ML19343D456
| ML19343D456 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/02/1980 |
| From: | Rogers L BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8105040525 | |
| Download: ML19343D456 (55) | |
Text
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1 INQNS 1
UMITED STATES h
2 ijUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
,{
X In the Matter of:
5' I
y Docket No.
None 9
METROPOLITAN-EDISON (TMI II) 3 6
e g
x i
2 7
s j
8 Conference Room D-4 Q
Howard Johnson Motor Inn c
9 473 Eisenhower Boulevard Harrisburg, Pennsylvania
.l-g 10 Tuesday, September 2, 1980 11 g
8 Interview of 2
d 12 4
x LELAND C.
ROGERS r
()
13 l
called for by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, pursuant to
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14 notice, at 2:20 p.m.
2 15 w
8 On behalf of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
16 j
i TERRY HARPSTER, Office of Inspection and l
h I7 Enforcement x
j 18 JOHN W.
CRAIG, Office of Inspection and I
P Enforcement 19 i.
8 i
NORMAN C. MOSELEY, Office of Inspection and 20 Enforcement 2I DAVID H. GAMBLE, Office of Inspector and Auditor 22 x:)
RICHARD K. H OE F LING, Office of the Executive 23 Legal Director 24 O:
25 i
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
0 5040S'2 5.
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On behalf of Babcock & Wilcox Company:
2 JOHil G. MULLIN, ESQ.
The Babock & Wilcox Company 3
Power Generation Group P.
C.
Box 1260
\\
4 Lynchburg, Virginia 24505 5
g KEVIN P.
GALLEli, ESQ.
2 Morgan, Lewis E Brockius 0
1800 M Street, N. W.
Washington, D.
C.
20036 7
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25 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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MR. GAMBLE:
Could we go on the record.
l 3
This interview is being conducted as a portion of the
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4 NRC's investigation into the exchange of information between the
- 5. Metropolitan Edison Company and the NRC on March 28th, 1979.
e E9 6
Mr. Roger, we have counsel for BSW present here.
Do R
7 you have any objections to their being present during the interview A
j 8
of you?
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9 MR. ROGERS:
No.
~ioy 10 Whereupon, E
E 11 LELAND C' ROGERS u
j 12 having been first duly sworn by Mr. Gamble, was examined and E
~~^ XX y 13 testified as follows:
m
[x 14 EXAMINATION 2
15 BY MR. CPAlG:
16 g
Q Lee, on the morning of 3/28/79 were you aware that w
d 17 high pressure injection flow had been throttled and the let-down E
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18 flow had been increased to a high value, higher than normal value?
P h
19 A
No, not directly.
I didn't follow that.
e 20 Q
Were you aware that operators were taking actions to try 21 and restore pressurizer level?
22 A
That is a little strange question really.
Pressurizer s
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23 level was one of the things that we had and we were trying to 24 restore it.
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25 Q
It was pegged high, and were you aware of the actions ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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that they were taking to try to get it back down to the indicating 2
range?
3 A
Oh, yes, yes.
4 Q
What were they trying to do?
e 5'
A Well, what was being done that I observed at least was E9 6
that we were trying to get the heaters operable and with the R
7 normal plant systems type operations to get that level back down a
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in the operating range.
0 9
Q Aside from the heaters, what plant systems?
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h 10 A
Well, I couldn't really tell you what they were doing M
h 11 because I wasn't observing them in that way.
I was just observing u
N 12 the indiciation as I saw it from further Dack in the control room.
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13 I know that they were having apparent trouble with the heaters TC h
14 and 4e was following in that particular vein because it was easier y
b-15 to follow in conversations, but as far as other actions, no, I y
16 wasn't directly following those.
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17 Q
Besides the information concerning pressuriser level
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b 18 lbeing pegged were any other actions, the heaters, discussed on the P"
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confernce call at approximately 6 a.m.
that morning?
n 20 A
I don't recall.
At this time I don't recall much of 21 that conversation at all.
22 Q
Did you at any time that day discuss the status of 23, high pressure injection and let-down as it existed prior to 8 a.m.
/Ierbeim 24 { wit? Messrs. Miller, Kunder, Zewe, Urbine or Chwastyk?
25l A
Not that I recall, no.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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Q Our review of your testimony to IE investigators I
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2 lindicates that during the 8 o' clock thinktank meeting in order 3 lto restart a reactor coolant pump that system pressure was raised 4
by increasing HPI flow.
However, in testimony before the Special y
5' Inq dry Group in response to a question about HPI discussions 0
6 thinktank meeting you state that you didn't recall jduring the a.m.
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7 lthe discussion of HPI occurring.
a i
j 8l In your statement of 6/12/79, the statement that you O
9 prepared you state that "The group impression was that HPI must
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10 be keeping the core cool."
Would you clarify your knowledge of the a
II status of the high pressure injection system before the S a.m.
?
N I2 Imeeting?
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13 A
1 have no recollection of ever inquiring on my own part 1
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5 I4 of what the flow was or what they were doing to it.
I just don't H
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15 8 ever recall that I was in a conve_sation about that.
I know we
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h I7,the pressure up.
We increased the HPI, but that makes an assump-
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n 18 l tion that you have some at that point to me.
So I guess I wouldn't E
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try to speculate on anything else because I don't remember any 20 ldiscussionsofwhat the flow may have been.
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Q After the primary system pressure was increased to 22 f approximately 2,000 pounds in the 10 o' clock to 11:30 time frame, 23 jwould you clarify your knowledge about the high pressure injection 4
e 4lsystemfromthat point on?
J 25 ll A
Well, I think I have already stated at other times that E
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6 I ithe knowledge of the flow rate was that it was the re, and I don't 2
remember ever hearing what the numbers were during those time l
3 ) frames at all, only that in one meeting Miller stated it won't be 4
shut off unless I, myself, am involved in that decision, speaking WMM 5'
g for myself.
Those are the kind of recollections I have about a
3 6
flow or flow rate or what was happening with HPI.
7ll Et Q
Can you give us an idea of what you felt was the e
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8 magnitude of the flow, just that it was there?
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A Yes.
I didn't question what the value of flow was.
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y 10,just r emember that the statement was made that it was on and it z
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were controlling the flow at whatever it was.
It was their 9
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directed order and I don't know what that would be.
h 14 l Q
Our review of your tes+1 mony to the IE investigators l
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15 l indicates that you were aware during the 6 a.m.
conversation that
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y 16 reactor coolant pumps had been secured, and in that same testimony 2
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I7 that you witnessed the pumps started at approximately 8:15 where
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18 indication.
lyou saw no flow P
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What was the reaction of Gary Miller, George Kunder-and n
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20 i
l l Jack Urbine to the inability to run reactor coolant pumps as 2I discussed during the 6 a.m.
conference call?
l 22 A
My reaction?
g 23 "j Q
Yes.
24h A
It was merely an information floi from Kunder to all of i
25husandquestionsthendirectedbackabout what were they then doing u
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and what were the plans and what we were going to decide to 2
recommend what the further actions were.
I don't believe there 3
were any explanations or statements of surprise or any other I
4 reaction, if you will, to the fact that the pumps were off.
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g were merely stated as a plant condition.
9 3
6, Q
Was there a discussion about what it meant?
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=E 7-A No, not that I recall.
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8 Q
On March 28th of 1979 when did you become aware of the dd 9
z, continuous relief path through the EMOV and block valve which we o
b 10 have learned existed for approximately two hours?
6_
f II A
You mean prior relief path, prior to the time that I was a
N I2 in there and prior to the knowledge of what time it was shut.
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y 13 did not know until the next day or the day after, I think it was e
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14 the next day, when we delogged the data from the reactimeter what 15 time it was shut.
My only knowledge of it being opened at the E
Ib time that I was there was when we were using t as a pressure e
h I7 control device, a mechanical pressure control device by operating
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I didn't know until some tine later. I am sure, P"
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as I recall now, it was the next day when the data was reduced that n
20 it had been open for that period of time.
2I MR. MOSELEY: If the EMOV was operating properly, why 22 g
was the block valve used do ycu suppose?
23 THE WITNESS:
I think we are digressing here a little 4
bit because in the conference call when I asked was the block 25 :( valve shut and got the answer that the block value was shut, then ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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I didn't concern myselfLin thought process at least whether or not e~
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'Later on it became obvious that 3
with the block being used as'a control 1 valve'tha we were passing-4 system pressure out.
