ML19343A571
| ML19343A571 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png |
| Issue date: | 11/14/1980 |
| From: | Gallen K, Hiestand O DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE, MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19343A572 | List: |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-SC, NUDOCS 8011190028 | |
| Download: ML19343A571 (11) | |
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{{#Wiki_filter://O y I4,I4 ?.,..... ,U TION M C ... -c-k__ r..17 sao.,M ~ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ., g paws ', ., f A9 a tu In the Matter of ) ) DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE ) Docket No. 50-409 ) (Liquefaction) (La Crosse Boiling Water ) (Show Cause) Reactor) ) LICENSEE'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. $ 2.749, Dairyland Power Coopera-tive (Dairyland or DPC), the holder of Provisional Operating Licensing No. DPR-45 for the La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBWR) and the licensee in the above-captioned proceeding, hereby moves for (1) st: mary disposition of the two issues with respect to which Dairyland was ordered to show cause in this proceeding in the Order to Show Cause issued by the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comis-sion (Comission or NRC) on February 25, 1980, and (2) a decision by the Licensing Board in Dairyland's favor as to all matters cur-rently pending before the Licensing Board in this proceeding which fall within the scope of the Order to Show Cause. -1/ In support of this. motion,. Dairyland states as follows: -1/ By Order, dated September 30, 1980, the Licensing Board certified to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board the question of whether it was "within our authority to 3 SO Os BDn no cn3 Q
i i -2 l l INTRODUCTION j As is readily apparent from even a cursory review of the February 25, 1980 Order to Show Cause, that Order is predicated on the assumption that liquefaction will occur beneath the reactor containment building and other safety-related structures at the LACBWR site (e.g., the turbine building and the LACBWR stack) in the event of an earthquake with a peak ground acceleration of 0.12g. In fact, in that Order, the NRC Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation specifically ORDERED THAT the licensee show cause in the manner hereinafter provided, why the licensee should not: 1. As soon as possible, but no later than May 27, 1980, sub-mit a detailed design proposal for a site dewatering system to preclude the occurrence of liquefaction in the event of an earthquake with peak ground acceleration of 0.12g or less. 2. As soon as possible after NRC approval of the dewatering system identified above, but no later than February 25, 1981, make such system operational, or place the LACBWR in a safe cold shutdown position. Order to Show Cause at 8 (emphasis added). 1/ cont. consider the magnitude of the safe shutdown earthquake at the La Crosse site as part of our determination of whether a, site dewatering system to prevent liquefaction must be designed and made operational or a specified schedule." By Order dated October 1, 1980, the Appeal Board accepted the certification. That issue is now pending before the Appeal Board. Licensee's Motion For Summary Disposition deals solely with the two issues with respect to which Dairyland was ordered to show cause and does not address the issue certified to the Appeal Board.
-3 These two issues (i.e., whether Dairyland should sub-mit a dewatering system design and make the system operational by a certain date) are the only issues which may be considered in this proc &eding. -2/ Inasmuch as these issues arise solely from the concern that liquefaction will occur at the site at 0.12g, tne threshold issue in this proceeding -- and the only issue which the Board actually needs to address at this time in order to dispose of the matters presently in controversy in this proceeding -- is whether or not liquefaction will occur beneath LACBWR and other key structures on the site at 0.12g. If reasonable assurance exists that liquefaction will not occur beneath these structures in the event of an earthquake with a peak ground acceleration of 0.12g and it can be shown that other measures can be undertaken to mitigate the effects of liquefaction elsewhere on the site, then there is r> need to even consider whether a dewatering system should be designed or installed for the entire site. In this regard, it should be noted that the use of summary disposition to resolve matters in controversy in NRC proceedings has 3/ been encouraged by both the Commission and the Appeal Board. - That 2/ See Commission's Order, dated July 29, 1980. See also Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill 1 and 2), UET-HD TO, 11 NRC 438 (1980); Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach 1), CLI (May 12, 1980); Houston Lir.hting & Power Co. (South Te;xa,sl'and2),CLI-80__,(Sept. 22, 1980). -3/ See 2e.., Northern States Power Co. (Prairie 7.sland 1 and 2), CET-73-12, 6 AEC 241, 242 (1973), aff'd sub. nom., BPI v. AEC, 502 F.2d 424 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Mississippi Power and Light Co? (Grand Gulf 1 and 2), ALAB-130, 6 AEC 423, 424-25 (1973); Duquesne Light Co. (Beaver Valley 1), ALAB-109, 6 AEC 243 246 (1973).
