ML19343D338
| ML19343D338 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 01/13/1981 |
| From: | Neely D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8105040305 | |
| Download: ML19343D338 (82) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA p
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
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4 In the matter of:
5 METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY 0
3 6
(Three Mile Island, Unit 2)
R 7
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x s
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Fifth Floor Hearing Room, q
9 4350 East-West Towers, Bethesda, Maryland.
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Tuesday, January 13, 1981.
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INTERVIEW OF DONALD R. NEELY was commenced at c,
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3 8:25 a.m.,
pursuant to agreement.
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APPEARANCES:
g 14 NORMAN MOSELEY, Office of Inspection & Enforcement, 15
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
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16 JOHN CRAIG, Office of Inspection & Enforcement, d
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
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5 VICTOR STELLO, Director, Office of Inspection 18 g
& Enforcement, Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
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"g 19k ROGER FORTUNA, Esq., Office of Inspection &
f Audit, Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
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k ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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(8:25 a.m.)
3 Whereupon, O
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4 DONALD R. NEELY e
5 was called as a witn'ess by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission U
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61 Staff in the above-entitled matter and, having been first G
7 duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
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EXAMINATION d
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B'Y MR. CRAIG:
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would you state your full name for the record?
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Donald R. Neely.
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12 BY MR. MOSELEY:
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Don, we've asked you to come this morning to ask
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exchange of information on Three Mile Island on the day of the
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17 l Tie have, as you recall, interviewed you one time 1
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and that interview.
But we do have some additional questions n
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I 2I First, what I would like to start with is the
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early morning of March 28th when you were still in the 1
23 Regional Office.
Would you tell us how you first learned
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Okay.
As I stated before, I was in Mr. Crocker's J
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1 office briefing discussilig our plans for a trip to Oyster 1
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He was the Acting Section Chief at that time for the i
3 Radiation Support Section.
Mr. Smith came into the office
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5 team to go to Three liile Island.
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Who else --
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A That's the first time I became aware of it.
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This was about what time?
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It was right around 8 :00 o ' clock.
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Okay, who else was in the --
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8:00 or 8:15, somewhere in there.
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Okay, was anyone in the office besides you and
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No, I don't think so.
E 15 Q
What all did Crocher tell you?
Did he give you any 5
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Or did he just say that you
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No, he just told me to put together a team, a
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response team.
He didn' t have any information either.
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Okay.
And after he told you this, what did you do?
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A I then started selecting pecple to be on the team,
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and started making travel arrangements, getting the emergency 22 23 equipmen: tog ether.
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Okay, and you then selected the other HP members 25 jj of the team?
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A Yes.
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And those people were?
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A Mr. Plumlee and Mr. Nimits.
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And you contacted each of them and told them they 1
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had been selected?
Or did someone else?
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A Iem not sure whether I contacted them, or George R
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It came out that I selected Plumlee because l
8l he used to be a TMI inspector; and Nimitz, to utilize him as --
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they recognized that he was junior -- to use him for analysis, o
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Af ter your discussion with Crocker, who did you 5c I
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I can' t remember -- It was -- We had about i
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30 minutes there, and it was just -- I talked to Donaldson h:j 15 about getting the emergency kits out of the emergency storage
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I went into George Smith's office; there was a s
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conf erence call going on there.
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I was in there for some short time.
There were
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That's all I can remember of the people
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Durin. the period of time that you were in George (O
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Smith's office, you say the speaker telephone was in use then, 7
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Yes, there was -- And at that time, I didn't know 2
who was on the other end.
But Greg Yuhas was up near the 3i speaker box and carrying most of the conversation.
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Did you participate in, or listen to the conversation g
5 during the tine you were ~there?
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'A Just briefly, and it had to do mainly -- if I can E
7 remember -- was the readings in the containment on the dome sj 8
monitor.
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Do you recall what that reading was?
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At that time, I think it was -- they were reporting E
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Okay.
And did you meet with George Smith, or have
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a discussion with George Smith at any time prior to leaving i
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A I can't remember what -- how we exchanged informa-
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Things were very informal, and it wasn't really well a
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We were just -- everybody -- we were just trying 5
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tion, like I say, outside his office.
5 20 Q
Specifically --
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A I can't remember.
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Specifically do you recall an informal meeting, a l
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Do you recall such a conversation?
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I don' t recall it, but there could have been one.
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You don' t recall, either way?
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A I could have been involved in one, but I -- I'd 3
say I don't kr.nw.
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Could you summarize for us the information that e
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A Essentially, about the containment dome monitor 3j 8
reading is about all I can remember of the information.
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From the time we lef t the z'cg 10 office until the time we got to the site, we did not have any z=
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Do you know -- You say you knew of the containment aj 14 '
dome monitor reading.
Could you tell us any other specific
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information you had about the accident?
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That's all.
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Do you recall a discussion about the containment t
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A I don' t remember any.
If I did, it may have not g
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4 21 Q
Do you recall a discussion about hydrogen prior to
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Hydrogen in the containment?
23 A
I don ' t remember.
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D y u believe that there was information i
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Do you believe there was information available to R
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before you left?
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Q Do you know of any reason why this information E_
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I don' t know.
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but it's been so long, we can ' t -- you know, it's been so x=
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17; BY MR. STELLO:
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Excuse me.
I want to make sure dhat I understand.
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There -- Now this is af ter the inves tigation U
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25 people once we got to the site, you know, so I don' t really l
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4 MR. MOSELEY:
Do you have that list that we were I
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using yesterday?
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6 BY MR. CRAIG:
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Q Don, I'll read down a few things and you can 8
indicate "yes" or "no" whether you knew about them, if you d
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can remember, or whether or not you remember.
