in order for it to become accredited; attended 0ARP l
classes; evaluated the proper role of simulators in an operator training program; and evaluated the 0ARP in light of NRC requirements and " lessons learned" from the TMI-2 accident.
Long, et al, ff 12,140, at 41, 42.
l Witness Gardner of this Review Committee concluded that the 0ARP helped to estabiish tha following necessary response sets in operators:
(1) l immediate reaction by the nuclear reactor operator according to operativ, I
procedures when the stimuli present the usual and faniliar situations; (2) knowledge of prior transients and the appropriate response in the I
n
T 9
s,
event similar situations should arise; (3) adeouate knowledge of the reactor and its theory so that appropriate data will be collected, analyzed and a conclusion reached for unusual situations which have not occurred before; and (4) provision for the possibility of irrational behavior should there be~a psychological breakdown by the individual reactor operator. Gardner, ff. 12,409, at 11-14.
42.
Upon completing its review, however, the Committee stated:
The conclusion of the Committee was that the Operator Accelerated Retraining Program carried out by Metropolitan Edison was a high-quality, well-executed program, having nany features which should be incorporated into the regular Operator Retraining Program.
Licensee Ex. 27 at 3.
43.
Cross-examination by Mrs. Aamodt, the Commonwealth and the Board, elicited further details concerning the training that took place during the 0ARP, including a comparison of the B&W simulatar with the THI-1 control room.
Tr.12,143-279 (Long, Knief, Newton, and Ross). Although simulator training was performed on the B&W simulator which has certain differences from the actual control room, Mr. Ross testified that the B&W i
simulator simulates well the nuclear steam supply system, and accidents l
l and training needt.d to mitigate accidents involving this system, (Tr.
12,250 (Ross)) and that the simulator very closely replicates the model of the TMI-1 plant in terms of plant system behavior. Tr. 12,251 (Long).
Witness Long testified that the licensee was presently planning to purchase a full replica simulator of the TMI-1 control room, which would be available about 1985 (Tr.12,145 (Long)), but that the current training on the B&W simulator is consistent with the amount recommended by TVA and others. Tr. 12,154 (Long).
The Board does not consider that this cross-examination revealed any defects in the 0ARP such as would render the t. raining program to be inadequate.
44.
CEA did not present evidence on its Contention 13 which questioned whether the 0ARP satisfactorily addressed 'mindset," nor did it even participate in the hearing.
However, NRC Staff witness Boger testified that the combination of the 0ARP training, which included both classroom instruction and B&W simulator sessions dealing with the THI-2 accident, as well as changes to emergency procedures, emphasis on shift supervisor responsibilities and the assignment of an STA for each shift, assure that plant operators have an overall perspective of plant conditions.
- Boger, ff. Tr.12,772, at 3, 4.
Mr. Boger stated that by maintaining such a perspective, including receptiveness to information showing that the plant is in trouble, operators are required to consider the available information and not underestimate the significance of abnormal conditions. As a result, operators should not be improperly preoccupied (i.e., have a mindset) with avoiding a situation where the reactor coolant system is allowed to be overfilled (going " solid"). Jd. at 2, 3.
l See also, Christensen, ff.12,409, at 11.
The Board agrees with this conclusion, and finds that the 0ARP satisfied the need expressed by CEA Contention 13, in that it satisfactorily addressed the problem of mindset or denial of infomation indicative of serious reactor problems as was experienced during the TMI-2 accident.
.he Board agrees with the licensee that the 0ARP should help operators to maintain an open, searching, contemplative, rational attitude when dealing with unforessen events.
- 45. Mrs. Aamodt questioned extensicely about the effects of distractions such as phone-ringing during a cris's situation, and whether the absence of phones'in the B&W simulator and during testing diminished the effectiveness of the simulator training.
See generally, Tr. 12,509-65.
Witness Kelly responded.that the reliability of the. testing was not '
affected by the abserice of phone ringing. Tr. 12,549 (Kelly). Witness Gardner stated that decision analysis teaches the operators a method of approaching -a problem, so that a traumatic occurrence would result in a systematic approach to the solution by the operator instead of causing him to be demoralized.
Dr. Gardner concluded that this would mitigate any external problems, such as phone ringing or anything else that occurs.
Tr. 12,549 (Gardner). Dr. Long testified about the modifications to the control room environment since the THI-2 accident which relieve the communications burden inquired into by Mrs. Aamodt.
These include the establishment of the Technical Support Center, the assignment on the emergency team of people who have responsibilities as communicators and do not have other assignments in the emergency plan implementing procedures, clear identification of the telephones and the -
parties that are to use them and where those phones are connected and separation of the phones to remove as many as possible from the control room into the shift supervisor's office or other areas. Tr. 12,737 (Long). The Boatd agrees that measures have been taken to reduce the distraction from phone ringing that existed previously.
- 46. Mrs. Aamodt also questioned licensee witnesses about the effects of stress and whether it was properly accounted for in the simulator training and testing. See generally, Tr. 12,422-51, 12,509-33, 12,566-76. Licensee. witnesses testified that the simulator. presented a reasonably stressful situation (Tr.12,428 (Christensen)), and that the total 0ARP program and simulator usage enhanced the ability of the operators to deal more effectively with stress. Tr. 12,449 (Christensen); Tr. 12,566, 67 (Gardner); Gardner, ff. 12,409, at 7, 8; Christensen, ff. 12,409, at 11. Dr. Christensen listed ' actors the licensee was taking to reduce stress. Christensen, ff. 12,409, at 9-11.
Staff witness Boger testified that, while not directly evaluated, operator candidates' performance under stress 's observed during the testing / licensing process.
Boger, ff. 12,770, at 6.
Mr. Boger added that time limits placed on the written and oral examinations place stress on the individuals which must be overcome for satisfactory completion of the exams. M. He concurred with licensee witnesses that previous operating experience, simulator exercises, and training on anticipated l
critical situations help to overcome the stress which may be associated with off-normal situations. H. The Board agrees with this conclusion.
(
- 47. Mrs. Aamodt also presented testimony regarding her Contention 2.
l She indicated that her claimed expertise was in the area of psychology I
and human engineering. Tr. 13,140, 41 (Aamodt). Although she depended l
on her teaching experience and education to develop her background in 1
psychology, she conceded that ner experience in testing and in evaluation of testing, which is the essence of her contention, was limited to her psychology courses and her work as an assistant to a statistitian.
Tr.
13,142 (Aamodt). firs. Aamodt did not offer any credentials, nor did she claim expertise, in areas other than psychology that would be involved in making such an evaluation, such as nuclear engineering, physics, health l
physics, etc. Tr.13,141 (Aamodt); Qualifications Statement of Marjorie Aamodt in Aamodt, ff. 12,931, after 9.
In fact, firs. Aamodt testified-that because of her l'aited expertise, she relied on others for her studies and conclusions, and did not form expert conclusions of her own on this subject matter. Tr. 12, 957 (Aamodt). The Board considered her limited professional training and experience in its weighting of firs.
Aamodt's testimony regarding the adequacy of the testing performed by the licensee and the Staff.
- 48. Although ttrs. Aanodt's testimony contained recommended modifications to the control room (Aamodt, ff.12,931, at 2-4), the Board ruled that such testimony is outside of the scope of Mrs. Aamodt's contention. Tr.
13,145-47. Mrs. Aamodt testified that the use of the B&W simulator was inadequate since it did not duplicate the distractions that could exist in a control roon during an emergency.
Aamodt, ff. 12,931, at 4, 5.
However, she admitted that she had not considered the effect on operator performance of the modifications to the control room made since the accident such as the shift communicator, the use of a tectinical control l
room center, etc. which Dr. Long testified (supra) would reduce distractions. Tr. 13,149 (Aamodt). Mrs. Aamodt also testified that the flRC exams given to operators are deficient in the extent of technical material being tested on (Tr. 13,151 (Aamodt); see also, Aamodt, ff.
12,931, at 6). However, because of firs. Aamodt's lack of exoertise on the technical matters which are covered by the flRC exams, the Board does not accord much weight to this testimony.
Consequently, the Board does i
not find that Mrs. Aamodt has made a convincing case that the licensee's training and testing program is deficient.
l l
- 49. The Staff r. viewed the OARP and concluded that the operator. training required as a result of the Commission's Order is provided, including training in areas beyond that required by the Order. Staff Ex.1, at C6-6.
These additional areas, required by the Staff, include training in heat transfer, fluid dyriaaics, plant transient response, and plant safety analysis.
Id,.; Boger, ff. 12770, at 2.
This training exceeds current flRC requalification training requirements.
Staff Ex.1, at C6-6.
The Staff indicated that it had not reviewed the requalification training program against the criteria set forth by the Staff in its March 28, 1980 letter from H. R. Denton to the licensee, but that approval of the progran is not a prerequisite to restart of TMI-1 since each of the licensed personnel for TMI-1 will be required to successfully pass an NRC exanination prior to resuming his licensed duties at an operating plant.
Staff Ex. 4, at 21. The Staff concluded that successful passing of the 11RC exam, coupled with the 0ARP, and previous THI-1 operator training programs, should ensure enhanced operator performance and the safe and effective cperation of TMI-i.
Staff Ex. 1, at C6-7.
In addition, candidates for CR0 and SR0 licenses are required to pass an audit exan developed by the licensee or its agent regarding the aspects of the TM1-2 accident covering transient effects, operator response, and related procedure / design changes as a prerequisite to licensing. Staff Ex. 1 at Cl-16, C6-6.
Mr. Boger testified that the NRC exarainations are designed to give the Staff reasonable assurance that the operator candidates can safely and completely operate the facility, and that they are structuied around those items that the Staff considers important to safety as enumerated in 10 C.F.R. 9 55.20 through 55.23. Boger, ff. 12,770, at 2.
In addition, Mr. Boger stated that the flRC examinations have been modified since the TMI-2 accident to incorporate' subject matter contained in the fiRC Action Plan, fiUREG-0660, Item I.A.3., as delineated in the Staff's March 28, 1980 letter to the licensee, which includes the new category dealing with thermodynamics, heat transfer, and fluid flow.
In addition, the Staff imposed time limits for completion of the
.exanination, and instituted oral examinations for senior operators.
Finally, the Staff increased the passing grade criteria from 70% to 80%
overall, and required a grade of at least 70% in each category.
_Id. at 3.
- 50. With respect to the narrow scope of Aamodt Contention 2, dealing with the reconnended demonstration of the upgrading of the performance of licensee technicians and nanagement as certified by an independent engineering firm, with 100% test performance of job description with provision for retraining and retest, the Board finds that a major portion of the contention is satisfied.
Specifically, the Board finds that the 0ARP does adequately serve as an independent training and testing function, and that it satisfies the requirenent of Connission Order Iten II.1.(e) regarding the retraining of all CR0s and SR0s, including training in TMI-2 accident matters. The Board also finds th~at the 0ARP and licensee testing satifies that aspect of the Order Item wr ch requires training at the B&W simulator and reexanination of aperators.