So it was-pretty easy to assume'that the e
5-EMOV value was not shut. -That was a-pretty easy assumption.
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6 sd-1 don't believe I se* down and analyzed anything beyond that at that t
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point.
It would be days later when we were trying to put things n
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together again.
In other words, if l'try to put together some l
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part of what I just rambled on here about, it was that when I:
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was informed that the block value was shut, then it.didn't-matter to me whether the EMOV value was open or shut at all.
The obvious f
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pathway that could be opened was not opened in my conclusion at-3.
'O 13 that point.
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BY MR. CRAIG.
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Q During the 6 a.m. conference call was there any-other 16 discussion concerning the EMOV or the block valve other'than
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d 17 your question was the block value shut and then you-got a w
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.i 18 subsequent reply that yes, it was shut?
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A I believe somewhere along in the things I have.said 20 before that one of the items that George passed on to us uas that 21 the electromagnetic valve opened on the transit.
When he then 22 llh described other things that occurred, he.said he thought maybe the j
23 code relief valves had opened but, if t 1ey had, it would only have 24 ll been for a!short: period.of time.
Then with the low pressure-I i
25 condition that he then described I think the conversation then i
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went to the rest of the plant conditions.
Then the questionocame-I l
2 out~of whether the block valve was-shut again..
I don't believe s
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3 any more was said about?it other than it' opened which would lead het 4
me_'to ask the question that I' did'.
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Q Did you _have: any ' discussions that-day at any_ time. con-if.e vb e A h.
0 cerning the EMOV with Gary. Miller, George'Kunder, Urbine, Zewetor R
f Chwastyk, with the exception of the fact that the block valve b
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might fail when you were using it for pressure control?
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'A Not that I recall.
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Q.
You were aware during the phont call that_the primary t
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on 3/28?
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Yes.
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(The prior question was read back by the reporter.I m
bI BY MR. CRAIG:
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What explanation were you given for primary system-f I
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17" pressure recovery after 6:20?
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Are you referring to the conference call, the
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explanation or the recovery of pressure during that conference.
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Q Was there a discussion of pressure recovery?
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A Not that I remember at all.
George was indicating that ggg.
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'the pressure was low during the time we were talking to him.
'24 Q
Here is a chart, and we have previously identified this 25 I
was one that was included in the Special Inquiry Report.
You T
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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1 were aware during the phone call that primary system pressure was 7~
low and yet when you got on site, and this is the 7 o' clock line 3
down here (Indicating.) The primary system pressure is the black
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4 one and it was back up pretty high, approximately 2,000 pounds.
I was wondering what explanation you were given for 9
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- l. the recovery of primary system pressure?
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A As I remember, the recommendations in the phone call n
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6 were to get the primary system pressure back up in an attempt to o
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I remember that.
Now, when ch 10 into the control room to see the pressure up and to fi. id p
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that it went back up again during the period of time that they d
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ran it would seem to be the e-action that they took to get it
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there which I didn't question at the time, how did you get it E
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I klow the rest of the day or the rest of the period of
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! time after that it was not really looking back at all from that 16 y
point on.
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When I came in and we had a discussion of did you try M
18
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to run our reactor coolant pump directed to Mr. Zewe, he told me I
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I got one to run for a little bit.
When he told me what the result 21,of that was, then there was still a question in my mind as to 22
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whether or not we could get another pump running.
That is why 23 we as a group decided to attempt to run another pump in subsequent 24 E[ action.
25 n
l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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MR.=HARPSTER:
Le.t me'ask a question here.
The.a.is 2
something we are having a hard time perceiving,--Lee.
3 Certainly_before 7 o' clock, before radiation alarms, 4
commenced, the one thing which was unusual about your plant 5-condition was your sitting there with your level up and your 0
pressure down with is anomalous to the behavior of these plants.
7 I guess the hard thing for me to visualize is.after.the 2
k 8 block valve is shut and you get this dramatic recovery in pressure d
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j it is hard for me to visualize the people in the plant notLtrying 6
h 10 to work back then and say, "Well, gee, what 'did we do now '.to get-the
-El II plant back into a condition we understand which is a several d
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hundred pound increase in the pressure.
Now we are back to what c
we understand is the way a reactor is supposed to operate where o
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the pressure and the level are following each other."
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17 THE WITNESS:
There is no way for me to know what u
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18 did, and there is no way for me to have had this that day either.
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The pieces of information that I had on the telephone and then 20 coming into the control room and getting some additional pieces of information and the displayed plant conditions in front of me,
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f,t would have been nice if I could have put it all together~ like 22 u (G Cctw pick W) 23 this and tried to sit down and figure it out.
Of course, we didn't.
A.
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None of us had that opportunity, nor did I ever go and ask 25 somebody, well, why weren't you thinking about this or that or ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
12 1 4another thing.
That just wasn't the mode of operation.
It was r) 2 what do we have here and what are we going to do to get it correcte d.
3 This was the kind of thinking that I would have done and I am sure b
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4 anybody else coming into that environment would do the same thing.
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- 5. I can't answer that question.
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6 MR. HARPSTER:
As I understand the o erators' concerns l
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at that time, there wasn't a lot going on.
The operators' testimon /
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would indicate that the plant was pretty stable except in a d
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configuration which you wouldn't expect with the pressure down
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10 and the level up.
There wasn't a lot happening at that time so E
h 11 it is not something that I would expect them not to be puzzled aboug I
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13 THE WITNESS:
Terry, are you asking me why I didn't
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14 ask them how come you are not doing something-because I can't 2
15 answer that.
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No.
I am asking in general why people j
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17 didn't look back to try and understand.
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18 perceive when you get this dramatic change and you get the plant P
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19 back now why someone isn't trying to go back and say well, how j
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j 20 did we get in this or what did we do to get out of it?
Even if j
21 we don't understand it, we did something right.
What did we do 22 because we have got to keep getting our condition improved?
What 23 did we do?
Where do we go from here?
i 24 THE WITNESS:
I certainly can't answer that.
-\\
i vcP60 25h MR. MOSELEY: Mr. Rogers, were you aware of the rccord-r E
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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increase as is shown in that pressure ---
0 2
THE WITNESS:
No.
3-MR. MCSELEY: You were not aware of that?
4 THE WITNESS:
No, sir.
A reasonable thing for me g-.
3 to maybe have assumed that day as I walked into the control room 9
3 6
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was that some action was taken af ter the recommendations were E
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made on the phone conversation of get your pressure up and try to e
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M run a pump.
Not at all having a chart to looK at displayed in a
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9 front of me and walk in and find the pressure had been up and E
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tiiey were trying to run a pump, it would not be something that I
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would question, was there a sharp change in something that you d
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did.
No, I certainly would not have done that.
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MR. MOSELEY: You were not involved in any conversations E
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where other people were talking about the pressure increase that
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16 M
THE WITNESS:
No.
You see, I have to go back to the z
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I didn't know that the block valve being shut at xe M
18 that time was what turned off the leak until a couple of days s
19 j
later, or the next day when we looked at the data.
It was quite 20 obvious when we were beginning to see this information developed 21 out in charts.
That Pind of fact wasn't known to me at all at
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that point in time.
23 l BY MR. CRAIG:
24 ggg Q
During the first thinktank meeting, at approximately 25 1! 8 o' clock, could you tell us what was discussed?
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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.2 put it, and that would be just to what. actions.can.wefnow suggest 3
to be taken towards-getting this plant.in a stable condition.
4 Q
The sequence of events surrounding the accident up until~
j that time, were they discussed at all?
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'A No.
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7 MR. HARPSTER:
Before we go'on let me ask Lee another-N[
8 question.
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the operators had attempted to restart 1the coolant pumps..What E=
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did you attribute to the fact that the reactor coolant pumps d
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just sat there and ran at a low current, at essentially a low cd 13
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Not necessarily you personally, but what-was the l
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You were running I think i
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g if I recal) at a hundred amps or something on a reactor coolant t
16 pump.
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THE WITNESS:
Yes.
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MR. HARPSTER:
What was that attributed to?
