ML19345H463
| ML19345H463 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 05/13/1981 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19345H461 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8105200334 | |
| Download: ML19345H463 (19) | |
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%w s ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT APPRAISAL BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENTS NOS. 48 ANC 42 TO LICENSES NOS. DPR-42 AND DPR-60 RELATING TO MODIFICATION OF THE SPENT FUEL POOL NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT, UNITS NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-282 AND 50-306 1.0 0"SCRIPTION OF PROPOSED ACTION By letters dated January 31, 1980 as supplemented by letters dated June 19, 1980, November 21, 1980, January 14, 1981, February 3,1981, March 10,1981 and March 31 and April 20, 1981, the Northern States Power Company (NSP) proposed to change the spent fuel pool (SFP) storage design for the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units Nos.1 and 2 (PINGP) from the design which was reviewed and approved in Amendment Nos. 22 and 16 to Facility Operating Licer,se Nos.
OPR-42 and DPR-60 issued August 16, 1977. This approved spent fuel storage capacity is 687 fuel assemblies.
The modification evaluated in this environmental impact appraisal is the proposal by the licensee to replace the existing spent fuel storage racks with high density borated storage racks. Several numbers are used herein which bear explanation. If the SFP were totally filled with fuel assembly racks this would provide 1582 storage spaces. However, the licensee would not store spent fuel assemblies from normal refueling operations in all of these spaces since that would leave no room for the eventual placement of a spent fuel shipping cask into the pool to remove the spent fuel assemblies from the pool. Therefore not more that 1386 assemblies resulting from nomal l
refueling operations are proposed to be stored in the SFP by the ifcensee.
This value has been further limited to 1120 assemolies pending further evalua-tion and resolution of the heavy loads handling issue in the future.
l Therefore the staff's evaluation and appraisal is being perfomed for a total of 1582/1386 as proposed by the licensee with the only exception being that the facility Technical Specifications and license will limit the number of l
assemblies resulting from nomal refueling operations to 1120.
2.0 NEED FOR INCREASED STORAGE CAPACITY The PINGP SFP was originally designed with the storage capacity of 198 fuel assemblies (1-2/3 cores). The first refueling of PINGP Unit 1 was on March 4, 1976 at which time 40 fuel assemblies were replaced and stored in the SFP.
The first 40 spent fuel assemblies from Unit 2 were placed in the SFP in October 1976. At this rate, 80 assemblies per year from both units are discharged from the reactor to the SFP.
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1 By letter dated August 16, 1977, we approved NSP's request to expand their SFP capacity to 687 fuel assemblies which would extend the storage capability L
of the pool midway through 1983 and leave room for a complete core discharge.
Spent fuel is not currently being processed on a commercial basis in the United States and storage ~ capacity away from reactor sites is available only on an emergency basis as is discussed in Sections 6.1 and 6.2 of this appraisal.
Based on the above information, there is clearly a need for additional onsite spent fuel storage capacity to assure continued operation of the PINGP units, with full core off-load capability, af ter the Spring of 1983. The expansion of the SFP capacity to 1120 assemblies would provide this capability through the Fall of 1989 using annual refueling cycles.
3.0 THE FACILITY The PINGP units are described in the Final Environmental Statement (FES),
issued by the Commission in May 1973, related to the section on operation of the facilities. Each unit is a Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) which produces 1650 megawatts thermal (MWt) and has a gross electrical output of 530 megawatts (MWe). Pertinent descriptions of principal features of the plant as it currently exists are summarized below to aid the reader in following the evaluations in subsequent sections of this appraisal.
3.1 Fuel Inventory Each PINGP reactor contains 121 fuel assemblies. The fuel assemblies are a cluster of 179 fuel rods or sealed tubes arranged in a 14 by 14 array.
The weight of the fuel, as U0, is approximately 120,000 pounds. About 2
one-third of the assemblies are removed from the reactor and replaced with new fuel each year. Present scheduling is for the refueling outage to be in the first few months of each year for Unit No. 2 and the last few months of each year for Unit No.1.
The proposed modification of the SFP would not change the quantity of uranium fuel used in the reactor over the anticipated operating life of the facility and would not change the rate at which spent fuel is generated by the facility.
The added storage capacity would increase the number of spent fuel assemblies that could be stored in the SFP and the length of time that some of the fuel assemblies could be stored in the pool.
3.2 Purpose of the SFP Spent fuel assemblies are intensely radioactive due to their fresh fission product content when initially removed from the core and they have a high i
thermal output. The SFP was designed for storage of these assemblies to
. allow for radioactive and themal decay prior to shipping them to a reprocessing facility. The major portion of decay occurs in the first 150 days following removal from the reactor core. After this period, the spent fuel assemblies may be withdrawn and placed in heavily shielded casks for shipment. Space pemitting, the assemblies may be stored for longer periods, allowing continued fission product decay and thermal cooling.
