ML19345E406
| ML19345E406 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 01/24/1966 |
| From: | Doan R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | Haueter R CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8101160330 | |
| Download: ML19345E406 (3) | |
Text
N RI.E COP' Distribution; s*t " '8' UNITED STATES l' cua. nt "oon
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1 ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION i
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545 r
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T4?P.33 !?carline DEL Pending d4fi 24 }9G3 Originator: Sc is ;
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Docket No. 50-155 g
J. Shen II. Stecic L. Cornblith (2)
Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201 Attention:
Mr. Robert L. Haueter Assistant Electric Production Superintendent Gentlemen:
This refers to your application, dated December 23,1965 for. a change (No. 8) to the Technical Specifications for the Big Rock.
. Point Nuclear Plant. As a result oi our review of your application which would authorize the use of zircaloy clad reload fuel, we have concluded that additional information will be necessary to complete our technical review. Accordingly, you are requested to provide the information listed in the enclosure.
Sincerely yours, Odginal Signed by R. L. Donn E. L. boan, Director Division of Reactor Licensine
Enclosure:
As stated above 2/6/No M30 DI!
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s BIC ROCK POINT - CHANCE NO. 8 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REOUESTED 1.
Thermal-Hvdraulic The conclusion that the use of the reload fuel " presents no safety problems related to normal operation of the reactor" was stated to be based on a " thorough review of the nucicar and thermal-hydraulic aspects of the use of zircaloy-clad reload fuel."
Please provide this thermal-hydraulic analysis with special attention to the points in the following questions.
1.
Provide the following information for a full core of reload fuel and for each intermediate combination of original and reload fuel: total flow cross-section of core, pressure drop, total flow, peak and averare heat fluxes at power nd overpower, peak linear heat generation rate, local and gross peaking factors, peak and average burnup, and minimum burnout ratio and maximum fuel center temperature at power and overpower.
2.
Discuss the method for ori. icing the fuel. Uill the orifices be chanced as the fuel is moved within the core?
3.
The calculated temperature coefficient at 77'F in an order of magnitude greater than that listed for the original fuel.
Give the temperature coef ficient at power aad reevaluate the " cold water" accident.
II.
- Nuclear, 1,
What is the calculated peak rod worth with the new fuel configuration? What is Kef f without rods (hot clean, cold clean, hot equilibrium) and Keff with the strongest rod withdrawn from the core (cold clean)?
2.
What testing will be performed to ensure uniform nuclear properties in the reload fuel? What precautions are taken against loading a high enrichment pin in an outer position in a fuel bundle? What are the consequences of this mis-placement ?
III.
Accident Analysis 1.
If the control blade or fuel bundle worths have changed significantly in the intermediate or full reload cores, what are the resultant ef fects on the hazards considerations for the fuel drop and rod ejection accident situations?
2.
Give the justification for terminating the metal-water reaction at 3300*F rather than assuming the Zr02 maintains the clad integrity to the meltine point of the oxide in the coolant loss accident. What additional reaction would take place in the latter case?
3.
Our calculations indicate that if the hydrogen reler. sed in the metal-water reaction were to pocket and recombine, thus adding energy directly to the contain-ment atmosphere, a recombination of an amount of hydrogen less than half that evolved from the calculated 27% reaction would be sufficient to bring the contain-ment to the design pressure. Similarly, if the hydrogen burned as it entered the
I(
. containment, the energy would be added directly to the containment atmosphere but some heat would be transferred to containmenc heat sinks _since the combustion is assumed to take place over about 15 minutes.
In this latte'r case our calcu-lations indicate that a full recombination of the hydrogen still could not be tolerated. Please provide your analysis of these two cases of hydrogen recom-bination.
4.'
In light of the above question, discuss the desirraility ot' eliminating the present 15-minute delay in the operation of the post-incident containment spray.
If initiated during the first minutes of the accident, would one set of sprays (400 gpm) be adequate to remove hydrogen combustion heat if the hydrogen burned as it entered the containment? Could the containment spray be expected to prevent hydrogen pocketing?
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