ML19347E957

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Forwards Addl Examples of LERs Typifying Util Inadequacies in Ascertaining Significance,Cause,Corrective Action & Probable Consequences of Events.Ongoing Efforts to Improve Accuracy of Licensee Reporting Strongly Supported
ML19347E957
Person / Time
Site: Millstone, Indian Point, Sequoyah  
Issue date: 05/01/1981
From: Michelson C
NRC OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD)
To: Stello V
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
References
NUDOCS 8105140410
Download: ML19347E957 (2)


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UNITED STATES

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wAsmucrow. o. c.2 eses MAY 1 1981 MEMORANDUM FOR: Victor Stello, Jr., Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement 4

FROM:

Carlyle Michelson, Director Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data

SUBJECT:

INADEQUATE LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS In my memorandum of July 14, 1980, I expressed a concern that licensees are not providing an accurate and complete description of reactor operational events.

Based on discussions with your staff and your memorandum of August 7,1980, we are aware that you have been emphasizing more stringent enforcement of reporting requirements to ensure complete Licensee Event Reports (LERs).

Enclosed for your infonnation and discussed below are three additional examples of LERs which are clearly inadequate to ascertain the significance, cause, corrective action, and probable consequences of the events.

The LER (Enclosure 1) reporting the containment flooding event at Indian Point, Unit 2 omitted two vital pieces of information:

first, that more than 100,000 gallons of brackish water accumulated undetected in containment; and second, the reactor vessel was partly submerged in relatively cool water while at full operating temperature and pressure.

This LER is the licensee's second attempt to accurately report the event and is only a slight improvement over the reporting contained in the first LER (Enclosure 2).

l The second example is the LER (Enclosure 3) reporting the containment spray event at Sequoyah, Unit 1.

The LER did not mention that about 110,000 gallons of water from the reactor coolant system and the refueling water storage tank were sprayed undetected into containment.

In addition, the LER failed to report that eight workers were contaminated, that there was a small radioactive release from the reactor building, that the ice beds were sprayed, and that some water accumulated in the reactor vessel cavity.

The third example is the LER (Enclosure 4) reporting an event at Millstone.

The LER did not report the loss of the 125V DC bus, the opening of the PORV, the lockout of the second diesel generator, inadequate pressurizer spray, and the loss of annunciators.

In addition, the LER should have been supplemented by additional information, i.e., sequence of events, to provide adequate under-standing of the event.

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Victor Stelle, Jr. In our opinion, these LERs indicate inadequate reporting which is a real concern to us. We recognize that substantive information concerning the events has been provided by the licensees in response to IE investigations; however, this information is usually not disseminated to other licensees and is not widely available within the NRC staff. An independent reviewer of the LER could not identify the significant aspects of the events.

Consequently, the lessons learned from operational experiences cannot be properly evaluated and effectively fed back to operators.

Ia addition, future operational safety evaluations will not have the full benefit of relevant reactor operating history if the events are not reported accurately to ensure that the event is properly characterized for identification and retrieval.

We strongly support your ongoing efforts to improve the accuracy of licensee reporting. We hope that these examples will help your efforts to enforce accurate event reporting.

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Ca le MichelsoM Director Of e for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data Enclosures :

(1) Consolidated Edison of New York, Inc., LER 80-016/ 99 X,

Docket 50-247, dtd 12/27/80.

(2) Consolidated Edison of New York, Inc., LER 80-013/03L,

Docket 50-247, dtd 11/14/80.

(3) Tennessee Valley Authority, LER 81-021/03L, Docket 50-327, dtd 3/11/81.

(4) Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, LER 81-005/3L, Docket 50-336, dtd 1/30/81.

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While in the hot shutdown condition, a containment entrv was made on I

o 10ct. 17, 1980 to repair a defective power range channel.

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The water accumulated because both containment sumo numesI iaiai Fere found to be inoperable.

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>#2I l reactor coolant. pumps 3 and 4 and residual heat removal pump 'B' were also not in' s I a l I servik:e at this titie. the un'it entered LC0 3.4.1.3.a and LCO 3.~4.1.3.b ' There was i13l [ no effect~upon publ'ic health or safety. Previous occurrences

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J L0ilt!n9_a dicsc.l... generator (o/cLresponse to a 1:ss of normal pcuer, a Theleakwettedtheenginecausingadicscitrip.

The,lesk also.

aj[,ilangeleaked.

The faciiity the amphenol plug on the Moodward Govence causing the plug to fail.

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3.8.1.1.d for t o]3] gorated in accordance with Technical Specification Action Statement At which +ime operability of the other o_/G was demonstrated and t'

'O.T. c] I imately 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

plant operated within Action Statement 3.8.1.1.a until ccid shutd:i;n was a j

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pressure surge when the D/G was started.

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