3.3 SFP Cooling System The spent fuel pool cooling system consists of two pumps and two heat exchangers. These are cross connected such that the loss of any one pump or heat exchanger will not prevent the operation of the remaining components.
The decay heat is removed from the spent fuel pool heat exchangers by either Unit 1 or Unit 2's Component Cooling Water System. Each unit's Component Cooling Water System consiets of two,100% capacity, normally interconnected parallel loops each comprised of one pump and one heat exchanger having a rating of 29 X 100 BTU /HR. In the unlikely event that a LOCA should occur in the unit whose Component Cooling Water System is connected to the Spent Fuel Pool Cooli.19 System, the operator would conservatively have more than one hour l
to transfer the pool cooling system to the unaffected unit's Component Cooling l
Water System.
l In the course of reconfirming the cooling system's heat removal capability NSP found that the hydraulic flow resistance of the two heat exchangers t
was unequal. Tfierefore the flow distribution to the two heat exchangers was revised and the maximum pool water temperature was recalculated using the revised heat loads and flows through the two heat exchangers. The assumed conditions and resultant maximum pool water temperatures are as follows:
6 (a) 1362 nomally discharged fuel assemblies (11.9 X 10 BTU /HR peak heat load) are stored in pools 1 and 2.
The pools are cooled by either the main heat exchanger and one of the two pumps or the backup heat exchar.ger and both of the pumps. The maximum pool water temperature will not exceed 137'F.
(b) 1362 normally discharged fuel assemblies plus a rgshly off loaded core consisting of 121 fuel assemblies (25.09 X iOO BTU /HR peak heat load) are stored in pools 1 and 2.
The pools aie cooled by both the main and backup heat exchangers and both pumps. The maximum pool water temperature will not exceed 145'F.
(c) 1362 normally discharged fuel assemblies plus a freshly loaded core consisting of 121 fuel assemblies (25.09 X 106 BTU /HR peak heat load) are stored in pools 1 and 2.
The analysis assumes the failure of either one pump or one heat exchanger. The maximum pool water temperature will not exceed 183*F.
l Based on the above results our Safety Evaluation finds the spent fuel pool lg cooling system is adequate and therefore acceptable.
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. 3.4 SFP Purific=Wn System The SFP purification loop consists of filters, a mixed bed demineralizer and the required piping, valves and instrumentation. The SFP cooling system pumps draw water from the pool or the refueling cavity. A fraction of this flow is passed through the SFP purification loop. The water is returned to the pool or the refueling cavity.
Because we expect only a small increase in the radioactivity released to the pool water as a result of the proposed modification as discussed in Section 4.4 of this environmental impact appraisal, we conclude the SFP filtering system is adequate for the proposed modification and will keep the concentrations of radioactivity in the pool water to acceptably low levels which have existed prior to the modification.
3.5 Radioactive Wastes The plant contains waste treatment systems designed to collect and process the gaseous, liquid and solid wastes that might contain radioactive material.
The waste treatment systems are evaluated in the FES dated May 1973. There will be no change in the waste treatment systems described in Section III.D.2 of the FES because of the proposed modification.
4.0 ENVIR0iGiEMAL IMPACTS OF THE PROPOSED ACTION 4.1 Land Use The external dimensions of the SFP will not change because of the proposed expansion of its storage capacity; therefore, no additional commitment of land l
is required. The SFP is intended to store spent fuel assemblies under water l
for a period of time to allow shorter-lived radioactive isotopes to decay and to reduce their thermal heat output. This type of use will remain unchanged by the modification but the additional storage capacity would provide for an additional sixteen nonnal refuelings. Thus, the proposed modification would result in more efficient use of the land already designed for spent fuel storage.
4.2 Water Use There will be no significant change in plant water censumption or use as a i
result of the proposed modifications. As discussed subsequently, storing additional spent fuel in the SFP will slightly increase the heat load on i
l the SFP cooling system. This heat is transferred in turn to the component cooling water system and to the service water system. Thr.nodifications will not change the flow rate within these cooling systems. The temperature I
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. i of the SFP water during normal refueling operations with only one SFP cooling pug running is expected to remain below 137'F, as cogared to the 120*F used as the design basis in the FSAR. Therefore, evaporation and thus the need for makeup water will not be significantly changed by the proposed modifications.
4.3 Nonradiological Effluents There will be no change in the chemical or biocidal effluents from the plant as a result of the proposed modification.
The only potential offsite nonradiological environmental impact that could arise from this proposed action would be additional discharge of heat to the atmosphere and to the Mississippi River. Storing spent fuel in the SFP for a longer period of time will add more heat to the SFP water. The SFP heat exchangers are cooled by the component cooling water system which in turn is cooled by the plant cooling water system. The maximum incremental heat load resulting from the SFP modification is 8.09 X 10' BTU /HR. This is the difference in peak heat loads for full core offloads that essentially fill the present and the modified pools. Comared with the existing heat load (8.4 X 10' BTV/HR) on the plant cooling tower water system, this small additional heat load from the SFP cooling system will be negligible.