Y 10 Were you aware that; the unit had tripped from E
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Oh, now I was speaking to more radiological.
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Q Did you know that they believed there was a primary 6
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I can' t remember the exact details, but there had s
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18 containment.
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Did you know that daey had a saf ety injection?
1 20 l A
I -- Possibly, but I can ' t really say for sure.
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Did you know that they had lost the bubble in the i
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pressurizer?
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I would have to say, an that one, daat I knew that 25 j when I got to th 2te.
I remember that later in the day, for t
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Did you know that they had failed fuel?
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No, I did not.
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Did --
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A Oh, there -- Well, I can recall something now.
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There were some radiation level readings in the aux building m
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that were being reported.
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Q This would be before you left the Region?
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I think so; it could be.
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Were you aware that they believed they had a bubble E
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Not at that time, I don't recall.
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Were you aware that all the containment monitors 4
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I don' t recall.
I know, after the fact.
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Were you aware that there was a one pound pressure w
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I don't think so.
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And the last thing is:
You indicated "60 R per 5
20 hour2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />," and the number that was reported a t 8: 00 a.m. was 0
21 1 200 R per hour.
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Q There was a problem with the interpretation of the i
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readings because of the shielding of the detector that may j
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You made this distinction before you lef t?
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A No, I found that out later.
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Later?
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Were you aware that they declared a site emergency?
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A I don't think I was at that time.
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A general emergency?
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I can't remember which one it -- which one they i
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You knew that they --
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Had had an emergency.
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-- had had an emergency before you left.
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(Nodding in the affirmative. )
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Okay.
I have been reading from notes that were w=
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5 18 BY MR. MOSELEY:
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Let's talk now about the trip to the site.
Do xn 20l you recall what was discussed during the trip?
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I can' t hardly remember.
All I -- one thing I --
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we were traveling, whether the troopers had been alerted.
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And that's about -- discussing what kind of plan. it was.
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Q Was there discussion about the dome, monitor reading V
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I can' t ' hones tly remember what -- it's been so
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Do you recall any discussions about hydrogen, or e
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A Mot to my knowledge.
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Do you recall discussiona about how s'erious people sj 8,
may have thought the accident was?
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A I can't remember.
All I Know is we -- to us in d
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What kind of perception did you have, yourself?
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How serious did you think it was?
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At that point, probably a site problem with the 2
15 containnient in isolation with high radiation level's.
Because 5
I did, back at the Regional Of fice, ask them to locate the y
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mobile laboratory in case we did need it for environmental N
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But at that point, with what information 5
20 h I knew, it was looking at a site problem, the containment i
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k 22 Q
Did you draw any inferences about damage to the l
23j core based on the dome monitor reading, at this point?
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A Not at that -- not on the way up there.
When I got i
25 to the Unit 2 control room, during that day I did start asking i
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questions about the condition of the fuel.
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Q But you had no -- drew no inferences as of the 3
time you arrived?
You had not drawn any?
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A No, because at that -- you know, I didn't know.
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could have been crud bursts that were the cause of the 6
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radiation.
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Is a reading of the magnitude you say you thought Mj 8
it was, or your recollection was that it was 60 R per hour, dd 9
is that an unusually high reading in your knowledge?
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Oh, definitely.
Definitely, j
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By orders of magnitude?
Give me some feeling for a
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well, it was -- definitely it -was out of the s_
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t would not -- with a reading like that, it was 5
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definitey a problem inside the primary system.
g' 16 Q
I'm trying to get some perception of whether you
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Did that l
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Did it indicate a lot.of rods perforated?
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19 Did it indicate a little core damage?
A lot of core damage?
5 20 Do you have a perception --
l 21 A
I don't really think I had assessed it at that
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I didn't -- I don' t think at that time I
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had really related it to fuel damage.
I probably hadn ' t gotten 25,
myself in that frame of mind, yet.
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Q Have you had the experience where a significant 2
primary coolant system J eak has occurred inside containment 3
that yc,a've looked into that event at a licensee?
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5 where they do have degraded fuel-because it starts breaking j
6 down.
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But what I'm looking for is some perception of s
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what readings -- what's the highest reading you are aware of tj o
9 from the dome monitor, in your experience?
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Probably up to a couple hundred MR per hour, at j
11 th e mos t.
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And this would be from?
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The etmosghere, ges from norme1 opereeien.
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And not associated with a large primary coolant 15 system leak, or anything of that nature?
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16 routine operation type of number?
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Yes, and that's high, too.
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18 BY MR. CRAIG:
I" 19 Q
Don, before you lef t the site, what level of 2
20 severity had this accident been declared by the Region before 21 you left the Regional Office?
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I een.t __ I een.e reca11 wheeher it was even i
i 23 announced.
It was happening so f ast, it was just:
Get the j
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And like I say, the information 25 flow to.ime, at that point that day, were minor details.
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, people in the Region had already activated the emergency m
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response center.
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And as I understand it, there are three severity 7sU 4
levels of incidents in accordance with the Region I Emergency g
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I can' t remember what the Plan calls for.
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Q How many times had the center been activated, do M
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you know, in Region I?
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A I -- To my knowledge, that was the first time zo 10 that we had gone into that mode.
11 Q
Was it the firs t time, to your knowledge, that the m
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road within essentially minutes of being notified of an
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We 've had other incidents -- not reactor-related --
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where we had, such as Rochester where they found the plutonium A
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I was the Response' Leader on t
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We were out within 30 minutes, essentially, p
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Within 30 minutes?
