ML19343D448
| ML19343D448 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/04/1980 |
| From: | Zewe W METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8105040507 | |
| Download: ML19343D448 (69) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES
/
s 2,
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I
3 !-________________x l
)
\\/
In the Matter of:
e 5
METROPOLITAN EDISON (TMI-II)
Ea 6 q_________________x 6
i g
7 l Conference Room D-4 s
lioward Johnson Motor Inn j
8' 473 Eisenhower Boulevard d
Ilarrisburg, Pennsylvania d
9 Thursday, September 4, 1980 g
10 Interview of William II. Zewe began pursuant to notice, II l
B at 1:15 p.m.
d 12 x
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PRESENT:
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13 1
o TERRY IIARPSTER, Office of Inspection and Enforcement h
I4 Nuclear Regulatory Commission U
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15 JO!!N U.
CRAIG, Office of Inspection and Enforcement 1
2 Nuclear Regulatory Commission 16 g
NORMAN C.
MOSELEY, Office of Inspection and Enforcement U
I7 Nuclear Regulatory Commission 5
M 18 DAVID !!. GAMBLE, Office of Inspector and Auditor E
Nuclear Regulatcry Commission 19 E
RICIIARD K.
IiOEFLING, Office of the Executive Legal Director i
20 Nuclear Regulatory Commission
-n s e e M R+L Pv e j
2I On Behalf of William II. Zewe:
1 22 I
MICIIAEL F.
McBRIDE, ESO.
(m e
s
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EUGENE R.
FIDELL, ESQ.
23 :
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae y
1333 New Ilampshire Avenue, N. W.
24 Washington, D.
C.
20036
'l 25 1
i ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
SIO50ttosoy
2 I
MOLLY S.
BOAST, ESQ.
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby 6 !!acRae 2
140 Broadway New York, ?Iew York 3
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMP ANY, INC.
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I PR0CEEDINGS
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MR. GAMBLE:
We will go on the record.
3 i
This interview is being conducted as a portion of the O
4 nuc1eer aesu1etery Commission e irvee11setion in1e the exchenRe 5
g of information between the Metropolitan-Edison Company and the e*
6 NRC on March 28th, 1979.
R 7
Mr. Zewe, will you please state your full name for the s
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r, record?
O" 9
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MR. ZENE:
William H.
Zewe.
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i-10 3
MR. GAMBLE:
Counsel present, would you please identify
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12 E
MR. McBRIDE:
My name is Michael F.
McBride of the law
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13 5
firm of LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae, counsel for Mr. Zewe.
5 14
!;5 MS. BOAST:
Molly S.
Boast.
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,iR. GEPHART-Smith B.
Gephart, Killian E Gephart.
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16 MR. GAMB LE :
Mr. Fidell will be ioining ue later?
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I7 MR. McBRIDE:
That is correct.
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18 MR. GAMBLE Norman Leslie is also out of the room E
19 8
and will be joining us later.
e 20
.Whe re u pon,
21 WI LLI AM H.
ZEWE l
22 having been first duly sworn by Mr. Gamble, was examined and O
23 l testified as follows:
24 1
MR. GAMBLE:
Thank you.
25 i ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
4 1
I EXAMINATION 2
BY MR. CRAIG:
I 3
l Q
Bill, our review of your testimony indicates that 4
on the morning of 3/28/79 you instructed the shift foreman to 5
g reduce and maintain pressurizer level, and these actions were e
6 that high pressure injection would be reduced and let-down flow R*
7 y
l would be increased to recover pressurizer level.
Did you at any 6
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time that day discuss the status of the high pressure injection d*
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and let-down systems with Mr. Miller?
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A Yes.
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II Q
Would you tell us what the substance of those convar-s d
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sations were!
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A Well, throughout the day we had discussed the status E
14 2
of the high pressure injection system and the status of the 9
15 l
2 let-down system throughout the whole day at various intervals.
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Ib Q
Did you discuss the status of these two systems as they 1
F 17 I d
existed prior to 8:30 a.m.
in that let-down had been increased and
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7 18 high pressure injection had been stopped for a while and then s"
19 8
throttled?
e 20 *j t
A Yes, we did discuss that.
i 21 I
Q Would you tell us the context of those discussions?
i 22 i
i A
When Mr. Miller arrived I was briefing him on what l
23 h had taken place to that point until he arrived.
As 1 recall, I i
n 24 ; described the actions that we took up to that point which included 1
25 ) increasing the let-down at various times and also verifying high r
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
l 5
i i
i
'I pressure injection flow and then further reducing it.
2
.Q Did you have. a similar conversation with Lee Rogers i
l 3
concerning the status'of the system as it existed prior to i
ll) 4 approximately Bi30 in the morning?
l j
A I really can't remember because Mr. Rogers was there 5
t-n 3
f for a period of time and I am not certain when he arrived.
He R
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was involved ~in most of the conversations that I had with
,f8 Mr. Miller after he arrived.
So I don't rec'all exactly if I f
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addressed them.to him and Mr. Miller together along with
$g 10 Mr. Ross and so forth, whoever was'with Mr. Miller at.that I
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h Il particular time.
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I2 Q
Did you have any kind of a discussion concerning the 3
13 fact that HPI had been reduced and let-down increased prior to
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E I4 8:30 a.m., the status and not the conversation.with George i
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15 Kunder?
l dN A
Yes, I did discuss that with George after he had.
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arrived.
We had talked about that.
N ovbeIw.
Q What about with Jack Urbir=?
l conversations with Mr. w i
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g A
I do not recall any direct Urbinc r
20 concerning those two items on that particular day.
I 21 l-MR. FIDELL:
Before we go on, may I ask for the record, I
2 22 please, to which of the three subjects listed-on the subpoena l
j@
5-23-these questions relate?
l 24 MR. CRAIG They. relate both to the radiation levels and to the pressure spike and to the core temperature.
25 i '
I ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
.m.
6 i
l 1
MR. FIDELL:
My sense is that they are really quite 2
tangential and I hope that, you know, some attention will be given I
3 to the fact that three specific subjects were addressed on the 4
subpoenas which forms the envelope for the inquiry.
g 5
MR. CRAIG:
Do you want to address that, Dick?
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Well, I think partially the significance i
R CE 7
that we see in these questions is this.
We have three items
.f8 that were icentified as the prime subject of the inquiry.
The d
i 9
potential question arises as to what significance should be
?
10 a t t ribut ed to these items perhaps by individuals in the plant.
To B_
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answer that question it is important in our mind to forn the con-b 12 2"_
text or the status of the oJant at the time that these i t -: m s r
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13 ll developed, if you will.
7.
5 I4 The purpose of these questions is to flesh out plant b
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15 ( st atus, knowledge of plant status in the minds of certain indi-
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h I7 what significance they should have attached to these three items
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IO ! and what actions they shou 1d have taken based on that significance l
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or their knowledge of those three items in the context of plant 20 l
status.
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2I That is the purpose for asking these questions.
22 j
MR. FIDELL:
I sort of feel that we should get on with I
23
! it and, you know, move forward.
I was getting concerned that it 24 f would take much longer than we set aside this afternoon to get n
25 ] to the issues as to which the subpoenas speak if you are going to l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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7 I
about the status of every system in the plant.
You know, you O
2 are talking about a very broad subject if you are going to go into 3
that.
So I just want to encourage you to bear in mind the
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4 envelope of the subpoenas. I hear what you are saying.
St far so 4
5 good, but I feel it is appropriate to at least note that there 9
6 constraints in our view on what we are here for.
are some R
- E 7
MR. HOEFLING:
Well, let me just say that we have tried 5
g 8
diligently to limit the number of questions that we are going to 0
0 9
ask.
We thought about the areas that we felt we needed informa-z.
Oy 10 tion and tried to limit it to those.
6 II MR. FIDELL:
Enough said.
I think I made it clear.
N I2 MR. GAMB LE :
IIeedless to say, let the record show c
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13 that Mr. Fidell has returned.
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( Laughte r. )
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15
!!R. "IDELL:
I suspect the record probably already
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showc that.
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17 BY MR. CRAIG:
w=
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Along the same line of conversations concerning the P"
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status of high pressure injection and let-down as it existed prior n
20 ! to 8:30, did you have a discussion with Joe Chwastyk or Brian 2l Mehler concerning those systems on 3/28/79?
l 22 A
I don't really recall with much clarity exactly when O
23 l I told them, you know, exactly what had transpired, but I am not 24 lsureexactlyhowI stated it.
T inst nonestly don't remembe r at 25,Ithis point.
I should have related it to them, and I probably did, ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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but..I T really ' don ' t. remember-that; now.
2 Q
- When you related it to Mr. Miller.in'the morning shortly; F
3 after he arrived,- what was his reaction?1 h
4
/s His reaction was more ' to everything at -once because
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- 5. he-was thrust-into the role of the emergencyfdirector as soon as j
6' he relieved me and he was trying to gather what information he~-
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I-am'not--sure f
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that he.was-overwhelming surprised-by those two; issues ~only.
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Q
.Did he' make any comments!specifically about-these two I
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g 10 systems or give'any directions concerning these two systems?