4.4 Radiological Impacts 4.4.1 Introduction The potential offsite radiological environmental impacts associated with the expansion of the spent fuel storage capacity were evaluated and determined to be environmentally insignificant as addressed below.
The additional spent fuel which would be stored due to the expansion is fuel which has decayed at least eleven years based on a pre-expansion capacity of 687 storage locations. During the storage of tha spent fuel under water, both volatile and nonvolatile radioactive nuclides may be released to the water from the surface of the assemblies or from defects in the fuel cladding. Most of the material released from the surface of the assemblies consists of activated corrosion products such as Co-58, Co-60, Fe-59 and Mn-54 which are not volatile.
The radionuclides that might be released to the water'through defects in the cladding, such as Cs-134, Cs-137, Sr-89 and Sr-90 are also predominately nonvolatile. The primary impact of such nonvolatile radioactive nuclides'is their contributi;n to radiation levels to which workers in and near the SFP would be exposed. The vole. tile fission product nuclides of most concern that might be released through defects in the fuel cladding are the noble gases (xenon and krypton), truium and the iodine isotopes.
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. 4.4.2 Effect of Fuel Failuy )n the SFP Experience indicates that t _re is little radionuclide leakage from spent fuel stored in pools after the fuel ' as cooled for several months. The predominance of radionuclides in the spent fuel pool water appears to be radionuclides that were present in the r"
.r coolant system prior to refueling (which becomes mixed with water in e spent fuel pool during refueling operations) or crua dislodged from the surface of the spent fuel during transfer from the reactor core to the SFP. During and after refueling, the spent fuel pool cleanup system reduces the radioactivity concentrations considerably. It is theorized that most failed fuel contains small, pinhole-like perforations in the fuel cladding at the reactor operating condition of approximately 800*F. A few weeks after refueling, the spent fuel cools in the spent fuel pool so that fuel clad temperature is relatively cool, approximately 180*F. This substan-tial temperature reduction should reduce the rate of release of fission products from the fuel pellets and decrease the gas pressure in the gap between pellets and clad, thereby tending to retain the fission products within the gap. In addition, most of the gaseous fission products have short half-lives and decay to insignificant levels within a few months.
Based on the operational reports submitted by the licensee and discussions with the operators, there has not been any significant leakage of fission products from spent light water reactor fuel stored in the Morris Operation (MO) (fonnerly Midwest Recovery Plant) at Morris, Illinois, or at the Nuclear Fuel Services' (NFS) storage pool at West Valley, New York. Spent fuel has been stored in these two. pools which, while it was in a reactor, was detennined to have significant leakage and was therefore removed from the core. After storage in the onsite SFP, this fuel was later shipped to either MO or NFS for extended storage. Although the fuel exhibited significant leakage at reactor operating conditions, there was no significant leakage from this fuel in the offsite storage facility.
l Experience indicates that there is little radionuclide leakage from Zircaloy-clad spent fuel stored in pools for over a decade. Operators at several I
reactors have discharged, stored, and/or shipped relatively large numbers i
of Zircaloy-clad fuel elements which developed defects during reactor l
exposure, e.g., Ginna, Oyster Creek, Nine Mile Point, and Dresden Units l
Nos. 1 and 2.
Based on the operational reports submitted by licensees and discussions with the operators, there has not been any significant leakage of fission predacts from spent reactor fuel stored in the M0 pool or the NFS pool. Several hundred Zircaloy-clad assemblies which developed one or more defects in-reactor are stored in the M0 pool without need for isolation in special cans. Detailed analysis of the radioactivity in the pool water l
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. indicates that the defects are not continuing to release significant quantities of radioactivity.
A Battelle Northwest Laboratory (BNL) report, " Behavior of Spent Nuclear Fuel in Water Pool Storage" (BNWL-2256 dated September 1977), states that radioactivity concentrations may approach a value up to 0.5 uC1/ml during fuel discharge in the SFP. After the refueling, the SFP fon exchange and filtration units will reduce and maintain the pool water in the range of 10'8 to 10~' tri/ml.
In handling defective fuel, the 3NL study found that the vast majority of failed fuel does not require special handling and is stored in the same manner as intact fuel. Two aspects of the defective fuel account for its favorable storage characteristics. First, when a fuel rod perforates in-reactor, the radioactive gas inventory is released to the reactor primary coolant. Therefore, upon discharge, little additional gas release occurs.
Only if the failure occurs by mechanical damage in the basin are radio-active gases released in detectable amounts, and this type of damage is extremely rare.
