ML19345D768
| ML19345D768 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 12/08/1980 |
| From: | Klingsberg D, Liberman J BERLACK, ISRAELS & LIBERMAN, GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP., KAYE, SCHOLER, FIERMAN, HAYS & HANDLER |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8012160604 | |
| Download: ML19345D768 (33) | |
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CLAIM FOR DAMAGE, n snt cuow Prener - -' or >>ne-ruer rie.* re=a c r ruii> iae co M Arritovso snstrucitofW Of' the r?% fM Yde and supph inforrr.atnin reqtsested on tuh oug Mo INJURY, OR DEATH
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- 1. SUBv1T TO:
- 2. NAME AND ADDRESS OF CLAIMANT ( Aumtier street. (str. State.
and Zip Coder General Counsel General Public Utilities Corp.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 100 Interpace Parkway Washington, D.C.
20555 Parsippanv, N,J 07054 et. al Isee attachment)
- 3. TYPE OF EMPLOYMENT 4 AGE
- 5. MARITAL 6 NAME AND ADDRESS OF SPOUSE. IF ANv ( A umper, strrer, city, State, und STATUS ZP Codet C M*LITARY
= cw: VAN NA NA NA NA
- 7. PLACE OF ACCIDENT tGive curr or town and State: ij outside cay hmors. ondr< ate s DATE AND DAY
- 9. TAME milener or destance to nearess city or town)
OF ACCfDENT LA.Al OR P.AlI Three Mile Island Unit No. 2 March 28, 1979 Begin s.g Londonderry Township, Pennsylvania Wednesday at 4:00 AM 1
10.
AMOUNT OF CLAIM tin dollarsl A PROpftTV DAMAGE 6 PERSONA. INJUPv C WRONGFUL Of ATM D TCTAL
$4,010,000,000 NA NA
$4,010,000,000 1 t DESCRIOTION Os ACC: DENT IState l>elvu. in Jetail. all knan n facts and t urcumstam es anendmy the damage. injurt. or death, odennfrone persons and property onsvived and the cause tirereon See Attachment i
12 PROPERLY DAMAGE NAME ANC ADCttS5 OF CwNtR. IF CTwit THAN CLAwANT t humbe r. street. rtn. hurre. und Zm Caden same seitstv otsceier oNo ANo tocAricN Os recetRiv ANC NATutt AND EXTENT 08 DAMAGE IArc mirrm runes em rrirror s,Jr for meth,=1of suh*4"inurme chums See Attachment 13 PERSON AL INJURY
$f ATE NATU91 ANC ExTINT OF sNJUtv WMcM 80eus Thf Basis 08 Tais CLAIM NA 14 WITNESSES r
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ADDet%% t %umher. surret. rury. 5une. und lef> C nles Due to the nature of this claim. based on the March 2 1979 accident at 'IMI-2, tMrts.
cox Co. anc 'Iblec;s and of tnirC of tM claimani are hundreds of persons, includine enclavees of the i
o Edison Co.,
carties, includinc but not 11mitti to~ the Whk & W
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is alreadv g ed of the Lt)o am witnesses pgssessiM re}esant info = nation. The t of its Sp(1980) quiry, In I
icentity or many, 1 not all, o these witnesses as a "Three Mile Island - A Report to lthe CCmnissioners and to the Public I CERTIFY THAT THE AMOUNT OF CLAIM COVERS ONLT DAMAGts AND INJURIES CAUSED BY THE ACCIDENT ABOVE AND AGREE TO ACCEPT SAID AMOUNT. IN FULL SATISFACTION AND FINAL SETTLEVENT OF TW5 CLAIM
\\$. StGNATURE OF CLAIMANT IThis signature should be used un all future corresponden< er te. DATE OF CLAIM r....
December 8, 1980 l
l CIVIL PEN ALTY FOR PRESENTING CRIN11N AL PENALTY FOR PRESENTING FR AUDULENT FR AUDULENT CLAIM CLAINt OR NI AKING F ALSE STATE \\ TENTS The claimant shall forfeit and pay to the United States the sum Fine of not more than $10.000 or imprisonment for not more of $2.000 plus double the amount of damages sustained b) the than 5 years or both (Ser 62 Stat. 698. 749; 16 U.S C. 287.1001.)
United States. tSee R.S. t3490.5438:31 U.S.C 231.s Ps.ien sfAsemao poem es ca. e-m N SY DWT. OF JuBTIG N 0W 342 h 4 *M h
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BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION p 3
OF THE UNITED STA5:S-M gr.c OEC.8 g, -!
--x gg General Public Utilities Corporation,
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anus Jersey Central Power & Light Company, te/
Metropolitan Edison Company and a
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' Pennsylvania Electric Company CLAIM Docket No.
Nuclear Regulatory Comission.
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General Public Utilities Corporation (" GPU" ) and its
' operating subsidiaries, Jersey Central Power & Light Company
(*JCP&L"), Metropolitan Edison Company
(" Met-Ed") and Pennsyl-
' vania Electric Company ("Penelec"), bring this claim against the Nuclear Regulatory Comission ("NRC") alleging as follows:
1.
This is a claim arising out of the March 28, 1979 accident at the nuclear electric generating facility known as Three MiJs Island Unit No. 2 ("StI-2 "). Claimants seek damages against the NRC under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
'S 2671 et s3 Jurisdiction 2.
Jurisdiction is based on the Federal Tort Claims
-Act, 28 U.S.C'.
5 1346(b), and regulation 10 C.F.R. 5 14.1 (1975).
This is a :laim against the United States for money damages for injury to and loss of property caused by the negligent and wrongful acts and omissions of employees of the NRC while acting within the scope of their employment.
This claim is filed before the NRC for disposition in acccrdance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 5 2675 and 10 C.F.R. 5 14.1 et sg.
t The Parties t
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Claimant GPU is incorporated in Pennsylvania and i
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has its principal place of business in New Jersey. GPU is an investor-owned public utility holding company, operating pur-suant to the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C.
t S 79 et sg., and owning a'l of the common stock of three operating electric company subsidiaries, claimants JCP&L, Met-Ed and Penelec. As used herein, GPU refers to GPU and all of its operating subsidiaries.
4.
Claimant JCP&L is incorporated in New Jersey and has its principal place of business in New Jersey. JCP&L sells electrical energy to retail customers in north-central, east-central, northwestern and western New Jersey and to other i
electric companies and entities for resale.
5.
Claimant Met-Ed is incorporated in Pennsylvania and has its principal place of business in Pennsylvania. Met-Ed sells electrical energy to retail customers in eastern, east-central and southeastern Pennsylvania and to other electric I
companies and entities for resale.
6.
Cla h nt Penelec is incorporated in Pennsylvania and has its principal place of business in Pennsylvania.