However, the Board notes that the Order item calls for De f4RC to administer examinations in accordance with 10 C.F.R. 6 55.20-23, and that 10 C.F.R. Q 55.11(b) similarly requires that the IIRC prescribe the test which must be successfully completed prior to licensing of operators.
In
this regard, the Board agrees with Mr. Boger that it must be the Staff, rather than an independent engineering fim as Mrs. Aamodt contends, which must detennine the competency of licensed operator candidates.
As to Mrs. Aamodt's remaining recommendation, the Board agrees with Mr.
Boger's reasoning that a p'erfect score on the NRC examination regarding an operator's job description is not necessary for the following reasons:
(1) the new Staff criteria provide reasonable assurance that an applicant who can achieve an exam score of at least 80% overall with no category less than 70% and who can successfully pass the operating test can perform licensed duties safely and competently, (2) the licensed operator is not alone at the facility as the Staff requires multiple licensed operators on each shift;E hence, plant safety is not dependent solely on the knowledge.ad understanding of one individual; and (3) the operating test varies from one individual to another so that the Staff can assess the overall effectiveness and scope of the training program.
While each operating test must cover a minimum number of plant systems, operating procedures and transients, the specific topics will not be the same for each applicant.
If the exam results indicate that there is a j
subject or system which has not been adequately covered in the training program, the Staff will infonn facility management to provide additional y
As indicated by Mr. Crocker, the Staff, subsequent to Mr. Boger's testimony, modified its recommendation that the Commission require two SR0s for each shift to only one required SR0 per shift.
He i
stated the factors that the Staff considered in concluding that the capability of the operating staff at TMI-1 would be satisfactory even with only one SR0 per shift, one of which was that the special training and experience possessed by the TMI-1 operators makes them better able to cope with operational problems and hence less in need of a second SR0 per shift.
Tr. 20,732, 20,740-46 (Crocker); Staff Ex. 14 at 22, 23.
training in the weak area.
Boger, ff.12,770, at 4, 5.
Addi tionally, the Board finds that adequate provisions exist for the retraining of operators and for requalification examinations, as well as for retesting-of individuals who do not initially pass the NRC examinations.
Id. at 6, 7.
Accordingly, the Board has weighed the testimony produced on Aamodt Contention 2, and finds that the existing training and testing programs i
supplied by the licensee, as well as the examination process by the Staff, are adequate.
C.
Maintenance
- 51. Plant maintenance, and record-keeping associated with maintenance, l
was the subject of TMIA Contention 5.
TMIA abbreviated its contention from its original fonn, and it ultimately stated the following:
It is contended that Licensee has pursued a course of conduct that is in violation of 10 CFR 50.57,10 CFR 50.36,10 CFR 50.71 and 10-l l
CFR 50 Appendix B, thereby demonstrating that Licensee is not
" technically... qualified to" operate TMI Unit 1 "without engangering the health and safety of the public." This course of conduct includes:
a.
deferrring safety-related maintenance and repair beyond the point established by its own procedures (see e.g., A.P.1407);
b, disregarding the importance of safety-related maintenance in safely operating a nuclear plant in that it:
1.
(Deleted) roposed a drastic cut in the maintenance budget; 2.
p(Deleted) 3.
4.
fails to keep accurate maintenance records related to safety items; 5.
has inadequate and understaffed QA/QC programs related to maintenance; 6.
extensively uses overtime in perfonning safety-related maintenance.
- 52. The Board was not satisfied that TMIA had fully responded to discovery, nor that the licensee and Staff were provided with sufficient infonnatiot from TMIA to prepare evidence on the contention sufficient
for a complete record. Accordingly, the Board directed TMIA to proceed first with. its affirmative case on Contentiot '5 at the start of the hearings, with subsequent opportunity for the licensee and staff to ' rebut TrilA's ' affirmative case on the contention. Memorandun and Order for Prehearing Conference of August 12-13, 1980, dated August 20,1980, at 4; Tr. 2106-28 (Chairman Smith).
- 53. TMIA presented its affirmative case by cross-examining certain licensee employees, both past and present.
See generally, Tr. 2631-4201.
In addition, TMIA introduced certain exhibits which' consisted of licensee work requests which deal with maintenance at TMI-1 prior to the THI-2 accident (THIA Exs. 1-433), as well as overtime charts (TMIA Ex. 44A-K and 46), job description titles (TMIA Ex. 45), the 1979 budget (THIA Ex.
47), and a corrective maintenance component history report (TMIA Ex. 48).
The primary thrust of THIA's presentation was an attempt to denonstrate j
that m intenance, as well as the testing of equipment after it had been i
repaired, was deferred beyond a reasonable time to the detriment of the j
safe operation of the plant.
However, TMIA did not attempt to distinguish between safety-related and non safety-related maintenance in introducing its exhibits. Counsel for TMIA stated that he was relying on the classification of work requests as being 1A maintenance as establishing safety significance (Tr. 2977-78 (Selkoditz)), whereas the licensee's supervisor of maintenance testified that anyone could assign a l
priority 1 to a work request depending on his own sense of priority, and t
l regardless of whether it in fact related to nuclear safety. Tr. 2676-77 l
(Shovlin). The Board instructed TrilA early in the proceeding that the
- ~ ~.
Board's jurisdiction was restricted to nuclear safety-related matters.
Tr. I.983 (Chairman Smith).
- 54. The licensee stipulated that certain Ti1IA exhibits did in fact represent situations where actual time spent performing maintenance exceeded the time estimated for completion of the job, as indicated on the job tickets. However, licensee witness Dyckman testified that the estimated time for completion of a maintenance task is only an aid to scheduling, and differences between the estimated and actual time for perfomance of the repairs does not impact on the perfomance of important maintenance work. Tr. 13,566 (Dyckman).
Over the longer term, the backlog of work requests does become a factor in staffing of the maintenance department, and staffing levels are adjusted to compensate for the backlog of maintenance work. Tr. 13,581-82 (Shovlin); 13,582-83 (Dyckman),and 13,584-85 (Snyder). However, the licensee testified that work requests were scheduled and completed in a timely manner, consistent with safety, plant conditions or other considerations. Shovlin, et al.,
ff. 13,533 at 5..
- 55. The licensee responded to the TMIA exhibits, presenting its own testimony regarding maintenance at THI-1.
Licensee witnesses testified that currently the maintenance work is organized into three departments:
preventive, corrective, an.1 shift maintenance. Shovlin, et al., ff.
13,533, at 1.
Included in the preventive maintenance area is the responsibility for technical specification surveillance.
I d_.
These departments are responsible solely for maintenance at TMI-1, as compared to the organization prior to the accident, when the superintendent of naintenance hid to divide his time and efforts between both TMI units.
H. The qualifications of the manager of plant maintenance, as well as those of the heads of the other referenced departments, are set forth in the licensee's testimony. M.at2-10. The licensee witnesses testified as to the expansion of _ the maintenance organization since the accident,
~
which in turn has drastically reduced the amount of overtine by maintenance workers for TMI-1. Tr. 13,608 -(Shovlin). The licensee also indicated that one sixth of the maintenance production personnel are scheduled for training each week, which provides for continuing enhancement of the technicians' job skills, job knowledge level, and overall plant systems understanding.
Shovlin, et al., ff. 13,533, at 11.
This training includes health physics asareness and radiation work practical factors sessions which develop a sense of responsibility and sharpen safe job performance abilities of the maintenance technicians.
M.
Finally, the maintenance staff works closely with the radiological control group to identify and implement work methods and practices that will help to ensure accomplishment of maintenance in a safe manner for both plant personnel and the general public. M.
In addition, licensee witnesses testified that administrative procedure, and controls have been modified or established to ensure that maintenance requirements are properly identified, coordinated, accomplished, and closed-out in an effective and timely fashion. M. at 78. Lines of communication have been established within the maintenance department and with other plant operations support groups so that the necessary attention is directed from all areas when a top priority situation develops. The preventive l
maintenance group is committed to identifying and implementing well-conceived and progressive concepts to help to maximize the safety, t
reliability, and availability of TMI-1 plant equipment. M.at78,79.
Finally, the use of information technology has been greatly expanded with continued use of the computer to provide and control data. This technology has been applied to both the corrective and preventive maintenance areas.
Id. at 79.
- 56. The Director of the Maintenance and Construction Division of the GPuliG testified as to the support maintenance services available from the GPUNG and, once authorized, by the GPullC. Manganaro, ff. 13,643.
Licensee witness fianganaro testified that the Maintenance Division of GPullG/GPullC can provide the direction and support in the func:.ional areas of maintenance, repair and construction to permit onsite management to concentrate their attention'and resources on the safe and efficient operation and maintenance of the facility. Although the TMI-1 plant director has responsibility for assuring the proper condition of the facility, the GPUNG/GPUNC maintenance division will be able to fill in with assistance whenever the onsite maintenance director requests assistance. M. at 2.
Mr. tianganaro described the initial organization of the maintenance division, including the breakdown of the i
responsibilities of the functional managers and the categories of management of work. M. at 2-6.
- 57. The licensee's witnesses testified about the TMIA exhibits which were admitted, and indicated that nany of them were examples of priority work requests which were in fact handled properly and in a timely manner.
Shovlin, et al., ff.13,533, at 52-59. The licensee conceded that a problem existed early in the work request system which permitted the continuing use of a work request for work in addition to the originally
... ~..
y identified problem, resulting in a najor paperwork problem. This problem was corrected by a revision to the maintenance procedure used by work requestors. M.at60,61. The licensee also stated that overtime policy has been revised so as to restrict the amount of overtime allowed, and that the priority system for identifying naintenance work has been nodified and clarified. H. at 70-75.
- 58. Tne Staff responded to TMIA's presentation with its testimony of Richard R. Keinig and Donald R. Haverkamp.
Keimig and Haverkamp (THIA 5), ff. 16412.
In that testimony, the Staff witnesses stated that they reviewed the licensee's testimony on maintenance and had concluded that it was an accurate representation of the licensee's current maintenance and quality assurance / quality control programs and practices. M. at 2.
The Staff conclusion was based on information independently obtained by IE in connection with its PAB inspection (PAB Report, supra, summarized at Appendix 8 of Staff Exhibit 4). The Staff reviewed the TMIA work l
requests received as exhibits in this proceeding, and presented its j
specific evaluations of the documents, the associated maintenance, and l
their significance, in its testimony.
Keimig and Haverkamp (THIA 5), ff.
l 16412, at Table B.
The Staff concluded that the majority of the work requests entered as TMIA exhibits were for equipment or components which had little or no nuclear safety significance in themselves. Therefore, there were no NRC regulatory or license requirements for maintaining the operability of those components or for administrative control of maintenance performed on those components. However, the Licensee optionally applied the same type of administrative controls to i
maintenance activities performed on nonsafety-related systems / components as it did on safety-related.
Id_. at 4.
