ML19340E520
| ML19340E520 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/19/1980 |
| From: | Chilk S NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19340E507 | List: |
| References | |
| FRN-45FR85459, RULE-PR-2, RULE-PR-50, RULE-PR-70, RULE-PR-73 NUDOCS 8101140811 | |
| Download: ML19340E520 (27) | |
Text
i I.
WUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR PARTS 2, 50, 70, AND 73 Protection of Unclassified Safeguards Infomation AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Proposed Rule.
SUMMARY
- The NRC proposes to amend its regulations to prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of safeguards infomation by NRC licensees and other persons. Th2 Commission is issuing the proposed regulations to identify specific types of safeguards infomation to be protected, establish minimum protection requirements to be applied by licensees and other persons, and set forth the conditions under which access to safeguards infomation would be granted.
DATE: Comments must be received on or before (70 days after publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER). Coments received after this date will be considered if
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it is practical to do so.
ADDRES'SES: ' Written comments in connection with the proposed amendnents should be sent to the Secretary of the Commission, U25. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.
20555, Attention: Docketing and Service Branch. Copies of comments received may be examined at the Comission's Public Document Room at 1717 N Street, W.W., Washington, D.C.
' FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Donald J. Kasun, Physical Security Licensing Branch, Division of Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety.
and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.
- 20555, Phone - 301-427-4010. rd10114*M \\
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
In November 1978, the Commission approved a plan i
to classify, under Executive Order 12065, sensitive safeguards infomation for activities involving fomula quantities of strategic special nuclear material.
Implementing regulations for the classification program,10 CFR Parts 25 and 95, were published in the Federal Register on March 5, 1980 (45 FR 14476) with an effective date of October 1,1980.
In regard to the protection of other sensitive safeguards infomation not classifiable under the Executive Order (i.e., infomation worthy of protection in the interest of public health and safety but with no direct connection to the national security),
the Commission has consistently supported legislation to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to provide for explicit authority in this area. Such legislation was recently enacted as a provision of the NRC Authorization r,i Appropriations Act for 1980 (PL 96-295). A new Section 147, SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION, was added to the Atomic Energy Act which directs the Commission to prescribe regulations or issue orders, after notice and opportunity for public comment, as necessary, to prohibit the unavthorized disclosure of safeguards infomation which specifically identifit:L a licensee's or applic nt's detailed -
l (1) control and accounting procedures or security measures for the physical protection of special nuclear material; l
(2) security measures for the physical protection of source material or byproduct material; or (3) security measures for the physical protection of and the location l
of certain plant equipment vital to the safety of production or utilization facilities.
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l Accordingly, the Nuclear Regulatc*y Commission proposes to amend its regulations in 10 CFR Parts 2, 50, 70,,.., 73, and invites public coment on the proposed amendments.
The requirements ses ; orth in these proposed rules are the minimum restrictions that the Comission believes will be responsive to the new legislation, in that (i) the information to be protected is limited to specific safeguards measures employed by licensees or proposed by applicants; (ii) the only conditions for access are a "need-to-know" and certain specified employment statuses; and (iii) facilities and materials covered by the rule are limited to those the Consission has already determined need to be protected against theft or sabotage.
The essential characteristics of the information protection system are as follows:
Types of safeguards information to be protected - In general, the proposed rule covers infomation previously withheld under 10 CFR 2.790(d)(1). A new proposed Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 73 detines explicitly types of information required to be protected.
In sumary the list includes information regard:ng (unless otherwise classified as National Security Information (NSI) or Restricted Data (RD)):
1.
Physical Protection at Fixed Sites
- Composite security and contingency plans
- Drawings showing location of site safeguards features and alarm system details
- Written guard orders and procedures
- Details of off-site response force capabilities (local police) I
- Plant specific conposite listings and locations of vital safety related equipment at reactor facilities as contained in phsical security and safeguards contingency plans and plant specific analyses.
- 11. Physical Protection In Transit
- Composite security and es atingency plans
- Schedules and itinercie': for specific shipments
- Description of vehicle safeguards features
- Detail of '.acal police response force capabilities iii. Calculated limits of error associated with inventory differences (LEID) 1/
iv.
Inspections, audits and evaluations
- Portions of inspection reports, audits or invest 1 tions that contain 3
details of a physical security system or that disclose uncorrected defects in the system.
- Portions of inspection reports, audits or investigations that contain limit of error data (LEID) or that disclose defects in a licensee's accounting system that could directly affect an LEID.
v.
Correspondence
- Portions of correspondence to and from the NRC which contain details of any of tns shove.
A summary of the arguments surrounding the selection of each type of information is set forth below.