Penelee sells electrical energy to retail customers located in western, northern and south-central Pennsylvania and to other electric companies and entities for resale.
7.
JCP&L, Met-Ed and Penelee are co-owners of the
- nuclear electric generating facility known as Three Mile Island Unit No. 2 ('TMI-2"), which is located in Iondonderry Township, Pennsylvania. Met-Ed owns an undivided 50% interest in "'MI-2, and JCP&L and Penelee each own an undivided 25% interest in
.TMI-2.
Met-Ed is the operator of TMI-2.
The Atomic Energy
' Comission issued an Operating License, DPR-73, to Met-Ed for TMI-2 cn February 8, 1978. The nuclear steam supply system in T'4I-2, including the nuclear reactor and substantially all of 4
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facilities used in the conduct of such activity.
." 42 U.S.C.
S 2201(i). The NRC has promulgated regulations setting forth mandatory agency operating procedures which are set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations, the NRC Regulatory Guide, the
' NRO Manual, the Office of Inspection and Enforcement Manual, the Standard Review Plan and other guides, manutis and publications which, in relevant part, are described below.
11.
In the operational exercise of its statutory and ratgulatory duties, the NRO induced GPU and Met-Ed to rely and GPU and Met-Ed did rely upon the NRC to warn of defects in equipment, analyses, procedures and training affecting the operation of TMI-2 of which the NRO was or should have been aware. The NRO, in the operational exercise of its statutory and regulatory duties, induced GPU and Met-Ed to rely and GPU and Met-Ed did rely upan the NRO to review with due care the equipment, analyses, pro-cedures and training for nuclear plant operation submitted to the NRC by nuclear equipmant vendors and nuclear plant licensees.
The March 28, 1979 Accident at TMI-2 12.
On March 28, 1979, beginning at 4:00 A.M., while TMI-2 was operating at about 97% of full power, the turbine generator shut down or " tripped" due to sudden loss of feed-water.
Under NRC regulations, such an unscheduled turbine generator trip is an " anticipated operational occurrence" which is required to be planned for in the design of a nuclear plant.
As with any such shutdown, the removal of heat from the primary loop by the secon'2ary loop was reduced substantially. Within seconds, the crntinuing buildup of heat in the primary loop
! raised th pressure in the reactor coolant system. In turn,
-this caused a relief valve on the pressurizer (the " pilot-
. operated relief valve") to open, as it was designed to do, in 4
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tne engineered safety systems that control the nuclear reactor, were supplied by The Babcock & Wilcox Company ("B&W").
8.
All of the major electric generation, transmission and distribution facilities of the claimants are physically interconnected. The operations of these electric facilities are l centrally coordinated within GPU to function as a single, integrated electric utility system known as the GPU System. The
- energy generated by TMI-2, when operating, is comingled with the energy generated throughout the GPU System and is transmitted throughout the GPU System ar.d distributed to retail customers or sold to other electric companies and entities for resale.
9.
The NRC is a federal executive agency, established J
by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, PL 93-438, 88 Stat.
~ 1233, 42 U.S.C. 5 5814 el m., as a successor agency to the Atomic Energy Comission. As used herein, NRC refers to the present agency, its predecessor, the Atomic Energy Comission,
. and all present and former divisions, offices, employees and agents of the NRC.
By statute, the NRC is charged with the t
- establishment of " standards and instructions to govern the pos-session and use of special nuclear material, source material, and byproduct material as the Comission may deem necessary or
- desirable to promote the comen defense and security or to protect health or to minimize danger to life or property." 42 U.S.C. S 2201(b).
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10.
The NRC has the authority and duty to regulate the design and operation of commercial nuclear power plants within the United States. In the 1974 Energy Reorganization Act, supra, Congress authorized the NRC to " prescribe such regulations or orders as it may deem necessary... to govern any activity authorized pursuant to this chapter, including standards and restrictions governing the design, location, and operation of I
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Several seconds af ter the pilot-operated relief
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- Ithe pressure in the reactor coolant system to drop to within
$sits normal range. At that point, the pilot-operated relief valve should have closed.
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14.
In fact, the pilot-operated relief valve improp-d*erly failed to close and, because of a lack of instrumentation to -
1J. indicate clearly either the open position of the valve or the
)jexistence of flow through the valve, the operators at TMI-2 s
1 iwere unaware that the valve had failed to close. Thereafter, a
3hsignificant quantities of coolant water and stcam escaped through P the stuck-open valve, and a " loss-of-coolant accident" was in 3
.t lprogress.
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As more coolant water and steam escaped, the t
f pressure in the reactor coolant syscem continued to drop.
lWithin approrimately two minutes, the pressure fell to a level
$at which an engineered safety system began providing high-j jpressureinjectionofwaterintothereactorcoolantsystemto ireplace the lost coolant and ensure that the nuclear core was i
1 acovered and protected by coolant.
16.
Approximately five minutes after the 4:00 A.M.
j
! turbine generator trip, the TMI-2 operators substantially reduced I
i the high-pressure injection of replacement coolant into the re-jactor, in accordance with B&W-supplied limits and precautions, 1 procedures and training, which the NRC had reviewed as described herein.
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As a result of the loss of coolant through the i) stuck-openpilot-operatedreliefvalveandthelackofreplace-ment coolant, the nuclear fuel core overheated, severely 1
4da= aging the protective cladding on the nuclear fuel and substan-t d
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- ~. u tially destroying portions of the nuclear fuel core. Radioactive
-material from the ruptured nuclear fuel core spread throughout
,tne surrounding reactor equipment, further damaging and contamin-ating large portions of the nuclear steam supply system and other' I
- equipment and structures in the TMI-2 contain:nent building and
'in the adjacent fuel auxiliary and intermediate buildings.
4 THE NRC'S NEGLIGENT PERFOR.WCE AND OMISSIONS OF ITS OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS 18.
Prior to the March 28, 1979 accident at TMI-2,
,'the NRC both had reason to know and actually knew that there were defects in the equipment, analyses, procedures and training supplied by B&W for TMI-2.
Notwithstanding the statutory and regulatory duties of the NRC to warn nuclear plant licensees of such defects, and notwithstanding the reliance by GPU and Met-Ed on the NRC for the dissemination of such warnings, the NRC negligen*1v failed to warn GPU or Met-Ed of such defects in TMI-2.
That failure to warn by the NRC was a proximate cause of the March 28, 1979 accident.
19.
Pursuant to NRC regulations, the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement is specifically required to inspect nuclear plant licansees to " ascertain the status of compliance with NRC requirements including rules, regulations, orders and license provisions," and to "lijnvestigate incidents, accidents, allegations, and other unusual circumstances involving matters in the nuclear industry which may be subject to NRC jurisdic-tion to ascertain the facts and to take or recommend appropriate actions." NRC Manual Ch. 0127 (1978).