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(Nodding in the affirmative. )
21 Q
Was this the same magnitude of response in the
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A No, that one was -- I would not -- it did not --
24 well, it did involve all the Branch Chiefs and Section Chiefs.
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That 's about the only -- jus t to bring them together and say:
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hadn' t assessed or tried to identify a cause for this high 9
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Is that right?
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assesement of the conditions and determined that there were --
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g with those kinds of readings, there had to be fuel damage.
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And did you report tha t to --
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I talked to -- and later in the day it was reported, O
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Can you give me a f eel for how much later in the 5j 15 i
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I can ' t remember whether it was in the af ternoon.
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And they did not confirm it.
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BY MR. MOSELEY:
5 20 0
When you say " fuel damage," would you categorize 1
2I that on a scale from --
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When I say " fuel damage," being a degradation of 22 23 ].lthe fuel rods; that they've had a leaker.
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cladding?
Is th a t -- I don' t want to put words in your U,
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Say whatever you think it is.
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So it was on that end of the spectrum, as opposed 8
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Is that your perception?
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At the first -- you know, at that, time I didn't d
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10 essentially confirmed it.
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Well, again, we all know dif f erently nov.
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12 trying to ask you about what your thinking was on March 28th.
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I would say later in the day, af ter gathering all w
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damage.
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okay, but let's then try to put a time on this.
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When you first arrived, you had a lesser degree of concern for 22 0 the core.
As the day wore on, your concern went up?
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I think what really confirmed it is when the p
25 uj results of the first primary coolant sample came back.
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I can' t remember when they --
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Do you recall what the activity level was in that c
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A There was -- During the day, there were several R
7 taken, but one number that I can remember was 1100 microcuries.
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And this was one that they tried to send -- they took to d
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Bettis Laboratories.
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Was that on the 28th?
Or was that some subsequent E
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3 12 A
I can't remember.
There was a primary coolant
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14 been fuel damage.
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That was a sample taken early on the day of March
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Were you aware of this sample?
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A I can' t remember, without going back to my notes.
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A It would be extremely high.
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You would believe that was severe damage?
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BY MR. STELLO:
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What is the normal gross j
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Most plants run around 10-2 microcuries -- we're j
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No, " gross."
Total.
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I think the max would be 1 to 2 microcuries.
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What would it be per minute operating?
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as a result of an iodine spike?
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would be a significant --
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Well, how about in die primary coolant activity?
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I don't understand the question.
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well, the iodine spiking will increase the primary 3
coolant activity. The gross beta / gamma in the primary coolant 4!
activity should increase because of the off-gassing of the g
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You would?
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That's about what they are, I think.
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indicate a very severe or extreme condition.
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Gross beta / gamma.
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Yes.
Okay.
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In the primary coolant, if I saw gross numbers of
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George Smith was then on site when this conversation
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I think it was on Friday.
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Is that the same day you recall having this 23 '
conversation?
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BY MR. STELLO:
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Don, you said when you talked about hearing l
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Do you recall any samples being pulled, or analyses E
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On any day.
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Do you recall any sampling of that type on March 11 28th?
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Do you recall any of 20 them talking about the results of these analyses?
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Uell, now, I'm not even sure that I even knew --
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I can't remember what went on.
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Q Do you recall discussing hydrogen with Plumlee?
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No, I don't.
3 Q
With Gallina?
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I've got a couple of things I'd like to see if I E
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As I recall, you were there.
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Yes, I was th ere.
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Do you have any recollection at about that time 21 frame in the af ternoon?
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Q Do you have any indication that they had ECC j
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Were you aware of Gary Miller's preparation to og 10 leave to go brief the !.ieutenant Governor at about that time?.
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No, I was not.
W hI Q
Did you have any discussions with Gary Miller?
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What did he tell you?
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He was -- he was talking --
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and things like this, and the upgrading of the monitor readings.
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Can you recall any discussion of hot leg tempera-J 4
23 tures being of f-scale, high?
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No, I don' t.
And mainly because we were set up 25 that Higgins was going to look at the operations end, and I h
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was to look at health physics.
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Did you sit in on the so-called "think tank" 3
discussions?
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A I stood in there on a couple of occasions.
I 5l Q
You never heard mention of hot leg temperatures, e
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A I may have at that time; it didn't register to me.
8 8
I didn't question it because of fir. Higgins standing there.
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Q Did you have any knowledge at all that the EMOV i
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I didn't know at the time that that was opened.
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Based on what you heard, can you tell me what you
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of all of the things that you can't recall whether 21 whether you knew or you didn't know, can you make an assessment:
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may have had an impact on you?
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Early in die morning, they had the in-core s
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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diermocouple measurements.
Had you known that the in-core O
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were low, and some of which were in excess of 2000 degrees?
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And if so, what impact?
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back -- if somebody --
R 8
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No, I'm trying to ask you to make the judgment on
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High temperatures in the core, it would be
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What impact would it have had on your' judgment?
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I'm not sure of what I would have...
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Okay.
Had j,u known that the EMOV had been open 5
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for like 2-1/2 hours, would that have had an impact?
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A I don ' t -- I don' t know.
n 20l Q
If you had known that there were periods of time l
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where the HPI flow was throttled back to very low flow rates, 22 would that have heightened your concern?
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A That, combined with lack of water getting in, yes,
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in the af ternoon, and that the containment sprays had gone i
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can you make a judgment on how you would have 7.A{ reacted had you had all of these facts, in terms of the impact E
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Ay Q
Okay.
To help me understand further a little bit, E$ you feel that anything you asked for you got, essentially?
i If you asked for a piece of information, you got it?
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Yes, I think so.