In addition, most of the gaseous fission products have short half-lives and decay to insignificant levels. The second favorable aspect is the inert character of the uranium oxide pellets in contact with water. This has been deterrained in laboratory studies and also by casual observations of pellet behavior when broken rods are stored in pools.
4.4.3 Radioactive Material Released to Atmosphere With respect to gaseous releases, the only significant noble gas isotopc attributable to storing additional assemblies for a longer perie,d of time would be Krypton-85. As discussed previously, experience has demonstrated that after spent fuel has decayed 4 to 6 mor.ths, there is no significan'.
release of fission products from defective fuel. However, we have cor,er-vatively estimated that an additional 33 curies per year of Krypton-85 may be released from both units when the modified pools are completely filled.
This increase would result in an additional total body dose to an individual at the site boundary of less than.00004 mrem / year. This dose is insigni-ficant when compared to the approximately 100 mrem / year that an individual receives from natural backpround radiation. The additional total body dose to the estimated population within a 50-mile radius of the plant is less than
.0002 person-rem / year. This is sigrificantly less than the natural fluctuatiofis in the dose this population would receive from natural background radiation.
Under our conservative assumptions, these exposures represent an increase of less than 0.1% of the exposures from the plant evaluated in the FES (1973) for the individual at the site boundary (Table V-2) and the population (Table V-3).
Thus, we conclude that the proposed modification will not have any significant impact on exposures offsite.
I
. Assuming that the spent fuel will be stored onsite for several years, Iodine-131 releases from spent fuel assemblies to the SFP water will not be significantly increased because of the expansion of the fuel storage capacicy since the Iodine-131 inventory in the fuel will decay to negligible levels between refuelings for each unit.
4.4.4 Solid Radioactive Wastes The concentration of radionuclides in the pool is controlled by the filters and the demineralizer and by decay of short-lived isotopes. The activity is highest during refueling operations while reactor coolant water is introduced into the pool, and decreases as the pool water is processed through the filters and demineralizer. The increase of radioactivity, if any, should be minor because of the capability of the cleanup system to remova radioactivity to acceptable levels.
The licensee does not expect any significant increase in the amount of solid waste generated from the spent fuel pool cleanup systems due to the proposed modi fication. While we generally agree with the licensee's conclusion, as a conservative estimate we have assumed that the amount of solid radwaste nay be increased by an additional two resin beds a year due to the increased operation of the spent fuel pool cleanup system. The annual average volume of solid waste shipped from the Prairie Island Plant during 1974 through 1979 was 7600 cubic feet.
If the storage of additional spent fuel does increase the amount of solid waste from the SFP cleanup systens by about 40 cubic feet per year, the increase in total waste volume shipped would be less tnan 1% and would not have any significant additional environmental impact.
The licensee indicates that alternative plans are being evaluated for the disposal of the present racks. The alternatives include removing and crating the racks for shipment offsite for. disposal as low level solid waste (a volume of about 15,000 cubic feet) versus removing, cleaning by electropolishing and subsequent disposal.
Selection of a disposal method has not been finalized.
Averaged over the lifetime of the plant the disposal of the racks intact as low level waste would increase the total waste volume shipped from the facility by less than seven percent. This will not have a significant additional environmental impact.
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4.4.5 Radioactivity Released to Receiving Waters l
There should not be a significant increase in the liquid release of radio-nuclides from the plant as a result of the prcposed modification. Since the SFP cooling and cleanup system operates as a closed system, only water originating from cleanup of SFP floors and resin siuice water need be l
considered as potential sources of radioactivity.
l It is expected that neither the quantity nor activity of the floor cleanup I
water will change as a result of this modification. The SFP demineralizer resin removes soluble radioactive matter from the SFF water. These resins 1
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are periodically flushed with water to the spent resin storage tank. The amount of radioactivity on the SFP demineralizer resin might increase slightly due to the additional spent fuel in the pool, but the soluble radioactivity should be retained on the resins. If any activity is transferred from the spent resin to the flush water, it will be removed by the liquid radwaste system since the sluice water is returned to the liquid radwaste system for processing. After processing in the liquid radwaste system, the amount of radioactivity released to the environment as a result of the proposed modification would be negligible.
4.4.6 Occupational Exposure We have reviewed the licensee's plans for the removal and disposal of the existing racks that were installed during a previous modification in 1977/78 and the installation of the new racks with respect to occupational radiation exposure. The occupational exposure for the entire operation is estimated i
by the licensee to be about 40 man-rems. We consider this to be a reasonable estimate because it is based on the if censee's detailed breakdown of occupa-tional exposure for each phase of the modification. Perfomance of this operation is expected to be a small fraction of the total man-rem burden from occupational exposure at the plant.