20.
The NRC regulations mandate that the NRC dissemi-l' nate among licensees of nuclear power plants information derived from operating experience at all nuclear p} ants in the United
.i States, including data on component failures and precedure I
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_c changes. 10 C.F.R. S 1.64 (1977): NRO tianual Ch. 0127 (1978).
'The NRC requires licensees to report unscheduled incidents or
-events which involve variations from regulations, technical
. specifications or license conditions. 10 C.F.R.
S 21 (1977): NRC Regulatory Guide 1.16 (1975). The reporta, called License
- Event Reports, are submitted to the NRC Office of Inspection and iEnforcement to aid the NRC in obtaining corrective action at the reporting plant and in preventing a similar occurrence at other nuclear plants. The director of each division within the Office of Inspection and Enforcement is required to "[e] valuate licensee event reports and Regional reports to identify generic problems and to dete=nine the significance of individual incidents.
NRC Manual Ch. 0127 (1978).
21.
The NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement is responsible for evaluating licensee and NRC responses to inci-dents or accidents to " assure adequacy of the overall response to the incident or accident." The Regional Director must
. review significant events, allegations and investigatory findings for matters having generic applicability. Regional Inspection and Enforcement Directors are required to review all reports mandated by NRC regulations, including all Licensee Event Reports. NRC Manual Ch. 0127 (197?)-
Inspection and Enforcement Manual Ch. 1110-051 (1978).
22.
As the primary recipient of plant operating data, the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement is required by regulations to analyze and disseminate important safety informa-tion to other NRC offices and to all nuclear plant licensees.
NRC Manual Ch. 0127 (1978). One of the principal methods used J
by the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement for advising licensees 'of Onportant safety matters is through the issuance of Bulletins and Circulars. Because of the importance of these f
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-- a notices for warning licensees of possible defects and safety problems, NRC offices other than Inspection and Enforcement, such as Nuclear Reactor Regulation and Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards, also recommend the issuance of Bulletins and Circulars on particular subjects. Inspection and Enforcement i
Manual Ch. 1125-052 (1978). NRO regulations direct all NRO staff to be alert to any information which has potential safety significance. The regulations require every member of the NRO staff "to be alert to the emergence of information -- f rom c :tside sources or within the staf f -- which is new, potentially important, and potentially relevant to one or more pending i
proceedings. " Inspection and Enforcement Manual Ch. 1530 (1978).
i 23.
NRC regulations impose a duty on the NRO Office of Inspection and Enforcement to issue Bulletins regarding matters of " safety, safeguards and environmental significance" for nuclear plants and to require tnat licensees take specific actions as a result of safety-related design inadequacies, equipment defects, operating inadequacies, malfunctions, or any other failures of a generic nature that have occurred at a simi-lar f acility or operation. A Bulletin requires licensees to inspect for and correct the inadequacies described in the Bulletin. The Inspection and Enforcement Manual requires the issuance of Bulletins when an event or condition is generic and important to safety. Inspection and Enforcement Manual Ch. 1125-031, 1125-041 (1976).
24.
GPU and Met-Ed relied on the NRC to comply with the ccmprehensive requirements of data collection, analysis and dissemination set forth in statutes and regulations. GPU and Met-1* relied on the NRO to issue warnings as required by NRC regula; ions. Met-Ed maintained a formal program for the review of communications from the Office o' Inspection and Enforcement l
to determine whether any adverse condition reported by the NRO 4
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required corrective action at TMI-2.
Met-Ed, the operator of TMI-2, promptly disseminated information from NRO Bulletins within Met-Ed and required prompt replies and appropriate e
action.
l THE NRC's NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO GIVE WARNING BASED ON THE DAVIS-BESSE INCIDENT 25.
In September 1977, a loss-of-coolant accident occurred at the B&W-supplied Davis-Besse I nuclear power plant of the Toledo Edison Company. That accident closely paralleled the cvents which occurred 18 months later at TMI-2.
26.
Following the September 1977 incident at Davis-Besse, the NRO negligently failed to perform its duty (a) to adequately to investigate and ascertain the facts, (b) to take and recommend appropriate action and*(c) to warn Met-Ed and other licensees of B&W-supplied nuclear plants of defects in equipment, analyses, procedures and training which the NRO had discovered or should have discovered as a result of the Davis-Besse incident. These negligent failures contravened NRO duties imposed by statute and regulations and were inconsistent with duties previously undertaken by the NRO.
The NRO thus negligently performed and negligently omitted to perform opera-tional functions mandated by statute, NRO regulations and past agency practice. If a proper warning had been given by the NRO, the TMI-2 accident on March 28, 1979 would have been avoided.
27.
On September 24, 1977, while the Davis-Besse plant was operating at 9% of full power, a sudden loss of feedwater caused a turbine generator trip. When the pilot-operated relief valve subsequently opened and failed to close, the Davis-Besse plant experienced a loss-of-coolant accident. -
As reactor coolant pressure dropped, the high-pressure injection l
of replacement coolant activated automatically. The Davis-Besse I
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28.
Immediately following the September 1977 Davis-Besse incident, the NRO began an investigation, as requir3d by 10 C.F.R.-
S 1.64 (1977), which included operator interviews and reviews of plant operating data, equipment and cperator action.
29.
The NRO conducted another investigation of the September 1977 Davis-Besse incident during 1978, which resulted in the NRC implementing a revised Operating Procedure for Davis-Besse, described more fully below at paragraph 34.
30.
As a result of the investigation and analyses of facts, which regulations required the NRC to perform following the Davis-Besse incident, the NRC knew or should have known the following:
(a) There were defects in equipment application and instrumentation of the Davis-Besse plant, including exces-sive reliance on the B&W-supplied pilot-operated relief valve to open and close and a lack of instrumentation to indicate the valve position; (b) There were defects in the transient analyses previously supplied by B&W and reviewed by the NRC, including a failure to analyze adequately potential breaks in the coolant system as small as a stuck-open pilot-operated relief valve and 10 i
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'a failure to analyze adequately potential breaks located at the j
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@ cautions, procenares and training reviewed by the NRC which a
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{zer to become filled with water or "go solids" j
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(d) There were defects in the operating and
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- permitted premature termination of high-pressure injection 1ibefore the operators had identified and arrested a loss-of-1 4
fcoolant accidents le) Unanticipated boiling of the water in the
{ reactor coolant systai at Davis-Besse had caused a rise in apressurizer water level which misled plant operators into con-i icluding that there was no loss of water from the reactor coolant I
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31.
