ML19347B633

Forwards LER 80-041/03L-0

ML19347B633
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	10/07/1980
From:	Finfrock I JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML19347B634	List: ML19347B633 ML19347B640
References
NUDOCS 8010150470
Download: ML19347B633 (3)

Text

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION M (609) 693-1951 P.O. BOX 388

• FORKED RIVER

• NEW JERSEY

• 08731 cQ d*""

Au. N Z..s.'j?O u c~,,

October 7, 1980 Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region I United States Nuclear Regulatory Comission 641 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

l

SUBJECT:

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket No. 50-219 l Licensee Event Report l Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/80-42/3L 1 1

This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to i report Peportable Occurrence No. 50-219/80-42/3L in compliance with paragraph l 6.9.2.b.(1) of the Technical Specifications, l Very truly yours, l

Ivan R. F' fro , Jr.

Vice Pres i dent Generation IRF:dh Enclosures cc: Mr. John G. Davis, Acting Director (40 copies)

Office of Inspection and Enforcement United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20550 l

1 Mr. William G. Mcdonald, Director (3 copies)

Office of Management Information and Program Control United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 l

h 8 910150 q7O

0YSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Forked River, New Jersey 08731 ,

License Event Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/80-42/3L Report Date October 1,1980 Occurrence Date September 11, 1980 Identification of Occurrence Containment Spray System high drywell pressure switches IP-15A, IP-15B and IP-15C tripped at a value greater than that specified in the Technical Specifications Table 3.1.1, item E.1.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.(1).

Conditions Prior to Occurrence The plant was operating at steady state power.

Plant parameters at the time of occurrence were:

4 Power: Core . 1872 MWt Electrical 612 MWe Flow: Recirculation 15.0 x 10 4gpm Feedwater 6.93 x 10 lb/hr Description of Occurrence:

On Thursday, September 11, 1980, while performing the " Containment Spray System Automatic Actuation Test", the IP-15A, IP-15B and IP-15C trip points were found to be less conservative than those specified in the Technical Specifications.

Surveillance testing on the High Drywell pressure switches for the Containment Spray System revealed the following data:

Pressure Switch Designation Desired Setpoint As Found As Left IP-15A <2 psig 2.1 1.95 IP-158 <2 psig 2.05 1.94 IP-15C 12psig 2.18 1.93 I?-15D <2 psig 1.98 1.98 i

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Reportable Occurrence Page 2 Report No. 50-219/80-42/3L

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The cause of the occurrence was attributed tg instrument rept?tability. The

! high alarm switch setpoints are set at 2.0101 psig and the long term repeatability

of the instruments is approximately 2-?% (.2 .3 psig) of full range. Therefore,

) although the instruments will be operating within design accuracy, the technical specification limit of 2.0 psig can be exceeded during surveillance testing.

Analysis of Occurrence The Containment Spray System consists of two independent cooling loops, each capable of removing fission product decay heat from the primary containment

after a postulated loss of cooling accident. The containment spray system automatically initiates upon receipt of two high drywell pressure and two reactor low-low water level signals in either of two trip systems.

The safety significance of this event is considered minimal since the high drywell pressure switches would have actuated but at a slightly higher pressure than the required setpoint. This function would have been delayed by only a i small fraction of a second (approximately 0.1 seconds from the start of the design basis loss of coolant accident). Since the reactor low-low water level 1

setpoint is not expected to be reached until approximately 4 seconds from the

start of the design basis accident, the delay in actuating the high drywell pressure switches would have had no effect on initiating the containment spray systet.

.

Corrective Action Pressure switch IP-15A, IP-15B and IP-15C were adjusted to trip with the Technical Specification limit of < 2 psig. It is recognized that there is a drift problem associated with the new snap-action switches which were recently installed during the 1980 Outage to upgrade its seismic qualifications. The manufacture has teen requested to evaluate the drift problem.

Failure Data Menu'acturer - ITT Barton Mo. . - 228A Indicating Pressure Switch Range: 0-10 psig I

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