19 l
THE WITNESS:
I don't know that the operators or 20 Zewe or anyone else gave me their feelings about that sort of 21 thing and I wouldn't guess that they would.
In soliciting some 22 information from Zewe about the fact had you attempted to run the 23 + pump, and he gives me the facts, yes, we did.
I tried to run all 24
.gg four of.them and only got one of them to start.
Then he says they 25 OO had little or awrt current on it and they weren't getting any flow-ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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indication.
2 I have trouble trying to even put together things here
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3 that really took that day.
It would seem reasonable that that was A
4 another piece of information that I needed or was trying to digest.
5-I didn't reach a conclusion then.
When we had our first meeting 9
3 6
_.d together as a group, one of the things I wanted to do was try to R
7 start it again so I could see what was going on.
I know that was n
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5 the kind of thought I had, that I would like to see that myself.
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Then I saw that and concluded myself at that point that
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the loops had os rateamed.
That was quite obvious to me.
With 9
(hh all the things I had been told before and now I had seen it myself, E
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that was my conclusion.
I don't believe I attempted to reach a e
conclusion until after I had seen that next attempt at 8:15 or 16 y
something.
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MR. HARPSTER:
Once you get to the point where the loops x
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are steam bound were you able to draw any inferences then as to
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what the extent of voiding was?
20 I
i THE WITNESS:
Yes.
I think one of my testimonies makes l
21
!a statement to the effect that I told Miller you have got steam I
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as far down in the loop as the reactor coolant pump itself which E
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23 l would given an indication in my mind at least of how much voiding 24 i'there was I am sure.
The whole hot leg was steam bound down
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through the steam generators and down to the suction pump.
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I MR. HARPSTER:
Down over the pump lift?
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THE WITNESS:
Yes, which would to me just give an I
3 amount of voiding conclusion I guess at that point.
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4 MR. HARPSTER:
Did anyone go-to the isometrics to tr.v 5
g and equate this with where you might be at in the core?
9 3
6l THE WITNESS:
No.
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7 BY MR. CRAIG:
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8 Q
Our review of your testimony indicates that you were d
9 aware that hot-leg temperatures were above 700 degrees and that y.
10 l instrumentation bridges had been hooked up so that
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II readings could be used to determine the approximate hot-ler a
f I2 temperatures on 3/28.
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Was a record kept of the data indicated by this 5
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extended scale read-out for the hot-leg temperatures?
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3 recorgea recora,,1og_xceying 300x2
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Any kind of a record.
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I7 l A
None that I know of, no.
Iwould like to rephrase your
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I was aware of a read-out of G
19 8
over 700 degrees.
I wasn't aware that that was a correct n
20 temperature.
I never agreed that that was a correct temperature i
2I l at that time.
[
Q You didn't agree with the hot-leg temperature?
23 )
A I didn't agree that we knew that that was what the 1
24 " temperature was.
25 MR. MOSE LEY : With any of the instrumentation even after i
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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this bridge was hooked up?
2 THE WITNESS:
That is correct.
There was speculation 3
and discussions to the effect do we know that those are really llh h
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If i
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_e known earlier maybe we wouldn't have arrived at that speculation, M
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but the question was put forth and that made ce as an individual
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5 i not sure that those were the real temperatures at'that point in i
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time.
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'j MR. HARPSTER:
At what point did you believe them?
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THE WITNESS:
After we had gone up in pressure.
That w
was a fairly obvious conclusion that those temperatures were too E
13 g
high for the 2,000 pounds there.
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At this time here (Indicating)?
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THE WITNESS:
Yes.
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HOST'"V-That is approximately ---
F 17 p
THE WITNESS:
Nine or ten o' clock.
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E 18 MR. IICS LEY:
--- at-the 9:30 time.
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-5 19 5
BY MR. CRAIG:
a 20 Q
On 3/28/79 what was your evaluation of the hot-leg 21 te=peratures when they sharply increased after the reactor coolant
~llh pumps had been shut down?
A We didn't know that.
We didn't have that piece of ejg 24{Linformation.
Slav:15 i
RILEY 25lI FOLS 2 40 l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
Take 2 18 cr2-1 I
Q On the morning of 3/28, were you aware that hotleg O
2 temperatures were in excess of the saturation pressures to the 3
corresponding coolant system pressures?
4 A
As I stated, not until we got up to pressure.
i 0
And that'n again approximately 9:307 h
6 A
Uh-huh.
R R
7 0
At that point, did you recognize the tenperatures in M
g 8
excess of 705 degrees were above the critical temperature for dd 9
s team and, in fact, meant that the system had contained super-
,zog 10 heated steam?
II A
I don't believe I put it all together like that, no.
is N
12 I really didn't arrive at any conclusions from an analysis point E"
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13 of view, no.
U m
14 0
Was superheated steam discussed with you or in your g
15 presence on 3/28?
a:
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Not that I recall, no.
us b"
17 BY !!R. MOSELEY:
5 5
18 0
Excuse me.
Did Rogers -- I mean Flint, talk to you E
19 about his conclusions on superheated steam on the morning of 20 March 28th?
21 A
I don't remember anybody talking about superheated 22 steam at all during that whole day.
23 BY 11R. CRAIG:
24 Q
You testified on 3/28 that you were aware that the gU 25 reactor coolant punps had been shut off because they were not ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
19 3r202 1
pumping water, and that the hotleg tenperatures were significantly b
2 higher than expected and, indeed, that the loops had substantial 3
amounts of steam on 3/28.
p)
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4 Did you infer fron these plant conditions and indications e
5 that an inventory problem existed in the primary system?
E h
6 A
I'm sorry, John.
Did I infer that we had inventory R
7 problems because of the steam voiding?
E j
8 O
The steam voiding and the hotleg temperatures, or any 0c 9
other plant parameters.
,z Cg 10 A
I nay not have thought in that logical sequence.
I 5
11 don't remember at this point.
N 12 Q
Were any ef forts made to determine or estimate reactor 5
'N 13 (G
coolant inventory in the primary system?
l 14 A
Not that I'm aware of directly, no.
{
15 0
In the afternoon?
z 16 g
A Well, in the afternoon, I'd say that we were as a e
d 17 committee and group purpose discussion coming into that kind 5
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18 of conclusion, and the question was brought up, are we sure L
1.-K.a3 g
19 that the core is covered with water type of thing, and ire gn 20 attempted to ensure that it was covered by lowering pressure 21 and bringing the core flood tank inventory in.
That's the conclu-22 sion that can be agreed to, maybe, in force, but probably not in 23 words.
24 0
What did you believe is the status of the primary O
25 system inventory on the morning of 3/28?
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
cr2-3 20 A
I don't believe I had any thoughts along that line, j
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ust directly towards inventory.
I 'm s orry.
The question was
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3
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4 BY !!R. IIARPSTER:
0 To what do you attribute the cause of the voiding in e
5 M
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the loops?
He are trying to understand the thought process, 6
e You have extensive voiding in the loops, and we have had to 7
.y account for this water somehow.
8 M
N A
The understanding was that we had gone down in low -
9
- z pressure condition, in the whole reactor coolant system. It's 10 ez!
11 n t unthinkable to get a saturated steam void condition in the
'<s hotlegs, assuming now, knowing, anyway, that the pressurizer d
12 3
7-level was gone, pressurizer was full, and now we have a very low V) 3 13 g
j4 pressure condition, it's easy for me to come up with getting wH 15 bubbles in the hotlegs and voiding conditions in the saturated 5
steam bubble condition.
That's easy to get to, if you nave a 16 M
g j7 full pressurizer.
w h
18 S
it w uldn't have been an unusual thought process k
to arrive at the f act that with lou pressure and high temperatures,
j9 R
we had gotten steam voiding in the hotlegs with the pressurizer 20 f"11*
21 0
Would this be some of the conditions experienced in 22 the past during the pre-op program, when they stagnated the loops?
23 A
Well, as I remember, during hot functional testing, 24 (0
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we had high temperatures in the loop.
Whether it became steam 25 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
cr2-4 21 1
voids or not, I don't recall that we ever came to those kind of
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conclusions bach during IIFT.
I just remember that we had a hot 3
trap condition in the loop when the reactor coolant pumps could p
k-4 not be run, and it stayed there for long periods of time.