Each of the defects and operating problems set
'forth in paragraph 30 were generic problems affecting TMI-2 iqand other B&W-supplied nuclear plants because those plants con-
- itained similar equipment and instrumentation and relied upon i
l 1similar procedures and analyses. NRC regulations required the i
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lso as to achieve appropriate precautionary or corrective action."
Il0 C.F.R. S 1.64 (1977). Nevertheless, the NRO negligently 1
failed to notify licensees, including Met-Ed, of these " generic
- problems," which it knew about or,should have known about as a iresult of the Davis-Besse incident. That failure was a proximate
!icause of the accident at TMI-2 on March 28, 1979.
32.
The NRC negligently disseminated to nuclear plant flicensees, including Met-Ed, summaries of Licensee Event Reports 4
tregarding the Davis-Besse incident wL.ch failed to warn that the 1
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operators at Davis-Besse had prematurely terminated high-pressure injection before determining whether a loss-of-coolant accident was in progress. Toledo Edison Corp., " Licensee Event Report: NP-32-77-16," Docket 50-346, October 1977.
33.
The NRC negligently disseminated to nuclear plant licensees, including Met-Ed, a su:nmary of azi erroneous supple-mental Licensee Event Report on the Davis-Besse incident. That report erroneously concluded that "[o]perator action was tirely and proper throughout the sequence of events."
As a result, the NRC failed to warn Met-Ed that the Davis-Besse enerator action had aggravated the less-of-coolant accident by t.trainating high-pressure injection o'. coolant. Toledo Edison Corp., " Licensee Event Report: NP-32-77-16 Supplement," Docket 50-346, Nove=be+
1977.
34.
More than a year af ter the Davis-Besse incident, the NRL *tplemented new operating procedures for Davis-Besse to preven s recurrence of the September 1977 accident. These procedurei stated:
" NOTE: Prior to securing EPI [high-pressure injection], insure that a leak does not exist in the pressurizer such as a safety valve or an electromagnetic [i.e., pilot-operated] relief valve stuck @ n.
A :rinimum decay heat flow of 2800 gpm is required prior to securing high-pressure injection.
If the leak has been isolated, the high-pressure injection pump can be shut down after RCS [ reactor coolant system] pressure increases above the shutoff head of the pump."
Davis-Lesse No. 1, Emergency Procedure EP 1202.06, " Loss of Beactor Coolant and Reactor Coolant Pressure." The NRC negli-gently failed to direct the implementation of this new operating procedure by licensees of other B&W-supplied nuclear plants, including Met-Ed.
i 35.
In addition to releasing incomplete, erroneous i
and misleading Licensee Event Reports regarding the loss-of-12
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coolant accident at Davis-Besse, the NRC Office of Inspection j
and Enforcement negligently f ailed to issue any Bulletin or Circular warning licensees of B&W-supplied nuclear plants, including Met-Ed, of the deficiencies in the equipment, analyses, procedures and training which the NRC had discovered or should have discovered as a result of the September 1977 Davis-Besse incident. As a result of its investigations of the Davis-Besse incident, the NRC knew that the equipment and procedural defi-ciencies were generic to B&W-supplied plants and that the sub-stituted operating procedure was important to the safe operation of the plant in that it instructed operators to take steps g
which wocid avoid core uncovery. Thus, the NRC knew that a Bulletin was mandated by NRC regulations, see paragraphs 22-23, supra. 'Nevertheless, the NRC negligently failed to issue a Bulletin.
36.
Section 208 of the Energy Reorganization Act of es Amended, requires the NRC to determine which incidents 4.id events represent Abnormal Occurrences and to report those Abnormal Occurrences to Congress. The NRC must disseminate information relating to an Abnormal occurrence to the public within 15 days after the NRC has learned of its occurrence.
Inspection and Enforcement hanual Ch. 1110. " Abnormal occur-rences" include
" Design or Safety Analysis Deficiency, Personnel Error, or Procedural or Administrative Inadequacy:
- 1. Discovery of a major condition not specifi-cally considered in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) or technical specifications that require irznediate remedial action.
- 2. Personnel error or procedural deficiencies which result in loss of plant capability to perform essential safety functions such that a potential release of radioactivity l
in excess of 10 CTR Part 100 quidelines could result from a postulated transient l
or accident (e.g., loss of emergency core cooling system, loss of control rod
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pystem)."
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Inspection and Inforcement Manual Ch. 1110, Appendix A.
The NRC knew that the procedure which misled operators at Davis-Besse pramaturely to terminate high-pressure injection was a "proced-ural deficione[y]," as defined by the Manual.
37.
In violation of NRC regulations (Inspection and Enforce. ment Nanual Ch. 1110, Appendix A), the NRO negligently f ailed to classify the September 1977 Davis-Besse incident as an Abnormal Occurrence in its subsequent quarterly or annual report to Congress, thereby failing to warn licensees of other B&W-supplied nuclear power plants, including Met-Ed, of the defects and operating problems revealed by this event which required I
immediate remedial action at similar plants, such as TMI-2.
38.
In addition to the f ailure of the NRO to warn licensees of B&W-supplied nuclear plants of defects and problems, of which the NRC was aware as a result of the Davis-Besse incid-ent, the NRO negligently failed to act in other ways to inves-tigate, discover and warn licensees of def ects of which the NRO should have been aware as a result of the Davis-Besse incident.
These negligent failures by the NRC have been documented by the NRO in a four volLP. report which the NRO approved, published and released in January 1980 to the public, entitled "Three Mile Island -- A Report to the Commissioners and to the Public*
(hereinafter "Special Inquiry").
The NRC, in its Special Inquiry, admits that l
(a) NRC staff personnel incorrectly advised the NRC Advisory Committee on Reactor Safety (ACRS) that the conse-quences of a loss-of-coolant accident, such as had occurred at I
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Davis-Besse, did not need to be examined for a reactor operating i
at full power -- as TMI-2 would be on March 28, 1979 -- because of the low probability of such an event occurring at full power.
(Special InTuiry, vol. II, Part 1 at 154) 14 9
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(b) While the NRO recognized that it should ex-amine the basis for the decision by the operators at Davis-Besse to terminate high-pressure injection, the NRO failed to direct its inspectors to resolve this issue.
(Special Inquiry, vol. II, Part 1 at 152) 39.
Even though the NRO knew or thould have known that there was an unreasonably high rate of f ailure of pilot-operated relief valves supplied by various manufacturers for nuclear plants, the NRC erroneously concluded that the failure of the pilot-operated relief valve at Davis-Besse in September 1977 had no safety implications for other nuclear plants con-taining pilot-operated relief valves designe-1 by dif ferent manufacturers. Another f ailure of the pilot-operated relief valve occurred at Davis-Besse in October 1977, while the NRO was investigating the September 24 incident. The NRC, in its Soecial Inct.iry, admits that the NRC knew that "similar pieces of equipment with comparable probabilities of failure and similar failure modes were installed on other B&W plants and, in some cases on all pressurized water reactors."