E 18 3
Q You didn't -- Did you have a f eeling that anyone s
19 4
lad intentionally been withholding information from you?
l 20 A
No.
But my -- my requests for information were 21 irectly to Dick DuBiel, who was the Rad Protection 22 h~
Sm ervisor.
Most of my dealings were with him, and that was 23
- I my infornatton ilow, 24 }i O
Do you feel that Met Ed's appraisal of the 2S I gi accident wqs -- had, as best as you could determine from I
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC, l-
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where you sat, the. seriousness associated with it that it g.sd think you 'went to the Governor's Office, the 2
should have?
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Lieutenant Governor 's Of fice -- !!o, that was !!iggins and --
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As best you can understand, '
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" Appropriate level" being their way of thinking? -
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Or the significance?
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serious a problem tTmy had, because they did not appreciate 21 the releases as they were reflected back to core damage.
And 22 that would be a lack of experience, probably, on their parr.
23 '
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should have been conveyed.
And your reasoning for that is i
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because of a lack of experience?
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okay.
A couple of details I want to make sure-that
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Were you aware of attempts to try to draw bubbles
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8 6
Q Did you hear any discussions at all of a concern R
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The hydrogen recombiners, you mean?
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Yes.
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The hydrogen recombiner issue, as I recall, came 14 up on Friday.
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It 's in my no tes --
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I'm talking about starting electrical equipment w
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inside the containment.
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18 A
No.
E 19 Q
No recollection?
5 20 A
I have something documented in my notes, but I 21 can't really put that in that particular page of the notes 22 for that day because they were out of sequence.
I'm not sure 0
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0 24j Q
shat do you have in your noees thae __
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Q Does anyone have a copy of them?
Or can you (E) 2 recall them?
3 (Pause.)
4; MR. STELLO:
I think maybe if he had a chance to e
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H 6
THE WITNESS:
It was on the notes I passed out to G
7 Norm.
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MR. MOSELEY:
We have it downstairs.
I'm not sure d
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if we have it here, now.
Y 10 (Handing notes to witness. )
11 MR. FORTUHA:
Is this it, Dod?
Or this?
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13 MR. FORTUNA:
Ah, this is it, I bet you.
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Of f the record.
g' 16 (Discussion off the record.)
W 6
17 i MR. STELLO:
On the record.
Let's take about a i
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21 (Recess.)
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22 MR. STELLO:
Back on the record.
I 23 '
BY MR. STELLO:
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Don, you have had a chance to look at all of the 25,
notes that we've been able to find that you've provided us.
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Have you found 'any notes relative to the statement you were O
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No, I haven't.
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Yes.
And I'm not sure whether it was under the 28th, io 10 or...
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It was part of that whole package that OIA picked
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MR. STELLO:
Mr. Fortuna, have you provided him 1
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MR. FORTUMA:
No, sir.
Let me explain for the n
20 record, so that we're a bit more tidy.
21 As you know, but I'll repeat for the record, we in
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OIA had a job to do that was a spinoff to the inquiry that 23 you are presently conducting.
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interviewed Mr. Neely, along with several other people.
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Mr. Neely and we could reconstruct, the notes that were for sj 8
the 28 th, and a couple of days following that.
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Where are those notes?
3 i
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14 MR. FORTUNA:
Those notes are presently in die E
15 Of fice of Inspector and Auditor -- photocopies.
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16 MR. STELLO:
Is it possible that you could have I
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A l9 MR. FORTUNA:
Yes, sir.
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I think it's an issue I'd rather not 21 leave the record ambiguous on.
Would you please call and, t
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if necessary, have a courier bring them over?
23 MR. FORTUNA:
Yes, sir.
(~N 3
(-)
24l MR. STELLO:
We will recess the record until we li 25 ge t th e no tes, and go through it.
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(Recess.)
2 MR. STELLO:
Let's get back on the record.
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We have attempted to have someone find the records O
4 that have been referred to earlier, and hopefully are 'in the e
5 process of bringing them here and will be here shortly.
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6 In the meantime, we want to ask some other questions R
7 in some other areas.
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I'll get back to these.
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EI 11 Q
Don, you discussed earlier information that may 3
p 12 have been reported to the State concerning the seriousness of 3
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That was discussed earlier, m
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14 Did you ever hear any reports of information that
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the day of the accident?
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I don' t have any information.I can -- The only l
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would have come out of probably the Unit 1 control room, and an 20 I wasn't in the Unit 1 control room.
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Q So you don' t have any personal knowledge of
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22 reports that Met Ed may have made to the State on the day of 23 '
the accident?
O 24l A
so.
25 )-
Q Okay.
Did you believe on the day of die accident
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that the core had been uncovered at any time?
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The day of the accident, not -- I'm not so sure t
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damage?
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A I attributed it to temperatures, and it could have N
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been a low water level at some point where the fuel had been dy 9
expos ed.
zC 10 Q
Did you believe that the fuel was still exposed 3
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' after you arrived on site?
3 N
I2 A
No, I did not, until -- unless somebody provided me O
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that information.
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I4 Q
Shortly after you got to Unit 2, about 11:30, in g
is e3,e time er,me, e3ere yo,,aecision maae to aepressurize
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h I7 g floated on the primary system, and eventually they could then
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Do you remember that?
c 19 A
No, I do not.
e 20 Q
You can't picture that in your recall of that 21 time frame?
22 l A
No.
I may have overheard that discussion, but s
,3 '
today I can't recall it.
(1) 24 l Q
When you got there, can you give us a feeling of p>
25 A your perception as to the stability of the primary system?
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Did you believe Met Ed thought, or did you think, that the V
2 system was not rapidly changing, essentially it was stable?