- 59. The few examples of maintenance which actually was deferred and the several examples of deferred testing, review or closecut of maintenance and documentation thereof, are not considered by the Staff to have had any individual or collective adverse impact on safety. There appears to be no example of inappropriately deferred safety *related maintenance work. The examples of misuse of " blanket" work requests and cancellation of duplicate work requests, appear to have had no impact on safety.
Keimig and Haverkamp (THIA 5), ff. 16412, at 4, 5.
- 60. The Staff concluded that the records of maintenance work activities were, in fact, auditable. However, there were several examples of cancellation of work activities, particularly with respect to air handling filter replacement, with no formal documentation of the basis l
for not performing the work. The maintenance apparently was re-evaluated as unnecessary prior to initiating any work, and the work requests were initially held open for extended periods and later cancelled during purges of dupiicate or inappropriate work requests. This shortcoming of l
record completeness was not a noncompliance with NRC requirements, but impeded the timely licensee and NRC review of those work requests, ultimately requiring discussions between IE and the licensee's l
responsible maintenance personnel to determine the reasons for cancelling l
work.
Keinig and Haverkamp (TMIA 5), ff. 16412, at 5.
- 61. The IE witnesses testified further that past practices regarding j
identification, scheduling, performance, testing, control, monitoring, quality review and docunentation of maintenance activities have been l
l considered by the licensee. Those practices found to be deficient or marginally adequate have been improved by revising maintenance organization structure, procedures, and management and computerized information control system.
Keimig and Haverkamp (TMIA 5), ff.16412, at 5.
- 62. The Board agrees with the Staff conclusion that TMIA has not demonstrated, nor does the record suggest, that the licensee improperly deferred safety-related maintenance.
- 63. The Staff also inquired into the proposed budget cut in 1979 by the licensee which, as contended in TMIA Contention 5, would have impacted on safety.
IE concluded that the licensee had informed IE of the proposed budget cut, which never was fully implemented, and that if a cut in maintenance had been implemented, IE would have factored that event into its inspection program at the TMI site. However, IE found no apparent basis to suspect that budget reductions were having an adverse effect on plant safety, or that the proposed budget cut would have had any effect on safety-related corrective maintenance.
Keimig and Haverkamp (THIA 5),
ff. 16412, at 6-10.
The Board b.ees with the Staff that there was no l
l basis established which supports TMIA's contention that the licensee disregarded the inportance of safety-related maintenance in safely l
l operating a nuclear plant by proposing cuts in the maintenance budget.
64.
The Staff also concluded, on the basis of its review of inspection reports and the project inspector's observations of work in progress, l
that there was no indication that the quality of maintenance was affected i
j by the extensive use of overtime.
Keimig and Haverkamp (TMIA 5), ff.
l 16,412, at 11-13.
i I
i
- 65. THIA had only brief examination of the licensee's testimony and did not question the Staff's witnesses on its Contention 5, nor did the j
Comonwealth. Tr.16,408 (Chairman Smith). Accordingly, the Board concludes that THIA has not brought into question the validity of the licensee's and Staff's conclusions regarding the contention.
66.
The Staff concluded, based upon its independent review of the licensee's safety-related maintenance program and practices, as well as its review of TMIA exhibits, that the licensee had not pursued a course of conduct in violation of the Commission's regulations such as would demonstrate that the licensee is not qualified to operate THI-1 safely with respect to deferring safety-related maintenance, proposing a drastic budget cut for maintenance, failir.3 to keep accurate maintenance records for safety-related items, having inadequate or understaffed quality assurance / quality control programs related to maintenance, or extensively using overtime in performing safety-related maintenance.
Keimig and Haverkamp (TMIA 5), ff. 16,412, at 14. The Board agrees with the Staff conclusion.
67.
In its Memorandum and Order dated March 25, 1980 and subsequent Memorandum dated April 24, 1980, the Board expressed its concern regarding the completeness of the record on the issue of management competence of the licensee in the event that THIA or other parties failed to follow through on TMIA's deposition program. The Board emphasized this concern in light of the Commission's Order of March 6, 1980 which charged the Board to carefully consider this issue during the proceeding.
68.
IE pursued this matter by reviewing transcripts of the depositions taken during the TMIA deposition program and has conducted inspections and investigations into those matters perceived by the Region I review were to be of concern to THIA. The review was conducted by Region I of IE with inspecticas and investigations carried out by various units within IE. A sumaary of the inspection and investigation reports which document the results of,0f these endeavors, was received into evidence following Tr. 16,412. The Board finds that the Staff has adequately pursued the concerns raised by TMIA in its aborted discovery prograa, and concludes that the matters are satisfactorily resolved.
59.
During presentation by TMIA of its affirmative case on its Contention 5, the Board was motivated by licensee's oral testinony and TMIA's summary (TMIA proposed Exhibit No.1, which was subsequently rejected) to " inquire further into whether, prior to November 1979, the Licensee had in place a reliable method of identifying nuclear safety-related work requests which required maintenance, and whether the Licensee had in place a reliable system of records which would identify and assure that the work was eitner done or nade unnecessary for some other reason." Tr. 3352 (Chairman Snith); see also Tr. 3355-56 and 3358.
It was agreed by the parties and the Boa.rd that the systen in place during 1978 would be an appropriate sample period. Tr. 3835-36. The Board subsequently narrowed the scope of its request for Staff testinony on this subject to a description of the auditability of the licensee's maintenance work both in 1978 and currently. T r. 13561-66.
l 70.
Licensee written testinony, dated February 17, 1981, " Licensee's Response to the Board Question Concerning Maintenance Practices in the Sample Year 1978" (Licensee Ex. 29), provides substantial infomation l
relevant to the Board's question including, (1) background regarding l
licensee's maintenance management systems and practices prior to 1978, (2) the maintenanc.e system in place during 1978, (3) the work request system and conduct and significance of Plan of the Day meetings, and (4) the Quality Assurance Group's role regarding periodic maintenance program review and audit, continuing review of documents governing Quality Control (QC) component corrective and preventive maintenance, and-selected surveillance (or monitoring) of the performance of each generic maintenance procedure.
- 71. The above testimony was reviewed by the NRC Staff and was determined to be an accurate representation of the licensee's maintenance and QA/QC prograus and practices prior to and during 1978, based on information previously obtained during the conduct of routine NRC inspections in those areas. Tne NRC Staff has made no attempt to substantiate t'.40se data contained in Licensee Ex. 29 because the statistics and status information did not appear unreasonable to the NRC reviewers nor did it indicate major progran inadequacies.
Rather, the Staff testinony reported the perfornance and results of the independent IE inspections conducted during the sample year,1978.
Keimig and Haverkamp (1978
'taintenance), f f.16,412, at 2.
- 72. Based on its inspections of license maintenance activities during l
1978 and a re-examination of those activities and inspections, and based on its subsequent review of specific work requests, the Staff determined l
that the licensee had implemented an acceptable system for identifying safety-related work requirements.
In addition, the licensee had in plan an acceptable and auditable method of maintaining records which I
demonstrated that the work was properly identified and either performed l
L l
or determined to be unnecessary for appropriate reasons.
Finally, the licensee's maintenance records provided an acceptable method of obtaining necessary work review, approval and reporting.
Keimig and Haverkamp (1978 Maintenance) ff,16,412, at 11-12.
73.
Based on review of the current licensee maintenance program during the PAB inspection, (supra), the licensee's report that the weaknesses were corrected and no noncanpliances were identifed by IE, the Staff concluded that a currently acceptable maintenance program is established as well. This incl ides the overall maintenance system and auditability of maintenance rela:ed records. The Licensee's management control systems for maintenance, which were improved and enhanced since 1978, continue to show, among other things:
(1) that the licensee has implemented an acceptable system for identifying safety-related work requirements; (2) the the licensee has in place an acceptable and auditable method of maintaining records which demonstrate that work is properly identified and either performed or made unnecessary for appropriate reasons; and (3) the licensee's maintenance records provide an acceptable method of obtaining necessary work review, approval, and reporting.
Keimig and Haverkamp (1978 Maintenance), ff.16,412, at 16.
The Board considers this matter to be satisfactorily resolved.
74.
In conclusion, the Board has considered the record in this proceeding and concludes that the operations and technical staff of Unit 1 is qualified to operate Unit 1 safely, that the maintenance program is adequate, and that the licensee poa.sesses sufficient in-house technical capability to ensure the simultaneous safe operation of Unit I and clean-up of Unit 2.
CLI-8'J-5 Issue 3:
What are the views of the flRC inspectors regarding the quality of the management of TMI Unit 1 and the corporate management, staffing, organization and resources of Metropolitan Edison.
75.
The licensee presented no testimony on (ssue 3 as it deals exclusively with views of f4RC Inspectors. 1.ie Staff's testimony on the subject is contained in fiUREG-0680, Supplement 1 (Staff Ex. 4), Sections III.B.5 and III.I and Appendix B and in NUREG-0680, Supplement 2 (Staff Ex.13) Sections III.B.5 and III.I. Based on its review, the Staff concluded i. hat the pervasion of management's positive commitment to safe operation at all levels of supervision and performance of licensed operations is expected and will be closely monitored by IE during the conduct of the TMI-1 Restart Inspection Program. Staff Ex. 4, at 24.
In addition, the testimony of Richard Keimig on ANGRY Contention 4, discussed earlier, represents IE's views on the licensee's management capability.
Keimig, ff. 11,946.
- 76. Since the accident at TMI-2, IE has undertaken investigations into the operational, radiological, and emergency response actions of the licensee during the accident, the implementation of the Quality Assurance / Quality Control Program, the implementation of the Physical Security Plan and the cold shutdown operations at TMI-1. Staff Ex. 4,.at 14-15. These inspections were essentiaily compliance-oriented. Staff Ex. 4, at 14.
In addition, three special inspections were conducted in July and August,1933 to appraise and evaluate the status and adequacy of 1
the licensee's implementation of certain management control systens and programs. Staff Ex. 4, at 15. These inspections included a management appraisal by the IE Program Appraisal Branch (PAB), a health physics i
evaluation by the Region I and Headquarters Staffs, and a "near-tera-operating license" (NT0L) review by the Regional and Headquarters Staffs.
Staff Ex.~4, at 15. The special inspections were evaluative and forward-looking in nature and were conducted to determine what actions the license should take prio,r to restart to conform to assumed NRC require-cents of a "model" operating reactor, to certain requirements soon to be in effect, and to requirements being imposed on NTOL facilities. Staff Ex. 4, at 15.
- 77. Appendix B in NUREG-0680, Supplement 1 provides the scope and findings of the special inspections conducted during July and August 1980. The first inspection (Inspection 50-239/80-19), held on July 23-25, 1980, included utility management and technical competence in the areas of shif t technical advisors, staffing for startup testing prograu, onsite technical support center, onsite operational support center, independent safety reviews, offsite and onsite staffing, dissemination of operating experiences, and communications with NRC. Staff Ex. 4, Appendix B at 1.
No itms of nc,ncompliance were found and no unresolved items were identified.
Staff Ex. 4, Appendix B at 1.
