ML19341C815
| ML19341C815 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 02/12/1981 |
| From: | Ippolito T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Morisi A BOSTON EDISON CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8103040225 | |
| Download: ML19341C815 (5) | |
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Docket File '
NRC PDR Docket No. 50-293 Local PDR IE9
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'yi Mr. A. Victor Morisi, Manager T. Ippolito N ~.
O Nuclear Operations Support Department M. Williams '?
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Boston Edison Company S. Norris y
M/C Nuclear NSIC
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800 Boylston Street TEP.A
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J' Boston, Massachusetts 02199 ACRS (16)
J. Heltemes, AE0D
Dear Mr. Moris1:
SUBJECT:
BYPASS AND RESET OF ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES On February 10, 1981, members of our staff contacted your staff in an effort to identify and resolve the remaining open items on the subject review (Enclosure 3). As a result of this conversation you were to forward copies of four drawings to us. These drawings (late revisions) resolved some items we previously considered as open.
Sene questions remain to be addressed. These are contained in Enclosure 1.
You are requested to respond to this letter within 45 days of its receipt.
Your satisfactory response to these questions should result in the completion of our review.
Sincerely, Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #2 Division of Licensing
Enclosures:
As stated cc w/encls:
See next page 910f04o225 1
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Feoruary 12, 1981 Oceket No. 50-293 Mr. A. Victor Morisi, Manager Nuclear Operations Support Department Boston Edison Company M/C Nuclear 800 Soylston Street Boston, Massacnusetts C2199.
Dear Mr. Morisi:
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SUBJECT:
BYPASS AND RESET OF ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES On February 10, 1981, memcers of our staff contacted your staff in an effort to identify and resolve the remaining open items on the subject review (Enclosure 3). As a result of this conversation you were to forward copies of four drawings to us. These drawings (late revisions) resolved some items we previously considered as open.
Scme cuestions remain to be aodressed. These are c0ntained in Enclosure 1.
v: are requested to rescond to this letter within 25 days of i s receipt.
Your satisfactory rescor.se to these questions should result in :ne completion of our review.
- i Sincerely,
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.i 0:'4.,=,L.L Thomas 'A'.
Iopoli to, ~hief Operating Reactors Branen d2 Division of Licensing
Enclosures:
As stated
- w/encis:
See next page 2
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Mr. A. Victor Morisi Boston Edison Comcany i
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Mr. Richard D. Machon Pilgrim Station Manager Boston Edison Company RFD #1, Rocky Hill Road Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360 3
Henry Herrmann., Escuire Massachusetts Wildlife Federation 151 Tremont Straet Boston, Massachuaetts.02111 f
Plymouth Public Library i
North Street Plymouth, Massachusetts 02350 t
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Resident Inscector 4
c/c U. S. NRC~
P. O. Box 367 Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360 4
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e ENCLOSURE 1 OPEN ITEMS ON BYPASS AND RESET OF ESF AS OF 2/10/81 1.
The 2" CAC valves do not appear to meet Criterion #1 (Attachme.i 1) in that the use of the " emergency coen" positicq may prevent another signal (e.g. high drywell pressure) from causing an ' solation. 'de understand that the isolation will occur at low low level, however, the criterion must be met. Please inform us whether you will aedify the system to prevent the blocking of other safety actuation signals or whether you will attempt some other method to resolve this item.
2.
The containment high radiation monitors / functions requ; red under this review are now also addressed in NUREG-0737 (II.E.4.2(7)). Your response in SECO S0-310 (12/15/80) noted your commitment to install these monitors.
Please provide us an update of your ccamitments in this regard, including the general requirements (i.e. safety grade or non-safety grade) you will apply in the design.
3.
Please furnish us your explanation discussed in our conversation, regarding the following two items:
a ). Are all components of the HPCI system, from the sensor to the final control device (electrical) safety grade; that is, qualified environ-mentally and seismically for the conditions that could be expected to exist at the point of installation during postulated accidents?
b) Explain the statement that the HPCI Gland Seal Blower is non-essential.