1/ Note that a licensee's or applicant's control and accounting procedures or inventory differences would not be included as Safeguards Information, and therefore not protected under the provisions of this proposed rule. Such information would continue to be withheld from pblic disclosure under 10 CFR 2.790(d), and in addition inventory differences for facilities that possess fonnula quantities of strategic special nuclear material would be classified under 10 CFR Part 95..
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_.,c.
Group I - Infomation regarding physical protection at fixed sites.
Included in this group are physical security plans, safeguards contingency plans, drawings that show safeguards features and details of the intrusion alam J
system, composite listings of vital equipment and locations, written guard orders, and capabilities and arrangements made with local response forces.
There is general agreement that the release of this type of infomation in significant detail would significantly increase the likelihood of theft or sabotage by:
- Reducing deterrence value. A good example is the passenger search system at airports which worked extremely well for years because the perfomance characteristics of the system were not known.
(The FAA has protected their security infomation under specific legisla-tive authority since the early 1970's ) Once it was found that the systems could not detect certain items, some of the deterrence was i
L lost.
- Allowing for possible compromise of the intrusion detection system and successful covert intrusion. Most alam systems used to protect nuclear facilities are tamper resistant and tamper indicating, making compromise all but impossible for even sophisticated adversaries. However, with knowledge of the electrical details and perfomance characteristics of alarm equipment, elimination of alarm system protection becomes possible.
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- Providing an opportunity for advance planning. In this regard the Generic Adversary Characteristics Report (NUREG-0459) states:
" Professional criminals, many terrorists groups, some extremist protest groups, and certain disoriented persons plan carefully and l l'
thoughtfully before initiating a given criminal mission. Many of these adversaries will abort planned encounters when security or other interruptions occur."
Our thought here is that opportunity to plan is a key element in target selection, and an essential element in a successful operation.
- Pinpointing target areas for power reactors - As part of a security plan review, Los Alamos National Laboratory provides to the Commission a detailed list of vital areas for a specific power reactor, a rank ordering of the importance of each vital area and sets or combinations that if sabotaged as a group would cause an offsite release. This is the type of infomation the Commission intends to protect under this rule.
Obviously, such infomation would be valuable to an adversary planning an attack for without it the probability of successful sabotage would be quite small.
Group II - Infomation regarding physical protection in transit. Included
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in this group are the same types of infomation as for fixed site plus schedules and itineraries for shipments.
Release of information in this group would have the same potential adverse effects as for fixed site information, plus this additional concern.
nowledge of shipment schedules and itinerary would allow an adversary v
to plan for and pick the time and place for a road ambush, thereby placing the defense forces at a significant disadvantage. (For multiple shipments over the same route, the itinerary, but not the schedule, tends to be self-disclosing. Therefore, routes for spent fuel shipments, which noma 11y consist of several shipments in a series, are not withheld from disclosure). !
Group III - Information regarding calculated limit of error associated with inventory differences (LEID).
Included in this group are LEID's for any facility that possesses one effective kilogram or more of special nuclear materi al.
(Note that nuclear material control plans, implementing procedures
- d records, and inventory differences are not included as protected safeguards inf omation. This infomation in whole or in part does not appear to meet the Section 147 test for withholding.)
Disclosure of LEID information would aid an insider adversary in detemining how much material could be diverted without exceeding the alam threshhold.
Group IV - Inspection reports, audits and investigations. This group includes reports produced by the licensee or the NRC that contain information from Groups I, II, and III, or those portions of such reports that contain details of an uncorrected defect or weakness in a licensee's safeguards program.
Disclosure of the details of an unccrrected vulnerability could provide a blueprint for defeat of the safeguards system and could be more harmful i
than the release of the security program itself.
(For example, disclosing that a facility's motion alarm system could not detect a person crawling on hand and knees would provide significant benefit to a would be adversary.)
Therefore, based upon the above considerations, the Comissior has determined that the unauthorized disclosure of the kinds of Safeguards Information listed in proposed Appendix E could reasonably be expected to have a significant i
adverse effect on the health and safety of the public or the common defense..--
and security by dgnificantly increasing the likelihood of theft, diversien, J
or sabotage of nuclear rtaterial or a facility.
Access requirements - Access to the safeguards information would be limited to persons who have a need-to-know and who fall within certain enployment or occupation categories. These categories include:
- employees of a licensee, applicant, the Comission, the United States Government or agents of these bodies.
- duly authorized Congressional Comittees.
- Governors of States or their representatives.
- representatives of the IAEA associated with the US/IAEA Agreement.
- me:r.bers of state and local police units.