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He gave directions that-~if we. changed.at-all'the status is y
12 of the high pressure injectio1.to keep him informed immedia'tely.
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5 13 Q
What about Mr. Kunder, what.was his reaction when he I4 learned about-it?
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.j 15 A-When Mr. Kunder arrived he was-trying to sort rout in
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I0 his own mind what the problems were and what'the:best-course of I
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He had arrived in the control room before I ca'me backi z
IO to the control room, so I am uncertain of what transpired before n
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g I came back.
He was still trying to sort out matters and trying to
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20 make his mind uo on what the best course of action was.
I Q
Was this information passed on' to the NRC on 3/28/79?
22 MR. FIDELL:
Which information?
e.
II '
MR. CRAIG:
The information concerning the fact that 24 high pressure injection had been secured and then throttled and 25 that.let-down had been increased prior to 8:30 a.m. on 3/28/79.
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I-t ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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'l THE WITNESS:
.I do not xnow that information.
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2 BY MR. CRAIG:
3 Q
To your knowledge,-was the information withheld from the r
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4 NRC?
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A To.my knowledge, no information was withheld.
M9 j'
'6 Q
Our review of your testinony indicates that two reactor l
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7 coolant pumps were secured based.on net positive suction head E
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8 limits and about 20 minutes later the remaining two coolant d
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pumps were secured due to deteriorated flow.
With whom did you zo e
g 10 discuss the inability of the reactor coolant pumps to pump water l
5 j
11 other than George Kunder?
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12 A
The other members of my shift that were present there, 4
Svgan f
13 the shift foreman and control room operators Ken Br1cn, the
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14 other shif t supervisor who I had called from Unit I to Unit IT I
f 15 Q
Later on after Gary Miller and Lee Rogers arrived, did l
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16 you have a conversation with them about the inability of the l
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17 coolant pumps to provide forced flow through the core?
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I informed them of the actions that I had taken and I
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19 why I had taken them.
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20 Q
What was their reaction to that?
21 A
As I remember, their reaction was that we should proceed 22 and try to start one of the reactor coolant pumps as soon as we G
23 could.
24 Q
During the conference call early in the morning, was it O
d 25 eyour understanding that there was-a direction.during that phone E
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
10 j
I conversation.'to start a. reactor coolant pump, to-increase pressure i g l
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and~ start a. pump?L l
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'A.
That morning-I was unaware of the conference call that-l i
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.4-I am now aware of that existed..between the. parties.
I' knew that-j i
I did'not know-exactly.who he-
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'6 was talking to or'that'there was more than one party.in the
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.Q Do you remember when you first became aware that there 1
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'was a conference call about 6 a.m. between Kunder, Rogers, Miller l
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11 A
I don't remember the time that I was aware of that.
'l is i
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Was it on 3/78?
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?
h 13 A
As best as I can recall, no, not for.at least a day
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14 or two-later.
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15-BY MR. MOSELEY:
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16 Q
Did you receive any instructions through Mr. Kunder
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.d 17 in the time period after 6 a.m. and before Miller arrived on i
a:
l 18 site to increase pressure and start a reactor ~ coolant pump' i:
E 19 A
!!o.
I don't remember that at all,new.
l A
i 20 BY MR. CRAIG:
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21 Q
Our review of your testimony indicates that you were 22 aware the containment pressure decreased after theEMOV block le c
i 23 valve was shut on the morning of 3/28/79, and that the open EMOV i
I i
l-24 had caused the plant status, the high pressurizer level and low t
j 25 - pressure condition.
Did you conclude that the EMOV had been open 4-1 i
f ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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for.some period of time. longer than the period that you would have
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expected?
3
- A Would you restate the beginning, please:there? 'Are you--
- 4 saying that. containment pressure was going'down?
j g5
.Q You were aware that containment pressure decreased' h0
~ f t e r the block' valve was shut.
a R
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MR. E'IDE LL:
That is a question?
l MR. CRAIG:
'No,.a statement.
l 8
h BY MP. CRAIG:
0 F
jo And that the MOV valve being opened as caused the plant Q
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status, hi n pressurizer level and. low primary system pmssure.
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12 Did you conclude that-the EMOV had been ocened for a period of l
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g time?
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A At that point, yes.
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2 15 ij.
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with whom did you discuss this conclusion?
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A At that time there wcre several people present-in:the.
control room and it was more of a collective type conclusion h
18 once we had shut the block valve 4+em-the ' electromatic and the l
g l
i 19 g
pressure changed dramatically.
We just concluded that.it hadlbeen 20 opened, but I really didn't have-a feel for exactly how long.
21 Q
Would you identify those people for us?
22 A
My control room operators were still present, the shi#t g
23 ll foreman was still present, Brian Mehler was present, George Kunde:r 24 was present, I believe Mike Ross was present at that point and
.O
~ and. I am not sure of all" of the others'.-involved.
I Ken 1
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- ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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'believe-that Mr. Logan was also present.at that point in time.
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Q Concerning the shutting-of the block valve; decreasing l
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containment pressure and increasing primaryfsystem pressure, did
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you discuss-that'with Gary Miller.on 3/28/79?
i 1
5.
A..
1 am certain:thatwe talked about'it, but-Itam not sure
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exactly what time frame it actually took place.
Like.I -have c
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stated be fore, I tried to cover everything that we had done and
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i-M what ' had happened whencver he came and.took. charge.and that should t
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have been among them.
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What about Lee Rogers, did you discuss that with him?
w i
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A Here-again I can only reiterate that I believe that I i
od 13 lll j
did, but I can't recall the exact conversation.
l E
14 w
Q How about Brian Mehler or Jack l?ad"="
4 t
9 15 A
Brian was present when we shut the. block valve so he s
g 16 j
was aware of the change in the pressure whenever we shut.the I
d 17 block valve and the repressurization of the reactor ccclant itself.
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18 N** b4 L Mr.
"rM.s, I would say no, I did not have direct communication
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with him on that subject.
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j 20-Q Do you remember any of the conversation that you had
~
with Brian Mehler about the res nse to shutting the block valve?
22 A
I don't recall exactly, but something to the effect that gg.
i 23 i
j that was it, that that was the reason for the low pressure.
1 l'
Q Did you discuss this with George Kunder?
24 i
25 j
A In the same light, yes.
1 I
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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13 I
Q How about Joe Chwastyk?
(:)
2 A
Joe wasn't present at that point in time that I recall.
3 I believe that he did come to the control room later in the 4
morning.
5 y
Q Did you discuss it with him later that day?
9 6
A When he arrived.
Here again I believe that I did, but R
y
- U 7
I don't recall the specifics of that conversation.
E 8
5 Q
Uas this information passed on to the HRC, to the best G"
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of your knowledge, on 3/28/79?
?
E 10 y
MR. FIDELL:
What information, please?
=!
II MR. CRAIG:
The information concerning the system s
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response to shutting the block valve to increase primary systerr
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f13 pressure and decrease containment pressure.
3 14 0
MR. FIDELL:
Du you understand the cuestion, Bill?
b I
5 15 i
g T::t NITNESE:
Yes, I do, but I have no knowledre of l
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I0 what exact information was passed on to the MRC at any partiiular l
H 17 in time.
t point.
=
18 BY MR. CRAIG:
E" 19 8
Q In your opinion now, should it have been passed on to
+
20 1!the NRC?
21 A
I think that the status of the plant in its condition, yes, information such as that should be passed on, yes.
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23
-y Q
To your knowledge, was this information, again referring 24 f. to t:1e EMOV block valve being shut, withheld from the HRC on O
h 25 0 3/28/80?
~~
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
r 14 l
I MR. McBRIDE:
I am going to object to that question on 2
the ground that it has been asked and answered twice already.
He 3 !previously testified that he is unaware of any information having 4
/
having been withheld from the NRC and he has just now reiterated 5
g that he was unaware of any information having been withheld from 4
6 the NRC.
R*E 7
MR. MOSELEY:
1 think his testimony was that he was s
E 8 ' not aware of what had been passed on rather than whether the l
s a
d 9
information had been withheld.
z.oy 10 MP. McBRIDE:
Hcwever, it was asked and answered E
h Il previously.
I think that the question now posed has been answered.
c 12 M
MR. CRAIG:
I agree that he said previously that he 5
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13 \\ didn't know of any information that was*#
_ld.
I was soliciting b
I4 a response specifically concerning this item.
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15 MR. FIDELL:
The greater includes the lesser, though,
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16 and if he has answered the larger question he has also answered u.
h I7 every constituent a?ement to the question.
I hope you are not
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18 going to ask the same question and get the same answer and ask P"
19 8
the same follow-op question and get the same follow-on answer for n
20 every item of infor : nation because it will waste a lot of time.
I 2I l
MR. HOEFLING:
I think that is a correct analysis of 22 where we are.
He answered the more general question before and we 23 l can take that to be pretty well all-inclusive.
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24 MR. FIDELL:
Fine.
