ML19341A772
| ML19341A772 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/08/1980 |
| From: | Mcneill W, Whitesell D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19341A767 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-QA-99900033 NUDOCS 8101270966 | |
| Download: ML19341A772 (9) | |
Text
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT m
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REGION IV Report No. 99900033/80-02 Program No. 51300 Company:
Westinghouse Electric Corporation Electro Mechanical Division Cheswick Avenue Cheswick, Pennsylvania 15024 Inspection Conducted:
November 18-20, 1980 4
80 Inspector:
W. M. McNeill, Contracto Inspector Date ComponentsSection I Vendor Inspection Branch
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Approved by:
- 0. E. Whitesell, Chief Datb ComponentsSection I Vendor Inspection Branch Summary Inspection conducted Nov mber 18-20, 1980 (99900033/80-02)
Areas Insoected:
Implementation of Topical Report including procurement controls; pressurizer relief line block valve failures, and action on previous inspection findings.
The inspection involved twenty-four (24) inspector-hours on site by one (1) NRC inspector.
Results:
In the three (3) areas inspected, no apparent deviations or unresolved items were identified va two (2) areas.
The following one deviation was identified.
Procurement Controls - Part 21 was not identified on Purchase Orders for safety related items as required by the Quality Assurance Manual and the Topical Report.
(See Notice of Deviation).
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2 DETAILS SECTION A.
Persons Contacted R. A. Asselta, QA Engineer
- F. R. Bakos, General Manager
- 0. R. Collier, Reactor Pump Engineering Manager P. T. McMunus, Product Assurance Systems Manager
- J. F. Phillips, Product Assurance Manager C. E. Plumbo, QA Engineering Assistant B. R. Reed, Design Engineer
- 0. L. Ross, QA Engineering Manager
- E. J. Rusnica, Valve Engineering Manager
- 0. P. Virtus, Supplier Quality Engineering and Records Manager E. M. Vukela, Test Engineer R. A. Weisman, Regulatory and Legislative Affairs Manager
- Denotes those attending the exit interview.
B.
(Closed) Daviation (Report No. 80-01):
Inspection Control Cards were not filled out ccmpletely and accurately.
A review of tan (10) lots of valve, mechanism, and pump parts found no further evidence of this problem.
Work place meetings were held on April 9th and May 21st to address this finding.
(Closed) Deviation (Report No. 80-01): Water pH requirements for testing were not identified in the water test procedure.
The procedure in question T.P. #3 has been revised, Revision M, to address this finding.
A review of recent data found no problems in this area.
(Closed) Deviation (Report No. 80-01):
ANSI N45.2.2 was not complied with.
Westinghouse has established that wrcp materials, caps, plugs and desiccants
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will be tested to assure they are nonhalogenated.
A review of test reports found no problem in this area.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (Report No. 80-01): Westinghouse will perform the over pressurization calculations.
The formal analysis of the over pressurization calculations had been performed.
This is documented in "L106A-1 CROM Generic Design Report Stress and Thermal Analysis," EML503, Revision 0.
C.
Procurement Controls 1.
Objectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to verify that:
a.
Procedures have been established for pre-contract and periodic evaltation of suppliers and that these procedures are consistent with applicable regulatory, code and contract requirements.
3 b.
Procedures have been established for the preparation and review of procurement documents and that these procedures are consistent with applicable regulatory requirements and the manufacturers overall QA plan, c.
Procedures have been established for product surveillance activities as appropriate to assure conformance of procured items and services to identified requirements (procurement documents).
d.
The above procedures are adhered to in the procurement of materials parts or services which are included in the scope of this program.
2.
Method of Accomplishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by:
a.
Review of the Topical Report, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Water Reactor Divisions Quality Assurance Plan, WCAP-8370, Revision 9A, Sections 17.1.4, Procurement Document Control and 17.1.7, Control of Purchased Material, Equipment and Services.
b.
Review of the Quality Assurance Program Manual, Revision 1, Section C7, Procurement, which established the general require-ments for procurement controls.
c.
Review of the following detailed procedures which established additional controls:
Quality System Requirements for WEMO Vendors, Field Memo, #4, Revision 8; Purchase Order Review and Planning, Field Memo, #41, Revision 7;
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and Implementation of 10 CFR 21, Purchasing Department Manual, #355, Revision 0.
d.
Inspection of purchase orders for gaskets, 541V60883; studs, 541Vl9293; nuts 541V193471; torque arm 541V23975-lM; and valve bonnet 541M952341.
Inspection of the procurement documents, drawings, specifications and etc.
Inspection of the Quality Releases issued on these purchase orders, and the Supplier Procedure Approval Requests and Material Review Reports, associated with these releases.
Inspection of the Annual Evaluation of Vendor Performances, Approved Suppliers List, and Vendor History Report.
Inspection of the recieving dimensional and documentation inspection of the material
4 associated with these releases.
In addition, Purchase Orders for stems 541V34381 and operations, 541V19359 were inspected.
3.
Findinas a.
See Notice of Deviation.
b.
Unresolved Item None.
c.
Comments Westinghouse has a Purchasing Department Manual, Policy number 355, which identifies parts requiring Part 21.
Within it pressure boundary parts are identified for Control Rod Drive Mechanisms, Reactor Coolant Pumps and valves.
In addition, nonpressure boundary parts are identified, for example, shafts, impellers, motors, etc.
However, for auxiliary valves, no nonpressure boundary parts are identified.
Auxiliary valves have Part 21 requirements identified in their contract documents from the Nuclear Steam Supply System designer (Nuclear Technology Division).
For these auxiliary valves, the motor operators, stems, and etc. are bought outside of Westinghouse. Motor operators are purchased to a Westinghouse drawing which references a general part number of the subvendor.