- parties in NRC adjudicatory hearings or federal court litigation involving the NRC when authorized by the presiding officer or court, as appropriate.
There would be no personnel security clearances required for these individuals.
Section 147 contains no provisions regarding trustworthiness determinations (as are set forth in Section 145 for access to Restricted Data) and, consistent with the directive of Section 147 that or.ly the minimum restrictions be applied to Safeguards Infonnation, the Comission believes such clearances are not necessary.
Level of protection - The protection afforded the safeguards information would be substantially greater than that currently afforded to information under 10 CFR 2.790(d) and in some respects approaches that provided Confidential National Security Information (CNSI) under 10 CFR Part 95, except that there would be no requirement for personnel security clearances. Protection provisions include:
- storage in steel filing cabinet equipped with a locking bar within a protected or controlled access area; or in a GSA approved security container within a locked building not in a protected or controlled access area.
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- control by an authorized individual while in use.
- marking of documents top and bottom - SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION - and indicating on the first page the name and organization of the authorizing in6tvidual (portion marking would not be required except on reports and correspondence).
- prohibition against transmittal by unprotected telecommunications except under emergency or extraordinary conditions.
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There would be no requirements for a facility clearance or submittal of an information protection plan as are contained in 10 CFR oarts 25 and 95.
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Persons, facilities and materials that are subject to the proposed rule - The proposed rule would apply to any person that possesses safeguards informat on, any applicant required by NRC regulations to submit a physical security, safeguards P
contingency or nuclear material control plan, and each licensee subject to the physical protection provisions of Part 73. Included in the latter wocid be:
- power reactors
- non-power reactors
- Fuel cycle facilities and transportation activities involving special nuclear material of moderate and low strategic significance
- Fuel cycle and transportation activities involving formula quantities of strategic special nuclear naterial for safeguards infomation not otherwise classfi'ed NSI or RD
- Spent fuel shipments except for routes and quantities Since there are no present NRC requirements for the physical protection.of source or byproduct material, facilities that possess or use these materials exclusively would not be subject to the proposed rule.
Information Types Not Included - Certain types of information, even though possibly regarded as safeguards information, would not fall within the scope of the proposed rule. Most notably are studies, reports and analyses con-ducted by or on behalf of the Commission, licensees or applicants which concern the safeguarding of nuclear materials or facilities. Specific pro-visions in Section 147 regarding the proteocion of such information were deleted from the final version of the Authorization Bill.
Information not covered by the rule includes:
1.
Documents, drawings or reports submitted by applicants or licensees, er produced by the staff, in response to the environmental and safety requirements contained in 10 CFR Parts 50, 51, 70, and 71.
2.
Generic safeguards studies, reports or analyses whether or not produced by or for the Commission or a licensee.
3.
Routes and quantities for spent fuel shipments.
4.
Guard training and aualification plans.
5.
Information concerning licensee control and accounting procedures, or 6
inventory differe. css (not otherwise classified as NSI or RD) for special nuclear material, or source material and byproduct material.
6.
Any information already in the public domain including commercial safe-guards equipment specifications, catalogues and equipment buying data.
Freedom of Information Act Considerations (FOIA) - Section 147, in the intro-ductory paragraph, provides that the, Commission's exercise of the new authority contained in the section be made " subject to subsection (b)(3) of section 552 of title 5 of the United States Code" (FOIA). The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee on Conference in regard to this provision, contains the following: --
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"This express reference to the Freedom of Infomation Act is intended to make it clear that the compromise provision is a specific statutory exemption from the FOIA, as provided for in Section 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3),
and meets all the requirements for a statutory exemption under that section".
Implementing procedures in response to FOIA requirements are contained in 10 CFR Part 9, Subpart A.
No change to Part 9 is considered to be necessary and none are proposed.
While material control and accounting records and infomation (other t' an LEID) would not be identified as Safeguards Infomation and accordingly would not be entitled to the special protections provided for that infomation under Section 147, the Comission staff proposes that the Comission continue to designate such infomation as connercial or financial information under 2.790(d)(1). The effect of revising 2.790(d)(1) as proposed will be to continue a basis for withholding this material control and accounting infomation from public release pursuant to 10 CFR 9.5(a)(4), (Exemption 4 of the FOIA), and to avoid requiring individual deteminations of whether the infomation qualifies for withholding based on the standard for proprietary information.
Because the staff believes material control and accounting infomation consistently contains matters entitled to some measure of protection, it recommends use l
of2.790(d)(1). Public comment is particularly requested on the proposed actionregarding2.790(d)(1).