Twelve itens, however, did remain open at the conclusion of the inspection.
Staff Ex.
4, Appendix B at 1-2.
The licensee's actions regarding these open items will be reviewed during subsequent NRC inspections prior to TMI-1 restart. Staff Ex. 4, Appendix B at 2.
73.
Inspection 50-239/80-21, a Management Appraisal (MA) or PAB inspection, discused earlier, was conducted on July 7-11, 14-18, 27-31, and August 1,1980 by the Program Appraisal Branch.
Staff Ex. 4, Appendix B at 5.
The PAB inspection methodology serves to identify
__ _ __. _ _ _ _ _ _ c problems of a generic nature and is structured to examine the licensee's management. controls over selected functional areas.
Staff Ex. 4, Appendix B at 3.
Of the eleven areas inspected, the Quality Assurance Progran received a highest rating of " good." Staff Ex. 4, Appendix B at
~
6.
All other areas were judged to be " average" on a national perspective with the exception of a portion of the training area (dealing with non-licensed personnel) which was evaluated as " poor." Staff Ex. 4, Appendix B at 6.
Additional significant weaknesses were found and potential enforcement items were also identifird in the MA inspection.
Staff Ex. 4. Appendix B at 6-8.
- 79. The llRC has identified a need for licensees to strengthen the health physics programs at nuclear power plants and, at a first step in assuring such measures are taken, IE is conducting special team appraisals of health physics programs whicn include the health physics aspects of radioactive waste management and onsite emergency preparedness.
Staff Ex. 4, Appendix B at 15.
During July 23 through August 8, 1980, the Staff conducted a special evaluation of the TMI-1 health physics program (Inspection 50-289/80-22). Staff Ex. 4, Appendix B at 15. Two additional areas were included in the TMI-1 evaluation that are not addressed in special team appraisals at other operating reactors. Staff Ex. 4, Appendix B at 15. The two additional areas reviewed were:
(1) licensee's at.tions to correct items of non-compliance documented in fiUREG-0600, and (2) verification of licensee's implementation of recommendations contained in llVREG-0578. Staff Ex. 4, Appendix B at 15.
Based on its review, the Evaluation Team reached the overall conclusion that the health physics program at TMI-1 was adequate to support the present level of activities, but that there were a number of significant weaknesses tnat must be corrected to provide reasonable ass'irance that-the program will be adequate during operation and major outages. Staff Ex. 4, Appendix B at 17.
The Staff identified eight significant weaknesses. Staff Ex. 4, Appendix B at 17-18.
80.
The licensee responded to the non-compliances and significant weaknesses identified in the llA and health physics evaluation; those responses were evaluated by the IE Staff and were considered acceptable.
Staff Ex. 13, at 5.
The licensee's reported corrective actions, either taken or planned, include implementation of a Plant Operations Review Committee Charter; development and implementation of a Training Department Administrative fianual; and definition of the fluclear Assurance 91 vision and the Radiological and Environmental Controls Division organization structures, responsibilities, and functions. Staff Ex. 13, at 5.
The Staff concludes that these corrective measures, when fully implemented, are sufficient to resolve the management concerns identified during past IE inspections. Staff Ex. 13, at 5.
- 31. fir. Keinig, on behalf of IE, further testified that the licensee has made and continues to make a sincere effort to correct prior deficiencies in the operation of Tt41-1. The commitaents and changes already made and j
those proposed by the licensee for the restart and future operation of Till-1 are diverse and significant. The organization changes made at the corporate and plant level provide an appreciably strengthened management capability. Also, the introduction of new personnel with varied backgrounds and experience into the organization, at all levels,
.i
complements the new organization and increases its technical competence.
Keimig, ff. 11946, at 15.
- 82. Mr. Keinig further testified that corrective actions taken and those planned and documented by the licensee relative to previous itens' of nonco.npliance cited by flRC, as well af, other progran changes resulting froa licensee and liRC reviews and investigations following the accident, should enable the licensee to operate TMI-1 in a safe manner. Based upon the licensee's commitments for corrective actions and changes in the organization, policies, programs and procedures, and upon full implementation of these commitments, it appears that the licensee will be capable of operating a nuclear power plant safely and with due regard to public health and safety.
However, IE will continue to review these aatters, inspect implementation on a s hedule consistent with the l
licensee's proposed restart date, and monitor the effectiveness of the changes and their interaction with each other.
Keinig, ff.11,946 at 15, 16.
- 83. Tne Board finds that the NRC inspectors believe the licensee to be capable of properly managing and safely' operating TMI Unit 1.
i CLI-80-5 Issue 4:
1 Whether the Unit 1 Health Physics program is appropriately organized and staffed with qualified individuals to ensure the safe operation of the facility;
- 84. The licensee submitted testimony on CLI-80-5 Issue 4 in three sets.
l The first was prepared by Robert L. Long, Donald A. Knief, Samuel L.
I tiewton, and liichael J. Ross (follows Tr.12140). The second set was submitted by William Wegner (follows Tr. 13284). The third set was l
L
submitted by Richard Heward, William E. Potts, Ronald A. Knief, Jesse W.
Brasher, and Richard Dubiel (follows Tr.16292). The Staff's testinony on this subject is contained in NUREG-0680 (Staff Ex. 1), Chapter 6 (pp.
C6-17 through C6-24); flVREG-0680, Supplement 1 (Staff Ex. 4),Section III.G; ilVREG-0680, Supplement 2 (Staff Ex.13),Section III.G; and two pieces of testinony prepared by Donald R. fleely (follows Tr.16450 and 20,572). No other testimony was submitted by the parties.
- 85. The objective of the licensee'r Radiological Controls Program is to control radiation exposure, to avoid accidental radiation exposures, to Gaintdin exposures within regulatory requirements, and to keep exposures to workers and to the general population as low as is reasonably achievable.
Heward, et al., ff. Tr. 16292, at 4.
In order to meet these objectives, the Radiological Controls Department has been reorganized, staffing has been increased from approximately 9 to 79, and the TMI-1 Radiation Protection Plan and implementing procedures have been rewritten.
Heward, et al., ff. Tr.16292, at 4.
In order to ensure that the new department is properly maintained, a new radiologica'l control training program has been developed and institeted and new equipnent has been purchased. Heward, et al., f f. Tr.16292, at 4.
- 86. The Radiological Controls Department is headed by a nanager who reports to GPU!1G's Division of Radiological and Environmental Controls although a close coordination with the TMI-1 plant management is maintained. Heward, et al., ff. Tr. 16292, at 4.
The Department is organized into three groups: Radiological Engineering, Radiol 9gical Technicians, and Administration. Heward, et al., ff. Tr.16292, at 5.
Radiological Engineering has a nanager and six engineers; the engineers
- 48.-
are responsible for anticipating and solving technical radiological control problems, planning and developing of the radiological controls program, providing technical support to TMI-1, and assessing the serformance of the radiological controls organization to ensure
' continuous taprovement in the program. Heward, et al., ff. Tr.16292, at 5.
- 87. The Radiological Technicians group consists of a manager, six foremen and 30 technicians. Heward, et al., ff. Tr.16292, at 5.
The technicians monitor ongoing radiological work and ensure that proper radiological control practices are used. Heward, et al., ff. Tr.16292, at 5.
The Administration group consists of an Administrator and four clerks who perform most administrative and clerical work for which the Department is responsible. Heward, et al., ff. Tr.16292, at 5-6.
88.
The licensee has instituted a comprehensive training program for Radiological Controls technicians and supervisors. Heward, et al., ff.
Tr.16292, at 6.
This training program is directed by the Technician -
Training Section of the Ti1I-1 Training Department which is part of the l
Narlear Assurance Division of GPUllG.
Long, et al., ff. 12140, at 4, 9, 45.
It consists of two parts:
the Initial Technician Training Program l
l and the Technician Training / Retraining Program (Cyclic Program).
- Long, I
l et al., ff. Tr.12140, at 45. The Initial Technician Training Program l
consists of approximately eight weeks of training which every new radiological control technician must undergo prior to assuming responsibility for radiation control work at THI-1. Long, et al., ff.
Tr.12140, at 45-46.
89.
Once a technician is assigned on shif t at TMI-1, he participates in the Cyclic Program which is conducted continuously over a minimum of a forty-two week period, with each shift rotating through the program for one week everj six weeks. Long, et al., ff. Tr.12140, at 46; Heward, et al., ff. Tr. 16292, af 6; Tr. 16369-(Knicf). The classroon progran consists of both practical and theoretical aspects of radiation protection.
Heward, et al., ff. Tr. 16292, at 6.
It was developed to maintain existing qualifications as well as to update the technicians.
Tr. 16370 (Knief).
- 90. Tne licensee subaitted to the NRC Staff its Radiation Protection Plan which describes the proposed radiation protection program with regard to the THI-1 restart.
Staff Ex. 1, at C6-17. The Staff reviewed the Radiation Protection Plan and found the material acceptable.
Staff Ex. 1, at C6-17.
I
- 91. The Radiation Protection Plan for TMI-1 consists of nine articles.
Staff Ex. 1, at C6-17 through C6-23. Article 1, " Foundation for the TMI
(
Radiological Controls Program," sets forth the licensee's philosophies, policies, and objectives regarding the radiological controls program.
Staff Ex. 1, at C6-17. The policies described in Article 1 include commitments to implement a radiation protection progran in accordance with Regulatory Guide 8.8 ("Information Relevant to Insuring that i
Occupational Radiation Exposures at Nuclear Power Stations Will be As Low As Reasonably Achievable") and Regulatory Guide 8.10 (" Operating Philosophy for Maintaining Occupational Radiation Exposures As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable"). Staff Ex. 1 at C6-18.
l l
l l
c
l.
- 92. Article 2, entitled " Responsibilities of Workers," identifies specific rules to be followed by individuals working in restricted areas in order to minimize radiological problems. Staff Ex. 1, at C6-18.
Article 3 which is entitled " Audits, Reviews and Reports on the TMI Radiological Controls hram," identifies nine levels of audits, reviess, and reports to assure that individuals and supervisors who are responsible for aaintaining occupational radiation exposures as low as is reasonably achievable are meeting that requirement and are assisting others in understanding and complying with tMt requirement.
Staff x.
1, at C6-18. The licensee has also committed to a policy for corrective action.
Staff Ex. 1, at C6-18.
93.
"Radiologica! Training" u the subject of Article 4 et the Radiation Protection Plan.
Staff Ex. 1, at C6-19.
It describes the training prograu which assures that each person understands radiation risks, radiological conditions to be encountered, personal responsibility to naintain exposure to as low as is reasonably achievable, and the need to comply with radiological control procedures. Stiff C.x. 1, at C6-19.
Article 5, " Control of External Exposure," reaffirms the licensee's commitment to maintain occupational radiation exposure, both individually and collectively, to levels as low as is reasonably achievable and describes exposure control policies and requirements addressed to that goal. Staff Ex. 1, at C6-20.