We have estimated the increment in onsite occ'upational doses resulting from the proposed increase in stored fuel assemblies on the basis of infomation supplied by the licensee and by utilizing relevant assumptions for occupancy times and for dose rates in the spent fuel pool area from radionuclide concentrations in the SFP water. The spent fuel assemblies themselves contribute a negligible amount to the dose rates in the pool area because of the depth of water shielding the fuel. The occupational radiation exposure resulting from the proposed actions represents a negligible burden. Based on present and projected operations in the spent fuel pool area, we estimate that the proposed modifications should add less than one percent to the total annual 4
occupational radiation exposure burden at both units. Thus, we conclude that storing additional fuel in the two pools will not result in any significant increase in doses received by occupational workers.
4.4.7 Impacts of Other Pool Modifications As discussed above, the additional environmental radiological impacts in the vicinity of PINGP-182 resulting from the proposed modification are very small fractions (less than 1%) of the impacts evaluated in the PINGP-182 FES. These additional impacts are too small to be considered anything but local
.'n character.
Based on the above, we conclude that an SFP modification at any other facility should not significantly contribute to the environmental impact of PINGP-1&2 and that the PINGP-182 SFP modification should not contribute significantly to the environmental impact of any other facility.
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. i 4.4.8 Impacts on the Community The new storage racks were fabricated offsite and shipped to the PINGP, where they are stored. Only a few truck or rail shipments would be involved in shipment of these racks and disposal of the present ones. The impacts of dismantling the present racks and installing the new ones will be' limited to those nonnally associated with metal working activities. No significant impact on the community is expected to result from the fuel rack conversion or subsequent operation with increased storage of spent fuel in the SFP.
4.5 Evaluation of Radiological Impact As discussed above, the proposed modification does not sign'ficantly change the radiological impact evaluated in the FES.
5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF POSTULATED ACCIDENTS Although the new high density racks will accommodate a larger inventory of spent fuel, we have detennined that the installation and use of the racks will not change the radiological consequences of a postulated fuel handling accident in the SFP area from those values reported in the FES for PINGP dated May 1973.
Additionally, the NRC staff has under way a generic review of load handling operations in the vicinity of spent fuel pools to detennine the likelihood of a heavy load impacting fuel in the pool and, if necessary, the radiological consequences of such an event. Because the PINGP has the TS requirement to prohibit the movemer;t of heavy loads over the fuel assemblies in the SFP, we have concluded that the likelihood of a heavy load handling accident is l
sufficiently small that the proposed modification is acceptable and no additional restrictions on load handling operations in the vicinity of the SFP are necessary while our review is under way.
6.0 ALTERNATIVES The staff has considered the following alternatives to the proposed expansion of the SFP storage capacity at PINGP-182:
(1) reprocessing the spent fuel; (2) shipment of spent fuel to a separate fuel storage facility; (3) shipment of spent fuel to another reactor site; (4) reduced plant operation; and (5) l shutdown of facility. These alternatives are discussed below.
6.1 Reprocessing of Spent Fuel i
l As discussed earlier, none of the three commercial reprocessing facilities in the United States is currently operatir.g. The General Electric Company's Midwest Fuel Recovery Plant at Morris, Illinois is in a decommissioned condition. Nuclear Fuel Services informed the NRC oa September 22, 1976, that it was " withdrawing from the nuclear
-. -. - fuel reprocessing business". The Allied-General Nuclear Services (AGNS) reprocessing plant at Barnwell, South Carolina, received a construction permit on December 18, 1970.
In October 1973, AGNS applied for an operating license for the reprocessing facility; construction of the reprocessing facility is essentially coglete but no oper; ting license has been granted. On July 3,1974, AGNS applied for a materials license to receive and store up to 400 MTU of spent fuel in the onsite storage pool, on which construction has also been cogleted but hearings with respect to this application have not been held and no license has been granted.
In 1976. Exxon Nuclear Cogany, Inc. submitted an application for a proposed Nuclear Fuel Recovery and Recycling Center (NFRRC) to be located at Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
The plant would include a storage pool that could store up to 7,000 MTU in spent fuel. However, licensing review of this application was discontinued in 1977 as discussed below.
On April 7,1977, the President issued a statement outlining his policy on continued development of nuclear energy in the U. S.
The President stated that:
"We will defer indefinitely the comercial reprocessing and recycling of the plutonium produced in the U. S. nuclear power programs. From our own experience, we have concluded that a viable and economic nuclear power program can be sus-tained without such reprocessing and recycling".
On December 23, 1977, the NRC terminated the fuel cycle licensing actions involving mixed oxide fuel (GESMO) (Docket No. RM-50-5), the AGNS' Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant Separation Facility, Uranium Hexafluoride Facility and Plutonium Product Facility (Dodets Nos. 50-332, 70-1327 and 70-1821), the l
Exxon Nuclear Cogany, Inc. NFRRC (Docket No.70-564), Westinghouse Electric Corporation (recycle fuels plant, Docket No. 70-1432) and the NFS West Valley Reprocessing Plant (Docket No. 50-201). The Comission also announced that it would not at this time consider any other applications fo', comercial facilities for reprocessing spent fuel, fabricating mixed-oxide fuel and related functions.