25 I e
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'BY'MR. CRAIG:
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Q Our review of your testimony indicates'that you were l
3 aware o'f hot-leg temperatures in the neighborhoo'd of '740 to 800 4
degrees and that you verified these. temperature readings in l
e 5
the 740-to 800 degree range by the instrument, the bridge, by 5
7 0
~
data indicatad comparing'it to a' graph.
Was~a record kept of the 7
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by this' extended scale readout device which was connected to the K
g 8
hot-leg RTD?
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i A
I don't remember whether _there was a record kept: of that z
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10 or not.
We have an.ISC engineer that was involved in that,-and I
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am not sure whether he did, but I certainly'did not.
II is g
12 Q
On 3/28/79 what was your evaluation of the hot-leg o
.I g 13 j
temperate?es when they increased sharply after the reactor coolant I
I4 j
pumps were shut down?
E bI A
What time was that again?
I am sorry.
l iE Ib Q
In the morning when you secured the reactor coolant
-l d
f h
I7 pumps, and I am looking at a graph that was part of the Rogovin i
m 18 Report, and I will show you a copy of-it.
.s 19 MR. FIDELL:
Let the record show that the witness is j
g i
20 looking at a copy of a graph or a series of graphs from the.
2I Rogovin Special Inquiry Group Color Plate III.
22 THE WITNESS:
I believe that if memory serves me the 23 final pair of reactor coolant pumps were secured at approximately 24 5: 41 in the morning.
l 25 5 4
MR.-CRAIG:
It is four or five down.
l 6
i ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
i N
16 I
i 1
(Short pause while witness examines document.)
2 MR. CRAIG:
And shortly thereafter the temperatures, 1
3 lthe Delta T, started to increase, the temperatures started to i
5 4 l diverge.
I e
5 l
What was your evaluation of those temperature readings?
M 6l]
e THE WITNESS:
It shows on this graph before me that it R
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after 6 a.m.
At that point, without lreallystartedtodiverse 7
n j
8 ) any reactor coolant pumps running, we we re looking and trying t<
J u
signs of natural circulation.
So we would expect the d
9 see
~d 10 temperatures to rise.
3_
7 11 BY MR. CRAIG:
B 12 Q
lould you expect them to increase that much te establish 3 j
=
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14 A
No, not that r.uch.
I do not know why they rose as b_
p i
f 15 / sharply or as far as they had.
E O
g' 16l 4 ew of your testimony also indicates that on the l
0 A res l
17 morning of 3/28 you were aware that hot-leg temperatures were w=
18 above saturation.
What was your evaluation of the fact that m
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19 temperatures were above saturation for those pressures?
E A
I am not sure of what testimony you are referring to, 20l 21 but I don't recall stating that I realized that we were above 1
i 22 saturation for that existing pressure.
23 MR. CRAIG:
This is the Senate testimony which was 24 h taken on October 18, 1979.
The discussion of those starts on 25,i page 6.
h ti ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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. I (The document is handed'to the witne's.)
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(Short pause.')
I 1
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THE' WITNESS: -Are you-referring to the. top portion 4
.here where-it ~ asked if I was locking at the' steam tables?-
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MR. CRAIG:
I believe',later on on-the page they' questioned you to t_he effect that did you realize you were above saturation
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-and I think you respcnded that you were aware-that-it was'above
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saturation temperature.
d-THE WITNESS:
Well, the-time frane.hereion the previous oF 10 y
page is af ter we had connected up the bridge instrument 1to.the.
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ARPS which was much later in the morning.
At'that point we we re -
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f existing pressure.
But at 5: 40,-as you'had first asked, 1 was j
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not aware of it then, no.
1 g
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MR. CRAIG:
I am sorry if I inferredtat any time in u
16 l
y the morning.
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THE WITNESS:
I knew that we had once we had connected
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18' up the bridge for the high temperatures that were indicated.
At l'
19 j
that point in time I did realize that we'had.gone.into saturation.
i 20 I do-not remember going to saturation b_efore that.
21 l
BY MR. CRAIG:
Q On 3/28/79, irregardless ' of time, did you recognize the 23 temperatures in excess of 705 degrees meant the system had.to i
24
! contain superheated steam and in ~ fact were above the critical--
25 temperature for steam?
i ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
1 18 I
t-Restate that again, please.
I 2
Q On 3/28 did you recognize that the temperatures which i
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5 heated steam?
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Q Did you also recognize that it was above the critical 8
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t empe rat ure for steam?
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I really didn't correlate that with the critical temoera-i z
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ture :or steam.
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h'h a t was your evaluation of the reaning of superheated C
i 19 I
8
- steam in the system on 3/26/79?
e 20 *i A
My evaluation was that we had very high temperatures 21 for the existing pressure in the system.
That is all.
And that 22 the temperatures should not have been that high.
23 'i s
Q Did you relate this to core cove rage?
e 24 MR. McBRIDE:
At that tite?
25:j MR. CRAIG:
At any time on 3/28/79.
i t
i ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
I 19 I
THE WITNESS:
I never really related that to any 2
, significant core uncoverage at all, no.
I 3
BY MR. CRAIG:
I
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4 Q
Was superheated stear discussed with members of the 5
g think-tank on 3/28/79?
The think-tank being the management group a
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Rogers, Kunder and I believe you were also invclved 7 ll with the others n*"
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I am sorry, the beginning of that I nissed again.
5 14 0
Whe re there any conversations on 3/28/79 concerning the u
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isource of these hot-leg tempe ra t ure s ?
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try to correct the situation that we had.
So, in that light, yes.
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A We were concerned more with trying to go on with where t
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!! we stood more so than what caused it.
I 22 Q
For a long period of time, several hours in the morning, l
i 23 4# hot-leg temperatures were pegged high, and I am trying to Eet ar 24 Jha feel for and understand the concern for moving ahead, and it
- l 25 4nas been discussed in past testimony by numerous people.
Did you a
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY INC.
l 20 1
make some kind of a determination as to the heat source that was 2
keeping the hot-leg temperatures elevated because you didn't 3
have any indications that you were getting any natural circulation 4
for a long time?
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6 full and that we were trying to feed water into the system to e
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that existed and looking for any signs sj 8
of filling the loops and of obtaining natural o#.rculation and ad 9
dealing with the other p roblems that we had at the time.
5 E
10 B MR. I:0SE LEY -
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g 11 Q
Specifically did you consider, your, yoursel f, or a
j 12 did jou participate in discussions concerning whether or not the 4
E 13 core was uncovered based on these T-hot readings?
E rg 14 A
I never thought myself that the core had been uncovered.
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Did you participate in discussions with any of the w=
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I don't remember specifically saying or discussing with
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20 core is uncovered other than we were saying that we feel that 21 } the high pressure injection that we had on at that point that i
22 l we were af fording the core coolant, and that was our main concern 1
23 at the time that we were still keeping the core cool, and we
- 1
, thought at that point that the core was covered.
24 t
25 g Q
And these elevated temperatures did not lead you or r
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21 1
others to conclude that that was an indication that the core 2,was uncovered?
i 3
l A
Well, we felt that the position of the RTDs for high 4
temperatures were in the hot range and they were fairly high g
5 on the candycanes of the loops and we knew that we did not have 0
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7 true actual water temperature that was in the reactor coolant s
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G 9
Q Did you perceive that the water temperatures might be
?
10 lower than the temperatures that were indicated of 700 to 750 6
11 what e ve r ?
7 a
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I don't really recall if we thought that they were E
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I don't really recall.
E 15 BY MR. CRAIG:
5 i
g' 16 Q
Hot-leg temperatures and superheat or the implicaticns l
d 17 i surrounding the temperatures and superheat were not reported to x=
M 18 the NRC in the morning of 3/28/79.
Rather T-average was reported P
19 g
even though the other hot-leg temperatures were requested.
In n
20 your opinion should the hot-leg temperatures have been reported 2I earlier?
22 MR. FIDELL:
Let me interrupt and say that the first 23 portion of that is a statement of fact as to which Mr. Zewe has 24 l testified that he has no knowledge.
The question builds on a I,
25 ) premise that we cannot deal with.
I mean, you are asking a p
is
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
22.
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hypothetical quection based Lon ; facts' that this witness has testifie d-2 he can't testify about.
Now, if you want an opinion about.what 3
the regulations mean, that'is a matter-within.the Commission's
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4
.own knowledge. ~ Mr. -Alprir. -can..give. it 1to you.
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.MR. MOSELEY:
-I think that the opinion of'the licensed-j i
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6 senior operators as to.what they perceive the reporting require-
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ments to be is quite pertinent to the NRC.
8 MR. FIDELL: 'Well, if you would.like to recast the G
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question subject to the comments that I made, let's see-how'it 2o b
10 comes out a second time, if that is agreeable to you.
I stated 1
3 h.II I do have an objection to it.
is Y.12 MR. CRAIG:
I will try again.
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?
13 BY MR.-CRAIG:
- f
=
14 Q
In your opinion, should the hot-leg temperatures 1have
-i I
j 15 l been reported to the NRC earlier than they were, given that they
.m 16 i
g-were not reported until sometime later in the af ternoon ?
.j 17 MR. GEPHART:
You want his opinion as of today?