3 A
I think the way I saw the situation is that they
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primary cooling to get the vessel cooled down; not severely 9
6 changing conditions.
R b
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But in their attempt to alter the cooling mode to E
8 establish a cooldown rate, would you describe that as a c!.c 9
methodical process?
As opposed to:
Hurry up' We've got to
,zoy 10 this system into operation because sonething 's going to get 3
II happen if we don' t change where we are now?
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I guess I would look at that as, they would try
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one thing and it didn't work; and they would ref er to
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How many things did they try?
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I have no idea.
You know, since I wasn't involved e
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Q Well, th en, did you f eel that they were running out n
20 of alternatives to get the core cooled down?
21 A
I don't think I'm -- withcut an operations back-O' 22 ground, I'm not really qualified to assess that; what things i
23) they have, what methods they have.
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But on the day of the accident, there were only 1
two NRC personnel in the Unit 2 control room --
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Right.
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-- and you had some perception of how severe they 3
thought the accident was, from "what do we think had happened?"
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the accident that there was an immediateness to get the core ic g
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If it didn't, then it was going to deteriorate?
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11 A
No.
I don' t think that came out.
Just the way it
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5 20 Do you have any training on the core exit thermocouples?
21 A
No, I don't.
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22 BY MR. STELLO:
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I'm not so sure I understand the
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thrust of the question.
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The ques tion was --
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I don't want to have a debate going i
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one way or the other on training.
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You didn't have any training on the in-core l
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excess of 2000 degrees temperature in the core, do you have
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I was responding to " extensive training
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in thermocouples," or core physics.
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Q No.
Solely with respect to the in-core thermocouples, 3
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That if E
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you were presented with a series of readings that some were 16 y
high and some were low -
"high" being 1500 degrees, 2000-d 17 a
degrees, some were low, a couple hundred degrees, and some E
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that data, based on your experience?
20 A
Those being low numbers, due to different 21 l temperatures in the core to me would be evidence of a
(-)
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f'T j
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And just to go back:
You have had no training 7
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on the core exit thermocouples as to what they mean?
Is that 5
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right?
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A Nothing more than what we get in our fundamentals 3
of reactor training.
4 MR. CRAIG:
I think we can --
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MR. STELLO:
Do you have anything else?
N h
6 MR. CRAIG:
No.
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7 MR. STELLO:
Then let's just -- We will recess 8
until the notes get back, and then we will reconvene.
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9 (Recess.)
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10 MR. STELLO:
Back on the record.
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II BY MR. STELLO:
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Why don't you go through the notes, to the best of (1) 13 g
your ability, to recall what they are, and what do they say?
z 5
I4 A
These are just some notes, but there is a date on
$j 15 them that ref erences an auxiliary vent sample of f 3/29.
So
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3 18 date on it does quote as "trying to set up electrical P"
19 2
recombiner."
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Is daat the ref erence you had in mind about the 2I equipment?
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I -- No, I thought there was another one where 23 there was another statement where somebcdy had made a -- had Stated not to start any electrical equipment.
25 Q
Well, then, you have not found that statement?
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A No.
This just has to do with " electrical r
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recombiner."
That's all.
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That's not the statement you were looking for,
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A No.
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Q So you have not found the statement you were looking R
7 for?
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A No.
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(Paus e. )
Y 10 (Mr. Harpster indicates notation to witness. )
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11 THE WITNESS:
I don't know what that means.
3 j.
12 There's no date.
Do you want me to identify that?
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MR. STELLO:
Why don't you go through those
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Let
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me just direct your attention to doing that, first, and then a
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But let's see if we can get this question clarified further P
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20 (Pause.)
21 THE WITNESS:
These are just assorted notes that l ()
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would imagine.
And it's hard to tell what time frame.
The 1
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then there is a statement on the same piece of paper -- I can' t l
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make it out -- it's "H2" and I don' t know if that's " fan";-
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BY MR. STELLO:
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"4 percent H "?
Would it be "4 percent hydrogen"?
2 I
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Uh-huh.
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What was your answer?
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THE WITNESS:
That's what it says here.
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8 MR. HARPSTER:
Could that be "f-1-a-m,"
flammability?
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THE WITNESS:
I don' t know.
i 10 MR. HARPSTER:
That's vary close to " flow" or i_
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" flammability. "
" Flame"?
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This says the date as "3/29," so it i
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must have been something that was on the 29th.
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13 14 l MR. HARPSTER:
Can I see that?
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Well, why don't you continue to look 5
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We'll
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look at these notes while you go through looking at the o thers,
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20 THE WITNESS:
All I can say is, since the writing 21 is in red, this must have tied with that.
It's the. same type l
22.
of pen.
And this says, " trying to set up the electrical
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BY MR. STELLO:
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25l Q
Is there a date on that?
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Huh-uh.
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BY MR. CRAIG:
3 Q
Don, when were you on shif t on the. 29 th?
4 A
I don't -- See, I could have got that.from the e
5 Unit 1 control room, because af ter the -- on the 29 th, I 8
6 spent the rest of my time over in Unit l'.
R 7
.Q On the 29th, when were you on site?
sj 8
A During the day, d
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Q During the day on the 29th.
3 l
And you went -- you E
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I can't remember that.
I think it was the same
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5 13 5
discharge, because I was over in Unit 1 on that issue.
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I4 MR. HARPSTER:
The 29 th or the 30 th.
$j 15 l THE WITNESS:
Okay.
E I6,
MR. HARPSTER:
No, that's the 30th or the 31st, s
h I7 Friday or Saturday.
h IO l (Pause.)