Agency Proceedings The Authorization Act also amended Section 181 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 by extending the requirements of this Section to safeguards inforination protected under the authority of Section 147. As amended, Section 181 requires that the l '
Commission, in the case of agency proceedings, provide by regulation procedures that will effectively safeguard and prevent disclosure of Restricted Data, defense infomation and safeguards infomation to unauthorized persons with minimum impaiment of the procedural rights which would be available if Restricted Data, defense inforation or safeguards infomation were not involved. As regards to safeguards infomation, basic regulations, as set forth in 10 CFR 2.744,
" Production of NRC records and documents" and 1G CFR 2.790 "Public inspections, exemptions, requests for withholding" are already in effect.
(Restricted Data and National Security Infomation are covered in Subpart I of Part 2 - Special Procedares Applicable to Adjudiciary Proceedings Involving Restricted Data or National Security Infomation.)
In addition to the regulations already in place, the staff proposes to amend 10 CFR 2.744 to add a provision giving presiding officers the authority to issue appropriate protective orders whenever protected Safeguards Infonnation is required in an adjudicatory hearing. Because no clearances are required for access to Safeguards Infomation under Section 147, the staff believes it to be unnecessary to include such infomation in Subpart I of Part 2.
The promulgation of these amendments would not result in any activity that i
affects the environment. Accordingly, The Commission has detemined under the National Environmental Quality guidelines and t'e criteria of 10 CFR 51.5(d) n l
that neither an environmental impact statement nor environmental impact appraisal to support a negative declaration for the proposed amendments to Title 10 is l
required.
The NRC has estimated the cost of these amendments to the licensed industry and the various states that would be required to protect the spent fuel shipping I !
notices against unauthorized disclosure. According to these estimates the initial costs of storage container procurement and document marking would be about $100,000 and $250,000 respectively. Annual recurring costs for document processing and control would be about $300,000.
Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and Sections 552 and 553 of Title 5 of the United States Code, notice is hereby given that adoption of the following amendments to Title 10, Chapter I, Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 2, 50, 70, and 73, is contemplated.
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PART 2 - RULES OF PRACTICE FOR DOMESTIC LICENSING PROCEEDINGS 1.
Section 2.744 is amended by adding a new paragraph 2.744(e) to read I
as follows:
5 2.744 Production of NRC records and documents.
(e)
In the case of requested documents and records (including Safeguards Information referred to in Sections 147 and 181 of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended) exempt from disclosure under 5 2.790 of this Part, but whose disclosure is found by the presiding officer to be necessary to a proper decision in the proceeding, any order to the Executive Director for Operations to produce the document or records (or any other order issued ordering production of the document or record) may contain such protective terms and conditions (including affidavits of non-disclosure) as may be necessary and appropriate to limit the disclosure to parties in the proceeding, to interested States and other governmental entities participating pursuant to 5 2.715(c) of this Part, and to their qualified witnesses and counsel. When Safeguards Information protected from disclosure under Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, is received and possessed by a party other than the Commission staff, it shall also be protected according to the requirements of 5 73.21 of Part 73 of this Chapter. The presiding officer may also prescribe such additional procedures as will effectively, safeguard and prevent disclosure of Safeguards Information to unauthorized persons with minimum impairment of the procedural rights which would be available if Safeguards Information were not involved.
In addition to any other san: tion that may be imposed by the presiding officer for i
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violation of an order issued pursuant to this paragraph, violation of an order pertaining to the disclosure of Safeguards Information pro-tected from disclosure under Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act, as
- r. mended, may be subject to a civil penalty imposed pursuant to 5 2.205 of this Part.
2.
Section 2.790 is amended by revising paragraph 2.790(d)(1) as follows:
5 2.790 Public inspections, exemptions, requests for withholding.
(d)(1) Correspondence and reports to or from the NRC which contain infomation or records concerning a licensee's or applicant's material control and accounting program for special nuclear material.
4 PART 50 - DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES 3.
Section 50.34 is amended by adding a new paragraph (e) to read as follows:
5 50.34 Contents of applications; technical infomation.
(e) Each applicant who prepares a physical security plan or safe-guards contingency plan pursuant to this section, shall protect the plan and other related Safeguards Infomation against unauthorized disclosure in accordance with the requirements of 5 73.21 and Appendix E to Part 73 of this chapter.
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4.
Section 50.54 is emended by adding a new paragraph (v) to read as follows:
5 50.54 Conditions of licenses (v) Each licensee subject to the requirements of this section shall ensure that physical security and safegn=rds contingency plans and other related Safeguards Information are protected against unautho-rized disclosure in accordance with the requirements of 5 73.21 and Appendix E to Part 73 of this chapter.