So e
5 it's a piping system layout condition that you can get to, having 5
h 6
either a void or a hotter condition in the hotlegs if you couldn't e'.
8 7
run the pumps during, say, hot functional testing, where you don't sl 8
have a heat source and you're not taking any heat out, any 0
m 9
appreciable heat out.
You've gone to natural circulation path.
,zo g
10 It's an easy condition to get to, to have a steam void, which I Z-l 11 accepted that we had in the hotlegs, and not running reactor a
p 12 coolant pumps.
It's an easy condition again to see that we
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15 direction we all headed.
x j
16 Q
Did people in the control room try and relate to their e
t' 17 past experience what you had seen before that?
M 18 A
Not that I'm aware of.
I think it's reasonable to E
19 assume here that everybody in the control room, after a point g
n 20 in time, accepted that we had steam in the hotlegs, and that's 21 a fact.
What are we going to do from here on out type of r~w 22 thing.
And probably not going back and relm'ing it all to any-O 23 thing that may have happened once in years before.
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24 BY MR. MOSELEY:
25 Q
Then you' re saying that, you know, you put all of these ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
ar2-5 22 1
things together, and we know there were discussions about some im O
2 people were concerned that the core wasn't covered, wasn't being 3
adequately covered, de
.te all these, and inventory deficiency G
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4 was not specifically d; scussed.
e 5
Am I capturing you correctly?
6 A
That's f air to say, to characterize the conversation, G
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8 BY MR. CRAIG:
d m;
9 0
Our review of your testimony before the Senate indicates ze 10 that you were aware there was a concern over recriticality 3
h 11 before 8:00 a.m. on the morning of 3/28.
W j
12 A
I was aware of some of the operators' concerns E
(~'; j 13 because they told me about it, yes.
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Did you believe on the morning of 3/28 that the reactor
$j 15 had gone recritical after it scrammed?
z j
16 A
No.
J.
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Was the count rate behavior discussed during this 5
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18 6:00 a.m. conference call?
E 19 A
Not that I recall.
g M
20 0
Did you at any time during the day discuss the 21 concern over recriticality with the count rate behavior with 22 Miller, Kunder, Zewe, Herbein or Chwastyk?
{s) 4/
23 A
Yes, I talked to Bill Zewe about it, when he and I had 24 a discussion.
I think that was probably before 8:00 o' clock.
V 25 Told me they thought they had been going recritical when some ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
l l
ar2-6 23 1
of the boron sample analyses had come back low numbers, and
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maybe this was shortly after 8:00 o' clock.
I'm not sure now of 3
the timeframes, but it probably was, because we concluded that f}
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g effect that it's reasonable to assume that you're getting steam 4
6 coming out through your sampling lines, and it's really just R
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flushing your boron out, you're not getting representative fluid M
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samples of boron.
Therefore, you're getting low numbers.
And Gd 9
it explained it away for me in that case.
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11 count-rate at all in that discussion, er _ny of the boron sample a
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Did you ever discuss this with -- the boron samples l
14 with Miller, Kunder, Herbein, Chwastyk or John Flint?
E
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I think I did with John when he came in and tried to z
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d 17 out from either the discussions or the conference call, or plant E
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E 19 I think I told him there had been some discussions 20 towards probably the recriticality was a concern, and gave him 21 my conclusions from the sampling results of the piping steam, e-22 and those are the only conversations that I recall having with N.)3 23 John.
24 Q
Did you discuss at any time the neutron instrumenta-V 25 tion behavior with respect to voids or core uncovery?
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
cr2-7 24 1
A Nct that I recall, no.
p kJ 2
BY MR. MOSELEY:
3 0
You don' t recall such a discussion with Flint?
4 A
No, I do not.
e 5
BY MR. CRAIG:
An 6
0 To the best of your knowledge, what are the core R
2 7
exit thermocouples used for during normal operations?
E j
8 A
Most of the information from that was accumulated in 4
PDL 0
9 what we call the PDQ runoff from the conputer for the analysis z,
c h
10 to be performed at Lynchburg on core performance, and it would E
h 11 then be forwarded down as a computer runoff, and the people in
's I
12 Lynchburg in the fuels section would take that information, E
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20 we sent a PD7 runoff down to Lynchburg.
2I BY MR. 'tOSELEY :
22 Q
This would just be a --
b(s 23 A
It would be an encoded computer system, digital 24 numbering system, and as far as reading it in the runoff, it 25 had nothing but a series of numbers that needed to be decoded
~
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
cr2-8 25 I
by the people in Lynchburg, and come back as readable information.
2 BY !!R. CRAIG:
3 Q
Would Metropolitan Edison people use this at all?
I v
4 A
They were developing a core performance type of e
5 evaluation program, and I don't know how far that went, so it's h
j 6
kind of hard for me to say whether or not they were at that time R
7 using it.
K j
8 Q
Do you know at that time, did they have a procedure d
ci 9
for the use of the thermocouples?
io g
10 A
I'm not sure.
E j
11 Q
What training have you had on the use of these thermo-is j
12 couples?
E 13 A
none.
h 14 Q
Would TfiI station personnel have received training on 2
15 these thermocouples?
E j
16 A
I don't know that.
e d
17 Q
Do you know why these thermocouples were alarmed in the a
M 18 computer?
E l
g 19 A
No.
n 20 0
Do you know what actions are required in the event of 21 an alarm of one of these thermocouples?
q 22 A
No.
b 23 Q
Do you know if they are referenced in the station l
24 procedure?
U 25 A
No, I don't.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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O Our review of your testimony before the inspection --
[_ )
2 the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, indicates that you were 3
aware that the core exit thermocouples were being monitored, Gkl 4
and that some were reading, and I quote, " pretty high and some e
5 were reading 600 and some degrees.
A lot of them are not A
N 6
reading or indicating."
R 7
You also testified that you were aware that millivolt 3l 8
readings of the core exit thermocouples were being taken, and that d
d 9
these readings were as high as approximately 2400 on some thermo-i o
10 couples.
E h
11 What was your evaluation and meaning of the core W
N 12 exit thermocouple temperatures?
E
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13 A
I don' t believe I would try to correlate it at all at l
14 that point, merely as a piece of information that we were getting
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16
.j the conversation at the tine, and that is probably because they e
d 17 didn' t tie into the safety system, or part of the normal 5
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18 operating condition.
It was just an auxil 2r piece of informa-E 19 tion for use of anyone.
A 20 I know very well that the discussion of the temperatures 21 that we were getting again, jus t like we did on the RTDs, how 22 do we know that these are good, is the conversational pieces 23 that came out, are these really reading correctly?
Are they 24 the real temperatures, or do we know that?
Do we know we can O
25 rely on them?
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
1 3r2-10 27 1
And I know that in that kind of an atmosphere, once
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2 you're not sure that the people that are telling you they are 3
right, they are not sure that the information is really correct,
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you discount it as being information that you don' t want to nse.
e 5
Q Did you discuss these temperature readings with John 3
N d
6 Flint?
e R
R 7
A I'm not sure that I recall any conversation with John M[
8 on the temperatures.
I'm not sure I can recall that.
Od 9
Q The core exit or the hotleg temperatures either?
ioy 10 A
Well, John and I, during the course of the day, were d
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j 12 trying to see that the actions being taken in the plant would 3
13 result in getting an indication back in a normal range, and I'm
(}
l 14 sure we had discussions on the RTDs.
2 15 Q
Did you discuss any time that day the core exit 5
y 16 thermocouple readings with the exception of can we really believe e
p 17 them, with fiiller, Kunder, Flint, Herbein or Chwastyk?
E 18 A
That's hard to recall at all.
The answer to that has h
19 to be I don't recall those kind of conversations, no.
gn 20 Q
Did you have a conversation with John Flint with 21 respect to the hotleg temperatures that he felt that the 22 temperature indication, both the core exit thermocouples and 23 the hotleg temperatures, sort of backed each other up?
24 A
Not that I remember, no.
O v
25 Q
Based on your discussions with John Flint, did you ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
l ar2-ll 28 I
believe that the core had been uncovered on the morning of 3/28/79?
r,~O 2
A I never remember reachir.g that conclusion at all.
I 3
more or less felt that from the time I was there, all the (3
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g trying to put together anything prior to that.