It also adds additional information which is unique to its nuclear application, for example, an 80".
voltage stall test.
The general part number of the subvendor is in its self not sufficient for procurement even if for a nonnuclear procurement.
Stems are bought from a subvendor with material supplied by Westinghouse.
The stems are machined and inspected by the subvendor to drawings supplied by Westinghouse for specific model valves.
Not all auxiliary valves are used in active modes.
In the nonactive mode, an auxiliary valve must
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maintain the integrity of the pressure boundary.
In the active mode, in addition, a valve must operate for safe shutdown.
- Some, but not all, models of auxilary valves are used in nonactive modes.
It appears the 3GM99 model is used only in an active mode currantly.
O.
Pressurizer Relief Line Block Valve Failures 1.
Objectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to verify that:
a.
A study had been made of recent failures of pressurizer relief line, block valve failures and that the causes of failures, generic considerations, and prevent action nave been addressed.
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5 b.
An independent verification of the accuracy and completeness of the information related to the above as can be found at the site.
2.
Method of Accomolishment a.
Review of the problem with design and manufacturing personnel.
b.
Inspection of the Safety Review Committee W eting files 10-80-167 and 10-80-169.
These files contained Customer Notifications, the Engineering Specification, Meeting Minutes, and engineering correspondence on the problem.
3.
Findings a.
Deviations None.
b.
Unresolved Items None.
c.
Comments Westinghouse has experienced failures of some motor operated gate valves in testing.
The failure has been of thres (3) inch 1500 pound valves to close fully under test conditions.
The valves in question closed about 87%. They did not fully close until 45% additional torque pressure was applied to the stems by the motor operators.
The problem was first identified with valves in a test loop at the Marshall Steam Station of South Carolina Electric and Gas. On September 16, 1980 a Safety Review meeting did identify this as a possible unreviewed safety problem.
However, later experience at a South Carolina Electric and Gas nuclear site and a foreign nuclear site added more failures to the problem. At South Carolina Electric and Gas thirteen (13) valves failed and ten (10) valves failed at the foreign site.
A second Safety Review meeting held on October 27, 1980 elected to identify this problem to utilities as a construction deficiency notification 50.55(e) item.
The failures have been generic to WEMD three (3) inch 1500 pound high pressure valves.
Not all valves have failed under test conditions.
The valves in question are model numbers 3GM88 and its later redesign 3GM99.
No failures have been reported on the 3GM99, however, only limited testing has been performed. Westinghouse has shipped 171 3GM88 valves and 70 3GM 99 valves.
They are used in the Safety Infection and Chemical Volume Control systems in the Nuclear Steam Supply System.
In the Chemical Volume Control System the applications
6 are Charge Line Isolation, Charge Pump Miniflow Isolation, and Letdown Line Containment Isolation.
In the Safety Injection System the applications are Cold Leg Recirculation Isolation, Hot Leg Recirculation Isolation, and Baron Injection Tank Isolation.
Some utili, ties have ordered these valves for replace-ments, spares, and Balance of Plant uses.
For example, Beaver Valley 1, North Anna 1 & 2, and Surry 1 & 2 have used these valves in the Turbine Driven Decay Heat Removal System of the Balance of Pipnts.
Eleven (11) operating plants have these model valves installed.
The application and extent of pre-operational testing of these model valves is unknown to Westinghouse.
Twenty-eight (28) nonoperating plants have these model valves.
Some applications of these valves have been in a nonactive modes and therefore are nonsafety signifi-cant.
A testing program was begun to establish the cause of the failures.
Currently, this testing is under way at Pacific Pump Company, South Carolina Gas and Electric, the foreign site and at Westinghouse EMD.
Reduction of data, analysis, and conclusions should be completed within the next 30 days.
An additional inspection will be performed of this position during the next routine inspection.
7' a.
MATRIX OF PROJECTS, VALVE AND LOCATION WITHIN NSSS PROJECTS VALVE DRAWING / REVISION LOCATION CAE 3GM88 115E422/5 CVCS 8105 CBE 8106 CCE CDE PBJ PCJ CGE 3GM88 115E071/5 CVCS 81C6 8107 SIS 8801 A B 8803 A, B 8884 8885 8886 CQL 3GM99 8318038/1 CVCS 8106 CRL 8107 CSL 8108 CTL SIS 8801 A,B 8803 A,8 8804 8805 8806 DMW 3GM8 115E071/5 CVCS 8106 8107 SIS 8801 A,B 8803
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8814 8816 8885 GAE 3GM99 8377D73/5 CVCS 8105 GBE 8106 NAH 3GM99 8377013/3 CVCS 8105 NCH 8106 8085 8151 SNUPPS 3GM88FNB 8374034/3 CVCS 8105 (2 plants) 8106 STP 3GM88FNS 115E404/4 DVCS 8106 SUP 3GM88FiS 115E404/4 CVCS 8107
g MATRIX OF PROJECTS, VALVE AND LOCATION WITHIN NSSS PROJECTS VALVE DRAWING / REVISION LOCATION 8108 SIS 8801 A,8 8803 8804 A,B 8912 TBX 3GM88FN8 8372026/1 CVCS 8105 TCX 8106 TGX THX TWP 3GM99FNB 8378007/4 SIS 8801 A,8 8803 8884 8885 8886 WAT 3GM88FNB 115E009/6 CVCS 8105 WBT 8106 TOTAL 132 Valves i
9 F.
Exit Interview The inspector met with management representatives (denoted in paragraph A) at the conclusion of the inspection on November 20, 1980.
The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
The management representatives had no comment in response to each item discussed by the inspector.
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