A l
l 19 t BY MR. CRAIG:
2 l
5 20 l Q
Referring to a small green booklet, bound, of your 1
i I
notes that you apparent _y made as you lef t the Regional
.A -
U-22 l Office, because you have an entry on the first page, "left i
23 '
King of Prussia," can you tell me when you filled in the very 24 first page on this book?
i 1
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A Leaving the site -- the of fice.
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3 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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O Leaving the office?
O 2
A (Nodding in the affirmative.)
3 Q
And the entry on there is " general emergency, 4
3/38/79, Three Mile Island 2, Harrisburg."
So when you left-e 5
the Regional Office, you were aware there was a general 0
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emergency?
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A Based on that document, yes.
A j
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Okay.
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And I don' t know if that's our classification, or i
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5 i
5 II Q
Well, on the back of that page you have, " emergency-ac N
I2 l categories:
local, site, and general" as part of the 13 l discu'ssion.
Did you make this entry also before you lef t the 5=
l 14 I Regional Office?
.5 15 A
I don' t know.
What does that say?
si I0 (Showing document to witness.)
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Oh, that's in the car.
Those -- I was talking a
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2I A
I guess that's right.
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BY MR. FORTUNA:
!I 23 Q
Did you have the FSAR in the car on the way out?
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(Pause.)
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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53 II MR. STELLO:
Have you -- Why do'n ' t you let him go I E
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to find, before we get to trying to discuss this issue.
Let's
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take it one at a time.
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5j (Paus e. )
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(Discussion -of f the record.. )
s' 7
tiR. MOSELEY:
Okay, let's go back on the record.
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In the interim while you were searching through d
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11 BY MR. MOSELEY:
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What's the result of your search?
Have you
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I4l A
Yes, I've gone through all these and can't find 5
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This may be -- I may have confused x
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question was asked.
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And which specific testimony do you believe that P
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That was the one in your of fice on -- in 2I Mr. Moseley's office.
22 Q
During this same investigation --
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.A Yes.
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-- it was the earlier interview we had with you --
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A Yes.
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Q in this same investigation.
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I've only had two with you, and that was the first 3
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okay, now, that's your best recollection of where I
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this faint memory comes from?
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6I A
Yes.
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Q In looking through these records, have you n'j 8
identified, or have you concluded that there are pieces missing?
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E 11 A
I -- I couldn' t state whether this is the entire 3
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were you able to identify the things that were 5
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missing?
By that, I mean, looking for a group of pages, or I
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I was just -- There was pieces of paper that had
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2I Q
So to try to summarize that:
To the best of your O) 22 knowledge and belief, now, you believe that the recollection
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of there having been an order not to operate equipment inside es 4
k-24 f containment was precipitated by questioning that we directed 25,1 towara you in-our earlier interview?
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A It's very possible.
2 O
Is that your best recollection --
3 A
Yes.
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-- or is that one of the possa.ble answers? -
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A Yes, that's my best recollection.
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Q Okay.
Now you've also turned up a page here, one R
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apparently in red felt tip pen.
And there is a notation d:!
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2 10 Let me pass that back and ask you to give me your 3
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j-12 you think it was generated.
13,
(Handing document to witness.)
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17 This piece of paper covers information for Unit 1
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And this information could be made up of E
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All right.
What do you think the notation, the 21 specific notation that I've called your attention to, says?
22 (Pause. )
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re.s definitely " hydrogen 4 percent," but I don't
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Have you been aware of the flammability limit for 4
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7 A
Yes.
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Is it possible that that notation is a notation e
5 that this was the flammability of hydrogen?
Would you have En 6l written a note to yourself reminding yourself of what the 7
flammability of hydrogen was?
8 A
It could very possibly be.
I don ' t -- I don ' t know.
dg 9
(Pause.)
i S
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What else could it have been?
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5 11 A
It just could have been some input from somebody B
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5 E
14 Q
The reference to " auxiliary sample off" at, what-5x 2
15 is it, 10:00 a.m. 3/29?
5 J
16 A
3/29.
E g
17 j Q
could this be a note that was made on a day other a
1 5
18 than the 29 th -- that is, later than the 29 th -- where you E
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19 were reporting that a sample that you were interested in, l
20 that was the time period that it covered?
21 A
I don' t know.
I 'think normally when I start a new
( ()
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And this was probably on that il
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24 particular' day.
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You believe tha t diat note was made on the 29th I
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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based on the entry that we <were just referring to, the O
2
" sample off" activity?
3 A
Yes, I do.
Only because of the same type of pen 4
used, and e
5 Q
When I was asking you about the note having N
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ref erence to a day -- being written later than ' die 29 th, R
7 making reference back to the 29 th, was that sometime one is s
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interested, when he gets a sample result, he's interested:
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And it's possible Y
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12 I'm not suggesting that; I'm just asking is that a possibility?
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This probably was that they had removed the sample
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What would that -- Is there anything there to E
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For a particulate and iodine analysis of the vent 18 l
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19 released over a specified time.
n 20 Q
The entry doesn ' t make ref erence as to what the --
21 whether it was a radiation or radioactivity sample, or whether
(
22 it was a constituent -- for instance, hydrogen, o xygen, and 23 so on -- sample.
But it's your belief that it was a radioac-j.
24l tivity sample?
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That " aux vent sample" is a radicactivity sample.
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Yes, sir.
3l
" Auxiliary vent" being " auxiliary building."
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And again, you would have expected that the analyses i
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that would be done on the sample would be done reasonably 9
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7 a previous day's sample in order to keep the results straight?
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of an assumption that might be made, that this entry was.made zog 10 on some other day.