At this time, any consideration of these or cogarable facilities has been deferred for the indefinite future. Reprocessing is not a reasonable alter-native to the proposed expansion of the PINGP SFP. Accordingly, no estimate of cost is considered appropriate.
6.2 Indeoendent Spent Fuel Storage Faciltiy An alternative to expansion of onsite SFP storage is the construction of i
new " independent spent fuel storage installations" (ISFSI). Such instal-l 1ations could provide storage space in excess of 1,000 MTU of spent fuel.
This is far greater than the capacities of onsite storage pools. The fuel l
storage pools at M0 and NFS are functioning as smaller ISFSIs although this l
was not the original design intent. The license for the General Electric (GE)
_. facility was amended on December 3,1975 to increase the storage capacity to about 750 MTU; and, as of August 30, 1978, 310 MTU was stored in the pool in the form of 1196 spent fuel assemblies.
An application for an 1100 MTU capacity addition is pending and the schedule called for cogletion in 1980 if approved. However, by a motion dated November 8,1977, GE requested the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board to suspend indefinitely further proceedings on this application. This motion was granted.
With regard to the status of storage space at M0, we have been informed that GE is primarily operating the M0 facility to store either fuel owned by GE (which had been leased to utilities on an energy basis), or fuel which GE has previously contracted to reprocess. We were also informed that the present GE policy is not to accept spent fuel for storage except fuel for which GE has a previous commitment. There is no such commitment for PINGP spent fuel.
Storage of the PINGP spent fuel at the existing reprocessing facilities is not a viable alternative to the expansim of the PINGP spent fuel pools.
The NFS facility has capacity for about 260 MTU2 with approximately 170 MTU presently stored in the pool at West Valley. Although the storage pool is not full, NFS has indicated that it is not accepting additional spent fuel, even from the reactor facilities with which it had reprocessing contracts.
We also considered under this alternative the construction of new ISFSIs..
The staff had estimated that at least five years would be required for cogletion of an ISFSI. This estimate assumes one year for preliminary l
design; one year for prepai ation of the license application, environmental report, and licensing revis in parallel with one year for detail desigr:;
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two and one-half years for construction and receipt of an operating license; and one-half year for plant and equipment testing and startup.
Industry proposals for additional independent spent fuel storage facilities are scarce to date.
In late 1974 E. R. Johnson Associates, Inc. and Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc. issued a series of joint p o-posals to a number of electric utility companies having nuclear plants ia operation or conte @ lated for operation, offering to provide independent storage services for spent nuclear fuel. A paper en this proposed project l
was presented at the American Nuclear Society meeting.in November 1975 (ANS l
Transactions,1975 Winter Meeting, Vol. 22. TANSA0 22-1-836,1975).
In 1974, l
E. R. Johnson Associates estimated the construction cost would be equivalent l
to approximately $9,000 per spent fuel assembly.
1 Several licensees have evaluated construction of an ISFSI and have provided cost estimates.
In 1975, Connecticut Yankee, for example, estimated that an independent facility with a storage capacity of 1,000 MTU (BWR and/or PWR l
. assemblies) would cost approximately $54 million and take about five years to put into operation.
The Commonwealth Edison Cogany estimated the construction cost of an ISFSI in 1975 at about $10,000 per fuel assembly. To this would be added the costs for maintenance, operation, safeguards, security, interest on investment, overhead, transportation and other costse On December 2,1976, Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation submitted a Topical Report requesting NRC approval for a standard design ISFSI intended for siting near nuclear power facilities. Based on discussions with Stone & Webster, we estimated that the present day cost for such a fuel storage installation would be about $24 million, exclusive of site preparation costs. On July 12, 1978 we concluded that the proposed approach and conceptual design are acceptable.
Base on the above facts, on a short-term basis (i.e., prior to 1986),
an ISFSI is not available as an alternative. One would not be available in time to meet the licensee's needs.
It is also unlikely that the environmental igacts of this alternative, on a delayed availability basis, would be less than the minor impacts associated with the proposed PINGP modification. This is based on the fact that offsite transpor-tation would be involved and a structure, pool, and supporting systems would have to be erected and installed for an ISFSI, whereas for PINGP modification, only new storage, racks are involved.
For the long term, DOE is modifying its program for nuclear waste management to include design and evaluation of a long term repository to provide Government storage of unreprocessed spent fuel rods in a retrievable condition.
It is estimated that the long term storage facility will start accepting commercial spent fuel in the time frame of 1995 to 2000. The criterion for acceptance is that the spent fuel must have decayed a minimum of ten years so it can be stored in dry conditior without need for forced air circulation.