- 94. Article 6 which is entitled " Control of Internal Exposure" describes the licensee's policy on an internal control program intended to prevent any significant internal exposure to personnel such that no individual shall receive nore than one-tenth of the permitted annual intake of
radioactive matarials. Staff Ex.1, at C6-21. Article 7. " Control of Radioactive Contamination" states an intent to ninimize possible inhalation or ingestion of radioactivity and buildup of radioactivity in the environment, to simplify subsequent decontamination, and to ninimize the need to rely on anticontamination clothing.
Staff Ex.1, at C6-22.
This Article also emphasizes the importance of training in assuring success in this progran.
Staff Ex. 1, at CS-22. Article 8, " Control of Radioactive Ilaterials," describes a system for radioactive material control to assure that such material is not lost or misplaced so as to cause inadvertent occupational exposures and to prevent uncontrolled spread of such materials to areas where the public might be affected.
Staff Ex. 1, at C6-22.
- 95. Article 9 describes the organization for the Radiological Controls Department Staff Ex. 1, at C6-23. The tlanager of Radiological Controls is responsible for assuring that a high quality radiologicai control
~
program is established and maintained, for evaluating radiological conditions, and for reconmending precautionary measures.
Staff Ex. 1, at i
l CC-23.
l
- 96. To assure that personnel radiation exposures are maintained as low as is reasonably achievable, each engineer involved with TMI-1 shall have responsibility for radiological engineering as part of work assignments.
Staff Ex. 1, at C6-23. As a result, most radiological engineering functions are performed in angineering groups rather than in the Radiological Controls Department. Staff Ex. 1, at C6-23.
Overall coordination of the TMI-1 ALARA program, however, is assigned to Radiological Engineering in the Radic. ogi. cal Controls Department. Staff Ex. 1, at C6-23. This Radiological Engineering Group consists of two Met-Ed radiological engineers and five contract radiological engineers.
Staff Ex.1. at C6-23.
- 97. Based on its review of the licensee's Radiation Protection Plan, the Staff concludes that the provisions described and commitments made are satisfactory and conform to the applicable regulatory requirements.
Staff Ex. 1, at C6-17 through C6-23. The Staff finds the Plan to be acceptable. Staff Ex.1, at C6-17 through C6-23.
- 98. Basic Energy Technology Associates (BETA) performed an independent review of the TMI-1 health physics prograia for the licensee in January, 1981. Wegner, ff. Tr. 13284, at 26. This assessment supports the conclusions that the TMI-1 health physics program is appropriately organized and staffed with qualified individuals to assure the safe operation of the facility. Wegner, ff. Tr.13284, at 27. BETA found t
l each of the nanagement personnel to be knowledgeable, interested, and l
l dCtively involved in the radiological control program. Wegner, ff. Tr.
13284, at 27. Representatives of BETA further testified that there were no weaknesses in the TMI-1 health physics program that need to be corrected prior to restart. Tr.16379 (Miles).
- 99. During the period from July 28 - August 8, 1980, the Staff conducted an evaluation of the health physics program at TMI, specific to the restart of Unit 1.
Staff Ex. 4, at 22. The results of the evaluation were issued as Inspection Report 50-289/80-22. Staff Ex. 4, at 22.
100. The objective of this health physics appraisal was to evaluate the l
overall adequacy and effectiveness of the total health physics program, including the health physics aspects of radioactive waste management and
on::ite emergency preparedness, and to identify areas of weakness that need to be strengthened.
Staff Ex. 4, Appendix B at 15. The TMI 4
evaluation also (1) reviewed the licensee's actions to correct the itets of noncompliance as a result of IE's investigation into the THI-2
~
accident and (2) verified the licensee's implementation of recocnendations contained in NUREG-0578. Staff Ex. 4, Appendix B at 15.
The evaluation team consisted of four inspectors from NRC Region I and two individuals from NRC Headquarters Staff Ex. 4, Appendix B at 16.
This team observed work practices, reviewed selected procedures and records, and interviewed GPUNG personnel and contractors. Staff Ex. 4, l
Appendix B at 16.
101. In its Inspection Report, the Staff described the significant weaknesses it found in the areas cf (1) organization, responsibilities, staffing, and nanagement oversight; (2) exposure control; (3) radioactive waste management; and (4) energency plan implenentation.
Staff Ex. 4, Appendix 3 at 20-28. The Staff also identified noncompliances:
(1) certain respiratory protection procedures were not maintained and implemented, (2) the respiratory protection program was not being audited, (3) the quality assurance criteria for shipping packages for radioactive material were not net, (4) no PORC-reviewed and Unit Superintendent-approved whole body couater and laboratory counting equipment procedures were in use, and (5) the licensee had not determined if appropriate extremity nonitoring devices were being supplied.
Staff Ex. 4, Appendix B at 29-33.
102. The Staff evaluated the licensee's response to the significant findings and itens of noncompliance specified in the Inspection Report.
Staff Ex.13, at 7; fleely, ff. Tr.16450, at 5.
The Staff concludes that no outstanding issues remain regarding the nanagement and' technical capability in the health physics area and training of radiological controls staff.
Staff Ex.13, at 7; Tr. I'.?52 (Neely). The corrective
~
actions, either taken or planned by the licensee, were sufficient to resolve the management concerns identified in past IE inspections.
Staff Ex.13, at 5; Neely, ff. fr.16450, at 5; Tr.16463 (Neely).
Subsequently, IE conducted an inspection to deternine the status of the implementation of the various corrective measures. Mr. Neely testified that, during the inspection, IE concluded that out of 27 items identified in Supplement 1 to the ER (Staff Ex. 4), Appendix B,19 items were correct-d by the licensee. With regard to the eight remaining open itens, Region I will continue reviewing the status of the licensee's corrective actions. During the above referenced inspection, IE also i
examined the licensee's corrective actions with respect to items of noncompliance previously identifed in NUREG-0600.
Based on the foregoing, it appears that the licensee's radiological control program is adequate to support the restart of Unit 1.
Neely, ff. 20,572, at 1.
103. The Board finds that the licensee has established an adequate l
radiological control organization which is guided by a comprehensive Radiation Protection Plan.
Further, the Radiological Controls Departuent at THI-1 is staffed with sufficient, adequately trained and qualifed personnel to ensure effective implementation of the plan. Thus, the Board concludes that the Unit I health physics program is appropriately organized and staffed with qualified individuals to ensure the safe operation of the facility.
CLI-80-5 Issue 5 Whether the Unit 1 Radiation Waste system is appropriately staffed with qualified individuals to ensure the safe operation of the facili ty; 104. The licensee's testimony on this issue was presented by Henry D.
Hukill, Ronald J. Tooie, Michael J. Ross, and Joseph J. Colitz (follows Tr.11617); by Samuel L. Newton and Michael J. Ross (follows Tr.12140);
and by William Wegner (follows Tr. 13284). Tha Staff's testimony on this issue is found in NUREG-0680, Supplement 1 (Staff Ex. 4),Section III.I and in HUREG-0680, Supplement 2 (Staff Ex 13),SectionIII.I.
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Consumer Advocate, ANGRY, and the Aamodts participated in cross-examination but no other direct testimony was presented.
105. The TMI-1 Radwaste organization, directed by the Supervisor of Radwaste, carries out the daily radioactive waste activities at the facility. Staff Ex. 4, at 25; Hukill, et al., ff. Tr.11617, at 24. The Supervisor of Radwate oversees, through the Radwaste forenan, the collection, compaction, packaging, handling, and shipping of radioactive waste.
Staff Ex. 4, at 25; Hukill, et al., ff. Tr.11617, at 24. The P.5dwaste foreman directs laborers, utility workers, and, at times, auxiliary operators in the performance of radioactive waste functions.
Staf f Ex. 4, at P5. The routine day-to-day operation of the waste systems is performed by auxiliary operators who report to the operations Shift Foreman who repcets to the operations Shift Supervisor Staff Ex. 4, at 25; Tr.11703 (Ross).
106. One of the goals of the Supervisor of Radwaste is to develop a rotating decontamination systen which will ensure that the protected and
~
vital artas at THI-1 are raaintained in as clean and radioactivity-free environ aent as possible. Hukill, et al., ff. Tr.11617, at 25. The Supervssor of Radwaste also. coordinates the activities of radwaste personnel with the needs of the operating and maintenance Staff and with the activities and respecibilities of the Radiological and Environnental Controls Divisicn of GPUNG. Hukill, et al., ff. Tr.11617, at 25.
107. Sarapling, analyses, and controlled release of radioactive effluents are performed by the Chemistry Group in the Plant Engineering Department, and Operations Department with the Radiological Controls Departmer.t a
providing control through issuance of gaseous and liquid radioactive waste release perraits.
Staff Ex. 4, at 25; Tr.11704-5 (Colitz). The Unit 2 Process Support Group, which reviews and approves all Unit 1 and 2 radioactive waste shipments, also reviews the liquid radioactive effluent release permits for Unit 1 prior to release. Staff Ex. 4, at 25.
t 108. The training programs for auxiliary operators was reviewed by the IE Perforiaance Appraisal Branch in its PAB inspection (50-289/80-21).
Staff Ex. 4, at 26. This review indicated that the training provided was l
adequate. Staff Ex. 4, at 25.
109. In addition, the evaluation of the health physics program at TMI-1 l
l (Inspection 50-289/80-22) included an evaluation of the Unit 1 l
Racioactive Waste Management Program. Staff Ex. 4, at 25. This evaluation consisted of a review of:
assignment of progran responsibility; waste processing systems (liquid, gaseous, solid);
effluent / process instrumentation; organization and staffing; and personnel training and qualifications. Staff Ex. 4, at 24. Based on its review, the Staff concluded that the Radioactive Waste Management Program t
at Unit 1 is appropriately organized and staffed with qualified personnel in accordance with f4RC guidance (flVREG-0731 and Regulatory Guide 1.8) and AtiSI standards (AtlSI/18.1-1971). Staff Ex. 4, at 26. The Staff did find, however, that the interface between the Unit 1 and 2 radioactive waste organization and the training and retraining progran for non-licensed personnel were not documented. Staff Ex. 4, at 26. The licensee's response to the Inspection Report explained corrective actions either taken or planned which included interfaces and radwaste training / retraining rograms for THI-1 and 2.
Staff Ex. 13, at 8.
These corrective measures, when fully implemented, are sufficient to resolve the previous significant weaknesses. Staff Ex. 13, at 8.
An independent assessnent conducted by BETA, Inc. for GPU/ Met Ed also concluded that Till-1 is appropriately staffed with personnel qualified to process radioactive waste safely. Wegner, ff. Tr. 13284, at 29.
110. The intervenors oid not elicit any evidence during their brief examination which would indicate that the radioactive waste system is inappropriately staffed.
111. Based on the evidence presented, the Board finds tnat the Unit 1 Radioactive Waste System is appropriately staffed with qualified individuals to ensure the safe operation of the facility.