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11 A
The reason that I think -- I'm sure that this is B
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samples as we requested.
At this point, we did -- We had
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6 17 i material released.
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18 Q
And how of ten would you have been seeking them n
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19 l to change them?
Some number of hours?
That is, every so many n
i 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />?
Or would it be once a day?
t 2I A
Whatever would be necessary because of buildup on 22 the filters.
On the 28 th, the licensae was reluctant to i
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l 25 And we also considered that from ALARA' purposes,
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i 1l you know, exposure, that you could run them fo'r some time
--O, 2l longer.
But it got to the point that we just insisted that l
3I they change them.
O 4f Q
And were you insisting that they change them once-g 5
a day?
Or once every six hours?
Or what frequency?
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A I don' t know what that --
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Q What is the normal frequency with which these are j
8 changed?
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Sometimes they're weekly, or -- usually it's a week 2i l
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Do you think you would have been asking for them y
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17 lj MR. MOSELEY:
Johnf you've been looking through 5
l bi 18 some of the rather assorted documents there.
Do you have E
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k 20 l MR. CRAIG:
I have a couple of questions.
I 2I BY MR. CRAIG:
22 Q
Don, these notes are dated "3/28" --
23 (Indicating a dif f erent document to the witness. )
O 24
__ and are these your neces?
25 A
Yes.
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Q On the second page, the top entry says "140 O
2 microcuries per milliliter from a letdown sample."
Where 3
did-you get that information?
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I think I got that information from --- they had --
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that earlier sample they had taken in the morning, based on 6
6, what I have reviewed in my notes that there was a. sample taken R
7 early, in the wee hours of the morning.
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9y 10 A
Yes.
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-- to the best of your recollection.
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Yes.
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Now the entry underneath that discusses an input
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And their response was?
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That it wasn' t damaged.
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That the fuel wasn ' t damaged?
2Ih A
That's correct.
22 Q
What time of the day was this ?
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es tima te?
24 A
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sometime in the morning.
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MR. MOSELEY:
What day is this you are talking 3
about?
O 4
MR. CRAIG:
"3/28."
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BY MR. CRAIG:
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Q So - on the day of the accident -- Was this in Unit 2, R
7 can you tell?
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8 A
Yes.
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Yes.
E 11 Q
So --
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It says, the page on the note says, " Unit 2 control 5
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So you were at sometime after 11:00 o' clock, then --
2 15 A
yes.
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-- in the morning, you were in the Unit 2 control-m 6
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l 21l A
Mr. Lee Rogers, and there -- according to the notes,
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22 there was also another person -- John Flint.
i 23 Q
John Flint.
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24 Do you know which one of them you talked to ab.ut 25,
the failed fuel?
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A It was the older of the two, and I think that is' (N
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Can you characterize the " failed fuel" here?
Was N.
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16 Q
Do you recall why the B&W personnel felt that the s
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5 18l A
At the time, I looked at it as a lack of experience
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On the part of Mr. Rogers?
21 A
Yes.
That being, around failed fuel, his experience n
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with fa11ee fue1.
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John, before you leave that -- Were I
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You can pursue it.
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Let me make sure I understand.
Based on your --
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Right?
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Yes, sir.
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Presumably you concluded in your own mind that there must have d
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I'm sorry?
Could you repeat that?
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Have I characterized it correctly?
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And you base your belief that there was failed fuel 21 on what?
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Merch 2eth.
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Q Right.
When you held this conversation, you felt
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Is that correct?
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jj the amount of gas in the aux building, the radioactive gas
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Just to make that clear:
This is a gross beta / gamma 2
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notation.
Would you check your notes to see if that is gross?
5 A
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5 20 BY MR. CRAIG:
1 21 Q
What was your evaluation?
How did you come away
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23 failure?
Did you think he was wrong, and you were right?
Did
()
24 you try to explain to him that they had had more fuel damage 25 than he implied?
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j 6
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R 7
A No, I don't.
He just -- He indicated he didn' t aj 8
thir.k there was fuel failure.
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Let's don' t go of f the record.
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While John continues looking at those s-
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16 BY MR. MOSELEY:
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Did you, on March 28th or subsecuently, have you E
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people?
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Would you repeat that again?
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-- being any time during the --
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On March 28th.
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Is this a reflection of the way business is w
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(Pause.)
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Prior to TMI.
It's greatly improved since TMI.
5 20 0
Well, I was trying to contrast whether or not what l
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21 l Q
Don, we've interviewed the other members of the
()
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()
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atmosphere of haste, and an effort to get some people in an t
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automobile as quickly as possible and get them out'the door ~
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This is what we want you to do.
These are the kind.4 t
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I hesitate to enter at this point, but I think we
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That's correct.
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In this particular case, the instructions were y
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Is that correct?
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Regional Office for further instructions, and to report what w
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Okay.
I don' t have any further ic g
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Terry, do you have any?
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No.
z 13 MR. MOSELEY:
Roger?
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The next page goes on to discuss trying to 1
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That's the hydrogen recc=biner?
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Is it your bes: recollection thar these two
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Is it reasonable to conclude that thes e notes,
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testimony, we had requested the licensee to remove those samples -
2 and count them.
And most likely the reascn I documented it
'I 3.
is because they had resisted doing that the day before.
And
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4 apparently they had finally -- I think that was probably the e.
5 first one that they removed.
E j
6 Q
When were you working your shift, again?
Were you A
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7, nominally on the day, or night?
i j
8 A
In the first -- the 28th through the 30th, we were -
I re dd 9l working, from the 28th through the 29th, we worked 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> Y
[.
10 with 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />' sleep.