I don't remember
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R b
7 Q
Water in the core meaning that the core was entirely N
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covered?
d y
9 A
I was confident of that during the time I was there, zo g
10 yes.
3 II BY 11R. ItOSELEY :
- s I
I2 Q
In this morning, Mr. Flint described a discussion with 3
(')'
g" I3 you of his inferences from the nuclear instrumentation.
You h
I4 don't recall such a discussion?
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15 A
No, I don't.
The answer is no.
m
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Okay.
M I7 A
Please remember now that I'm trying to answer your i
z h
IO question honestly, and trying to remember a year and a half ago, E
19 l
g and I don't -- I'm not too sure that I can answer any of these l
20 l
by saying I remenber words that we: e said, or such things as 2I that, and being confused with data charts and all the investiga-22 tions, reports I've read, and testimony and everything else.
t's
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23 It's a little difficult to put them in proper perspective.
24 Q
I can certainly appreciate that.
I was just 3
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25 wondering, since Flint -- you had either assigned him or agreed ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
w-wr e
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ar2-12 29 1
that he was going to monitor the instruments, and was to report r~
2 things to you.
I thought perhaps you would have paid particular 3
attention to what he came back to you with, n
k) 4 Was that an improper conclusion on my part?
m e
5 A
No, that's what I wanted him to do, and that's what I Ee 3
6 expected him to do, and if he told me one thing or another that G
7 day, which I may have used in my own conclusions or discussions Ml 8
with other people, I have difficulty remembering them now, dc 9
frankly.
Y 10 BY MR. CRAIG:
11 Q
At any time on 3/28/79, did you monitor or were you k
y 12 aware of anyone else monitoring the self-powered neutron detectors?
E
(~)';
y 13 A
No, I did not monitor them, and I don't remember x
x r.
14 anybody else looking at them or telling me anything about them, 2
15 no.
That is probably a region that one who was arcund that E
y 16 reactor plant for any length of time wouldn't even bother looking i
d 17 at, with the plant being shut down for many hours by the time I E
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18 got in there.
I wouldn' t even expect to see anything on the P
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19 SPNDs, and wouldn't ask anybody for any information from it, n
20 either.
21 BY MR. IIARPSTER:
l 22 Q
Was there ever an occasion during the day where as you 23 got more and marc confirmation of the fact you did have it hot 24 in there, you not only had the core thermocouples and the V
25 computer printouts and the extended scale wide range, but as you ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
'cr2-13 30 1
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but as you became more and more updated on the plant conditions, NJ 2
was there ever an occasion where people would go back and question 3
whether or not those were valid readings in the morning on core
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4 thermocouples?
5 e
g A
No, I don't think so.
I don't remember that kind of 8
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I think we were more concerned with where we are now n
and where we want to be at some future timeframe, like next d
d 9
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try and determine where we were, why we got there.
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It's reasonable to assume that the plant conditions d
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right now were our major concern, and it certainly was that c
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E 14 y
BY MR. CRAIG:
m 2
15 g
Q Our review of your testimony before the Senate inquiry 16 group indicates that you were aware of the radiation monitors H
17 Q
in the control room which were either alarmed or upscale.
On z
M 18
=
the morning of 3/28, were you aware of the 10 R per hour offsite 19 l
projected dose rate at Goldsboro?
20 A
No, I don't think I remember that at all, during that 21 day, either projected or actual.
In fact, most of the numbers
('/
I was hearing gave me confidence that we were containing our T
s 23 onsite and offsite
-- in buildings at least the majority of the 24
/~S activity, because most of the readings that I can remember L) 25 hearing were -- the highest type thing I remember hearing at all ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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31 cr2-14 I
was about 100 MR out at the processing center or something like 2
that.
That became the highest number that I recall.
3 O
This was a number, I believe, calculated by Crawford, 4
Mr. Crawford?
i e
5 3
A Yes.
2 6
Q In the cover memorandum to your. Tune 12th, 1979 e
2 7
s tatement of March 28th, 1979, Unit 2 Transient, you state, and n
S 8
f I quote:
o 9
.j "The majority of the information and conclusions E
10 y
expressed in this package are a result of my personal recollection,
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post-trip review of collected plant data information, and the j
d 12 E
results of tapes, interviews, and transcripts of interviews of
=
13 4
g other personnel involved, with contributions toward plant I
14 stability on that date.
A E
F 15 2
"Because of use of the above-listed resources, I con-4
?
16 y
sider the times and events to be most accurate of any other H
17 0
time and event information I have personally either written or x
18 verbally described."
s On page 22 of the same report, you state, and again I 20 quote:
21 "Somewhere around 1350 hours0.0156 days <br />0.375 hours <br />0.00223 weeks <br />5.13675e-4 months <br />, a deep thump noise was
()
heard by the majority of people in the control room area.
At 23 i
first in response of questions about the noise, it was suspected 24
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that some ventilation dampers had been repositioned which caused 25 the noise.
After carefully checking the entire plant conditions, ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
ar2-15 32 1
it was noted that both reactor building spray pumps had started.
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2 Two of the reactor coolant pumps indicated high temperature 3
air cooling systems and source range instrumentation showed a q
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The transient conditions were a result of a e
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6 and occurred coincident with the continued long period of system R
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The operator shut off the building s[
8 spray pumps after approximately six minutes of operation.
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9 Monitoring teans reported no new high level of activities.
hvw 3
10 Therefore, it was concluded that containment had not been eeached-E 11 by the pressure transient approximately 28 psig."
W 12 Concerning reactor building spray pumps, did you say E
13
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that they had started?
mg 14 A
Not on the 28th, no.
{
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How did you find out that they had started?
s = 9 e nd 16 A
Datalogging severy days later.
g r:
N 17 Q
Then uhat is the basis for your statement that it was E
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18 noted that both reactor building spray pumps had started?
M 19 A
It was noted by the delogging and all the data that 20 we had.
My preface to all that description has -- as you bave 21 already quoted, I have used all of the information I had 22 available some time in June, when I was laying on my back in bed,
-,b 23 recovering from a bad back.
I had the luxury to sit and study 24 all these things.
The words of the pressure transient and the s
25 spray pump operation and so on were all pieces of operation that ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
cr2-16 33 1
I didn't know on the 28th.
. /m
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1 a
2 O
Well, your statement has "after checking the entire 3
plant conditions," and then "it was noted."
,m k-4 A
Uh-huh.
e 5
Q And you are telling me that it was noted by the h
cu(4 6
date recording system that the spray pumps had started; not by R
R 7
you on the 28th?
A j
8 A
Not by me personally, no, sir.
dd 9
BY MR. MOSELEY:
- /o g
10 Q
Mr. Rogers, we had Mr. Flint this morning, and other 11 people who have described that it was fairly general knowledge
~p k
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-- in fact, we even heard it was discussed in Unit 1 in the E
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13 control room -- that the building spray pumps started.
It's 14 your recollection that you did not know on that morning?
2 15 A
I did not know that, no, sir.
I didn't know it until 5
g' 16 the -- as the delogging process and the data reduction teams J.
b~
17 were working several days later, that those pumps are started 5
M 18 shortly after that thump had been heard.
5 E
19 BY MR. CRAIG:
2 20 0
Concerning the air coolant system on the reactor 21 coolant pumps, did you observe these high temperatures on 3/28?
l 22 A
No, sir.
That whole paragraph that you read, John,
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23 is really what I determined from either interviews or data 24 delogging.
i l
25 0
So your answer is the same for the source range ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
br2-17 34 I
instrumentation noise spike?
2 A
Yes, that's correct.
3 Q
And the statement about hydrogen and oxygen causing a
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4 transient?
e 5
A Yes.
2e 6
Q And concerning the monitoring teans, how did you become R
7 aware that monitoring teams reported no new high level activity?
Al 8
A In some of the information that I had gathered together d
o 9
after the succeeding days, and because B&W was charged with i
h 10 collecting all this data, and John Flint and John Putnam and some 3
h 11 of these people we had up from Lynchburg were the key members k
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They had access to all these logs and E
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Eventually it was put together e
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So I had continued access x
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d 17 natural way of doing business, I guess, is to get as much 5
M 18 information as I could and put it together.
E g
Q The fact that monitoring teams were reporting no new 19 n
20 high level of activity just after the 1350 pressure spike, 21 these were surveys that were made as a result of this thump that 22 you heard?