CLI-80-5 Issue 6 Whether the relationship between Metropolitan Edison's corporate finance and technical departments is such as to pmvent financial considerations from having improper impact upon tecnnical decisions; 112. The licensee's testimony on Issue 6 was presented by William Wegner of BETA, Inc. (follows Tr. 13284) and by Herman Dieckamp (follows Tr.
L
13437). The Staff's testimony is contained in NUREG-0680, Supplement 1 (Staff Ex. 4),Section III.I.
Neither the Intervenors nor the interested-state agencies presented testimony on this subject.
113. At TMI-1, technical decisions are made through the operational chain
~
of GPUNG, headed by Robert Arnold. Staff Ex. 4, at 26. Within Met Ed, financial natters are under the purview of the Vice President for Finance, Vernon Condon.
Staff Ex. 4, at 26.
Both Mr. Arnold and Mr.
Condon report directly to Hernan Dieckamp, Acting President of Met Ed.
Staff Ex. 4, at 26. Thus, possible conflicts between technical decisions and financial considerations should not occur below the level of Mr.
Dieckanp.
Staff Ex. 4, at 26.
114. The Staff is not aware of any instances since the TMI-2 accident where financial considerations have had an improper impact on technical decisions regarding the restart of TMI-1. Staff Ex. 4, at 26; Tr.12059 c
(Crocker).
In addition, there was no indication of undue influence of financial considerations on TMI operations before the TMI-2 accident, based on the various investigations of the accident.
Staff Ex. 4, at 26; Dieckanp, ff. Tr.13437, ct 3; Tr.13484 (Dieckanp).
115. The Staff is confident that if the technical staff felt there were a serious deficiency of the plant that needed to be corrected and the funds to correct the deficiencies were not available, then the plant would be put in a safe condition pending the necessary actions. Tr. 12057 (Crocker).
The licensee is emphasizing the safety aspects of plant operations and any decisions that would have to be made on financial considerations would also account for plant safety. Tr. 12058 (Crocker).
While financial matters do influence the actions of the utility, the emphasis on safety is such that there is not an undue financial influence. Tr. 12058 (Crocker).
116. Mr. Dieckamp testified that, with the high cost of replacement power, the overall economic incentives are to provide the resources necessary to ensure operability of nuclear facilities.
Dieckamp, ff. Tr.
13437, at 2.
Since operability and safety are directly linked through reliability and regulation, the economic incentives are supportive of safety. M. He concluded that safety takes prededence over economics by virtue of the overriding requirement to protect the public and worker health and safety, to satisfy regulatory requirements, and to constrain operation within the limits of the technical specifications. H.
117. The licensee's consultant, BETA, concluded that, with the creation of GPUNG, the likelihood of financial matters interfering with technical decisions is greatly reduced.
Wegner, ff. Tr. 13284, at 30. Major policy / financial decisions are made by the GPUNG Board of Directors which is composed of knowledgeable people, experienced in nuclear matters, who understand the importance of technical integrity. Wegner, ff. Tr. 13284, l
at 30. The independent assessment performed by BETA, Inc. indicated that if financial pressures became so severe as to deny funds for proper and f
safe technical action at TMI-1, GPUNG itself would not permit restart or continued operation. Wegner, ff. Tr.13284, at 30; Tr.13455 (Dieckamp).
118. Based on its review, the Staff concluded that, for THI-1, the relationship between the corporate finance and the technical departments is such that financial considerations should not have an improper influence on technical decisions. Staff Ex. 4, at 27.
Further, the assessment performed by BETA found no evidence that undue financial pressures were being applied in the technical areas of TMI-1 even though there was financial stress within GPU. Wegner, ff. Tr. 13284, at 30.
119. The intervenors elicited no evidence on cross-exanination which would deuonstrate a conclusion contrary to that reached by the Staff and the licensee.
120. The Board finds that the relationship between the licensee's corporate finance and technical departments is such as to prevent financial considerations from having an undue impact on technical decisions.
CLI-80-5 Issue 7:
Whether Metropolitan Edison has made adequate provision for groups of qualified individuals to provide safety review of and operational advice regarding Unit 1; 121. The licensee presented direct testimony on this issue through Philip R. Clark, (testinony follows Tr.11759) and William Wegner (testinony follows 13284). The Staff's testimony is contained in NUREG-0680, Supplement 1 (Staff Ex. 4),Section III.C and in HUREG-0680, Supplement 2, (Staff Ex. 13),Section III.C.
No other direct testimony was submitted.
122. Tne NRC requires that licensees make acceptable provisions for reviews and audits of changes to plant design and procedures and for conduct of tests and experiments as specified in 10 C.F.R. Q 50.59.
Staff Ex. 4, at 19.
Provisions for review and audit activities that are dCCeptable to the Staff are stated in Regulatory Guide 1.33 (Second Proposed Revision 3), " Quality Assurance Program Requirements (0peration)." Staff Ex. 4, at 19.
Regulatory Guide 1.33 also recoauends
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.1
that an Independent Safety Engineering Group be established. Staff Ex.
4, at 19. The requirements-for an independent, dedicated, full-time safety engineering Staff to be located onsite is established in Task I.B.1.2 of IlVREG-0694; the composition and functioning of such a group is discussed in i4UREG-0731. Staff Ex. 4, at 19.
123. The licensee has established provisions for carrying out safety reviews and audits and is finalizing procedures to provide operational advice to Till-1.
Staff Ex. 4, at 20; Clark, ff. Tr. 11759, at 1.
The provisions for providing safety reviews and audits will include reviews by three different groups:
the support divisions; an Independent Onsite Safety Review Group (10SRG); and the General Office Review Board (G0RB) which utilizes the services of the fluclear Safety Assessnent Department (f45AD) of the iluclear Assurance Division. Staff Ex. 4, at 20; Clark, ff.
Tr. 11759, at 4-8.
124. The support divisions are multidisciplinary corporate organiza-tions which provide technical review and support of activities at the plant site.
Staff Ex. 4, at 20; Tr.11779 (Clark). They are independent of the THI-1 Staff and provide personnel who perform an independent review of all proposed changes to procedures, the facility, and the Technical Specifications, and of all license amendments. Staff Ex. 4, at 20; Clark ff. Tr. 11759, at 4.
This group also conducts a continuing review of overall plant performance and identifies trends. Staff Ex. 4, at 20.
Results of reviews are made available to the TMI-1 management through the Technical Functions Tf11-1 Site Supervisor. Staff Ex. 4, at 20. This group will, upon flRC approval, replace the existing Plant Operations Review Comeittee (PORC). Staff Ex. 4, at 20; Tr. 11760, 11781 (Clark).
125. The 10SRG will satisfy the requirements for an independent, full-time, safety engineering staff to be located onsite. Staff Ex. 4, at 20; Tr. 11543 (Arnold). The 10SRG will be a group of technical personnel who are assigned at Till-1 but who report to the Nuclear Assurance Division of GPullG. Staff Ex. 4, at 20; Clark, ff. Tr. 11759, at 4; Tr.11546 (Arnold); Tr.11769 (Clark). This group will conduct an ongoing prograa to evaluate the technical adequacy and clarity of procedures important to safe operation of the plant. Staff Ex. 4, at 20; Clark, ff. Tr. 11759, at 4-5.
It will evaluate TMI-1 operations from a safety perspective and will review proposed changes to the facility; proposed tests of experiments; proposed changes to the Technical Specifications, and violations, deviations, and other events reportable to the NRC. Staff Ex. 4, at 20; Clark, ff. Tr.11759, at 4-5; Tr.
11770-1 (Clark).
The 10SRG will advise the Director of THI-1 and the Manager of TMI-1. Staff Ex. 4, at 20. This group clearly will function as an independent review croup in that none of the members are in line positions. Wegner, ff. Tr.13284, at 32.
126. flenbers of the NSAD of the Nuclear Assurance Division serve as the Staff for the GORB. Staff Ex. 4, at 20; Clark, ff. Tr.11759, at 6; Tr.
11554 (Arnold). The G0R3 is a senior level overview group charged with responsibility to foresee potentially significant nuclear and radiation problens and to recommend to the Chief Operating Executive how they may be avoided or mitigated.
Staff Ex. 4, at 20; Clark, ff. Tr.11759, at 6-7, Tr. 11784 (Clark). The GORB has a permanent, full-time Chairman, a permanent Vice Chairman who is Manager of the flSAD, and approximately nine additional members whose areas of expertise embrace all aspects of w
nuclear power plant operation.
Staff Ex. 4, at 20-21; Clark, ff. Tr.
11759, at 6-7; Tr. 11783-4 (Clark). The Chairman and Vice Chairman also serve in similar capacities for the GORB's for THI-2 and Oyster Creek.
Staff Ex. 4, at 21; Clark, ff. Tr.11759, at 7; Tr.11783 (Clark). The
~
NSAD conducts assessments of all aspects of nuclear power plant design and operation, considers their potential for compromising nuclear safety, and recommends necessary improvements to GORB. Staff Ex. 4, at 21.
A unique function of the NSAD is to serve as an ombudsman for all members of the corporation having concerns for nuclear safety.
Staff Ex. 4, at 21; Clark, ff. Tr.11759, at 6; Tr.11776 (Clark).
127. In addition to the safety review and audit functions described, the licensee is taking specific measures to assure the proper collection, evaluation, and dissemination of plant operational experiences throughout the corporate structure and at THI-1.
Staff Ex. 4, at 21. The Staff has reviewed two procedures which are intended to accomplish these tasks.
Staf f Ex. 4, at 21.
Based on this review, the Staff concludes that these procciures make adequate provisions for the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of operating experiences. Staff Ex.13, at 6.
128. Based on its review of the provisions made by the licensee for review and audit activities, the Staff concludes that the licensee is making acceptable provisions for safety review and operational advice.
Staff Ex. 4, at 27; Staff Ex.13, at 5-6; T:..11808 (Clark); Tr. 11834-5 (Crocker). The Staff, therefore, considers this matter to be resolved.
Staff Ex. 13, at 6, 8, 129. The Board finds that cross-examination on this issue did not produce any substantial evidence which would suggest a conclusion contrary to that reached by the Staff and licensee. The Board concludes, upon consideration of all the facts, that Met Ed has made adequate provision for groups of qualified individuals to provide safety review of and operational advice regarding Unit 1.
CLI-80-5 Issue 8:
What, if any, conclusions regarding Metropolitan Edison's ability to operate Unit 1 safely can be drawn from a comparison of the number and type of past infractions of NRC regulations attributable to the Three Mile Island Units with industry-wide infraction statistics; 130. The licensee presented testimony on this issue through Robert H.
Koppe (follows Tr. 13338.) The Staff's testimony is contained in NUREG-0680, Supplement 1 (Staff Ex. 4),Section III.I and in the response of Mr. Moseley to questions raised by the Board on this matter.
No other testimony was submitted.
131. The licensee had an analysis perfomed on the operating availability and safety performnce at TMI-1.
Koppe, ff. Tr.13338, at 1. Because TMI-2 had been in commercial operation for only three months, the limited amount of data available was not considered useful in perfoming this l
analysis.