(Special Incuiry, vol. 2, Part 1 at 156) 40.
The final report of the NRC Inspection and Enforcement inspectors in Region III, where Davis-Besse is located, failed to identify the generic Lmplications of the Davis-Besse incident, including the misleading rise in pressur-izer water level, the incorrect operator response to pressurizer level and the misleading limits and precautions, procedures and training, reviewed by the NRC, which had directed that erroneous 6
l operator response.
I 41.
Prior to the September 1977 Davis-Besse incident, i
I the NRO knew or with due care should have known from other I
reports which it had received that its previous evaluations of 6
4 15 t
o i
~J i
e B&W equip =ent, analyses, procedures and training were inadequate.
.As the NRC Soecial Inauirv admits, the NRC omitted to heed these early " precursors," just as the Commission later failed to respond with due care to the Davis-Besse incident, as described at paragraphs 25-40, supra. These earlier precursors included:
(a) In 1971, the Atomic Energy Comission, the predecessor agency to the NRC, was specifically advised that a small-break loss-of-coolant accident at the top of a pressurizer as was to occur at TMI-2 on March 28, 1979 -- could create misleading signals, thereby interfering with high-pressure injection of coolant. Although the NRC was thus on notice that it should analyze misleading signals of water level caused by such an accident, the NRC negligently failed to perform that analysis or require suppliers of nuclear equipment, such as B&W, to perform that analysis.
(St,ecial Incuiry, vol. II, Part 1 at 139-40)
(b) In 1975, the NRC completed a comprehensive report on nuclear reactor safety, "The Reactor Safety Study 3
(WASH-1400)," which concluded that small-break less-of-coolant accidents -- such as the failure of a pilot-operated relief valve to close -- were among the highest probability risks in a nuclear plant.
(Special Incuirv, Vol. II, Part 1 at 142)
- Yet, the NRC failed to analyze or require nuclear equipment suppliers, such as B&W, to provide adequate analyses of small breaks.
(c) In 1977, the NRC substantially ignored a report prepared by Carlyle Michelson, a consultant to its Advis-ory Comittee on Reactor Safeguards, which put the NRC on notice
{
that neither the small-break analyses supplied by nuclear equip-l ment suppliers nor the computer models then used to predict i
reactor-coolant-system behavior were valid for analyzing small-j break loss-of-coolant accidents. (Special Incuirv, vol. II, Part 1 at 144-46) 16 i
1
. -l 3
l EFFECTS OF NRC'S NEGLIGENT PERFORMANCE ANL OMISSIONS OF ITS OPERATIONAL FUN TIONS 42.
GPU and Met-2d relied on the NRC to issue warnings,
of defects in equipment, analyses, procedures and training in a:cordance with the NRO's statutory and regulatory duties.
43.
If the NRO had exercised due care in investigating the Davis-Besse incident and analyzing other precursors, and if the NRC had issued correct warnings of generic problems in B&W equipment, analyses, procedures and training, GPU and Met-Ed would have had the equipment, inst; umentation, procedures and training reasonably needed to avoid the accident on March 20, 1979.
44.
The negligent failure by the NRC to issue Bullet-ins, Abnormal Occurrence Reports ara other warnings required by statute and NRC regulations was a proximate cause of the March 28, 1979 accident at T:iI-2.
NRO'S NEGLIGENT IMPLEMENTATION OF REVIEW REQUIREMENTS 45.
A proximate cause of the March 28, 1979 accident at TMI-2 was the failure of the NRC to review with due care, or in accordance with statutes and regulations, the equipment, analyses, procedures and training supplied by B&W for TMI-2.
46.
Pursuant to statutory and regulatory authority, the NRO issues licenses for the construction and operation of l
eaen commercial nuclear power plant in the United States.
1 (42 U.S.C. S 2133(b)). The NRC
'is responsible for managing safety reviews of applications for construction permits and operating licenses for reactors and evalua-tions of standard plant designs evaluates technical specifications.
[and] performs technical reviews and analyses of mechanical, structural, and materials engineering aspects I
of reactor systems, core performance, auxiliary l
systems, control systems, mechanical components, reactor structures, and power systems."
10 C.F.R.
$ 1,61 (1977).
17 I
7 a
.-* Q g -
1;
+
. -.. - - - - - ~ ~ - - - - - - -
l 1
The NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation " reviews applications [for licenses) and issues licenses... and evaluates the health, safety, and environmental arpects" of a plant prior to the approval of a Preliminary Safety Analysis Report or a Final Safety Analysis Report, which incorporate the equipment vendors' analyses, evaluations and descriptions of operati n of all camponents and systems. 10 C.F.R. $ 1.61 (1977),
S 50.34 (1978).
47.
The NRC Office of Nuclear Regulation is required by statute to
"[rleview the safety and safeguards of all such facilities, materials, and activities, and such review functions shall include, but not be limited to monitoring, testing and recom-mending upgrading of systems designed to pre-vent substantial health or safety hazards..
42 U.S.C. S 5843(b).
48.
Applicants for nuclear plant construction permits must submit for NRC review and approval " principal design criter-ia" for the proposed facility. 10 C.F.R. S 50.34 (1978). These principal design criteria " establish the necessary design, fabri-cation, construction, testing, and performance requirements for structures, systems, and components important to safety...."
10 C.F.R. S 50, Appendix A.
The NRC has promulgated General Design Criteria and has a duty to review equipment and designs for conformance to the General Design Criteria which " establish minimum requirements for the principal design criteria" for
,1,d,.
The NRC has further all commercial nuclear power plants; d
promulgated and has a duty to enforce additional design require-ments described throughout the appendices to 10 C.F.R. S 50.
49.
GPU and Met-Ed relied on the NRC review of B&M equipment, analyses, procedures and training to provide for the safe operation of TMI-2.
12
d O
t
/J 1
.._.y,_
l l
E i
1s hNegligent Review and Approval of B&W
] Topical Reports and B&W Generic Designs f
50.
Prior to any licensing submission by Met-Ed for i
1 lTMI-2, the NRC has already reviewed and negligently approved I
il numerous topical reports and generic models prepared by B&W for b
l nuclear plant design and operation. These topical reports b
I
, described generic systems in and the operation of B&W nuclear i
3 l
3 plants and were a means by which the NRC was able to review
]
E
! generic features once, rather than repetitiously for each
{
a
)succeedingB&Wplant. Licensees, such as Met-Ed, have no input l
i t in the creation of topical reports and rely on the NRC to review s
j the reports with due care prior to approving them for use in
- subsequent nuclear plant licensing proceedings. In reliance a
1 upon the prior review and approval by the NRC of topical reports, '
prospoetive licensees, such as Met-Ed, incorporate such reports
!j by reference into the Safety Analysis Report for specific f nuclear plants.