(~)
'p/
23 A
No.
The survey reports were coming in, reported no 24 increased activity.
I made a conclusion on that in my written 25 report here that -- that with the survey team reports coming ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
cr2-18 35 1
in, one can then see that there was no breach of containment as
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V 2
a result of that transient.
3 That was not something that was known on the 28th.
k-4 0
Was there any concern for containment integrity on '3/28 5
in the afternoon?
g N
h 6
A Not that I'm aware of.
The only thing that we had R
7 concern for was reactivity levels that were in the auxiliary n]
8 building, early in the morning, and we had never gotten any 0d 9
conclusions after that period of time that that was going up, E
10 and certainly I can say right now, ny own knowledge on the 28th 6=y 11 never tied the thump with anything but ventilation damper k
N 12 realignment.
It was the succeeding day's information coming 5
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I4 was not ventilation damper realignment, as it had at first been E
g 15 thought, but really was the transient of the hydrogen in the a
g' 16 building.
m d
17 Q
Then plant parameters, plant conditions, were not n
M 18 fully checked on 3/28 as a result of the thump?
Is that what A"
I9 g
you're saying?
e 20 A
Not that I was ever aware of, no.
21 BY MR. GAMBLE:
22 Q
When you say after fully checking plant conditions, rsb 23 it was noted that, you were talking about the check days or months 24 later, reviewing the logs and materials?
25 A
Yes.
Yes.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
36 cr2-19 1
BY MR. CRAIG:
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2 O
As I read this the first time, as you can tell from 3
this line of questioning, it led us to believe that a lot of 4
things were checked and looked at on the afternoon of 3/28. ~
5 MR. MOSELEY:
Let's go off the record for a second.
6 (Discussion off the record.)
N 7
MR. MOSELEY:
Let's go back on the record, please.
N 8
BY MR. MOSELEY:
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9 Q
Now, Mr. Rogers, you can see why when we read this, z
O 10 why we took this to mean these were activities that were done E
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11 at the time.
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12 A
Uh-huh.
E 13 0
would you like to state for the record what you l
14 intended to convey by these words?
15 A
Yes.
What I intended to put together in this package j
16 was what happened, and I used all the information pieces that I e
d 17 could gather at the time, which was the 12th of June, the middle 5
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18 of June.
E 19 By that time there had been a lot of interviews 20 conducted, there had been a lot of data delogged, and I had it all 21 available to me, and what I was trying to do was put together 22 my part that I played with it, plus all the other things that esU 23 went on during the time that I was playing a part in it, whether 24 I had any part to do with that action or not.
I wasn't trying O,
25 to separate those in my description.
It was just as the events ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
or2-20 37 I
unfolded, as time sequence events, and there was no intent mb 2
whatsoever to convey that I knew those kind of things on March 3
the 28th.
4 I misled myself and everyone else if that's what 5
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the result of that is, and certainly as you read it, I would a
j 6
reach that same kind of'a -- what was really meant here type of R
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a question.
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8 In relating the thump to when I knew that that had d"
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been a transient, I have to say that it was some time later, af ter ze h
10 we saw that there had been a ;28-pound pressure indication on a
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y 12 really what it was all about.
And that was either the next day
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h I7 as these taped up all around my bedroom, and I was putting it --
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"e 19 period of time, and I would write it down.
Not that I was aware M
20 of it on the 28th, but that was the event as it occurred or II unfolded at that point in time.
22 BY MR. CRAIG:
23 0
on 3/28/79, did you monitor containment building 24
! temperatures during or after the pressure spike?
O 25 A
Not that I recall, ever, no.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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Q Were you aware of anyone monitoring?
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2 A
No.
3 Q
Did you at any time on 3/28 discuss the pressure spike l
4 with Miller, Kunder, IIerbein or Chwastyk?
e 5
A no, h
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BY MR. MOSCLEY:
R 7
Q If you interpret that question to be the thump or n[
8 any of the associated phenomena, would the answer be the same?
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9 A
Yes, it would be the same.
If you will, we are in the 5
g 10 control room, the noise is heard, and everyone says, "What is
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And the answer is given, probably ventilation realignment.
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12 Now during the day we had been in and out of E
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respirators because of the ventilation problems.
It seemed an I4 acceptable answer at the time.
It very well fit into, sure, E
h 15 there are some changes being made, and then never thinking about x
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that thump again.
16 e
h I7 No, I can surely say that there was no further discus-m
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18 sion about that at all on that day.
A" 19 BY MR. CRAIG:
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20 Q
Our review of your testimony indicates that you had 21 a telephone conversation with Mr. Arnold some time between 22 2:30 p.m. and 4:30 p.m. on 3/28.
During this or any other 23 conversation with Mr. Arnold on the 28th, did he relate to you 24 that B&W in Lynchburg had requested his help in having you 25 telephone the home officer', your home office in Lynchburg?
l l
I ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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A No, I don't recall any of those type of conversations,
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2 no.
3 Q
The conversation or --
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4 A
I don't recall any conversation with Mr. Arnold at 'all e
5 about calling Lynchburg, about me calling Lynchburg.
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You do recall a conversation?
R 7
A Yes.
Ml 8
Q Are you aware that Mr. Arnold testified before the d
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Senate that B&W made this request of him?
I o
10 A
I was made aware of that when the Senate committee E
11 had the interview with me, yes.
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Did you have a telephone conversation with Mr. Arnold 5
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13 approximately 10:00 to 10:30 in the morning on 3/28?
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14 A
I only remember talking with Bob once during that E
g 15 day, and it seems to me that it was during the peried of time z
16 g
that Miller was of fsite, over to the state house. As I recall, 1.
d 17 now or any other time, thinking about it, I only renenber one E
M 18 conversation with Bob.
E 19 Q
The NRC investigation which resulted in this NUREG 0600 gn 20 identified missing segments of data.
The reason for these 21 missing segments has not been identified, and they inciode 22 various time periods for the alarm status printout, the utility f~x U
23 typer output, and an analog trend recorder No. 2 strip chart.
24 Can you explain, or do you have any idea what happened
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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A No.
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llave you been involved or overheard conversations 3
concerning the missing data?
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4 A
Oh, I have read the reports and the testimony about it, e
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Q Are you aware of any efforts which may be being made R
7 by Metropolitan Edison to locate or explain this missing data?
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8 A
Am I aware of their efforts now?
Oc 9
0 or subsequent to 3/28.
Eg 10 A
No.
The only thing I could relate in this area is that 11 the people we had working in the data reduction group were k
N 12 concerned that some of the alarm typing -- alarm typewriter 5
(~)/ j 13 data had been missing because the machine was down and had made
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g 15 that, because it could have answered some of the things we wanted z
16 to evaluate."
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b' 17 But that's the kind of conversations that I was aware 5
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19 g
point in time, or even then, accepted the fact that the machine n
20
.was down and the data was lost and there was no way to recover it.
21 Q
During the day John Flint was getting temperatures 22 g-)
and things, primary system parameters, printed out, and he v
23 testified this morning that Ivan Porter was trending some data, 24 and they were getting printouts and taking them into the shift GV 25 sup's office.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
41 cr2-24 j
Do you have any idea what happened to this data?
/~'T
'v' A
No.
2 3
Q Ilave y u been involved in or overheard any conversations
(-)
concerning this data, subsequent to the 28th?
4 e
5 A
No.
5 A
6 0
Do you know if Metropolitan Edison has made any e
7 effort to locate this data?
K g
8 A
No.
Oc 9
0 Finally, with respect to missing data, the sheet on
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E ij recorded on the morning of the 28th vanished until May 7tb.
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12 Do you have any idea what happened during -- why it Ea
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d 13 was missing for so long?
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Oh, I have heard the reports that the people who took U
h 15 that data, entered it into the computer logbook, and it was 5
16 taken up to the control room and set on one of the desks in the k
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17 control room, and it wasn' t discovered until somewhere along 5g ja the date you stated that that information was there.
I'm just b
aware of that as a fact that came out of your investigation.
j9 R
20 0
Do you _ know if any ef forts have been made by Metropolitaa 2)
Edison to account for this disappearance?
22 A
No.
/
23 0
Since the accident at Three Mile Island, have you 24 changed any of your recollections?