We weren' t on a shif t.
We were just --
3l until we got replacements on the 30th, there weren't any 4
a d
" shifts."
We were just there, and would leave to go to the E
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13 motel, and come back.
I r
14,
Q Co you recall when you lef t' on Thursday?
1 I
j 15l A
Well, let me start back on Wednesday.
We left, I E
y 16 think, probably around 2:00 -- 12:00 or 2:00 o' clock Thursday i
d 17 morning, and then came back in Thursday morning around 6:00 4
5 I
i 18 l o' clock.
So i t was sometime that evening when we probably
=
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19,
left again on Thursday, a
i 20l Q
And when were you having the problem with the.
21 I samples?
3:
A It was on the 28th.
O 22k L/
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i t
23i o
And you were trying to get
- hem to pull the samples?
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24f A
'les.
25,
O So then it's possible that this could be a note that i
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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76 jwb was made at about the time they pulled the sample on 3/29?
j A
That could be.
2 3
Q could be?
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Yes, sir, e
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or it could be a note that you made that the sample
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was in fact pulled?
6 e
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Yes.
g 7
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Q The next day?
n n
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9 A
Yes.
E' E
10 Q
It could be either way'.
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E 11 '
A (Nodding in the af firmative.)
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<3 There was also some discussion, as I recall, about --
d 12 Q
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The waste Friday, about what the amount of hydrogen might be.
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and there was i
j 14 l gas decay tanks were running high in pressure, t!
15 a concern about trying to take thoce tanks and empty that gas a
back into containment.
Do you recall those discussions?~
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I can remember that bein,g brought up.
I don't A
d 17 9 know whether it's something I've learned since the accident, 5
18
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I do n ' t know.
I can't separate c
4 i
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20 f, the two.
You don' t recall when that occurred?
21 Q
22 A
On that Friday, daat is when the -- if I can l ()
?
that is when the Regional support starting arriving 23
- recall, 24 on site, and I think I was off the site up until about l
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3:00 o' clock that af ternoon, when I took over one of the j
Il ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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77 jwb 1
shif ts, which it was the 4:00 to 12:00 shif t.at that time on O
2 that Friday.
So something coald have gone on during that day 3
that I wouldn' t have -- wouldn' t know about.
O 4
O Did you have any recollection as to when the boreated 5
water storage tank was being filled?
e E
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A only from my notes there where it talks about the e
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Haliburton.
That might bave some input to it there; I don't
~n 8
know.
"Haliburton tanks" there.
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9 0
okay, there was nothing else that you could look 2l.
E 10 at in your notes that would cause you to have any recollection E
5 11 of tine?
B d
12 A
No.
z 13 (Paus e. )
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j 14 l (Handing document to witness.)
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15 Q
There is a -- let me show you your notes on this x
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16 l first page.
It looks like it's -- Well, let me ask you what it
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I'll point tg it, so that I don't read in a word which 6~
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18 l might not be there.
Right where I have my finger (indicating).
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I think that 's " sump tank. "
5 i
l 20 j Q
" Sump"?
21 A
(Nodding in the affirmative.)
l
()
22f Q
Was there not an attempt being made at some point l'
)
4 23j to look at cetting water f rom Surry and have some equipment 4
1
()
24l and things brought up from Surry?
Do you recall any such j
h t
25 j discussion?
I l.
1 i
6 1i ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
I
jwb 73 l
jl A
.No, I don't.
2 (Pause. )
3 0
There is something here that says " Unit 1 tank O
4 coming on site for low-level water."
Do you'know what that I
5l means?
e E
I n
i A
It's probably some of those different tankers.
They e
E 7
brought some tankers in from Southwest Nuclear, and other
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tanks -- but a lot of that started on the 31st, I think.
I n
d d
9 do n ' t --
i 10 Q
7o you think that that's what the note is referring i_
5 11 to?
<3 d
12 A
I don't knov.
z 5j 13 0
Well, I think the words are fairly legible.
" Unit 1 s
1 14 tank coming on site for low-level water."
d b
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(Pause. )
z=
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I don' t recall what that --
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Q Do you think it could refer to tanks arriving on 5
i E
18 l site?
9 E
19 A
It could have been -- I don't know, it could have 5.
20l been Unit I was finishing up a refueling and it could have i
21 )
been coming on to process Unit 1 water af ter the refueling;
()
22 I don't know.
l 23 ]
BY MR. IIARPSTER:
1
)
24 Q
Capgun riggers?
l k
l 25 :
A Like a capgun for low level.
J I
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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jwb 79 1
(Pause.)
O 2,
Q I was just trying to review your - records c.rt here, i
3 whether there was anything on here that could possibly refresh O
4 your memory as to when those notes were taken..
I 5j A
I would definitely think they were -- by the color s
9 i
4 6I of the pen, and the same paper -- they were probably in tne
-g R
7 same time frame.
And if I used the~"3/29," that was the...
E 8
8 MR. STELLO:
Is that it?
tj d
9 MR. MOSELEY:
That's it.
2ioy 10 MR. STELLO:
Okay.
Thank you very much.
i5 h
II (Whereupon, at 1:02 p.m.,
the interview of
?
I 12 Donald R. Neely was concluded.)
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' UCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION V
l Ihis is to certify that the attached proceedings before the NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION STAFF in the matter of:
Three Mile Island Unit 2; Interview, Donald R.
Neely l
Date of ?roceeding:
Tuesda 13 January 1980 Docket flumb er :
l Place of ?roceeding: Beth es da. Maryland were held as herein appesrs, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the Ccesission.,
4 JANE W.
BEACH s
Official Reporter (Typed)
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