Koppe, ff. Tr.13338, at 1; Tr.13343 (Koppe).
In perfonning the analysis, Mr. Koppe, Manager of Reliability and Safety Projects with the S.M. Stoller Corporation, concentrated on quantitative measures of l
overall performance (both operating and safety) and did not try to l
quantify the effect of plant management on that performance.
Koppe, ff.
l Tr. 13338, at 1-2.
l 132. Although there are many factors which affect the operating i
availability of a unit, there is usually some correlation between how well a unit perfonns and how well it is managed.
Koppe, ff. Tr. 13338, t
I l
l at 5-6.
Capacity factor is one of the most common and useful indices of operating availability.
Koppe, ff. Tr. 13338, at 6.
At the time of the T11-2 accident, the capacity factor of TMI-1 was considerably better than average for other nuclear units.
Koppe, ff. Tr.13338, at 7.
133. The analysis perf6rmed for the licensee also contained an examination of noncompliances. Koppe, ff. Tr.13338, at 25. Data for flRC Region I (including Titl) was
- d on the theory that there might be more unifonnity of inspection standards within a region since the same t
flRC personnel are involved.
Koppe, ff. Tr. 13338, at 26. The perfonaance of THI-1 was almost exactly average tthen compared with all other Region I units.
Koppe, ff. Tr. 13338, at 27.
134. To determine what, if any, conclusions could be drawn with respect to Met Ed's ability to operate Unit 1 safely, the Staff compared the enforcement history at THI-1 and 2 with that of selected other plants and with national average data using enforcement statistics compiled since 1975.
Staff Ex. 4, at 27. The number of inspections, noncompliances, civil penalties, and the severity of noncompliances were compared. Staff l
Ex. 4, at 27. The Staff attempted to select plants for comparison that were licensed in a simliar time frame since the safety equipment required and the associated licensing requirements for this equipment are to some i
degree dependent on the time the facilities were licensed.
Staff Ex. 4, i
at 27. The THI-1 comparison sample includes PWR's manufactured by f
Babcock and Wilcox, Westinghouse, and Combustion Engineering. Staff Ex.
l 4, at 27. The THI-2 comparison sample was structured on licenses obtained in a similar time period and includes history for only the first l
l i
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ o year of operation; the list includes Babcock and Wilcox designed units and Westinghouse designed units. Staff Ex. 4 at 27.
135. The analysis perforned by the Staff examined noncompliances by Cdtegory of severity, severity 1 being the most serious.
Staff Ex. 4, at
- 27. The total of noncompliances, the number of inspections, and the ratio of noncompliances to the number of inspections (NC/INSP) were compared.
Staff Ex. 4, at 27.
136. The NC/INSP ratio was included to provide a nomalization of the data.
Staff Ex. 4, at 27-28.
IE's inspection results have shown that the number of noncompliances is dependent on the inspection aanhours applied.
Staff Ex. 4, at 28; Tr.13374-5 (Koppe). Licensee perfomance is related to the number of noncompliances, but a far more meaningful index for comparison of regulatory perfomance is the NC/INSP because the more time spent inspecting produces a greater likelihood of finding any existing noncompliances. Staff Ex. 4, at 28.
137. A comparison of the yearly noncompliance history by severity with the data nomalized by the ratio NC/INSP for units of similar age (including THI-1) and the national average of all plants shows the Tt11-1 enforcement statistics to be very close the the national average and slightly better than typical for the similar units.
Staff Ex. 4, at 27.
There were r40 severity 1 noncompliances for THI-1. Staff Ex. 4, at 28.
138. A similar analysis was perfomed for TMI-2, except that data for the facilities was for the first year of operation.
Staff Ex. 4, at 28. The comparison of TMI-2 to those licensed near the time period of TMI-2 shows the THI-2 noncompliance perfomance to be typical for comparable units.
Staff Ex. 4, at 28. There were no severity I noncompliances identified at TMI-2 prior to the accident.
Staff Ex. 4, at 28.
139. The Staff also examined the civil penalties that have been levied against licensees, including Het Ed, fro?,1973 through 1978. Staff Ex.
4, at 28. Two civil penaities were imposed on tiet Ed for TMI-1 for j
physical security weaknesses.
Staff Ex. 4, at 28.
140. The imposition of these two civil penalties spaced two years apart and the cumulative amounts coupled with the noncompliance history of this licensee do not indicate a cause for regulatory concern.
Staff Ex. 4, 1 at 28.
Its overall enforcement history shows Met Ed has been an average perfonner.
Staff Ex. 4, at 28. Mr. Moseley of IE testified that there was little value in considering a statistical treatment of the comparison of past infractions by TMI-1 personnel versus those of other facilities; l
the value is in examining the corrective actions taken by a licensee af ter being cited for an infraction.
Tr.13,091 (Moseley).
141. Based on the facts presented above, the Board concludes that from a comparison of the number and type of past infractions of NRC regulations attributable to TMI with industry-wide infraction statistics the licensee has been an average overall perfonner, but that this type of analysis is of limited value in assessing the management capability of the licensee.
CLI-80_-(Issue 9:
What, if any, conclusions regarding Metropolitan Edison's ability to operate Unit I safely can be drawn from a comparison of the number and type of past Licensee Event Reports ("LER") and the lices see's operating experience at the Three Mile Island Units with industry-wide statistics on LER's and operating experience;
142. The licensee presented testimony on this issue through Robert A.
Kcppe (follows Tr. 13338.) The Staff's testimony is found in NUREG-0680, Supplement 1 (Staff Ex. 4),Section III.I, and in the responses to Board 4
questions by Mr. Moseley. No other direct testimony was filed.
143. The licensee revie$ed the LER's filed for Tril-1, Koppe, ff. Tr.
13333, at 23. A simple count of the number of LER's submitted by a unit, however, is a very poor measure of the safety of that unit.
Koppe, ff.
Tr. 13338, et 23; Tr. 13393-4 (Koppe). Some of the factors which affect the number of LER's but which have no effect on safety are the age of the plant, the kind of equipment it has, and the way the utility reports certain events.
Koppe, ff. Tr. 13338, at 23-24. To minimize the effect of these factors, the licensee compared TMI-1 with those units in the same size range and in the same vintage.
Koppe, ff. Tr. 13338, at 24.
The number of LER's submitted by THI-1 was almost exactly equal to the average for the similar plants.
Koppe, ff. Tr.13338, at 25. Based on the data from al'. Region I nuclear units, the performance of THI-1 was almost exactly average over the years from 1975 - 1979.
Koppe, ff. Tr.
13338, at 27.
The licensee could not, however, draw any conclusions with respect to the operating performance (capacity factor) of TMI-1 after reviewing the LER's. Tr. 13340-1, 1;391 (Koppe).
144. The Staff examined all of the Licensee Event Reports (LER's) for THI-1 and THI-2 from 1972 to 1980 and compared them with itJustry-wide statistics to determine what conclusions could be drawn on Met Ed's ability to operate Unit 1 safely. Staff Ex. 4, at 33. The LER's were examined for repetitive occurrences of causally related events and for what actions management could have taken to improve the readiness and
ability of the installed safety systems to perform their safety functions.
Staff Ex. 4, at 33. The number and type cf LER's were then compared ~with those of similar plants and industry-wide statistics.
Staff Ex. 4, at 33, 145. Tne Staff's examination of the LER's for TMI led to three ev.tluations. Staff Ex. 4, at 33. The first method was to review the number of recurrences of causally connected events. Staff Ex. 4, at 33.
One indication of the quality of management of an operating plant is mdnagement's effectiveness in eliminating the recurrence Of Causally connected events. Staff Ex. 4, at 33. The second method utilized Human Error Licensee Event Reports (HELER's) to correlate licensee performance with LER data.
Staff Ex. 4, at 33.
Using just the number of LER's, by itself, can be misleading because the number of LER's varies too much with plant type, size, and age to be used as a direct indicator of plant man 6gement. Staff Ex. 4, at 33. The number of LER's also depends to a considerable extent ca the technical specifications for the plant and how the licensee interprets its Technical Specifications.
Staff Ex. 4, at 33.
HELER's are all the LER's which are caused by personnel errors or defective precedures. Staff Ex. 4, at 33. On the average, approximately 20i; of the LER's industry-wide are attributable to human error.
Staff Ex. 4, it 33. The HELER to LER ratios in only plants of approximately the same type, size and age were compared.
Staff Ex. 4, at 34. The third method used to evaluate the TMI management's safety performance was to compare the percentage of HELER's in each "What Went Wrong" category to the average percentage for 31 PWR's.
Staff Ex. 4, at 34.
Hone of the three methods used, however, have been proven accurate and the premises l
o and assumptions upon which they are based have not baen validated.
Staff Ex. 4, at 3.4.
146. It appears that the first method is logically correct and cannot be easily biased. - The major shortcoming of using the number of
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reocc.arrences of causally connected events, however, appears to be a lack of quantitative determination of how important the particular deficiences are to the public health and safety.
Staff Ex. 4, at 34.
147. To the extent the ratio of HELER to LER is a valid indicator, it has shown that the safety perfomance of TMI management was about average.
Staff Ex. 4, at 34. The ratio for TMI-1 over its operating life was.29; the average for nine similar plants (including TMI-1) was.27.
Staff Ex.
4, at 34-35.
148. Using the "What Went Wrong" categories, 45.7% of all HELER's on the PWR's considered were attributable to safety equipment being on the wrong setting or surveillance not being perfomed on schedule.
Staff Ex. 4, at 34-35.
For TMI-1, this number is 42%; for TMI-2 prior to the accident it is 72%. Staff Ex. 4, at 35.
This difference may be due to the fact that l
the THI-2 operating data wers: for much less than a full year and for the first year of operation.
Staff Ex. 4, at 35.
149. From its review, the Staff concludes that the LER data do not show l
any statisfically significant or substantial anomalies for the management of TMI-1 compared to that for other plants.
Staff Ex. 4, at 35.
However, Mr. Moseley of IE concluded that a comparison of LER's from TMI-1 versus other facilities is of little value in and of itself.
Tr.
i 13,081, 13.085-89 (Moseley).
I --
150. Based on the evidence presented, the Board finds that no meaningful conclusions regarding the licensee's ability to opc-rate Unit I can be drawn from a comparison of the LER's from TMI and those from the industry es a whole.
CLI-80-5 Issue 10:
Whether the actions of Metropolitan Edison's corporate or plant management (or any part or individual member thereof) in connection with the accident at Unit 2 reveal deficiencies in the corporate or plant management that must be corrected before Unit I can be operated safely.
151. In response to this issue, the licensee presented testimony by several consultants, as well as from personnel within the-licensee's organization. William Lee, President of Duke Power Company and Chairman of the Board of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, testified as to his involvement with the licensee immediately following the THI-2 accident. Lee, ff. 13,251. He concluded that the GPU management demonstrated strong capability in the preparation for, and conduct of, its nuclear program, in the handling of the accident and its aftermath, and in organizational planning and top-level manning in preparation for ongoing nuclear activities. M. at 11-12; Tr.13,269-74,13,279 (Lee).