51.
During the licensing of TMI-2, the NRC acknowl-l g
l Jedged thats i
Many features of the design of TMI-2 i
l are similar to those we have evaluated and approved previously for other nuclear plants j
now under construction or in operation. To i
~
t %e extent feasible and appropriate we have relied on our earlier reviews for those fea-i I
tures which were shown to be substantially the same as those previously considered.
Where this has been done, the appropriate section of this report identifies the facility involved.
NRC Safety Evaluation Report for the Operating License on TMI
?
, Unit 2 (1976).
i 52.
GPU and Met-Ed relied upon and incorporated by i
reference in the TMI-2 Final Safety Analysis Report, a number of 1
B&W topical reports previously reviewed and negligently approved by the NRC.
GPU and Met-Ed reasonably relied on the NRC to have reviewed these submissions with due care. These included 19
. 3
. /4 3
4 A
~. -
l previously approved topical reports, relating to small-break analysis, loss-of-coolant accident analysis and emergency core cooling system performance in B&W plants of s<ztantially the same design type as TMI-2, specifically the B&W type 177-TA
" lowered-loop" nu: lear plants. Prior to the licensing of TMI-2, I
the NRC had licensed eight B&W plants, including seven which contained a 177-TA lowered-loop design. The earliest lowered-loop plant was oconee I, licensed in 1973.
Transient Analyses 53.
The NRC negligently approved B&W transient analy-ses for TMI-2, including those for small-break loss-cf-coolant accidents and for loss of normal feedwater, even though those I
analyses failed to comply with NRC regulations. The NRC knew that transient analyses in compliance with NRC regulations are
. necessary for proper plant design and operation. A transient is an unintended change in ;ower level or system condition in a nuclear plant, and includes anticipated operational occurrences such as a loss-of-normal-feedwater transient, which cccurred at TMI-2 on March 28, 1979.
54.
7s set forth in paragraphs 55 and 56, below, the NRC failed to evaluate with due care B&W transient analyses and failed to compel B&W, either during the TMI-2 plant licensing process or as part of B&W's prior submisa'on of topical reports, to submit transient analyses which complied with NRC regulations, including the Standard Review Plan and the General Design Cri-teria. As a result, the NRC negligently failed to require B&W to submit the transient analyses necessary for proper design and j
operation of TMI-2.
55.
The NRC has admitted, with respect to the tran-i sient analyses submitted by B&W prior to and in support of the licensing of TMI-2, that the NRC failed to enforce compliance 20
s f
i with the requirements of its Standard Review Plan, Section 15.
As the NRC has stated:
"The TMI-2 accident started with a loss of feedwater transient and, because of the stuck-open power operated relief valve, a small break less-of-coolant accident resulted. According to the Standard Review Plan, such a sequence should have been analyzed in the licensing process, but it was not."
NUREG 0560, Staff Report on the Generic Assessment of Feedwater Transients in the PWR's Designed by The Babcock & Wilcox Co.
(1979) at 5-4.
56.
The NRC has admitted in the respects described in paragraph 57, below, that it failed to comply with the require-ments oflits General Design Criteria. As the Commission has stated:
- Feedwater transients are anticipated operational occurrences (AOos), since they are expected to occur one or more times during the life of a nuclear plant. The basic requirements for AOO's are given in General Design Criteria (GDC) 10 and 15.
GDC-10 requires that specified accept-ahle fuel design limits not be exceeded during AOOs.
GDC-14 and GDC-15 require that the design of the reactor coolant prgssure boundary should preclude abnormal 1?akage and the design conditions of the boundary should not be exceedad during A00's.
Additional requirements specified in GDC-13 are: ' Instrumentation shall be provided to monitor variables and systems over theiI anticipated ranges... for anticipated opera-tional occurrences... as appropriate to assure adequate safety.
Appropriate controls shall be provided to maintain these variables and systems within prescribed operating ranges.'
GDC-20 states the general requirements for protec-tion systems, including the following:
'The protection system shall be designed (1) to initiate automatically the operation of appropriate systems including the reactivity control systems, to assure that specific acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded as a result of anticipated operational occurrences.
t I
In the light of the TMI-2 experience, it is apparent tnat applicable criteria were not met."
1 Id. at 5-8 (emphasis added).
l
}
57.
The NRC negligently failed to comply with the regulations described in paragraphs 55 and 56, above, in that i
i 21
~
]
.f i
^
t
-~
l i
i f
(the feedwater transient analyses and small-braak less-of-coolant I
I analyses sub=itted by B&W and approved by the NRC were inadequate '
]toprovideaproperbasisforplantdesignandforthedevelop-Imentofoperatortrainingprogramsandoperatingprocedures.
I I
I ySpecifically:
e n
(a) The NRC failed to require B&W to submit the l
lnecessary analysis of any break size smaller than 0.040 square
) feet. As a result, the NRC failed to require the necessary i; analyses of breaks equivalent to the size of a pilot-operated
- relief valre (0.007 square feet) which had f ailed to close.
I t
(b) The NRC failed to require B&W to sulnit the
'necessary analysis of a small break occurring in the steam space at the top of the pressurizer, where the pilot-operated relief A
l
\\
ivalve is located.
1 (c) The NRC failed to require B&W to submit the necessary analysis of a pilot-operated relief valve failing to
,:close, even though such a failure should have been assumed since lthe valve was designated as non-safety grade equipment.
(d) The NRC failed to require B&W to submit
! analyses which examined more than the initial minutes of a
} transient, whereas such analyses should have covered the time J.iperiod until a stable system had been assured.
t J
(e) The NRC failed to require B&W to submit J
antlyses of the sensitivity of the foregoing small-break loss-of-
] coolant analyses (subparagraphs a-c, above), to reactor coolant
- pump operation or non-operation.
58.
As set forth in paragraph 41(b), supra, the NRC i
l
! knew, at least at the time that it reviewed and published in l
l l
- 1975 the " Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400)," that small-break 1
' loss-of-coolant accidents were substantially more likely to 9
occur in a nuclear plant than large-break loss-of-coolant I
22
?
.)
r l
r-r!
~
6' e
1 l
1 accidents.
Yet, the NRC failed to examine the B&W design and iprocedures with due care to ascertain the likelihood of s=all-jbreakloss-of-coolantaccidentsandtheirconsequenceseven after the Davis-Besse incident, which was a small-break loss-of-coolant accident.
I 59.