REVIE'd CRITERIA ENCLOSURE 2 The primary intent of :nis evaiuatter is to cete-mine nat the following NRC staff criteria are me: for One safety signals to all ESF
' equipment:
(1) Criterion no.1 - In keeping witn the requirements of General Design Criteria 55 and 55, the over-ricing' of one type of safety. actuation signal (e.g., radiation) snould not cause ne clocking of pressure) for : nose valves nat nave no func-ion besides containment isolation.
(2) ' Criterion no. 2 Suf ficient pnysical features (e.g.,
keylock swit:nes) are to ce provi cec to f acili ste acequate acinis rative con:rcis.
(3) Criterion nr. 3-A system-level annunciation of the overricce t status snould be provicec for every safety system imoactec and wnen any overrice is
' active.
(See R.3. 1.47).
!ncidental to :nis review, ne following adci:ional NRC design
- riteria were used in :ne evaluation:
(1) Criterion no. 4 - Dive-se signals snouic ce pro-vi cec to initia a i sol ation of :ne :entainment ventilation system. Soecifically, containmen nign radiation, safety injection actuation, and contain-ment high pressure (anere containment hign pressure is not a portion of safety inj ection ac tuati on) snoulc autom' tically initiate CVI.
a (2) Criterion no. 5 - The instrumentation and control systems provicec to ini ti ate ne ESF snould ce cesigned and cualifiec as safety-grace equipmen..
I (3) Criterion no. 5 - The overriding or resetting" of
- ne ESF actuation signal snould not cause any valve or camper to enange position.
Criterion 5 in :nis review applies primarily to c:ner relatec ESF systems cecause implemen.ation of :nis criterion for containment isolation nave been reviewed by tne Lessons Learned Task For:e, cased on :ne recom-l mencations in NUREG-0573 Section 2.1.4 [Ref. C.
Au:cmatic valve reposi-
-ioning upon rese may be acceptacle wnen containment isolation is no:
involved; consideration will De given on a case-cy-case :: asis.
Ac:ept-acility would be depencent upon system function, cesign inten; and suitacle coerating procedures.
- ine f ailowing definition is given for clarity of use in :nis evaluation:
Overrice:
The signal is still present, and i.: is clocked in order to perform a function contrary to the signal 9 g-mo o
d aju sju 2. kln"io
4 E1Ct.0SURE 3 NESTICriS FRCM IE!.ZCCtl CF FE3.10.1981 L
1.4 drawing sxt Ao i-i an as-buitt, or la it proposed or ce==ittedt what is the function of this circult?
hhere are the contacts of 16A-X6XA snd 16A-K6M.
l shown en B-194 6 E-401, 4 B-4037 (RESCU/E0 Ill TELECCtl EY.:CRWARDING 0:A!!NGS) 3.
What modifications do you ptmpose for the 2" CAC valves so that they will nect Criterion No. 11 (?!Ed CLESTICtl d 1)
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3.
What plans do yod have for adding d containment high radiation input to the CVI system? ([,fEdCUESTICf1f2) 4.
What modificatlons do yod propose for the CVi system so that it will meet Criterlon 61 (ac3ce/g 3y ecpyjApagne ;;gg ;ppgtp;g3) i 56 Are all components of the llPCt system, from the sensor to the final control device (electrical) safety grade; that is, qualified environmentally and j
seismically for the conditions that could be expected to exist at the point of installation during postulated accidents 7 ([!Ed CUESTICtl d3) 8.
Expidin ths ilatement that the itPCI Giand Seal Blower Is non-essential.
(I,'Ed 4 ESTICN 5)
PARTICIPAfriS EECo NRC J. CAUGHLIN JPEARD J, KEYS M, $Iu.I;es K. JACCBY (CCNTRACTpR RE?.)