I -4 summary disposition may be used to dispose of all the issues in a proceeding, thereby obviating the need for a public hearing, is l clear from the Appeal Board's recent decision in the North Anna proceeding where the Appeal Board indicated that the mere admission of contentions does not perforce mean that there will be a need for an evidentiary hearing on all or any of CEF's con- ~ tentions. Even those contentions found to be acceptable will be sus-ceptible to a motion for summary disposition under 10 C.F.R. 5 2.749. VEPCO (North Anna 1 and 2), ALAB-5777 9 NRC 54, 56 (1979) (emphasis added). Finally, the use of summary disposition to resolve threshold issues is particularly appropriate in the enforcement context in light of the Commission's recent admonition in Marble Hill that We believe that public health and safety is best served by concentrating inspection and enforcement resources on actual field inspections and re-laced scientific and engineering work, as opposed to the conduct of legal proceedings. Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill 1 and 2), CL1-80-10, 11 NRC at 441. It is Dairyland's position that reasonable assurance exists that liquefaction will not occur in the soils beneath L.ACBWR and other key structures at the LACBWR site in the event . a* cf an earthquake with a peak ground acceleration of 0.12g and that other measures can be taken to adequately mitigate the effects of liquefaction elsewhere on the site. Dairyland is entitled to
-5 summary disposition and a decision in its favor with respect to these issues -- and, a fortiori, summary disposition and a decision in its favor with respect to the two issues identified in the Order 4 to Show Cause -- because there is no genuine issue of material fact to be heard on these issues. As will be shown below, in their re-sponses to discovery requests submitted by Dairyland and the NRC Staff, the consolidated intervenors (the. Coulee Region Energy Coalition (CREC) and Frederick Olsen), have as much as conceded that they have no real factual basis for challenging either the analyses performed by Dairyland, its consultants, and the NRC Staff demon-strating that liquefaction will not occur in the soils beneath LACBWR and other key structures at the LACBWR site in the event of an earth-quake with a peak ground acceleration of 0.12g or less or the other measures designed to mitigate the effects of liquefaction elsewhere on the site. Attached to this motion are " Licensee's Statement of Material Facts As To Which There Is No Genuine Issue To Be Heard" (Licensee's Statement) and the Affidavits of Mycore S. Nataraja (Nataraj a Affidavit), and -John D. Parkyn (Parkyn Affidavit), which, when read in conjunction with the NRC Staff's " Safety Evaluation By The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Relating To Liquefaction Potential At The La Crosse Site," dated August 29, 1980, (the Staff SER) compel the grant of summary disposition for the reasons " "I* summarized below. -1
-6 DISCUSSION l In June 1978, the NRC Staff initiated a review of the geology and seismology of the LACBWR site in connection with the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP). As part of this review, the NRC Staff contracted with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Water-ways Experiment Station (WES) to perform an analysis of the poten-tial for liquefaction of the soils at the LACBWR site under con-dicions of seismic stress. The WES Report entitled Liquefaction Analysis for La Cross (sic) Nuclear Power Station was completed in December 1978 and concluded that the soils could strain under an earthquake $ producing a peak ground level acceleration of.12g and perhaps liquefy under an earthquake producing a peak ground level acceleration of 0.2g or greater. Inasmuch as some questions still existed concerning the adequacy of the soils data utilized in the WES Report, after a series of technical meetings, Dairyland agreed to undertake a detailed soils properties investigation program, in-cluding the taking of additional test borings and soils samples in the " free field" at the LACBWR site (i.e., not directly beneath the plant structures), in an attempt to ascertain the actual extent of the liquefaction potential at the site. This program was approved by the NRC Staff on April 30, 1979 and got underway shortly thereafter. Dames & Moore completed this soils properties investiga-tion progr,am and Dairyland submitted the results in September 1979. During the course of its initial review of these reports, the NRC-- Staff adjusted downward the density values for the free field soils i
-7 samples which Dames & Moore had calculated and concluded that a liquefaction problem could still exist with respect to the soils under the plant structures. This prompted the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to issue the Order to Show Cause on February 25, 1980. In its March 25, 1980 Auswer to Order to Show Cause, Dairyland submitted a " Response to NRC Concerns on Liquefaction Potential At LACBWR" prepared for Dairyland by Dames & Moore in consultation with Dr. H. Bolton Seed in which Dairyland demonstrated that the soil strength curves utilized in the earlier Dames & Moore reports (showing that even the " free field" soils at the LACBWR site would not liquefy under the design seismic conditions) were con-servative, and that it was inappropriate for the NRC Staff to adjust the Dames & Moore results and conclude that a liquefaction problem existed with respect to the soils under the plant structures. The key point in the Dairyland Answer was the fact that the critical plant structures at the LACBWR site were supported by driven piles and that Dames & Moore had not taken " credit" for this factor in its original analysis. The Dames & Moore Response indicated that the soils under these structures were expected to be much more dense than the soils in the free field and therefute much less susceptible to liquefaction. The NRC Staff reviewed the Dairyland Answer, conceded .? that there was a basis for the judgments expressed in the Dames & Moore Response, and requested additional information from Dairyland i