A k'l A
I have reinforced a lot of them with all of the 25 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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reports and data.
It's f air to say that.
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2 As far as recollections, recollections become affected 3
by anything that you are then exposed to, so it's a little unf air
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4 for me to state that this is something that I now remember that e
5 I didn' t remember before, if I've read it.
It doesn't add up that h
3 6
way.
R R
7 BY fir. HARPSTER:
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Help me out a little bit here.
During the course of d
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the morning, when you were having these meetings, if I can go
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11 had a real concern for whether or not the core was uncovered a
p 12 and being cooled by steam.
And as you went on throughout the
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morning, you had quite a bit of information available to you 14 and prior to the depressurization attempt to get down on the 5j 15 core flood tanks, what was the discussion with regard to what x
y 16 the status of the core was?
How were his concerns addressed?
A 17 Kunder has testified that he was extremely concerned Y
18 that he couldn't show that the core was bein-covered, and as a P
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19 result of his conversations and analysis, he thought it might be M
20 uncovered, and he thought it was being cooled by steam.
21 Surely this had to be discussed by the group.
22 A
I don' t renember that kind of a conversation at all, 23 until that meeting where it was a -- a result of the meeting was 24 to go down or attempt to get core flood inventory in the core,
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25 or to prove that the core was covered by seeing the core flood 1
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
1
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did not dump in, if you will.
No meeting prior to that, that I O) 2 remember, at least, was there any discussion about whether or not 3
the core was actually covered.
O s_,i 4
I think the thrust of the efforts in everyone else's t
5 g
mind was to get the steam conditions back to water phase, to e
6 start reactor coolant pumps, and I don't really recall any R
7 discussions up until that later meeting where the conclusion sl 8
was to depressurize that ever came out about is the core covered.
Oj 9
I don't think I ever heard that kind of a question presented, or 0y 10 is there water in the core, steam in the core, or anything like E
k II that, until that meeting.
B 12 O
How did people account for the extremely high tempera-5
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y 13 tures that you had?
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E I4 A
I can only relate that the way I put it all together g
15 af terwards myself, and that is that not at any time that I z
j 16 remember did I go back and try to put how did we get there in e
17 my mind, as much as how are we going to get away from here?
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rather than trying to go back and accumulate enough data, at n
20 least that was avail able, to determine why we were where we were, 21 as much as ~I'd rather t.tke care of it now and take a look at it 22 es later on.
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23 As an. xa.
of that sort of thing, it was a concern 24 later in the evening, after the pump had started, about let's
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make sure we don' t lose any of the data that is recorded, any 25 1
l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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logs that are taken off, make sure they're put in this box in l]-
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the corner here.
It's labeled as such.
For all the logs that 3
came off all the strip chart recorders and computer printouts kx (q
4 or anything else was supposeu to go in that bag for an accumula-e 5
tion, so we could afford the luxury of going back and looking Mn 8
6 later on, and seeing why we were where we were at.
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I just don't believe that anyone else had any kind of j
8 thoughts, much more than I did, as to let's get the plant under d
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control and then we'll go back and look and see how we got there.
Y 10 BY MR. MOSELEY:
El 11 0
Isn't it a normal part of deciding how you get out of a
p 12 it, to consider how you got into it?
5
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Well, I like to relate it this way:
If my car is
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E 15 guardrail failed up there.
I'm worried about what's going to E
y 16 happen right now in the next few minutes, and I think the e
p 17 concern, at least the way Miller -- and as I remember Miller 5
M 18 describing it, and myself, at least, we are concerned with E"
19 radiation releases.
We have got to keep this thing together, 8e 20 we have got to get this plant where we can control it, make sure 21 that we don't destroy any nore equipment, if we have that luxury 22 and that kind of an order of importance, and in that kind of a s-23 thought process, I wouldn't go back and put everything together, 24 if I was satisfied that I had a handle on what I'm seeing now A
25 is pretty good.
I certainly relied upon the pressures as being ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
ar2-28 45 I
an indication of where I was.
I relied on most of the (q'
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2 indications on there, and later on during the day, as I arrived 3
at the conclusion that those temperature indications were more f-(- g) 4 than likely right, that's what it is, you know, I've got to get 5
g rid of that, dump heat somewhere.
I've got to get some kind of a e{
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I've got to have R
7 the luxury of getting the pump started or some circulation started n[
8 to remove that heat.
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9 That's kind of the way that I would have approached z
Oy 10 any emergency I was in, was try to get to a safe condition, 3
h II rather than try to find out why I got there, as much.
It's not M
12 that important to me, to know why I got here.
If I have an idea E
13 tnat I can get to a safe condition next.
b;( )A l
14 0
Let me take a subject that's totally apart from what E
.j 15 we have been talking about.
Ilho were members of the think tank?
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Who participated in those v:
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E 18 A
They are identified in other pieces of paper, but P"
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I'll try to remember the ones I can put down now.
It was n
20 Miller and Logan and Seelinger from time to time, and Kunder 21 and Zewe and Mike Ross.
Occasionally John Flint would sit in 22 f-)
with us, but most of the time not.
And shortly after 10:00 k/
23 o' clock, there was always a member of the NRC, either one or 24 two, that were in the control room area, was in any meeting we O'O 25 had.
Until later on during the day, that was the majority of the ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
ar2-29 46 1
peonle involved.
Chwastyk came in later on, but I don't think
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2 mos t of the meetings,
I think there maybe only was one or two 3
or afterwards Chwastyk was there for.
Possibly Bryan Mailer, in e(_)x 4
and out from time to time, but I don't recall that he was in 5
there as a required member in most cases.
6 Q
May I go back and make sure I've got the notes down righ b?
R 7
Miller -- I'm going to talk about people who were really the E
j 8
principals, who were there most of the time.
Yourself, Miller, O
9 Logan, Kunder, Zewe and Ross.
Is that correct?
Zcy 10 A
Yes.
And I did say Seelinger was in and out from time 3
h 11 to time, but when Seelinger was there, he was a major contributor k
y 12 because of the fact that Jim had been the superintendent on Unit 5a 5
13 2 prior to his transfer to Unit 1.
So he was recognized as being
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5 I4 a significant input to any process when he was there.
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15 0
I had listed him as part time, and Flint occasionally, x
j 16 and Chwastyk one or two times later, and Mailer was in and out, e
b' 17 but wasn't really a member of the group.
Do I have it right?
E 18 A
Did I name Zewe?
E 19 g
Q Yes.
n 20 A
Yes.
I think that's pretty much right.
There was 2I other people.
22 BY MR. HARPSTER:
xs 23 Q
Let me ask one additional question here.
This might 24 call for an opinion on your part.
We have had in our review of
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25 the testimony extensive cases where people in the control room ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
ar2-30 47 I
other than or as part of the think tank had diagnosed or. analyzed O
(V 2
and discussed various parts of the transient during the day.
3 For instance, John Flint's explanation which he discussed with a 4
nuclear engineer, with George Kunder, Zewe, Frederick and oth'ers, 5
g over the apparent voiding of the core.
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6 We have had several people in their testimony discuss R
7 the implications of superheat.
Now was that discussed throughout M[
8 the day?
Why do you think this information rever got into and d
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was discussed by the think tank?
It seems to me a lot of these z,
og 10 people's inferences and discussions they had would have benefited 3
h 11 you people, because at least in retrospect they had a handle on is
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p' y
13 A
Well, it's hard for me to say, and as you pointed out, v
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h I4 more of speculation of why that information didn't surface in
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15 the discussions.
The kind of approach the first meeting that a
16 j
Miller called in the morning was all right, guys, where do we go 1.
17 from here type of thing.
If you direct your thought processes 5
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18 toward what you know, where we are, that you feel comfortable E
19 it's good information and try to use that as to where are we 20 going next, and what should we do, it's not the kind of a thing 21 of a group of people getting down and what do you know about how 22 we got here type of thing.
O 23 I don't think that approach ever came out that day, 24 what happened.
25 0
Let's talk about where you're going.
We have people ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
cr2031 48 1
making recommendations that you're going to accomplish nothing (q
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2 by repressurizing, because your relief setpoint, if in fact 3
those temperatures are what they indicate, then you
-1't have
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4 the ability to pressurize to any extent to collapse those bubbles.
o 5
Let me give you another example in the af ternoon.