A second consultant, Basic Energy Technology Associates, Inc. (BETA),
also conducted an independent assessment of the management capability and technical resources of the licensee. Wegner, ff. 13,284.
BETA representatives testifed that there existed a number of deficiencies in the corporate and plant management at TMI prior to the accident at TMI-2, t
many of which were not unique to TMI or to GPU, not all of which have been fully corrected. H.at33. He concluded, however, that there are sufficient nanagement and technical capabilities within GPU to permit L.
restart of TMI-1, and there are no deficiencies now existing in the corporate or. plant managemenet of the licensee which must be corrected before Unit 1 can be operated safely. M. at. 34-35.
152. The licensee also rmsented testimony by two employees who headed up its efforts to detennine and evaluate the accident's scenario, including the management response.
Keaten and Long, ff. 13,242. These witnesses tescified to the actions taken by licensee management during the first day of the accident, the flow of information, and the technical support which was accumulated. H. at 2-13.
They described a'd commented upon the follow-up to the accident in the weeks after tl'e accident as well, again describing the technical support that was made available both on and off site, the establishment of communications links, and the expedited purchase and delivery of large amounts of equipment.
Id. at 13-27. These witnesses concluded that they did not feel that actions taken by the licensee during and after the accident reveal deficiencies that must be corrected before TMI-1 can be safely operated. M.at27.
153. Intervenors did not present any evidence on this issue.
The Staff's presentation on this matter consisted of its discussion of Item 10 in Supplements 1 and 2 of its ER (Staff Ex. 4 and 13), as well as the testimony of Mr. Moseley. Moseley, ff. 13,023.
154. The " Investigation into the March 28, 1979 Three Mile Island Accident by the Office of Inspection and Enforcement" (NUREG-0600) includes a description of the licensee's management of the ac:.. fent.
Section I-3 of NUREG-0600, " Management Actions During Accident," provides an account of tue actions and management decisions undertaken by those members of licentce management who were called to the site to provide I
emergency direction to cope with the operational aspects of the accident.
The section also addresses the additional support that was provided through the licensee oraanization and by other parties to support the onsite operational activities.
The actions that the plant operators,
~
Met-Ed management, and their advisors either performed or directed during the accident and the major operating decisions that were made and by who,a and their reasons for the decisions were examined in the subsection
" Plant Operators Response" of the 14RC Special Inquiry Group (SIG) Report, (IlVREG CR/1250, Volume II. Part 3). Staff Ex. 4, at 35.
155. During the post accident investigation, a concern was raised regarding whether information, which indicated plant conditions, had been properly transferred to the flRC during the day of the accideat at Unit 2.
The flow of information between the flRC and the licensee during the early hours of the accident is briefly described in fiUREG-0600,Section I.3.4.2 "Coamunications Between flRC and the Licensee." The SIG investigated the informatior. transfer concern and reported that it found no direct evidence suggesting intentional withholding of information by the licensee but that it was not appropriate for the SIG to reach conclusions as te the enforcement questions. Therefore, the Office of Inspection and EnfoNement completed the investigation related to information transfer during tne day of the accident to determine whether further enforcement action was justified.
156. IE's findings are contained in its report, fiUREG-0760,
" Investigation into Information Flow During the Accident At Three Mile Island," was issued on January 27, 1981.
(Staff Ex. 5.) This investigation found that although pertinent ir. formation was not
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intentionally withheld on March 28, 1979, information was not adequately transmitted to the 14RC or the Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiological Protection. Tr. 13,025-037 (Moseley); Staff Ex. 13 at 9.
157. IluREG-0746, " Emergency Preparedness Evaluation for TMI-1," assessed
~
the licensee's communications facilities and plans for comunications flow during an accident in accordance with the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 9 50.47 and the guidance in NUREG-0654. The problems with communications and information flow identified during the THI-2 accident were reflected in the revised emergency planning regulations and as such the recommendations subsequently contained in NUREG-0760 had already been considered.
Staff Ex. 13 at 9.
158. Tne licensee's corrective actions relative to the items of noncompliance cited in the ilotice of Violation included in the January 27, 1981 transmittal will be reviewed as part of the NRC's evaluation of the licensee's energency preparedness. When the licensee's implementation of its revised emergency plan, revised in conformance to the guidance in llVREG-0654, is reviewed during an emergency preparedness exercise, the adequacy of the corrective actions will be verified. There are no management, organization, or staffing issues addressed in NUREG-0760 for which additional licensee action has been identified. Tr.
13,072 (Moseley); Staff Ex. 13 at 9.
159. In Supplement 1 to the Evaluation Report, the Staff also presented a brief description of a separate investigative effort conducted by the-Department of Justice (D0J) in response to concerns raised regarding possible falsification of Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leak rate test data for Unit 2.
That investigation was initially undertaken by liRC and
F.
identified a number of apparent problems related to procedure adherence.
NRC's investigative effort was suspended pending the conclusion of the 00J investigation, at their request, to avoid parallel administrative and criminal proceedings. The DOJ investigation is still ongoing, and the NRC does not possess any infomation as to when it may be completed.
HRC personnel involved in the suspended investigation have been requested by D0J not to discuss the details of the natter. Since completion of the investigation of this matter by the NRC could turn up infomation which is related to past management practices, the matter was included in Supplement 1 to the Evaluation Report, NUREG-0680.
The NRC will resume its investigation of the concerns when D0J has completed its investigation of the matter. However, the Staff has reviewed the infomation that it has obtained to date on the matter, and has concluded on the basis of infomation thus far obtained that there appears to be no l
l direct connection with the Unit 2 accident.
Further, although the NRC investigation is not complete, and the examination of Unit I records was l
limited, no indication of practices at Unit I similar to those alleged at Unit 2 were identified. Staff. Ex. 13 at 9-10.
160. In light of the licensee's clear management policy regarding strict adherence to procedures which was stated in a nemorandum from the licensee's Office of the Chief Operating Executive communicated directly l
by face-to-face discussion between nanagement and plant personnel, and recently fomalized by incorporation into the Conduct of Operations Manual, the establishment of a nanagement policy for disciplinary measures to be taken for failure to adhere to procedures, and the establishment by the licensee of an operations inspection program to
verify procedure adherence, the staff believes, based upon their current knowledge, the identified concerns appear to _be only of historical l
significance. Nevertheless, the Staff indicated that ilRC inspectors will be alert to procedure adherence problems in general, and accuracy of RCS leak rate testing data specifically, should the facility be permitted to restart. Staff Ex. 13 at 10.
161. Based on its reviews, the Staff concluded that deficiencies in the licensee's corporate or plant aanagement revealed by investigation of corporate or plant management actions in connection with the Unit 2 l
accident have been corrected or have been identified for correction prior to restart of Unit 1, and consider this matter resolved.
Staff Ex. 13 at
- 10. The Board concurs.
C0!1CLUSI0flS OF LAW The Board concludes, on the basis of its findings as discussed above, that the licensee has demonstrated its managerial caoability and I
resources to operate Unit I while maintaining Unit 2 in a safe I
configuration and carrying out planned decontamination and/or restoration activities. The Board accordingly finds Commission Order Item 6 of CLI-79-8, as well as the issues of CLI-80-5 (r.s modified by CLI-81-3), to be satisfactorily resolved.
In addition, the Board concludes that the l
licensee has provided the training and testing of its operators that is l
required pursuant to Commission Order item 6.
l i
1
.. = - _..,
J 4
Respectfully submitted,
't n
..c, a
'Lucinda Low Swartz Counsel for NRC Staff'.
I
.lAw&E hm Daniel T. Swanson-Counsel for NRC Staff.
Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 15th day of May,1981.
i I
I f
I f
L e.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0f1 MISSION BEFORE THE AT0lilC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
)
METROPOLITAN EDIS0N COMPANY,
)
)
)
(Tnree flile Island, Unit 1)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of "NRC STAFF PROPOSED FINDINGS AND CONSLUCIONS OF LAW REGARDING MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY", dated May 15, 1981, in the above captioned proceeding have been served on the following: (1) by deposit in the United States mail, first class,or (2) as i ndicated by an asterisk through deposit in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's internal mail system, this 15th day of May, 1981.
- Ivan W. Smith, Esq., Administrative fis. Marjorie M. Aamodt Judge R.D. #5 Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Panel Coatesville, PA 19320 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20655 Mr. Thomas Gerusky Bureau of Radiation Protection Dr. Walter H. Jordan, Administrative Dept. of Environmental Resources Judge P.O. Box 2063 l
481 W. Outer Drive Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17123 l
Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 Mr.11arvin I. Lewis Dr. Linda W. Little, Administrative 6504 Bradford Terrace Judge Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19149 l
5000 Hermitage Drive Raleigh, North Carolina 27612 Metropolitan Edison Company ATTN:
J.G. Herbein, Vice President George F. Trowbridge, Esq.
P.O. Box 542 Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge Reading, Pennsylvania 19603 1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20006 Ms. Jane Lee R.D. 3; Box 3521 Karin W. Carter, Esq.
Etters, Pennsylvania 17319 505 Executive House P. O. Box 2357 Walter W. Cohen, Consumer Advocate l
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Department of Justice Strawberry Square,14th Floor Honorable Mark Cohen Harrisberg, Pennsylvania 17127 512 D-3 Main Capital Building Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 L
Thomas J. Germine Deputy Attorney General Division of Law - Room 316 1100 Raymond Boulevard Newark, New Jersey 07102 Allen R. Carter, Chairman John Levin, Esq.
Joir.t Legislative Committee on Energy Pennsylvania Public Utilities Comm.
Post Office Box 142 Box 3265 Suite 513 Senate Gressettc Buildirig, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Columbia, South Carolina 29202 Jordan D. Cunningham, Esq.
Fox, Farr and Cunningham Robert Q. Pollard 2320 North 2nd Street 609 Montpelier Street Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17110 Baltimore, Maryland 21218 Louise Bradford Chauncey Kepford 1011 Green Street Judith H. Johnsrud Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17102 Environmental Coalition on Nuclear Power 433 Orlando Avenue State College, Pennsylvania 16801 lis. Ellyn R. Weiss Harmon & Weiss f1s. Frieda Berryhill, Chairman 1725 I Street, N.W.
Coalition for Nuclear Power Plant Suite 506 Postponement Washington, D.C.
20006 2610 Grendon Drive Wilmington, Delaware 19808 Mr. Steven C. Sholly-Union of Concerned Scientists Gail P. Bradford 1725 I Street, N.W.
ANGRY Suite 601 245 W. Philadelphia St.
Washington, D.C.
20006 York, Pennsylvania 17401
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 ryg j f /,_
- Atomic Safety and Licen'.,ing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Counsel for NRC Staff Washington, D.C.
20555
- Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:
Chief, Docketing & Service Br.
Washington, D.C.
20555 William S. Jordan, III, Esq.
Harmon & Weiss 1725 I Street, N.W.
Suite 506 Washington', D.C.
20006
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