ML19344D120
| ML19344D120 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000262 |
| Issue date: | 02/01/1980 |
| From: | Seyfrit K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Mcclurg L Brigham Young University, PROVO, UT |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8003110361 | |
| Download: ML19344D120 (1) | |
Text
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~j NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION NSIC 3
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2 REGION IV f, ~
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611 RYAN PLAZA oRIVE. SulTE 1000 g
4, ARLINGTcN, TEXAS 78012 e
February 1, 1980 3 Raply Refer To:
)ocket No. 50-262 Brigham Young University h
ATTN:
Dr. Lynn McClurg Assistant to the Dean College of Physical and Mathematical Science Provo, Utah 84602 Gentlemen:
1 The enclosed IZ Circular 80-02 is forwarded to you for infor: nation.
If there are any questions related to your understanding of the suggested actions, please contact this office.
Sincerely, W
Karl 7. Seyfrit i
Director
Enclosures:
1.
II Circular No. 80-02 2.
List of II Circulars Recently Issued cc:
Brigham Young University l
ATTN:
D. W. Dixon, Facility Chief College of Physical and Mathematical Science Provo, Utah 84602 Ii 1
800311e 36 \\
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SSINS No.: 6830 Accession No.:
UNITED STATES 7912190657 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCE?E.NT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 IE Circular No. 80-02 Date:
February 1, 1980 Page 1 of 2 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT STAFF WORK HOURS Description of Circumstances:
Studies indicate that with fatigue, especially because of loss of sleep, an individual's detection of visual signals deteriorates markedly, the time it takes for a person to make a decision increases and more errors are made, and reading rates decrease. Other studies show that fatigue results in personnel ignoring some signals because they develop their own subjective standards as
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to what is important, and as they become more fatigued they ignore more signals.
Inspections of personnel performance and training since the accident at Three Mile Island, have shown that in certain situationa facility personnel are either required or allowed to remain on duty for extended periods of time.
j Also, complaints have been received from some licensed nuclear power plant 1
operators concerning the number of continuous hours they have been on duty.
Licensee management is responsible for providing a sufficient number of trained personnel who are in the proper physical condition ta operate and maintain the plant. Licensee management should review their administrative procedures covering the working hours of nuclear power plant staff. These procedures should establish a sound policy covering working hours for plant staff who perform safety related functions (e.g., senior reactor operators, reactor operators, health physicists, auxiliary operators, I&C technicians, key maintenance personnel, etc.)
Subcommittee ANS-3 is currently developing criteria to address the subject of operator work hours. These guidelines will become a part of ANSI N18.7. The i
NRC is.also considering issuing requirements for administrative procedures that would control staff overtime. Until either the ANSI Standard is issued and endorsed by NRC (via a Regulatory Guide) or separate requirements are issued by NRC, it is recommended that the following guidance be used. The guidance should be applied to all personnel performing a safety-related function:
1.
Scheduled' work should be limited to the following maximum work hours:
a.
An individual should not be permitted to work more than 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> straight.
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IE Circular No. 80-02 Date: February 1, 1980 Page 2 of 2 b.
There should be at least a 12-hour break between all work periods, An individual should not work more than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in any 7-day period.
c.
d.
An individual should not work more than 14 consecutive days without having 2 consecutive days off.
2.
In the event that special circumstances arise that require deviation from the above, such deviations should be authorized by the Station Manager with appropriate documentation of the cause. Plants should be staffed and schedules developed to operate such that exceptions are not required.
3.
If an operator is required to work in excess of 12 continuous hours, his duties should be carefully selected.
It is preferable that he not be 1
assigned any task that affects core reactivity or could possibly endanger the safe operation of the plant.
No written response to this Circular is required.
If you desire additional information regarding this matter, contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
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h-LE Circular No. 80-02 February 1,1980 RECENTLY ISSUED II CIRCULARS Circular Subject Date Issued To No.
Issued 4
79-20 Failure Of GTE Sylvania 9/24/79 All Power Reactor Relay, Type PM Bulletin Licensees with a 7305, Catalog SU12-11-AC Construction Permit (CP)
With A 120V AC Coil and/or Operating Licensee (OL) 79-21 Prevention of Unplanned 10/16/79 All holders of Power Releases of Radioactivity Reactor Operating Licenses (OLs) or Construction Permits (cps) 79-22 Stroke Times for Power 11/16/79 All Power Reactor Oper-Operated Relief Valves ating Facilities and all Utilities having a Construction Permit (CP) 79-23 Motor Starters and 11/26/79 All Power Reactor Oper-Contactors Failed to ating Facilities and Holders Operate of Reactor Construction Permits (cps) 79-24 Proper Installation and 11/26/79 All Holders of a Calibration of Core Spray Power Reactor Operating Pipe Break Detection License (OL) or Equipment on BWRs.
Construction Permits (cps) 79-25 Shock Arrestor Strut 12/20/79 All licensees and Assembly Interference holders of power reactor construction Permit (CP) 80-01 Service Advice for GE 1/17/80 All licensees of nuclear Induction Disc Relays power reactor operating facilities and holders of nuclear power reactor Construction Permits (cps)
Enclosure