ML19344F546

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Submits Conclusions Re Proposed License for Transnuclear,Inc to Export high-enriched U to Sweden.License Issuance Would Be Consistent W/Nuclear Nonproliferation Act
ML19344F546
Person / Time
Issue date: 05/10/1978
From: Moore R
NRC OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS (OIP)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS (OIP)
Shared Package
ML19344F539 List:
References
NUDOCS 8009150422
Download: ML19344F546 (5)


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MAY 10198 Memorandum to the File STAFF CONCLUSIONS REGARDING PROPOSED LICENSE TO EXPORT HIGH-ENRICHED URANIUM TO SWEDEN (APPLICATI0tr7SNM-1074)

'In January 1977, Transnuclear Incorporated applied for a license to export 21.053,ilograms of uranium, enriched to 93.3% U-235 to Sweden.

The material is for use in Sweden's R-2 research reactor after conversion and fabrication into fuel elements by NUKEM in Hanau, the FRG.

The Executive Branch memorandum of March 3, 1978 has noted that the R-2, a 50 Mwt reactor is especially constructed to produce the high neutron flux necessary in the testing and development of pcwer reactor fuel.

These tests are conducted on behalf of Swedish, other European and US customers.

The high neutron flux u also required for neutron physics research and for the production of certain radioisotopes.

The application states that the material will be shipped soon after issuance of an export license pursuant to the subject application.

In response to our January 31, 1977 request for views, the Executive Branch has (1) concluded that issuance of the proposed license would not be inimical to the interests of the United States, including the common defense and security, and (2) confirmed that the material will be subject to all the terms and conoitions of the US-Sweden Agreement for Cooperation and during the time it is in the FRG, the Additional Agreement for Cooperation between the United States and EURATOM.

These views and license application analysis by the Executive Branch were forwarded by the State Department memorandum of March 3,1978 Confirmation of the applicability of the US-Sweden Agreement and the US-EURATOM Agreement were also set forth in the letters of March 7, 1977 from the Swedish Embassy and February 14, 1977 from the Delegation of the Commission of European Communities.

The staff has reviewed the subject anplication in light of tne censidera-tions below.

f fq APPENDI U -1 8.0.091:50 [7 Ah.

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r Memorandum to de o.;

o Safeguards.

The export will be subject to EURATCM an.d IAEA safeguards.

Also, as parties to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT),

Sweden and the FRG have undertaken an obligation to accept IAEA safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory.of. Sweden and the FRG, under its i

jurisdiction, or carried' out under its control any-

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where. The State Department memorandum of March 3, 1976 2.

notes that (1) the IAEA-EURATOM safeguards agreement has come into force and subsidiary arrangements are now being negotiated to bring IAEA verification into practical effect; and (2) the IAEA has the right to apply the verification procedures of the safeguards agreement prior to completion of the subsidiary arrangements.

O fia Nuclear Exolosive Use. As parties to the NPT, Sweden ano tne FRG nave uncertaken the obligations not to receive any transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive cevices directly or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

In addition, under the US-EURATOM Agreement, the Comunity guarantees that (1) no material, including equipment and devices transferred pursuant to the agreement, and no source or special nuclear material utilized in, recovered from, or produced as a result of the use of materials, equipment or devices transferred pursuant to the agreement, will be used for atomic weapons, or for any other military purpose; and (2) no material transferred pursuant to the agreement will be transferred to unauthorized persons.

o Physical Security.

Based on 1975 visits of. physical security review teams, and subsequent exchar.ges and reviews, the physical security programs in Sweden and the FRG are considered adequate to protect trigger quantities of special nuclear naterial. Moreover, as noted in the Stat,e Department memorandum of March 3 the US has assurances that Sweden and the FRG are committed to providing a level of

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protection for their programs fully compatible with that envisioned by the recomendations in IAEA INFCIRC/225, "The Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials."

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Memorandum to File

, o Retransfer.

The US-Sweden Agreement contains a provision pronibiting the reexport of US-supplied special nuclear material, unless the US agrees to such transfer, and then only if it is within the scope of a bilateral agreement for cooperation between the US and the nation to which it is being transferred

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.oriwithin an appropriate multilateral agreement.

The

, US-EURATOM Agreement-.provides that no material including eouipment and devices, transferred u

pursuant to the agreement may be transferred beyond the control of the Conmunity without US approval and, then, y

only if the transfer is within the scope of an agreement for ccoparacion with the US.

The agreement also provides the basis for consultations between the pa'rties'and US daterminations regarding any proposed transfer beyond the Community of special nuclear material which has been produced and separated from L'S-supplied material.

Reprocessina. The US-Sweden Agreement stipulates that any o

repr'ocessing of US-supplied material shall be performed in

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facilities acceptable to both pa-ties upon a joint ~determina-tion that safeguards may be effectively applied.

Under the US-EURATOM Agreement, US-supplied material may be reprocessed within the Community.

Such re-processing would be subject to safeguards, as would the recovered special nuclear material.

Nuclear Honoroliferation Act of 1978.

It is noted that EURATOM o

has not, as Section 404(yet, agreed to negotiations as called for ina) of the NN the US-EURATOM Agreement for Cooperation.

Since the Executive Branch's favorable reccmmendations and analysis on this application were forwarded on March 3, prior to enactment of the Non-proliferation Act of 1978, the State Department has reviewed the appli-cation to ensure, in its view, that the requirements of this Act,are met.

Subsequent to its review, as more fully explained in its revised analysis

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dated May 8, the Department advises that:

With respect to Sweden, all of the criteria of P.L.95-242 o

currently are met, including the requirenents of Section 126 a.(1), and the specific criteria of Sections 127 and 128.

Sweden has adhered to all provisions of its Agreement for o

Cooperation with the U.S.

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i Memorandum to File

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With respect to EURATOM,' the Department notes that in view of the limited Community (FRG) role in this export as an intermediate consignee fer the exclusive purposes of fuel fabrication, all of the criteria of P.L.95-242, including i

the functional equivalent of criterion (5) currently are met.

(EURATOM has stated that "it is understood that, af ter processing at the NUKEM plant, (the) material will be transferred to Sweden", thus, there will be no irradiated fuel generated in the Community (FRG) and no possibility of reprocessing within the Community.)

o EURATOM has adhered to the provisions of its Agreement for Cooperation with the U.S.

The staff has concluded that issuance of the proposed license would be consistent with the recently enacted Nuclear Nonproliferation Act.

In addition, the State Department has noted that the proposed export was approved by the President and is consistent with policy measures governing high-enriched uranium exports as set out in the White House Fact Sheet of April 27, 1977.

In view of all the considerations above, and as required by Section 57 of the Atomic Energy Act and 10 CFR 70.31, the staff has also concluded that the export to be made pursuant to the proposed license (1) would be subject to the US-Sweden Agreement for Cooperation and the Additional Agreement for Cooperation between the US and EURATOM, and (2) would not be inimical to the ccmmon defense and security of the United States.

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R. de'al Moore Senior License Reviewer i

END M A 4

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k APPENDIX B

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EXECUTIVE BRANCH VIEWS OF MARCH 3 & MAY 8 RECOMMENDING ISSUANCE e

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