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18 MR. CRAIG:
Yes, as of today.
E 19 g
THE WITNESS:
I will answer that in two parts then.
M 20 First, yes,'I feel that they should have been-reportea.
I 21 All right.
But on the second part, I'have no knowledge of what
)
22 information was given to the NRC or when.
23 j
MR. CRAIG:
That is fine.
Our intent was to solicit your e
3 they'have f
24]opinionastowhetherornotyourbeliefistodaythat 25 reported-and not in any way to do anything_else.
l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
i i
23 1
Our review of your previous testimony and your testimony
()
2 I today shows that you were aware that water had been going out 3
through an open EMOV and was responsible for high pressure and
()
4 temperature inside containment and symptoms of a Loca, that high 3
pressure injection had been throttled and let-flow had been a
E 6 lincreased, that the reactor coolant pumps were shut off because R
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8 8 l a time period long,er than you would normally have expected and a
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On 3/28/79 did you infer from these plant conditions and
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indications that an inventory problem existed in the rimary s
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THE WITHESS:
At that time, yes.
Considering all those E
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MR. FIDELL:
I think the record nay be unclear.
16
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y MR. Zewe, do you understand that the question is not
[y 17 what you would today infer from those inputs, but what you did
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You may have understood the
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question to mean as of 1979.
20 THE WITNESS:
I took it to mean as of the 3/28/79.
And 21,that after that had transpired we had gone back and increased 22 l high pressure injection because we had felt that we did have 23 ] an inventory problem at that time, yes.
24 lip BY MR. CRAIG:
()
25 <
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Q Could you describe for us your belief at that time as to t
f II ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
24 I h severity of the inventory problem in the primary system?
Y O
2 A
At the time I did not think that it was as se ve re as l
3 I I know now.
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4 MR. HOEFLING :
When you indicated "we" in your response g
5 to the previous question who did you mean?
You indicated that 0
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we went back and increased high pressure injection.
G 7
THE WITNESS:
Well, I had directed the control room E
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operators to increase and reinitiate high pressura injection.
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9 MR. HOEFLING:
So by "we" you mean yourself and the M,
i 10 control room operators?
6 h
11 THE WITHESS:
Yes.
?
Y 12 BY MR. CPAIG:
=
h 13 Q
What efforts were made to determine o r e s t i r,at e the E
z 5
I4 reactor coolant inventory in the primary system on the morning 15 of 3/2S/1979, the day of the accident?
t E
16 A
I did not make an attempt to calculate the inventory j
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17 at that particular time.
We were on high pressure injection and w=
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So I really did not make a n
20 quantitative analysis of the primary system inventory.
2I Q
At any time on the cdy of the accident was an attempt 22 made to determine or estimate the inventory of the primary system?
O 23 ;
A Yes, the re was.
In the early afternoon, it might have 24 been three or four p.m.
in the afternoon when we elected to try
()
25 ll to repressurize and start a reactor coolant pump.
We were keeping 9
i l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
25 l
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track of the amount of water that we were charging into the system, O
I 2
and in that way we had a fairly good idea of our primary system 3
inventory by the amount that we we re charging in.
O 4
(Short pause.)
l g
5-MR. FIDELL:
Could we go off the record a second.
8 i
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MR. CRAIG:
Off the record.
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MR. MC BRIDE:
Back on the record, 91 Mary 2.
)
2 Let me make one observation quickly, while we are on 3
the record, that we nay ask, particularly during the testimony of 4
Mr. Zewe, that we have a precise reference to prior testimony e
5 where a question builds on prior testimony, for the probably En h
6 obvious reason that Mr. Zewe has testified on a great number of R
7 occasions since the accident before a very large number of M
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investigative bodies, and it is not at all intended to be in a
o; 9
any way obstructionist, but simply because it is impossible for zo 10 him and us to recollect all of his prior testinony, without h
11 having it in front of us.
3 N
12 MR. 110SELEY :
And let me say in our thinking we did 5
f~,
y 13 exactly that.
He have the references here, but we felt we e
z 5
14 could get through quicker;if you don't recall it, say so, and we'l l
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15 be happy to show it to you.
But we didn' t intend to drag each a
y 16 piece out one at a time.
But we are prepared to do it, and we W.
d 17 don't feel, you know, bad if you ask for it.
5 M
18 MR. MC BRIDE:
Good.
You've been cooperative, you've P
h 19 provided everything to us when we asked for it, and we appreciate n
20 that.
21 BY MR. CRAIG:
I 22 l
Q Mr. Zewe, what did you believe was the status of the 23,
reactor coolant inventory and the primary system in the morning 24 before noon, on the day of the accident?
25 i A
Quantitative, I don't know.
Sonething less than full.
I ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
27 cr2-2 1
Q Do you have any knowledge of conversations with regard
()
2 to the inventory in the prinary system on the morning of the 20th?
3 A
No specifics, no.
("}
4 Q
Did you at any time on the day of the accident discuss v
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Primary system inventory with Mr. Miller?
M N
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A I don't recall the specifics, but, yes, the core cooling e
9
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one of the highest priorit..es we had, yes.
But I don't recall N
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saying how many gallons or whether or not the -- how full the ic g
10 system was, because we really didn't know at that point.
E 5
11 Q
If I can characterize your discussions -- and'please
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12 correct me if I'm wrong -- on the day of the accident, were you ed 13 just concerned with trying to get the loops full, to implement --
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S 14 to get some natural circulation going, to just put some water in 2
15 there?
Is that -- was it a broad kind of approach like that?
16 A
Early in the morning we were concerned about trying to j
+.
d 17 fill the loops and then to depressurize and eventually go to 5
E 19 BY MR. MOSELEY:
8e 20 0
I think his question, if I may, is trying to 21 differentiate between something that might be described as a 22 general concern for inventory and one that might be described as t')r 23 specific.
Were the discussions centered around the fact that 24 there was an inventory problen?
(~h We discussed at various times whether the core was
(,j 25 A
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
I
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28 ar2-3 I
being cooled and whether the core indeed was always -
remained-0 2
to_be covered, and we concluded that it was. -
3 BY MR. IiOEFLING:
f'T
(_)
4 Q.
Who are the "we" that you are referring to?
5 g
A operating and managing staff that was in the control 9
h 6
room at the time.
R R
7
-Q Did that include Mr. Miller?
E{
8 A
Mr. Miller and Mr. Ross.
d d
9.
O Mr. Rogers?
,2 Og 10 A
Ross.
E h
11 Q
I unders tand that.
Mr. Rogers?
M I
12 A
Mr. Rogers was there.
I am -- some tine _during the day, 5a 13 5
yes, he was there during sone of the conversations, but when~he
(
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14 arrived and that, I'm not sure of that.
h 15 BY MR. CRAIG:
x.'
16 Q
On the morning of the accident, were you aware of j
W g
17 the increase in the-count rate on the source and intermediate m
M 18 range monitors?
E I9 g
A I was.
M 20 BY MR. HOEPLING:
2I Q
Excuse me. Just one question here.
In your opinion, 22 should the -- should the plant condition relative to inventory, O
\\s 23 plant status relative to inventory, should information for the 24 n
plant status, inventory status -- should that information have bee 25 passed on to the NRC?
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
cr2-4 29 1
A Yes.
(~)
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2 BY MR. CRAIG:
3 0
on the morning of the day of the accident, did you
/')
(
4 believe that the reactor was going recritical after the scram?
e 5
A I did not believe that it was going recritical, but I En h
6 did not have a good answer for why the increase in count rate.
R 7
0 Did you at any time on the day of the accident discuss n[
8 this increase in count rate with Mr. Miller, Kunder, Flint, d
c; 9
Herbein or Chwastyk?
E g
10 A
Any time that day?
Uith Mr. Miller, Mr. Chwastyk.
Not E
h 11 Mr. Herbein.
And who else did you say?
I'm sorry.
a N
12 Q
Mr. Kunder.
c
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y 13 A
Mr. Kunder, yes.
%/
l 14 Q
And John Flint?
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15 A
Yes, I recall discussing that with Mr. Flint later in m
j 16 the day, yes.
M M
17 Q
Can you tell us the reaction to this increase in count wz M
18 rates for any of these people?
Mr. Miller, Kunder, Flint or P
19 Chwastyk?
20 A
I really can't recall" exactly what each of the gentlemen 21 expressed to me, other than some way the out-of-core detectors 22 were seeing an increase in flux, and I don't recall exactly 23 what each of them had to say about it at the time.
24 0
At any time on the day of the accident, were these O)
's.
25 conversations held with respect to voiding in the primary ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
30 cr2-5 1
system for core uncovery, which would give you the increase in 2
flux at the outer detectors?
3 A
Not that I can remenber, no.
,,)
(_
4 Q
In your opinion today, should this increase in count e
5 rate and potential for recriticality have been passed on to the b
h 6
NRC on the day of the accident?
R R
7 A
Yes.
M[
8 Q
To the best of your knowledge, what were the core e: tit dd 9
thermocouples used for during normal operation?
Y 10 A
Prior to the accident, we did not really use them.