We've M
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6 had testimony that all sorts of actions were taken in trying to --
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at least by sone control room members -- in trying to decide what 3l 8
had happened, when you had the 28-pound pressure spike.
People 0e 9
in Unit 1 knew about it, and yet it doesn't seem to have been iey 10 common knowledge among the management group.
It seems to be Ej 11 common knowledge among the other people in the control room who k
j 12 actually took actions in a lot of these cases on their own, E
13 trying to do something about this, and yet we haven't heard l
14 that the management group has discussed it.
That's really what I 2
15 was looking for.
Why is that, that the information didn' t get 5
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16 back to the management grc.up?
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17 A
It's hard for me to answer that kind of a question.
E M
18 If you add the confusion in my mind to what I can relate to and h
19 say if I have something told to me, and I get a reasonably 8n 20 acceptable answer to that question, that I may have, I may go on 21 very rapidly to another area of concern in my thought process.
22 When the transient -- hydrogen transient occurred, as I stated
^
23 earlier, it was reasonable to ne that realignment of ventilation 24 dampers, it sounded very reasonable to me.
bNJ 25 Therefore, I didn't go and find out if anything else ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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had happened on the panel which was related to it.
Later on I (V
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in the story as I wrote, that things were subsequently noted and n()
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I remember hearing some of the conversation days and n
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7 if Zewe said this or somebody else -- they thought that because j
8 of some of the electrical distribution problems, that may have d
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I have read that E
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12 if I had been the operator and the spray cumps came on in front
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13 of me, and somebody stands behind me and says we just had a loss pO 14 of electrical distribution, that tells me that's a reason for 15 those spray pumps to have come o;t.
The safety circuit has y
16 activated some of the interlock systems, so that the spray pumps s'
tj' 17 saw some protective action that required them to come on.
That's E
k 18 a reasonable answer.
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20 to question that when it comes up to be a reasonable sort of an 21 answer.
22 Q
I think the thing that is giving us a problem is, it's
' ' ~ ^
23 unreasonable on the surface, because given the operator's 24 knowledge and training with regard to electrical distribution, 25 losing motor control centers 32A and 42A doesn't help you cat much ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
ar2-33 50 1
with the containment spray pumps,: and. given. the redundancy and ID L./
2 diversity of all the indications out there, and then all of these 3
actions throughout the afternoon that we have people taking,
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4 that the managenent group isn' t aware of, we have a guy out there e
5 trying to calculate the inventory of the plant, and refill the 3
N h
6 loops, and the management group isn't aware of these actions.
R 7
It's hard for us to understand that, s
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8 Part of our responsibility is to decide how we get d
d 9
this information in an event like this.
So how do we get to the i
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10 point where we can write a requirement when we can't understand 5
j 11 why the management of the plant doesn't have this same informa-k j
12 tion, that seems to be common knowledge in the control room?
E
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y 13 And in fact, in the control room on the other side of the m
x-h 14 facility?
2 15 A
Well, I don't know right now that I can put together N
j 16 anything in the middle of why we did certain things, we or myself e
~
17 or anyone else, in the middle of a rather unusual set of condi-U
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18 tions that none of us had ever expected to be involved in, P"
19 number one.
R 20 You are living something that is a brand new experience, 21 really, and I'm not sur that your normal type of thought 22 processes really work.
If you're in a situation that you're b
a 23 satisfied with some of the answers you get -- I know I did this 24 during the day, I became satisfied with an answer to something 25 that I may ham questioned, and that just never became a thought ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
cr2-34 51 1
again, I never went back to that sort of thing.
I moved on to t(_/
2 something new and dif ferent.
3 My concern all day long had to be to get the steam out
,~
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4 of there, get water in those loops, and get circulation sowe' e
5 could remove the heat.
We had to get the heat removal process 34 6
working one way or another.
If we could get the pumps to R
7 run, fine, or if we could get the loops filled with water, then X
8 we could have natural circulation.
I was confident that we could d
d 9
have that, but I knew we couldn't have it with the steam in ioy 10 there.
So I am concentrating on what actions tha' I can dream E
h 11 up, if you will, to contribute in any group discussion, and these k
j 12 other things that occur around me are not really going to change 5
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y 13 my direction of thought so much.
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14 I wasn't happy, as an example, at all when it was 2
15 decided that we must shut of f the only steam dunp that we had, 5
y 16 the a tmospheric dump relief valve. When that was required that w
d 17 we had to shut that off, I was very concerned.
We've really got a
{
18 more compounded problem now, because that's been the only way E
19 we have been able to get any heat out of this whole darn plant, g
n 20 as far as the removal process out of the building.
It becomes 21 a very serious concern to me then.
When are the boilers are 22 able to give us the steam, the auxiliary boilers.
Well, we're O
23 working on it.
That's a good answer to me.
They're working on 24 trying to get that auxiliary boiler system up so we can get steam in(-)
25 into the condenser, so we can get the condenser back and go to a ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
52 ar2-35 1
normal steam dumping system.
(
2 I can't, because of my role in the plant as a 3
consultant, so to speak, go and direct Met Ed operators to do
()
4 something different.
All I can do is just ask questions and '
e 5
talk about it.
I'm in a rather unique kind of a role in that E
N 6
kind of thing, because I can't myself go out and maybe start R
7 helping the operators, getting the aux boilers up.
This is what El 8
someone may be able to do if they happen to be a Met Ed operator.
do 9
M-( whole type of thinking that day, as I put it io 10 all toget'aer, was to take where we are and try to get conditions 11 back to where I thought we wanted them to be, and maybe other l
12 people think the same way, I don't know.
I can't answer for E
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13 that.
()
h 14 MR. CRAIG:
That concludes the interview.
We'll give 2
15 you a copy of the transcript after it's typed up.
E g
16 (Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m.,
the interview was e
d 17 adjourned.)
E k
18 E"
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8n 20 21 22 23 24
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25 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO.M4ISSION This is to certify that the attached preceedings before the NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION in the =atter ef:
- Date of ?receecing:
September 2, 1980 Docket flu =b e r :
None Place of ?roceeding:
were held as herein appears, and tha; :nis is the criginal transcrip:
thereof for :he file of the Cc==ission.
ANN RILEY Official Reper:er (Typed)
I
(&
O Official Reperter (Signature)
==
1 d
P00ROR8!Nid
I NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO.94ISSION This is te certify that the attached proceedings before the
)
u,,,3n,-
un7n1, envy rn -3ssion in the matter of:
v.e,.,
2,..e..d.4 September 2, 1980 s
..w
.e.
Docket Nu=ber:
None
? lace of Proceeding:
Harrisbura, Pennsylvania were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript therecf for the file ef the Cec =ission.
MARY C.
SIMONS
-,..4
=.
..M. N. C 7. ~M N.
O t
Official ?.eperter (Signaturei I
.g d
_.~.
l POORORBIE l
i ERRATA SHEET LELAND C. ROGERS HARRISBURG, PENNSYLVANIA September 2, 1980 0
PAGE LINE CHANGE d
4 14 "and it was" should readI"and I was"
/4 24 "Urbine" should be "Herbein" ~
'/6.
5 "myself" should be "himself" 20 "Urbine" should be "Herbein" v
1
" precess at least" should read " process at least,"
6 "saw" should be " sat" 3
add comma between opened which
>9 6
"Urbine" should be "Herbein"
'l.0 12
" reaction" should be " action"
- 11 23 after "this" add (indicating the special investi-
/.
gation plant parameter chart)
- 12 25
" record" should be " rapid"
-14 25 "not" should be "no"
'15 3
"took that day"'should be changed to took place
/
that day" 95 12 "oversteamed" should be chenged to " filled with steam"
5 25
" suction pump" should read " suction of the pump" i
p
'v 7 4
" fade" should be " phase" t9 19
" thing" should be " thinking" 3
11 "or any" should be "only"
'24 9,17,20 "FDQ" should be "PD0" 24 19 "one" should be "100%"
d32 10
" reached" should be " breached" v$2 16 "severy" should be "several" 3
2 "has" should be "was" 3
6 "date" should be " data" v@7 16 after "such as these" add (indicating).
138 25
" officer" should be " office" d44 4
" bag" should be " box" i
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