The NRC has admitted in post-accident reports
'that the B&W analyses submitted to the NRC had failed to provide ignecessary information needed for operator action following a small break. Generie Evaluation of small Break and Loss of fCoolantAccident Behavior in Babcock & Wilcox Designed 177-FA Oserating Plants, NUREG 0565 (1980) at 1-1.
4 t
60.
If the NRC had reviewed B&W topical rey rts and
!j license submissions with due care, and had required Bsw to
!2 provide the transient analyses required by NRC regulations, the fiMarch 26, 1979 accident at TMI-2 would have been avoided.
I jProcedures 3
i j
61.
Prior to the issuance of the "MI-2 operating license, the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement conducted 1an extensive audit of the TMI-2 procedures which were drafted by a
1 jB&W. The audit included a review of the procedures which were llaterusedbytheoperatorsduringtheMarch 28, 1979 accident.
1 jThe NRC negligently failed to identify deficiencies in these
!B&W-draftedproceduresandinsteadfoundthatthe" technical content [of the procedures] was adequate to assure satisfactory
}performanceofintendedfunctions." Inspection and Enforcement
. Report No. 77-26, August 1977.
62.
The NRC negligently reviewed proit;dures for foperatingTMI-2whichincorrectlyprohibitedpermittingthe ilpressurizer to "go solid." The TMI-2 operating procedure 2103.1.3 (Revision 0,1977), supplied by B&W, contained the l
i 23 i
f 6
m
1 1
11 N
l' 8
l 4
l t
i 6
4 i
i i
8 ifollowing prohibitions i
"2.1.8 The pressurizer /RC System must not be I
filled with coolant to solid conditions (400 inches) at any time except as a
required for system hydrostatic tests."
l lThisprocedurecontainednoexceptionforemergencyconditions ileven if there were risks of core uncovery.
I 63.
The NRC knew or should have known as a result of
{
lits investigation of the Davis-Besse ine' dent which confirmed s
4
- ? earlier precursors, that the failure of a pilot-operated relie" t
jvalvetoclosewouldcausethewaterlevelinthepressurizerto I
jrise even though the reactor coolant system was not " going o solid," see paragraphs 25-41, supra. Nevertheless, in the
!18 months following the September 1977 incident at Davis-Besse, i
the NRC negligently failed to modify or direct a modification of iithe procsdures for TMI-2.
As a r1sult, Met-Ed and CPU continued.
I l
to rely on the NRC-reviewed p3ocedures, which incorrectly pro-scribed filling the pressurizer " solid" with water and risked
" uncovering the core during small-break loss-of-coolant accidents.
)
j 64.
The failure of tse NRC to warn GPU and Met-Ed of defects in the TMI-2 procedures was a proximate cause of the s
jaccidentonMarch 28, 1979. On March 28, 1979, almost immed-i iately after a turbine generator trip occurred at TMI-2, the 4
I 1TMI-2 operators cbserved that the water level in the pressurizer b
fwas rising higher than allowed by the procedures reviewed by the 4
'NRC.
l 65.
The TMI-2 procedures, negligently reviewed by the
)NRC, had prescribed the wrong course of action. Although the water level in the pressurizer was hich, the entire reactor i
- coolant system was not " solid" with water.
Instead, the indic-
' ated water level in the pressurizer remained high due both to j
lincreasing amounts of steam elsewhere in the reactor coolant I
Ii system and to the stuck-open pilot-operated relief valve at the 1
e a
1 24 I
1 l
i I
+
l 1
Etop of the pressurizer through which coolant water and steam continued to escape. Rather than improving the situation, the jreduction of high-pressure injection, as prescribed by the f
<} procedures negligently reviewed by the NRC, resulted in a failure,
5 l
p to replace the coolant escaping through the stuck-open valve.
I i
i Pilot-Onerated Relief Valve 1
i 66.
The NRC failed to exercise due care in reviewing i
IB&W equipment, analyses and procedures, including tha determi-
~
5 l'
j nation of reactor trip points, and other operating procedures i
which placed heavy reliance on the repeated and correct opera-1 tl tion of the pilot-operated relief valve. The NRC negligently I
i failed to review properly B&W transient analyses, as set forth I
.in paragraphs 53-58, above, to determine the frequency with f which the pilot-operated relief valve would be required to i
l function or to determine the probability of f ailure of that h
r jvalve. From its investigation of the Davis-Besse incident and f analysis of operational data f rom other plants, the NRC knew or
?should have known of prior failures related to pilot-operated l
4
$ relief valves. Therefore the NRC should not have approved B&W's 4
i yequipment, analyses and procedures which relied on repeated open-2sing and closing of that valve. Staff Reports to the President's i
l Cor:: mission on the Accident at Three Mile Island (Kemeny Commis-1 jsion), Reports of the Technical Assessment Task Force, Vol. IV ijat 193-99.
i I
.; Training and operator Licensing I
.i 67.
The NRC, in the implementation of regulations l
i requiring it to license operators, failed to exercise due care l
?
4in assuring that licensed operators were properly trained to i
{
) respond to transients such as occurred at TMI-2 on March 28, l1979. NRC regulations require examinations by the NRC and l
25 4
i t
I i
1
i
.f.
.i 1
- --- g.
i
\\
)
c i
8 i.
1 l encourage the use of simulators by vendors. 10 C.F.R. S 55.11 4
(1963): 10 C.F.R. S I5.20 (1975): 10 C.F.R. S 55.22 (1975); 10 6
I
\\ C.F.R. S 55.23 (1963): 10 C.F.R. S 55, Appendix A (1976).
j 68.
NRC regulations require that candidates for in operating licenses take an operating test which includes a
}
i
$ reacter startup from shutdown to power. 10 C.F.R. S 55.23 i: (1963). In fulfillment of the requirements of 10 C.F.R. S 55.23 ij(1963), the NRC specifically sanctioned the use of a " cold" licensing program which included a minimum of one week of training
)
i (on a nuclear plant simulator. The initial TMI-2 staff of control t room operators were trained in a " cold" licensing program,'
l utilizing B&W's simulator, which was reviewed by the NRC Opera-l ting Licensing Branch for compliance with established standards i1 and was formally approved. The training program for TMI-2 0i operators included eight weeks of training on the B&W simulator.
4 j
j Staff Reports to the President's Commission on The Accident at IThree Mile Island (Kemeny Commission), Reports of The Technical i
<; Assessment Task Force, Vol. ZII at 15-16; NRC Operator Licensing Guide, NURIG 0094.
f 69.