5l 11 They were unavailable in Unit 1, and they were available in Unit 2 k
(
12 and to my knowledge, there were not any existing procedures that Ed 13 really had you use them at all.
gx(-)
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14 Q
To the best of your knowledge, who would have used 2
15 the core exit thermocouples?
E 16 MR. MC BRIDE:
On the day of the accident?
]
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17 MR. CRAIG: Previous to the day of the accident.
18 MR. MC BRIDE:
Hell, that question strikes me as a E
19 little odd, because he's just testified that they weren' t used.
R 20 MR. CRAIG:
No, he testified that he wasn' t aware 21 that they were used.
I'll be a little more specific.
22 MR. MC BRIDE:
Okay.
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23 BY nn. CRAIG:
24 Q
I interpreted the response that you didn't believe n\\ ')
25 that they were used, is that Metropolitan Edison personnel didn't ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
31 ar2-6 1
use the core exit thernocouples.
Is that correct?
O 2
A No, I really meant that I did not use them in the 3
course of r,ormal plant operations.
f~'r
(/
4 Q
Do you know if any Metropolitan Edison people would 5
have ised the core exit thermocouples in the course of normal 5
6 operation?
^e.
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A I do not know;the instrument and control group may have Ml 8
used them for something that I was unaware of, because they also O
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maintained the computer and also maintained the inputs to the b
10
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11 Q
11 ave you had any training at all on these thermocouples?
- s y
12 A
Prior to the accident?
'b 13 Q
Prior to the accident.
Yes, I'm sorry.
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A The training that I had on it was I knew that they l
14 2
15 existed, and I knew where they were located.
E 16 O
Do you know why these --
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d 17 MR. MC BRIDE:
One moment, if we could.
I'm not sure E
18 that he understood the full range of the last question with C
19 respect to his understanding of those numbers.
20 Cou d you please read back the question and the answer 21 that Mr. Zewe gave.
22 (Whereupon, the reporter read the record.)
(~)
'ud 23 MR. MC BRIDE:
Was there anything else you knew about 24 those core exit thermocouples as a result of your training?
("V) 25 (Witness and counsel conferring.)
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
32 cr2-7 1
Tile WITNESS :
I knew the range of the instrument on
)
2 the computer was approximately zero to 700 degrees.
3 MR. MC BRIDE:
Let me just add that I wasn't trying to
()
4 disrupt your question at all.
It was just that the question
=
5 could have been interpreted fairly narrowly or fairly broadly, 3n 6
and I had the impression that he may have interpreted it fairly R
R 7
narrowly, and I was relatively certain he knew more about those n[
8 numbers than his answer would have suggested, and I just wanted do 9
the record to be complete on that.
10 MR. MOSELEY:
Good.
E
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11 BY MR. CRAIG:
j 12 O
Do you know why these thermocouples are alarmed in the c
y 13 computer?
_]
l 14 A
To indicate higher than normal core temperatures 2
15 that we would expect to exist.
E 16 O
Did you have any training with respect to these j
i d
17 alarms with the actions that you were supposed to take, based Y
18 on these thermocouples alarm?
=
19 A
No.
The thermocouple alarms were only monitored on the R
20 plant computer.
They in themselves do not have a specific alarm 21 response to them.
22 '-
0 Were you aware of anybody monitoring the computer U'm e
23 printout of the core exit thermocouples on the day of the 24 accident?
C)\\
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I do not know.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
33 4:2-8 I
O Did you at any time on the day of the accident discuss 2
the core exit thernoccuple readings with Miller, Rogers, Flint, 3
lierbein or Chwastyk?
C) b 4
A As I recall, I did discuss with -- and I'm not sure 5
g who in that group that you mentioned that the conversation was a
{
6 with -- that the thermocouple readings on the computer indicated G
R 7
a question mark that they were of fscale high, which was consistent X
f, 8
with the readings that we had off of the bridge network on the d
y 9
ARPS RTD.
O g
10 (Pause.)
II BY MR. CRAIG:
is N
I2 Q
Is it your belief now that information concerning 5
13 the core exit thernocouples should have been passed on to the h
I4 NRC on the day of the accident?
{
15 A
Yes, I do.
m g'
16 Q
At any time on the day of the accident, did you monitor rA 17 or were you aware of anyone else monitoring the self-powered z
k 18 neutron detectors?
E 19 A
No.
20 Q
On the morning of the accident, were you aware of 2I the 10 R per hour of fsite dose projections in Goldsboro?
l 22 A
I uas aware of the projected dose rate, more indirectly 23 than directly.
24 Q
Would you elaborate on that?
25 A
The reading was not reported directly to me, but I was ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
34 cr2-9 1
aware of it.
<m()
2 Q
Did you overhear conversations concerning the projected 3
dose rate?
(}
4 A
That is correct.
e 5
BY MR. GAMBLE:
h h
6 Q
Whose conversations were they?
R 6
7 A
The persons that were involved in making the of fsite Ml 8
determination and the transmittal of that information.
Od 9
Q Do you know who they were?
iC 10 A
That day the only people that I can remember was OdteA 11 Richard Ocbich4 and Mr. Miller again, their conversations, along y
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12 with Mr. Ross.
S 13 BY MR. CRAIG:
/'
()'
h 14 Q
Did you at any time the norning of the accident, 2
15 enter into any conversations concerning the 10 R per hour s
y 16 projected dose rate at Goldsboro?
M d
17 A
I'm not sure if I understand what is meant by " enter E
18 into" it.
m 19 Q
You just testified that you became aware of it in-R 20 directly, and that you overheard conversations.
Here you then --
21 and I gathere'd from your testimony that these were -- you were not 22 a direct participant in those conversations, since it was
)
x/
23 indirect.
24 Did you later -- were you involved in a conversation
()
25 or a participant -- were you in the shif t sup's office when this q
i ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
35 cr-10 I
was discussed?
-m 2
A No.
The conversation that I had overheard was outside 3
of the control -- outside of the shift supervisor's office, but
()
4 in the rear of the control room, and very shortly thereafter, it e
5 was concluded, at least in ny own mind, that the reading was not 39 6
true, that it was an erroneously high reading, and from that G
7 point on I treated it very lightly.
M[
8 Q
When you say in a short period of time, can you give --
G d
9 can you relate that '.o an event that happened?
You say it was i
Og 10 before an event, after an event?
E
{
11 A
No, not really.
The only surrounding circunstances a
p 12 in an event that I can recall is that we had dispatched a 5
13 helicopter to the area of the suspected high reading, and the h
14 report was that the reading'there was very low, and also we had 2
15 readings fron onsite teans in that direction.
They were also very E
16 low.
And I an uncertain of the tineframe between hearing 10 R g
e d
17 and hearing these other two facts which thocc, plus, as I recall, w
Qubil 18 Mr. Ocbichi was saying that they can' t be real readings, based
=b[
19 on those factors is what helped me reach the conclusion that M
20 they were erroneous readings.
21 BY MR. GAMBLE:
22 Q
But there was a period of time in between when you f,,Ji 23 overheard the projected reading and then the actual readings, 24 you were awa e of the projected readings some tine before 25 hearing the actual readings?
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
cr2-ll 36 i
MR. MC BRIDE:
There's a problem with that question, in 2
that although he characterized the readings from the helicopters 3
having been obtained some brief period of time after he became 4
aware of the calculated reading in Gold @oro, I don't believe e
5 that he has testified today that his knowledge of the onsite h
6 readings was obtained subsequent to the calculated dose rate R
6 7
for Goldsboro, and your question assumed that he had obtained K
g 8
both readings subsequent to his knowledge of the calculated dose d
ci 9
rate in Goldsboro.
Ng 10 MR. GAMBLE:
Let me ask, is that not the case?
Did iGj 11 you learn about the projected dose ahead of learning of any of is j
12 the actual readings, either onsite, helicopter, at Goldsboro, E
13 any of the actual readings?
h 14 THE WITNESS:
I really can't say either way, with any 2
15 real subs tance, because I really don't remember which was first or E
16 second or third.
I really don't remember the order of the j
us p
17 things, but those things all contributed together to draw my E
18 conclusion.
A
{
19 BY MR. GAMBLE:
Odial 20 Q
Uhat was the substance of the Dchichl-Miller conversa-21 tion that you heard?
Was one of them informing the other of 22 these readings, or were they discussing it both with prior O
23 knowledge of the readings?
24 A
That I don't know, because I really heard it in O
V-25 between, if you will, their conversations.
So I don't really ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
37 ar2-12 1
know what had transpired before that, or what.
I really can't d
2 say, and I really don't remember their exact exchange or how it 3
was, other than that the high reading naturally alarmed me to
(~)
(_/
4 begin with, and then once all the other factors were put together,
=
5 concluded that it was a very erroneously high reading.
Then I 29 6
dismissed it.
7 Q
Did they discuss any specific actions that they had nj 8
taken or were planning to take, depending upon when this Od 9
conversation occurred?
Any specific actions that they had taken i
C 10 or were planning to take as a result of the calculated reading, E
f 11 to determine its validity or actions in response to the k
j 12 projected reading?
c 13 A
There again, I don't remember, because I don't have
{}
l 14 the right timeframe for when I heard it, so I really don't 2
15 know.