-8 in order to enable the NRC Staff to complete its review and deter-mine whether the increased density of the soils baneath the plant structures would be sufficient to obviate the need for a dewatering system for the entire site. In response to the Staff's request for additional informa-tion, Dairyland had Dames & Moore take four additional test borings directly beneath several of the plant structures on the LACBWR site. The results of these borings, as summarized in the Dames & Moore Report dated July 25, 1980, clearly indicate that the density of the soils beneath the pile-supported plant structures is much greater than the density of the soils in the free field. The stack for the Dairyland coal-fired plant at the Genoa-3 site is the only major structure in the vicinity of LACBWR which is not supported by piles and the failure of which could conceivably impact LACBWR. Dames & Moore recently took four additional test borings on the Genoa-3 site which demonstrate that the density of the soils on the site and under the stack are also much greater than the density of the soils in the free field at the LACBWR site. Use of the increased soil density values and Standard Penetration Test (SPT) blow counts (N-values) obtained in connection with these borings in both of the standard analytical techniques for evaluating cyclic shear strengths of soils demonstrates that the factor of safety,against liquefaction of these soils under 0.12g is much greater than the normal minimum. The results of all of these addi-tional borings provide adequate assurance that the soils under the' reactor containment building and other key structures on, or in the l vicinity, of the LACBWR site will not liquefy in the event of an
-9 earthquake with a peak ground acceleration of 0.12g. The only other structure on the LACBWR site which is not supported by piles and which could be considered important to safety is the crib house and the associated underground piping running from the crib house to the containment building. Dairyland has agreed to install a dedicated safe shutdown system to provide an additional source of emergency cooling water in the event of an earthquake in order to preclude reliance on the crib house and the associated buried piping. Dairyland has already injected grouting into several voids which were discovered beneath the concrete slab in the turbine building. The NRC Staff has issued an SER which concluded that Dairyland has shown adequate cause why it should not be required to design and install a site dewatering system. In the -{2 the NRC Staff found that (1) the borings " clearly indicate an increased density below these pile supported structures;" (2) "the borings under the turbine and stack foundations are considered representative for other adjacent structures that are pile supported, including for example the reactor containment building;" and (3) " mitigative measures to increase the margin of safety against liquefactioa for these struc-tures are not needed." NRC Staff SER at pp. 4-5. Moreover, the Staff concluded that (1) the soils under LACBWR an_d the other kar structures are " adequately safa against liquefaction effects for an earthquake. . with a peak ground acceleration of 0.12g," (2) "with the proposed remedial action of ~ grouting the voids and installing the dedicated safe shutdown l l l
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- system, loss of the crib house and underground piping would not endanger the health and safety of the public," and (3) "it is l
not necessary to install a dewatering system at the La Crosse site." NRC Staff SER at p. 6. The SER also notes that the WES personnel who prepared the original WES Study which formed the basis for the Order to Show Cause concurred in these findings and conclusions. In response to discovery requests from Dairyland and the NRC Staff designed to ascertain the specific basis for Consolidated Intervenors contention that a dewatering system should nevertheless be designed and installed at the LACBWR site, Consolidated Intervenors merely took issue with a number of state-monts in the SER, dismissed the studies and analyses prepared by Dames & Moore as inconclusive, and expressed their general preference for dewatering vis a vis other mitigative measures against lique-4/ faction. - As a result, it is clear that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether there is a reasonable assurance that (1) liquefaction will not occur in the soils beneath LACBWR and other key structures at the LACBWR site in the event of an earth-quake with a peak ground acceleration of 0.12g, and (2) the other measures which are designed to mitigate the effects of liquefaction elsewhere on the site will be adequate for this purpose. -4/ See Consolidated Intervenors' Response to Licensee's Interrogatories (Oct. 27, 1980); Consolidated Intervenors' Response to NRC Staff Interrogatories (Oct. 27, 1980).
l -11 CONCLUSION Dairyland submits that the attached Statement and Affidavits, as well as the other pleadings in this proceeding, including the Safety Evaluation Report prepared by the NRC Staff, conclusively demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists concerning the two issues identified in the Order to Show Cause. Accordingly, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 5 2.749, Dairyland respectfully requests;that the Board grant the instant motion for summary disposition and issue a decision in Dairyland's favor in this proceeding. Respectfully submitted, O. S. Hies and Attorney for Dairyland Power Cooperative OF COUNSEL Kevin P. Gallen Morgan, Lewis & Bockius 1800 M Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 Dated: November 14, 1980 l i - ~.!- L l , c,}}