ML19343A193
| ML19343A193 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 09/11/1980 |
| From: | Utley E CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Ippolito T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NO-80-1315, NUDOCS 8009160376 | |
| Download: ML19343A193 (4) | |
Text
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, 3 September 11, 1980 FILE: NG-3514 (3)
SERIAL N0: NO-80-1315 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ATTENTION:
Mr. T. A. Ippolito, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 2 United States Nuclear Regulatory Cocaission Washington, D. C.
20555 BRUNSWICK SIEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT NOS. 1 AhT 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-325 AND 50-324 LICENSE NOS. DPR-71 AND DPR-62 EFFECT OF DC POWER SUPPLY FAILURE ON ECCS PERFORMANCE Dc;c :Ir. Ippolito:
In partial response to your letter of April 25, 1980, Carolina Power &
Light Company (CP&L) provides the following:
Your letter of April 25, 1980 supplied information from a generic General Electric (GE) study regarding the effects of a DC power supply failure on ECCS performance and requested that CP&L provide a schedule for a full response on this issue. Our May 29, 1980 letter provided this schedule, and the analysis results of ECCS availability relative to DC power failure are included herein for the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP).
A review of the ECCS equipment availability with a DC power supply failure has been conducted. The attached Tables 1 and 2 reflect the results of this review.
_ NOTE:
Tables 1 and 2 address a DC power failure relative to one loop in one unit only 'or both a suction and discharge recirculation line break. A study for the remaining loop ' unit would yield the same ECCS conbinations as presented in Tables 1 and 2.
A comparison of Tables 1 and 2 has been conducted relative to the GE report "DC Power Source Failure for BWR 3 and 4" for each hypothesized accident.
The following su=marises the results of this comparison of remaining operable equipment for each analyzed cendition; and, ns indicated in the notes, GE's worst case combination is conservative for BSFr.
Small Break Analysis: Suction an? Discharge - Loss of DC GE Combination: 1 CS + 1 LPCI + ADS Actual BSEP Combination: 1 CS a 1 LPCI + ADS + HPCI Y,
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8009160 MN
j Mr. Ippolito 1 I
Large Break Analysis - DC Power Failure Discharge i
GE Combination: 1 CS + 1 LPCI + ADS Actual BSEP Combination: 2 CS + HPCI + ADS NOTE:
Although the BSEP combination differs from the GE combination presented in GE's Table 5, BSEP's worst case combination matches GE's worst case combination (LPCI-Injection Valve Failure) presented in the Appendix K analysis for large break recircu-lation discharge line.
Suction GE Combination: ' CS + 3 LPCI i
Actual BSEP Combination: 2 CS = 2 LPCI + HPCI + ADS NOTE:
Although the BSEP combination differs from the GE combination presented in their report (1 CS + 3 LPCI), BSEP's worst case combination matches GE's worst case combination (LPCI-Iajection Valve Failure) presented in the Appendix K analysis for large break recirculation suction line.
4 In our May 2'.),
1980 letter, we stated that the response to the loss of equipment due to water spillage would be provided by September 17, 1980. Due to
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the extensive number of =anhours expended during the past outages on torus modifi-i cations and CRD piping supports, the analysis for the loss of equipment due to spillage will not be completed as scheduled. A review of the status of this pro-ject ia currently in progress and a new schedule will be provided when this review is complete.
Yours very truly, Cf N
O 1 2,d 2'+;
/-
E. E. Utley Executive Vice President Power Supply and Engineering and Construction FDT/dk j
Attachments
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TABLE 1 s
PRESENT DESIGN-DISCHARGZ LINE BREAK IDOP-A ANALYSIS FOR FAILU2Z OF ONE (1) BATTERY (D.C. POWER) UNIT 2 FAILURE LOSS DUE M LOSS DUE TO LOSS EUZ TO IDSS DUE TO RUNNING CCNTROL PWR DiERGENCY LPCI/DUECTICN PIPE BREAK PAILURE.
FAILURE /TO OPEN e
i i
Batt. 2A D/C #3 C.S. Ptap 2A RHR Pimp 2C C.S. Pump 23 Unit 2 4KV SWCR E3 RHR Pump 2A RHR Ptap 2B l
Div. I HPCI RHR Pump 21) i ADS
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i Batt. 23 D/G #4 C.S. Ptssp 2B RHR Ptap 2A C.S. Ptamp 2A Unit 2 4KV SWCR. E4 RHR Ptmp 23 RHR Ptap 2C Rl[R Ptap 2D t
l gBatt. lA D/C #1 RHR Ptmp 2C RRR Ptap 2A C.S. Pisap 2A fait 1 4KV SWGR El C.S. Pump 251 I
Div. I RHR Ptap 2B RHR Ptap 2D ADS HPCI t
.B a t t. 1B D/C #2 RHX Ptap 2D RHR Ptap 28 RHR Ptap 2A C.S. Pump 2A l
, Unit 1 4KV SWGR. E2 RHR Ptsp 2C C.S. Pump 2B (
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OW 13 i
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TABLZ 2 PRESENT DESIGN-SUCTICN LINE Bk'8LK LOOP-A ANALYSIS FOR I
FAILURE OF ONE (1) BAITZRY (0.C. POEJER) L' NIT 2 PAILURE LOSS DUE 10 LOSS DUE TO LOSS DUE 10 LDSS DUE TO RUNNING CONTROL PWR' EMERCZNCY LPCI/INJECTICN PIPE BREAK FAILU32 PWR SYSTDi VLV.
FAILURE /ID OPEN
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i Batt. 2A D/C #3 C.S. Pu:ap 2A C.S. Pimap 23 ADS Unit 2
~4KV SWCR. E3 RHR Pu:ap 2A RHR Pump 28 RHR Pump 2C Div. I IIPCI RHR Pinap 2D 4
l l
Ba t t.
23 D/G #4 C.S. Pu:np 25 C.S. Ptamp 2A ADSl Unit 2 4KV SWCE. E4 RHR Pt=ap 23 RHR Pu:np 2A HPCI RRR Pump 2C Div. II RHR Puxap 2D i
Batt. lA D/G #1 Rl!R Pu:sp 2C RHR Pump 2A C.S. Ptmap 2A ADS l t
C.S. Pump 23 HPCI!
Unit 1 4KV SUCa. El RHR Pump 23 Div. I RHR Pump 2D Batt. 1B D/C #2 RIIR Pts =p 2D RHR Ptzsp 25 C.S. Pump 2A ADSt C.S. Ptznp 23 HPCI'.
Urei t 1 4KV SWC2. E2 RHR Pu:ap 2A Div. II RHF. Pu:ap 2C l!
dl 1
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