E 16 Mr. Miller was in charge of the entire emergency
]e d
17 operation, and I was directed to conduct the operations on E
18 the plant itself, so I, at that point, I was not totally E[
19 knowledgeable of all the ideas that he was transpiring or trying M
20 to accomplish.
21 Q
Did you say Mr. Ross was present during the conversa-a 22 tion between those two?
Is that what you said?
23 A
He was present in the control room.
I cannot say 24 with all certainty that he was right there.
I really don't know i
V 25 that.
I j us t don ' t know.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
38 cr2-13 1
BY MR. CRAIG:
,m i
\\
2
'/
Q Is it your belief today that information concerning 3
the projected dose rate of 10 R per hour should have been
('~j) reported to the NRC on the day of the accident?
4 m
5 g
(Witness and counsel conferring.)
6 THE WITNESS:
I would like to qualify my answer and N
8 7
say that if I learned of the projected readings first in the N
E 8
10 R per hour range, and then there was sone time lag between o
c 9
j learning any of the other readings, then I would say that I would c
H 10 report it.
But if before I had a chance to report it, or if I
=
E 11 j
had readings, measured readings, by on the onsite or offsite d
12 E
personnel that indicated that the calculated reading was cd 13
('N erroneous, then I would not report it.
k-E 14 BY MR. CRAIG:
e 9
15 g
Q Thank you.
T 16 Prior to the day of the accident, 3/28/79, what train-y 17 ing had you received with regard to the logic associated with we 18
=
the reactor building pressure?
19 l
MR. MC BRIDE:
The logic associated with the pressure, 20 or the logic associated with the nonitoring or measuring l
devices that determine the pressure?
22 MR. CRAIG:
The monitoring and neasuring devices
,s
(_)
23 and instrumentation associated with the SFAS systen concerning 24 reactor building pressure.
A 25 THE WITNESS:
I think that I had adequate training ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
39 cr2-14 I
and knowledge of the reactor building pressure instrunents, O
2 where they were located, and how they functioned, and what logic 3
they had, for instance, in starting the reactor building spray rmb 4
pumps themselves.
5 I'm not sure what you're really asking there.
h 6
BY MR. CRAIG:
R R
7 0
That's part of what I'm asking.
7.
[
8 Now, if you would, would you go into the other d
d 9
' indications or functions which come off of this?
There are some
.ze h
10 14, I believe, other indications or functions that come off
=
II the reactor building pressure.
is N
I2 A
Well, the reactor building high pressure initiates E"
g 13 the reactor building containnent isolation and reactor trip, b
I4 and starting the reactor building spray pumps on the logic.
$i g
15 And it also is displayed in the control room on recorders, and z
j 16 has various alarms.
as h
I7 I'm not sure how much of that you want.
m 18 0
That's fine.
And you were aware of that prior to the A
19 g
day of the accident?
20 A
Certainly.
Yes.
2I Q
And did you receive this knowledge as part of your 22 q
license and training to operate?
V 23 A
Yes, I did.
24 Q
Prior to the day of the accident, had you read the 25 sections of the-FSAR applicable to this instrumentation?
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
40 or2-15 1
A I would have to say 'I probably have at one time or rm
\\ -)
2 another, but I don' t recall exactly when.
3 O
Do you recall if you were required to read the sections
()
4 of the FSAR as part of your training?
e 5
A To read the instrumentation section of the PSAR?
5 h
6 Q
That section of the FSAR which is concerned with R
R 7
engineered safeguard features.
M[
8 A
oh, yes.
Od 9
Q And that area describes some of the logic associated
,zo G
10 with the containnent spray pumps?
E=q 11 A
Yes.
W 12 Q
And you were required to read that as part of your 5
13 training?
h 14 A
Yes.
g 15 Q
our review of your testinony to Inspection &
x 16 Enforcement, 7/2/79, page 41, indicates that you were aware of g
d d
17 the pressure spike of approxinately 30 pounds which had 5
{
18 occurred at about 1:15 on the day of the accident.
E 19 MR. MC BRIDE:
1:50.
R 20 BY MR. CRAIG:
21 Q
Excuse me.
22 You have also testified in that same intervieu, page 7,_(>
23 38, that you initially believed the spike was due to a false 24 electrical signal, but -- on page 34 -- after discussing the
/
k 25 two-out-of-three logic required to start the containment spray ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
41 cr2-16 I
pump, you wondered if the real reason was a hydrogen explosion.
Q 2
Did you, on the day of the accident, believe the pressura 3
spike was real?
rm 4
A Could I see that testimony there, please?
Q 5
Q Sure.
l 6
A Where it says that I concluded by the logic that we R
b 7
had a hydrogen explosion?
%[
8 0
No, I didn' t s ay that.
O ci 9
3 1.n sorry.
That's what I thought you said.
- r.o g
10 MR. 11C DRIDE:
It sounded to me as if you said that, 3m II too.
I think we were with you until that point, though you can is I2
{$
tell me if I'n wrong.
S 13 5
MR. CRAIG:
It's the big one in the middle, and we're n
, U 14 referring to the Inspection & Enforcement interview, tape No. 60 h
15 and 61, fron 7/2/79, nage 34.
x j
16 (Witness examining document.)
as h
I7 fir. MC BRIDE:
I'n not sure there's a question u
{
18 pending, but perhaps the best way to nove along would be to have F
19 him characterize what he meant by this answer, and we'll see 20 whether that comports with the question as you posed it.
2I f1R. CRAIG:
We can do it either way.
22 MR. MC BRIDE:
Whatever you like.
U 23 BY MR. CRAIG:
24 O
Let me ask a series of questions.
I think it will
/m()
25 clarify it.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
42 cr2-17 I
Did you, on the day of the accident, believe the V
2 pressure apike was real?
3 A
I did not.
r 4
Q At all, at any time on the day of the accident?
5 g
A I did not.
N 6
Q Even after you discussed the logic associated with R
b 7
this, which is required to start containment spray pumps?
K[
8 A
I do not recall discussing the logic for the spray d
9 switches until the next day, in relationship to the electrical
.zo h
10 fault could not have caused them to actuate as they did.
=l II O
When you did discuss the pressure switches in the s
N I2 two-out-of-three, with whon did you discuss this?
25 13 MR. MC BRIDE:
The next day, you mean?
c
(
l 14 BY MR. CRAIG:
15 Q
When you discussed it, which was the next day.
x y
16 A
That was on Thursday, and an electrical engineer, e
h I7 Richard Benzel, had been assigned to look at the possibility of e
b I8 how an electrical spike could have caused the indications that E
19 we had seen, and in discussing with him, I realized that it 20 was not possible to do that.
21 Q
Did you discuss the possibility of a hydrogen explosion 22 with Mr. Benb l?
7(/
23 A
I really don't know.
On the 29th, there was discus-24 sion about the hydrogen explosion, and I recall one such discus-t^
25 sion with Mr. Marshall about either u hydrogen explosion or ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
ar2-18 43 i
some chemical reaction, and Mr. Begkel may have been involved 2
in that, but I really don't remember.
3 Q
Did you discuss it with anybody else?
O) 4 A
I really don't remember.
Everyone on the 29th, I
(_
5 g
believe, had bits and pieces of what was proposed the spike was e
6 the previous day, and hydrogen was foremost on their mind at G
7 that particular time.
So I'm not sure if I had any specific Al 8
conversations, or with who that day.
But everyone, I feel in my d
c; 9
own mind, knew some aspect of it.
zoy 10 Q
And just one brief clarification, the word " hydrogen,"
B h
11 when was the first tino you remember that word being used in a
j 12 association uith or conne i to the pressure spike which S
13 g-)
5 occurred on the day of the accident?
'N_/
h I4 A
Some time on the 29th, in the early morning hours, I
$l 15 guess.
Before noon.
x 16 3
Q Before I asked that series of questions, you. indicated w
d 17 you wanted to explain what you meant by that passage in the U
{
18 7/2/79 IE investigation.
E 19 A
I think that your subsequent questions covered just 20 what I wanted to bring out.
I just wanted to clarify that at 21 no time on the 28th did I conclude from the logic for the spray 22 switches that we had a hydrogen explosion in the RB at that 23 point.
24 BY MR. MOSELEY:
25 Q
Let me ask one further clarifying question:
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
~
44 cr2-19 1
Did you conclude on March 28th that the pressure spike (7,)
2 was real?
3 A
I did not.
N_
4 Q
For whatever reason?
5 A
I thought that it was a false indication.
I could g
9{
6 not conceive how the building of over 2 nillion cubic feet R
R 7
could pressurize that rapidly, and then be depressurized that 8
8 rapidly.
I had not conceived of that before.
Oc 9
BY MR. CRAIG:
- /oy 10 0
on the day of the accident, did you -- are you aware
${
11 of anyone else who nonitored any parameters such as containment M
j:
12 temperatures, reactor coolant pump, air inlet temperatures, c
13 steam generator pressures, durino or following the spike, x
5 14 pressure spike of 28 pounds?