DOE has recently revised its policy with respect to the provision by I
DOE of interim fuel storage facilities. By letter dated March 27, 1981, addressed to the Presiding Officer for the ongoing Waste Confidence Rulemaking proceeding, DOE indicated that it had reached a decision l
to discontinue its efforts to provide Federal government - owned or l
controlled away-from-reactor storage facilities. DOE intends to redirect its effort to support the development of alternative means to be employed by utilities to further increase spent fuel storage capabili-ties. This leaves the task of developing interim storage capacity to private industry. We conclude that Government - sponsored interim storage is not a viable alternative to the proposed SFP modification.
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6.3 Storage at Another Reactor Site NSP owns and operates the Monticello Nuclear Plant. The Monticello facility is a boiling water reactor whereas the PINGPs are pressurized water reactors.
l The fuel handling and storage equipment for fuel assemblies from the two plants l
l are not compatible. Monticello has been operating since December 1970 and is also confronted with the similar problem of spent fuel storage capacity. The licensee cannot assuredly rely on other power facilities to provide additional storage capability except on a short term emergency basis. If space were available in another reactor facility, the costs would probably be comparable to the cost of storage at a commercial storage facility.
6.4 Reduced Plant Output Nuclear plants are usually base-loaded because of their lower costs of gener-ating a unit of electricity compared to other thermal power plants on the system. Therefore, reducing the plant output to reduce spent fuel generation is not an economical use of the resources available. The total production costs remain essentially constant, irrespective of plant output. Consequently, the unit cost of electricity is increased proportionately at a reduced plant output. If the plant is forced to substantially reduce output because of spent fuel storage restriction, the licensee would be required to purchase replace-ment power or operate its higher cost fossil-fired units, if available, without any accompanying environmental advantage. The cost of electricity would therefore be increased without any likely reduction of environmental impact.
l 6.5 Shutdown of Facility Storage of spent fuel fre.n the PINGP units in the existing racks is possible but only for a short per od of time. As discussed above, if expansion of the i
SFP capacity is not approved and if an alternate storage facility is not located, NSP would have to shut down Unit No.1 in late 1984 and Unit No. 2 in early 1984 due to a lack of spent fuel storage facilities,.resulting in the cessation of at least 1040 MWe net electrical energy production.
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. The incremental cost for providing replacement power if both units were shutdown would be approximately $160 million dollars per year. This would be the cost of increased use of NSP's coal-fired and oil-fired generating facilities and the purchase of some replacement power from other utilities. This does not reflect that the $370 million dollar investment would be idle and that the PINGP would have to be maintained in standby or decomnissioned.
6.6 Comparison of Alternatives In Section 4 of this environmental impact appraisal the incremental environ-mental impacts of the proposed expansion of tne SFP storage capacity were evaluated and were found to be insignificant. Therefore, none of the alter-natives to this action offers a significant environmental advantage. Further-more, alternatives (1), reprocessing, and (2), storage at an independent spent fuel storage facility, are not presently available to the licensee and are not likely to become available in time to meet the licensee's need.
Alternative (3), shipment to another reactor site, would be a short term emergency solution but would eventually involve shipment to another temporary storage facility. Alternatives (4), reducing the plant output, and (5),
shutdown of the facility, would both entail substantial additional expense for replacement electrical energy.
Table 1 presents a summarized comparison of the alternatives, in the order presented in Subsections 6.1 through 6.5.
From inspection of the table, it can be seen that the most cost effective alternative is the proposed SFP modification, which is included as alternative 6.
The SFP modification would provide the required storage capacity, while minimizing environmental effects, capital cost and resources committed. The staff therefore concludes that expansion of the PINGP SFP storage capacity is superior to the alternatives available or likely to become available within the necessary time frame.
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. TABLE 1 COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES Alternative Cost Benefit 1.
Reproc
'- of N/A Continued production of electrical Spent Foc!
energy by Units 1 & 2.
This alternative is not available noW.
2a. Storage at Repro-
$3,000 to $6,000/
Continued production of electrical cessor's Facility assembly per yr*
energy by Units 1 & 2.
This alter-plus shipping costs native is not available now or in of $12,000 per the foreseeable future.
assembly.
2b. Storage at a new S20,000-$40,000/ assembly Continued production of electrical Independent plus operating and trans-energy by Units 1 & 2.
This alter-Facility portation costs, and en-native could not be available in vironmental impacts time to meet the present storage related to development needs of the PINGP.
of a new facility.
3.
Storage at Other Costs of shipment to other Continued production of electrical
- Nuclear Plants facility plus cost for energy. However, this alternative subsequent shipment to an is unlikely to be available.
l ISFSI; increased environ-i mental cost of extra shipping and handling.
4.
Reduction in Plant See below for replacement Continued production of electrical Output electricity costs. Amount energy by Units 1 and/or 2 - but at l
of replacement required much higher unit cost. The gener-would be equivalent to at ation of replacement electricity least 50% reduction in elsewhere would probably create no rated output of Units 1 less impact.
and 2.
