05000366/LER-1981-023-01, /01T-0:on 810323,high Drywell Pressure Switches 2C71-N002A-D (RPS),2E11-N010A-D (ADS) & 2E11-N011A-D (RHR) Did Not Operate,In Violation of Tech Specs 3.3.2-1,3.3.3-1 & 4.3.3-1.Caused by Personnel Error.Valves Opened

/01T-0:on 810323,high Drywell Pressure Switches 2C71-N002A-D (RPS),2E11-N010A-D (ADS) & 2E11-N011A-D (RHR) Did Not Operate,In Violation of Tech Specs 3.3.2-1,3.3.3-1 & 4.3.3-1.Caused by Personnel Error.Valves Opened

ML19341D717
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	04/03/1981
From:	Nix R GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML19341D715	List: 05000366/LER-1981-023, Forwards LER 81-023/01T-0 05000366/LER-1981-023-01, /01T-0:on 810323,high Drywell Pressure Switches 2C71-N002A-D (RPS),2E11-N010A-D (ADS) & 2E11-N011A-D (RHR) Did Not Operate,In Violation of Tech Specs 3.3.2-1,3.3.3-1 & 4.3.3-1.Caused by Personnel Error.Valves Opened
References
LER-81-023-01T, LER-81-23-1T, NUDOCS 8104080487
Download: ML19341D717 (3)

LER-1981-023, /01T-0:on 810323,high Drywell Pressure Switches 2C71-N002A-D (RPS),2E11-N010A-D (ADS) & 2E11-N011A-D (RHR) Did Not Operate,In Violation of Tech Specs 3.3.2-1,3.3.3-1 & 4.3.3-1.Caused by Personnel Error.Valves Opened

Event date:
Report date:
3661981023R01 - NRC Website

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9 LER flo.: 50-366/1981-023 Licensee: Georgia Power Company facility: Edwin I. Hatch Docket flo.: 50-366

'Harrative Report for LER 50-366/1981-023 With the unit in steady state operation at 2324 fRt, it was found that High o

Drywell Pressure Switches, 2C71-N002A-D (RPS), 2E11-N011A-D ( ADS) and 2E11-N011A-D (RHR), were not operable violating the two (2) operable channels required by Tech. Specs Sections 3.3.2-1, 3.3.3-1 and 4.3.3-1.

This is a non-repetitive event for these switches.

The health and safety of the public was not affected.

The cause of this event has been attributed to failure to follow procedure.

The technician responsible for performing the RPS/ECCS valve lineup procedure, HNP-2-1004, closed the panel isolation valves believing they were drain valves.

When the panel valves were found closed, they were immediately opened.

Veri fi-cation of proper valve lineup for the RPS/ECCS instruments was immediately performed.

Vital safety related instrument valves, (Vital meaning any instrument that gives a trip or isolation signal for safe reactor operation.), will be color coded to distinguish.which should be normally opened and normally closed.

The RPS/ECCS Instrument Valve Lineup procedure, HNP-2-1004, was completed on March 9,1981, following reactor shutdown for MSIV repair work.

This procedure was performed by a Senior Instrument Technician.

Following reactor startup on liarch ' 14, 1981, a maintenance request was written to investigate the response of the Primary Containment low Pressure Annunciator, because it did not seem to be responding to changes in containment pressure.

This annunciator is re-ceived. from 2C71-N004 The instrument was checked and found to be within specs.

It is tapped into the same header as;the High Drywell Pressure Switches.

The pane 1' isolation valves that had been closed during the RPS/ECCS valve lineup were not found at this time.

Another maintenance request, concerning the same problem was written. _Another calibration check of 2C71-N004 proved the setpoints to be acceptable, but this time the technician traced the instrument sensing lines down.and found the panel isolation valve closed.

This valve had instruments 2C71-N002A (RPS Channel Al High Drywall Pressure Switch) isolated.

Immediately the other three (3) panel valves on 2H21-P004, associated with High Drywell Pressure, were checked and found closed.

Panel 2H21-P005 was checked and the found (4) panel valves s

- associated with High Drywell Pressure were also found closed.

The eight (8) valves were opened immediately.

The Instrument Technician that performed-the-valve lineup had not performed it before. He had closed:th'e panel isolation valves believing they were drain valves.

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His reasoning was that on typical -instrument racks, the process sample line comes -

in'at the top of the rack and the drain lines and drain valves exit the rack at the bottom. This is true on Panel H21-PO!1 and P005 with the exception of the eight (8) valves that were found closed. These valves are piped up with the process sample line' entering the rack from the bottom and there is no drain

Narrative

Report for 50-366/1901-023 (con't.)

valve for these particular instruments. When the valve lineup was performed initially, the eight (8) valves were found open, but the technician closed them because he thought they were drain valves.

The location of these. valves at the bottom of the instrument is common to Unit I and Unit II. All valves on these panels are tagged with identification numbers; however, these numbers were not on the valve lineup procedure, HMP-2-1004.

To prevent similar occurrences in the future, the.following steps will be taken:

1. Instrument valve lineup procedures for safety related systems will be revised to include valve identification numbers and independent verification.

2. Valves for USSS instruments will be color-coded to indicate the normal position. Green will signify normally closed valves.

Red will signify normally opened valves.

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