E
{
15 A
We had various operators nonitoring all portions of a
g' 16 the plant, but I was not specifically aware that ue were monitor-e d
17 ing them at particular times or noted any changes at that E
5 18 particular time because of the spike.
E 19 g
0 And specifically with respect to containment building n
20 temperatures?
21 A
No.
22 O
Did you or anyone else, to your knowledge, monitor ws 23 the alarm printer during or after the spike on the day of the 24 accident?
Gk/'
25 A
I don't remember if anyone was monitoring the alarn ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
P5 cr2-20 1
printer.
We should have been, because the alarm printer was now
(')
2 printing out in real time, so we should have been doing it just v
3 as a normal evolution if any one person was assigned that, rm 4
even though there may have been.
But I just don't remember.
I
(.
5 know that we were aware of the alarm printer and we would use it e
6 as we would normally.
R R
7 Q
Did you at any time on the day of the accident have M[
8 a concern for the potential of continuing core damage?
Od 9
A No, I did not.
ic h
10 0
Concerning the containnent pressure spike, is it your E
g 11 belief today that this infornation should have been passed to k
j 12 the NRC on the day of the accident?
E y
13 MR. MC BRIDE:
Which information?
['s
\\/
h 14 MR. CRAIG:
Concerning the pressure spike that had 2
15 occurred.
5 y
16 MR. MC BRIDE:
That the instrument itself had spiked e
p 17 high?
E 18 MR. CRAIG:
Whatever his knowledge was.
And you said 5
"g 19 you didn't believe it was real, but you were aware of the n
20 instrumentation.
21 BY MR. CRAIG:
22 Q
Should that have been reported to the NRC?
r
(_\\)
23 A
Yes, it should have, even though, if I may just 24 clarify that somewhat, there were NRC personnel present, onsite, 25 ! and even in the Unit 2 control room.
()
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
ar2-21 46 I
BY MR. IIOEPLING:
{i 2
Q Bill, do you recall an instruction being given at the 3
site not to start any electrical equipment in the containm'ent
(~%
(_)
4 because of the potential that would have for srark?
5 g
A Yes, I do.
N 6
Q De you recall when that instruction was given?
R R
7 A
Some time on the 29th.
I'm not sure of the exact n[
8 timeframe.
4n 9
z, Q
Who gave the instruction?
Oy 10 A
I am not sure who relayed it to me, or if Mr. Miller z
E 4
Il told me directly, but it ultimately, I believe, came f rom Mr.
's y
12 Miller.
E" I3
{}
g Q
You can't indicate who specifically passed the informa-I4 tion to you?
{
15 A
No, I -- I really don't remember if it was Mr. !! iller z
y 16 himself, or if it was another menber of the operating or v.
h 17 management staff, but I had asked who directed that, and I was z
18 told that it came from tir. Miller.
E 39 Q
Why do you think that instruction originated on the g
20 29 th?
21 A
I think at that point there was enough evidence 22 and enough conclusions at that point that we had had a hydrogen 23 burn in the building, and that we wanted to preclude any further 24 hydrogen burns by having an electrical spark ignite it again.
O 25 Q
That's not quite my question.
Why do you think the ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
I
47 Dr2-22 1
instruction originated on the 29th, as opposed to, say, the 28th?
2 Is there some reason as to why you feel it happened, that 3
the instruction originated on the 29th?
4 A
Well, to my knowledge, I do not believe that we knew 5
that we had a hydrogen problem in the building, so that there l
6 would be no need for us to not cycle any electrical components R
R 7
in the building, other than those that could possibly be under-N[
8 water and could short out or something of that nature.
O ci 9
Q Brian Mehler has testified that he spoke with you ze g
10 concerning the time at which this instruction originated, and E
11 he had a conversation with you about that subject some time in is N
12 October of '79.
E 13 Do you recall such a conversation?
m 14 A
Yes, I do.
15 0
Could you tell us the substance of it?
y 16 First of all, did Brian -- how did the conversation w
d 17 begin?
E lE 18 A
As I recall, Mr. Mehler was testifying before the Hart C
19 g
Commission, I believe, at that point, and that he had made a n
20 statement to where he thought that that order had originated on 21 the 28th, and he had mentioned that to me, and I had voiced 22 my own opinion on my own recollection that it was not until the m
23 29th, that it couldn' t have been, because we didn't know or 24 suspect that we had liberated hydrogen buildup inside the (3
V 25 containment building.
So there would be no reason to have that ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
cr2-23 48 I
order issued about the energizing of electrical equipment inside 2
the building, other than for the motors and whatnot that may be 3
underwater due to the water level inside containment.
And as I 4
remember, he concluded and said, yes, you're right, that he had e
5 felt that based on our conversation, that it had to have been on 6
6 the 29th, but he said he remembers it on the 28th, and I said, R
7 "Well, you can only say what you remember.
And if that's what A
l 8
you remember, that's what you would say. "
0 bu A C
9 And I believe then after that, he went back to the
,zoy 10 committee that he had talked to, and I'm not sure if he was E
11 successful in changing or qualifying what he had said earlier or is N
I2 not.
5 a
13 0
Was there anyone else present during this conversa-(~')s 5
=
l 14 tion?
{
15 A
I really don't -- I don't remember at that point.
m j
16 C
Do you recall any other conversations in that time-as d
17 frame, October ' 79, between Brian and other individuals at the 5
M 18 plant about this subject?
E 19 A
I would like to say yes, that there were, but I g
e 20 really can't call with that much certainty that, yes, there was.
21 So I would have to say no, because I really can't recall the 22 specifics involved or who they were with, for sure.
23 <
BY MR. CRAIG:
24 Q
What tine did you leave the site on the day of the
(
)
25 accident, approximately?
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
cr2-24 49
.)
A 6:00 p.m.
(')
2 0
In the evening?
3 A
6:00 p.m.
Right.
(~s, 4
Q And if the instruction not'to start electrical equipment U
e 5
had been given on the 28th, you would have been in the control 2a N
6 room area to hear it; is that correct?
e 7
A If it was given up until that point before I left, yes, 8
I should have been aware of it, if it had been given.
- Yes, d
d 9
BY MR. GAMDLE:
i h
10 0
When you heard the instruction, did you have the B
E 11 impression that the order had just been given, or did you have-
<a d
12 any feel for time as to how far in advance the order had been Ecd 13 given?
[l 5
b/
E 14 A
I really don't know.
I don't recall reacting either sx 2
15 way, that it uas a long time or it had just happened.
I don't E
16 recall that.
a M
d 17 BY MR. CRAIG:
E M
18 Q
on the day of the accident, did you make or were you
=
5 aware of any other Metropolitan Edison-GPU employee who made 19 R
f 20 calculations as to the extent of fuel failure, based on data l
I 21 from the containment done monitor or other instruments?
22 A
No, I do not.
/~'
, (_)T 23 0
would you describe, please, Metropolitan Edison's 24 policy with regard to reporting information to the NRC?
This is
(,)
25 up to and including the day of the accident.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
50 or2-25 1
A We would follow the reporting guidelines that we had 2
for prompt and seven-day notification and 30-day notification,
-3 and so forth.
t' 4
BY MR. IlOEPLING:
e 5
Q Where were these guidelines set out?
Where were they?
E h
6 A
The guidelines are set out in our admin. procedures, 7
in tech specs.
It says in Section 6, it has what your prompt A[
8 notifications are.
Od 9
Q And this is supplemented by administrative procedures?
10 A
Yes.
E I
11 DY MR. CRAIG:
j 12 0
Who is responsible for the reporting of this inforna-E rx y
13 tion the day of the accident, onsite, prior to about 7:03, or
(_)
m l
14 whenever Gary Miller arrived?
2 15 A
I was in charge of the facility at that point in W.'
16 time.
j e
g 17 Q
It's your understanding you would have been responsible?
5 M
18 A
Yes.
h 19 Q
And subsequent to that, for the rest of the day?
f 20 A
Mr. Miller would have, since he was the emergency 21 director.
22 Q
Can you give us a description of your understanding 23 of what information was to be reported, based en the reporting 24 requirements as set forth in the new procedures?
A 25 A
Up until the declaration of the site emergency, which ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
cr2-26 51 j
I made somewhere around 10 or five to 7:00 in the morning, I r-)x didn't feel up to that point that we needed to nake any NkC
(
2 3
n ti fications at that point.
(
4 Q
Would you describe the criteria that --
e 5
BY MR. HOEFLING:
1 6
0 Excuse me.
What notifications did you feel were 7
necessary af ter that point?
[
8 A
After the --
d d
9 Q
After you declared the site energency.
~i 10 A
I felt that the phone call and the notification to the e
E 5
ij Region I of the NRC was to be initiated, and infornation passed d
12 to the NRC there at Region I.
3 0
Uhat types of information?
13
~ (~')
o 8
\\
E 14 A
Pertinent plant information.
'^'
W 2
15 Q
What does that nean to you, given the circuns tances E
16 that you had?
M A
Just the conditions of the reactor and the conditions g
17 5
M 18 of the plant, temperatures, pressures, pressuriner level, and b
19 any releases of radiation levels, any damage, any contamination, R
20 anything that would be useful information to them.