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- Since NFS and MO are not accepting fuel for storage, the cost range reflects prices that were quoted in 1972 to 1974.
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, TABLE 1 COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES Alternative Cost Benefit 5.
Reactor Shutdown Increased electric pro-Environmental impacts associated with duction expenses are plant operation would cease but the estimated to be approx-generation of replacement electricity imately $160 million/yr elsewhere would probably create no
($438,000/ day) if both less impact.
units are shut down, plus the costs of main-tenance and security of the plant.
6.
Increased Storage
$7,600/added assembly Continued production of electrical Capacity of PINGP storage space energy by PINGP Units 1 & 2.
SFP e
e 6
. 7.0 EVALUATION OF PROPOSED ACTION 7.1 Unavoidable Adverse Environmental Impacts 7.1.2 Radiological Impacts Expansion of the storage capacity of the SFP will not create any significant additional adverse radiological effects. As discussed in Section 4.4, the additional total body dose that might be received by an individual at the site boundary or the estimated population within a 50-mile radius is less than 0.00004 mrem /yr and 0.0002 person-rem /yr, respectively, and is significantly less than the natural fluctuations in the dose this population would receive from background radiation. The total dose to workers during removal of the present storage racks and installation of the new racks is estimated to be about 0 man-rem. Operation of the plant with additional spent fuel in the 4
SFP is not expected to increase the occupational radiation exposure by more than one percent of the present total annual occupational exposure at this facility.
7.2 Relationships Between Local Short Term Use of Man's Environment and the Maintenance and Enhancement of Long Term Productivity Expansion of the SFP storage capacity would permit more efficient use of the land already committed to this purpose. There would be no other significant changes from the evaluation in the FES.
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Irreversible and Irretrievable Comitments of Resources
.3.1 Water, Land and Air Resources The proposed action will not result in any significant change in the commit-ments of water, land and air resources as identified in the FES. No additional allocation of land would be made; the land area now used for the SFP would be used more efficiently by reducing the spacings between fuel assemblies.
7.3.2 Material Resources Under the proposed modification, the present spent fuel storage rack., will be replaced by new racks that will increase the storage capacity of the SFP by 699 spent fuel assemblies. The new spent fuel storage racks consist of storage tubes on 9.5 inch centers which have three components: an inner type 304 stainless steel square tube with an inside dimension of 8.27 inches, a layer of neutron absorbing material sandwiched in between the inner and outer tubes and a 0.090 inch thick outer square tube of type 304 stainless 1
. steel. The largest storage rack consists of a 7 X 8 array of individual storage boxes, a base with four legs, and various bracing and support members.
The fuel assemblies sit on bars across the bottom of each storage box. The tops of the storage boxes are flared to form a lead-in funnel. A total of sixteen 7 X 8 racks and fourteen 7 X 7 racks each weighing less than 12.4 tons will be used resulting in a total weight of less than 744,000 pounds.
Thus, the resources to be comnitted for fabrication of the new spent fuel storage racks total less than 744,000 pounds of stainless steel. The amount of stainless steel used annually in the U. S. is about 2.82X1011 lbs.
The material is readily available in abundant supply. The amount of stain-less steel required for fabrication of the new racks is a small amount of this resource consumed annually in the U. S. and therefore can be ignored in this Appraisal. The amount of boron required in the borated rack is insignificant. We conclude that the amount of material required for the new racks at PINGP is insignificant and does not represent a significant irreversible commitment of material resources.
8.0 BENEFIT-COST BALANCE This section summarizes and compares the cost and the benefits resulting from the proposed modification to those that would be derived from the selection and implementation of each alternative. Table 1 presents a tabular comparison of these costs and benefits. The first three alter-natives are not possible at this time or in the foreseeable future except on a short term snergency basis. Alternatives 4 and 5 have higher cost and no less environmental impacts than that of increasing storage capacity of PINGP SFP.
From examination of the table, it can be seen that the most cost-effective alternative is the proposed spent fuel pool modification. As evaluated in the preceding sections, the environmental impacts associated with the proposed modification would not be significantly changed from those analyzed in the Final Environmental Statement for PINGP Units 1 and 2 issued in May 1973.
9.0 BASIS AND CONCLUSION FOR NOT PREPARING AN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT We have reviewed this proposed facility modification relative to the require-ments set forth in 10 CFR Part 51. We have determined that the proposed license amendment will not significantly affect the quality of the human environment and that there will be no significant environmental impact attributable to the proposed action other than that which has already been predicted and described in the Final Environmental Statement for PINGP dated May 1973.
Therefore, the staff has found that an environmental impact statement need not be prepared, and that pursuant to 10 CFR 51.5(c), the issuance of a negative declaration to this effect is appropriate.
Dated: May 13, 1981 l
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