The NRC negligently certiff.ed the B&W simulator 4
j used in training the TMI-2 operators even though the NRC knew or Iwith due care should have known that the B&W simulator was fdefectivelydesignedandprogrammed. The NRC negligently failed jtodetectorcorrectthefactthatB&W'strainingofTMI-2 l operators by simulator and otherwiss was inadequate in the i
,following respects, among others:
i 4
(a) The B&W simulator could not simulate the j
' presence of a "two-phase" mixture, i.e.,
steam and water, in the j
jreactor coolant system, and therefore was incapable of simulat-l
'ing many loss-of-coolant accidentst l
(b) The B&W simulator failsd to simulate the
?
i i
iDavis-Besse september 1977 incident, or any transient in which a f
I 26 i
e i
I.
^
j
~
i l
i 1
~
i jpilot-operated relief valve f ailed to close or in which the
$ reactor coolant system pressure dropped as pressurizer water i
llevel rose, even though the NPC knew, based on its investigation c.
hsf the Davis-Besse transient and from the Reactor Safety Study
!(WASE-1400), that such a transient was part of a class of likely i
I
- small-break accidents, see paragraph 41(b) suprar i
(c) Operators were given insufficient instrue-i l tion in saturation conditions:
a 4
{
(d) The B&W simulator training program did not use s
(the actual operating procedures for TMI-2 supplied by B&W.
i 3
70.
GPU and Met-Ed re3' on the proper implementa-iItion by the NRC of its regulat
, regarding operator training jto assure that the TMI-2 operators were prepared to operate the i
- plant safely, and they relied specifically on the fact that the i
- TMI-2 operators had scored above the national average for all bperators who had passed the NRC licensing test.
If the NRC had performed its investigation of the Davis-Besse incident required f
by regulations with due care and had reviewed B&W topical re-
- ports and small-break loss-of-coolant accident analyses with due
- care, it would have known that the training programs it approved 1
s
.did not reflect what the NRC knew or should have known were actual operating conditions and potential safety problems of B&W iplants.
I EFTECTS OF NRC NEGLIGENT REVIEW AND APPROVAL 71.
If the NRC had exercised due care in reviewing and evaluating B&W submissions and had recognized their failure to comply with the NRC General Design Criteria and other regula.
- tions, and if the NRC had required B&W to submit complete and
' correct analyses of transients, GPU and Met-Ed wruld have had i
the equipment, instrumentation, procedures and training reason-
' ably needed to avoid the accident on March 2B,1979 and the accident would not have occurred.
27
T q
?
f i
l 72.
If the NRC had complied with NRO regulations and exercised due care in reviewing and evaluating B&W submis-4 sions, the NRO would have anticipated the circumstances under 4
e lwhich a small-break loss-of-coolant accident at the top of the s
6 pressurizer would result in a pressure drop in the reactor i
( coolant system while the water level rose in the pressuriser and Ijthe NRO would have required B&W equipment, analyses, procedures and training to deal properly with such conditions.
73.
The negligent review and approval by the NRC lof B&W equipment, analyses, procedures and training, which it
} knew or should have known were deficient and not in compliance i
' with NRC regulations, was a pro-imte cause of the March 28, s
]1979accidentatTMI-2.
1 DAMAGES 4
)
74.
As a proximate result of the foregoing, the March 28, 1979 accident at TMI-2 occurred and caused and will i continue to cause cla hants to suffer damages and losses in the
,following respects, together with other ite=s of damage inciden-i b'talthereto.
(a) Claimants have incurred and will continue to l incur expenses for' decontamination and debris removal --
$1,000,000,000.
(b) Claimants have incurred and will incur expen-i ses for repair or replacement of damaged and defective plant and equipment, refueling, upgrading of equipment and systems, re-training operators and additional expenses for personnel and
- consultants necessitated by the accident -- $430,000,000.
(c) In order to meet the needs of their customers j for electric power, claimants have had to purchase and continue to purchase from other utilities additional capacity and energy and have had to operate and continue to operate their i
4 6
28
1 i
i a
1
- 1ess cost-efficient plants longer than they otherwise would i
l i have in order
- .o replace the loss of capacity and energy result-1 ing from the March 28, 1979 accident at TMI-2, which caused i the shutdown of TMI-2 and prevented the restart of TMI-l --
0S1,590,000,000.
t (d) Claimants have lost and will continue to 3
. lose revenues based on the removal from the rate base of the cepital invested in TMI-2, which revenues they would have i-: otherwise earned during the period for which that unit is not
- t. in the rate base -- $950,000,000.
(e) Claimants have had to and will continue to fj incur increased borrowing of capital and at higher rates of 4
l interest than they would have otherwise incurred were it not for 1
'the accident -- 540,000,000.
i (f) In the event that claimants are not able 'co restore TMI-2 to operation, claimants will lose all of the eapital invested in TMI-2 -- SB00,000,000.
f A schedule of damages is attached hereto as
- Appendix A.
LEGAL AUTHORIIT 75.
The NRC has recognized in its regulations 4
othat it has the specific duty of " notifying licensees regard-1;ing generic problems so as to achieve appropriate precautionary lor corrective action." 1C C.F.R. S 1.64 (1977).
'f 76.
Where a government agency has a statutory duty to I
- warn, or undertakes to warn and thereby induces a reliance by a i
private party on government action, the government is liable
'under the Federal Tort Claims Act if it fails to provide such i
- warning. Indian Towing Co., Inc. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 j
(1955), Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 T.2d 227 (2d Cir.),
i cert, denied, 389 U.S.
931 (1967); Gill v. United States, 429 T.2d 1072 (5th Cir. 1970).
29
-1
.(
i 1:
4 1
1 r
I I
f
(
77.
In licensing a reactor for operation, the NRO
! decides that i
"a reactor whose ECCS (emergency core cooling system] meets the criteria will 3
{
control a LOCA [ loss-of-coolant accident]
j and is, therefore, safe for operation.
IUnion of Concerned Scientists v. Atomic Energy Commission, f499F.2d1069,1087 (D.C. Cir. 1974). A government agency such 3 as the NRC which f ails to exercise due care in its licensing and
?
- f ails to comply with its regulations is liable under the Federal
- Tort Claims Act.
Griffin v. United states, 500 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir.
31974); Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.), cert.
' denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967): United Airlines, Inc. v. weiner, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed sub nom., United Airlines Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); Hartz v. United States, 387 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1960).
l 4
4 I
4 l
l
,(continued on page 31) l i
i t
30 i
i
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t i
l WHIPITORE, claimants pray for an award in the amount of $4,010,000,000.
Dated: New York, New York December 8, 1980 KAYE, SCHOLER, FIER.%N, HAYS & RANOLER By V
David Klingsberg 425 Park Avenue New York, New York 10022 (212) 759-8400 Of Counsel:
Milton Handler Richard C. Seltzer BERLACT. ISRAELS & LIBEPFAN
'a-
/'
-J ^~
By James B. Liberman 26 Broadway New York, New York 10004 (212) 248-6900 Attorneys for clainants of Counsel:
Jesse R. Meer l
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