21 What I would be looking for is to transmit.information 22 to them, so that they could act and give me some recommendations fx(-)
maybe in return, to act as a tool to help ne.
23 24 0
Who did you direct to make the notification to the NRC?
r~x
(,)
25 MR. FIDELL:
Could you speak up, please?
I can't hear ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
52 cr2-27 I
you.
p 2
BY !!R. IlOCFLING:
3 0
Who did you direct to make the notification to the NRC
)
4 af ter you declared the site emergency?
5 MR. FIDELL:
I'm sorry, I cannot -- maybe it's the h
0 air conditioner.
E b
7 BY MR. IlOCFLING:
A k
0 Q
Who did you direct to make the notification to the NRC 0d I
af ter you declared the site emergency?
h 10 A
At that point in time we had a lot of the emergency E
E II management people already present in the control room, and I is f
I2 declared the site emergency, and George Kunder, our Unit 2 e
p g
13 superintendent for technical support, all right, he agreed that I4 I should declare it, and he went back into the shif t supervisor's 15 of fice and then he was initiating the calls himself, and with x
i[
I6 the people that we had available.
e h
I7 0
Did you give him any instructions other than to make u
I0 the notification?
II 8
A Well, I really didn't say in those words, make the c:
O notifications.
Once I declared the site emergency, per the THI II emergency plan, all right, the people who have the duty for the 22 duty section of which George is a prime member, all right, would 23 then initiate the plan, and since he was already there, he knew 24 the situation that we had, as well as I did, and he went and he 25 had already been involved in previous phone call conversations ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
cr2-28 53 1
-- all right -- with other staff members.
2 Now he went, and hin and the people that were with 3
George, started to nahe the calls, more of an automatic type t-(_)/
4 thing.
e 5
O So you didn't give any specific instructions as to what E
6 was to be passed on to the NRC?
G 2
7 A
No, I did not.
I just made sure that they were taking s[
8 action to make the notifications, and I knew that he knew 0c 9
exactly what our plant situation was, so I didn't feel that
~i Og 10 there was a need to tell him, to say, " Call this and say this 5
{
11 and this and that."
W j'
12 MR. FIDELL:
Is it clear from the testimony that E
13 the NRC was or was not personally represented at the station?
l 14 When does the first NRC person show up?
E 2
15 THE WITNESS:
I don't remenber seeing any menber of 5
16 the NRC until, I would think, about 9:00, 10:00 o' clock area.
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17 MR. PIDELL:
llow many hours after was this ?
5 k
18 THE WITNESS:
I declared the site emergency somewhere k
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20 10:00 o'cloch, in that neighborhood, and I'm not certain of 21 when they arrived, either.
It was toward late morning.
22 BY MR. CRAIG:
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Just a few nore questic.ts.
Did the company policy 24 tend to stress events in their best light, when they were to be O/
25 reported?
By that, I mean try to take out -- improve it and ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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D you understand my question?
2 A
I think I understand your connotation there.
But I feel 3
that the management was always trying to report even previous (3
events all right in a correct and responsible manner.
All right.
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but just trying to do an honest job, and trying to present what 7
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Did the company policy prior to the day of the accident is stress the volunteering of information or reporting, or was the ti 12 Z-r p rt to be kept to some discrete form or volune?
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did they restrict that to a certain amount?
No.
20 If the type of repart had warranted a larger volume, -I gj feel that they would have reported it with the record material 22 nb that they felt warranted that particular material.
23 BY f!R. MOSELEY:
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I think the question is more related to, rather than 25 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
55 cr2-30 1
volume, more related to the volunteering of information, as 2
opposed to responding to questions, and it relates more to 3
verbal reporting than to written reporting.
4 Does that help you in responding to the question?
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I think you've answered the question.
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BY MR. CRAIG:
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2 Q
Since the TMI incident, have you been influenced either jdirectly or indirectly to change any of your recollections?
3 I
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Would you repeat that again, please?
Q Since the accident, have you felt influenced either 3
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directly or indirectly to change any of your recollections?
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but certainly on what I remember how it was.
Good or bad, that is I
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The NRC investigation of the accident identified some N
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page I-446.
The reason for the ndssing segments has not been 1
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These segments include time block from the alarm
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Is your recollection the same with respect O
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A I am not sure what data he is referring to.
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I have never sheet, no.
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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I heard, that one of the irstrument people that was involved in it O
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I7 MR. McBRIDE:
If I could, could we have one moment as a:
18 there may be one clarifying question that may help us.
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(The witness conf erred with counsel.)
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20 MR. McBRIDE:
If I may ask one question, I think that 23 it will be helpful to you, and it may clarify the earlier testimony.
I 22 Mr. Zewe, in the earlier questioning, the phrase 23 j'Think Tenk" was used.
The question is whether, to your knowledge, 1
24 Ilit any time on March 28, 1979, the date of the accident, any
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of the so-called think tank?
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What do you base your conclusions that
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Every time you looked, or was it inter-F E
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mittent?
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I really don't have a feel for it.
My 21
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But my contact with them was
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The only time that I really conversed with the 4
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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We are speaking of NRC representives in 3
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Were they continuously present in that office, could you 5
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h II BY MR. MOSELEY:
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Would you characterize the participation of the NRC 5
13 people in the think tank activities as active or passive?
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14 Were there votes taken, or opinions asked of everyone,
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21 Q
How would you describe the presence in the shift 22 supervisor's office, as one of observing or participating in the
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24 A
It was my observation that it was more observing.
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k-25 MR. MOSELEY: Thank you.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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I MR. McBRIDE:
If I may, let me ask one or two follow-up 2
on some questions here which I think may be enlightening to you.
3 Mr. Zewe, is it a fact that you observed the contain-k 4
ment building pressure instrument actually, record the pressure 5
y spike?
?
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That was approximately 1:50 p.m. on the r) c; 9
day of the accident?
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That is correct.
II MR. McBRIDE:
Do you recall if there was an NRC is j
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How close to you approximately?
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Because he was too close to you for you c:
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2I TIIE WITNESS:
Yes.
22
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MR. McBRIDE:
Do you know who that NRC inspector was?
23 TIIE WITNESS:
I do not know.
24 MR. FIDELL:
Would you be able to recognize him if you
?
25 ' saw him again?
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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I THE WITNESS:
No, I would not.
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MR..CRAIG: He would like to thank you for coming here 3
to talk to us today.
You will get a copy of your testimony, when 4
we get it back, and have concluded the interviews that we are 5
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conducting in the present session.
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(Uhereupon, at 3:15 p.m., the interview was concluded.)
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5-Date of Proceedings:
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6 Docket Number:
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7 Place of Proceedings:
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' RESIDENT PARTNERS WASHINGTON OFFICE
- RESIDENT PARTNERS LONDON OFFICE
. ADMITTED TO T E DiSTa:CT Cr COLUMBIA =Aa
-October 6, 1980 Mr. Norman C. Mosely Director Division of Reactor Operations (7
Inspection
(
Of fice of Inspection and Enforcement
- y)
U.S. Nuclear. Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Re:
NRC Investigation of March 28, 1979 Accident at Three Mile Island - Unit 2
Dear Mr. Mosely:
In response to your letter of September 15, 1980, the following are transcript corrections to the September 4, 1980 testimony of Mr. William Zewe:
PAGE LINE WORD (S) THAT NOW APPEAR CHANGE TO t/l Add appearance of "Mr. William Fisher, Region III, Office of Inspection and b,
Enforcement, Nuclear Regulatory Commission" w
d5 18 Urbine Change "Urbine" to "Herbein" p
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PAGE LINE WORD (S) THAT NOW-APPEAR CHANGE TO 5
19 Urbine Change "Urbine" t'o "Herbein" O
'd 13 Brian
' Change " Brian" to
" Bryan" j
40 10' Urbine Change "Urbine" to "Herbein"
^ 0 19 now Delete "now"-
0 22 MOV Change "MOV" to "EMOV" d'1 10 MOV Change "MOV" to "EMOV" VII 18 from Change "from" to "for"
'I1
.25 Brian Change " Brian" to
,j
- " Bryan" 12 14 Urbine
-Change "Urbine" to "Herbein" 42 18 Urbine Change "Urbine" to
,/
"Herbein" 22 4
Alprin Change "Alprin" to
/
"Eilperin"
- 34 11
.Debiehl Change "Debiehl" to "Dubiel" J5 17 which those Delete "which those"
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45 18 Debiehl Change "Debiehl" to i
"Dubiel" vb 6 20
'Debiehl
- Change "Debiehl" to "Dubiel"
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/
"Bensel" i
'43 1
2 Be nzel :
Change "Benzel" to j
"Bensel" 8
21 sheet Change " sheet" to "seen it" i
In addition to the statutory witness fee of $30 per day to which he is entitled, Mr. Zewe is entitled.
to $2.40 for a total of 12 miles to and from the inter-view and hereby requests a total of $32.40 for his appearance.
Very truly yours, cc:
Mr. William Zewe Smith B. Gephart, Esq.
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