PART 70 - DOMESTIC LICENSING OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR KATERIAL Section 70.22 is amended by adding a new paragraph (1) after paragraph 5.
(k) to read as follows:
70.22 Contents of applications.
(1) Each applicant who prepares a physical security or safeguards contingency plan shall protect such plans and other related Safeguards Information against unauthorized disclosure in accordance with the requirements of 5 73.21 and Appendix E to Part 73 of this chapter.
6.
Section 70.32 is amended by adding a new paragraph (j) to read as follows:
5 70.32 Conditions of licenses.
(j) Each licensee subject to the requirements of this section shall ensure that physical security and safeguards contingency plans and other related Safeguards Information are protected against \\
unauthorized disclosure in accordance with the requirements of 5 73.21 and Appendix E to Part 73 of this chapter.
PART 73 - PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS 7.
Section 73.1(b) is amended by adding a new paragraph (7) to read as follows:
5 73.1 Purpose and scope.
(b)(7)
This part prescribes requirements for the protection of Safeguards Information in the hands of any person, whether or not a licensee of the Commission, who produces, receives, or acquires Safegua-ds Information.
8.
Section 73.2 is amended by adding new paragraphs (jj), (kk), (11) &
(mm) to read as follows:
5 73.2 Definitions e
(jj) " Safeguards Information" means information not other-wise classified as National Security Information or Restricted Data which specifically identifies a licensee's or applicant's detailed, (1) security measures for the physical protection of special nuclear r.aterial, (2) security measures for the physical protection and loca-tion of certain plant equipment vital to the safety of production or utilization facilities, or (3) limits of error associated with. invent =j differences (LEID) for special nuclear material.
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(kk) "Need-To-Know" means a detemination by a person having responsibility for protecting Safeguards Infomation that a proposed recipient's access to Safeguards Infomation is necessary in the per-fomance of official, contractual, or licensee duties of employment.
(11)
" Person" means (1) any individual, corporation, partner-ship, fim, association, trust, estate, public or private institu-tion, group, government agency other than the Commission or the Department of Energy (DOE), (except tnat the DOE shall be considered a person to the extent that its facilities are subject to the licensing a
and related regulatory authority of the Commission pursuant to S
- ion 202 of' the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 and Sections 104, 105, and e.
202 of the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978), any state or political subdivision of state, or any political subdivision i
of any government or nation, or other entity; and (2) any legal successor, representative, agent, or agency of the foregoing.
(mm)
" Security Storage Container" includes any of the following repositories:
(1) A steel filing cabinet equipped with a steel locking bar and a 3 position, changeable combination, GSA approved padlock, for storage in a building located within a protected or controlled access area; (2) A security filing cabinet that bears a Test Certification Label on the side of the locking drawer, inside wall adjacent to the locking drawer, or interior door plate, and is marked, " General Services _ _,
t Administration Approved Security Contain2r" cn the cxterior of the top drawer or door; (3) A bank safe-deposit box; and (4) Other reposi-tories which in the judgment of the NRC, would provide comparable physical protection.
9.
A new Section 73.21 is added to read as follows:
5 73.21 Requirements for the Protection of.cifeguards Infomation.
(a) General Perfomance Requirement - Each licensee subject to the provisions of 55 73.20, 73.25, 73.26, 73.37, 73.40, 73.45, 73.46, 73.50, 73.55, 73.60, or 73.67, and each person who produces, receives, or ac-quires Safeguards Information shall ensure that Safeguards Information
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is protected against unauthorized disclosure. To meet this general per-formance requirement, licensees and persons subject to this section shall establish and maintain an information protection system that includes the measures specified in paragraphs (b) through (i) of this section.
(b)
Infomation to be Protected - The specific types of infor-mation, documents, and reports that shall be protected are set forth in
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Appendix E of this Part.
(c) Access to Safeguards Infomation - (1) Except as the Comission may otherwise authorize, no person may have access to Safeguards Infomation unless the person has an established "need-to-know" for the infomation and is:
(i) An employee, agent, or contractor of an applicant, a licensee, the Comission, or the United States Government.
(ii) A member of a duly authorized comittee of the Congress.
(iii) The Governor of a State or designated representative.
(iv) A representative of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) engaged in activities associated with the U.S./IAEA Safeguards Agreement who has been certified by the NRC,..
(v) A member of a state or local law enforcement authordty that is responsible for responding to requests for assist-ance during safeguards emergencies, or (vi) A person to whom disc 1csure is ordered pursuant to 5 2.744 of Part 2 of this chapter.
(2) Except as the Comission may otherwise authorize, no person may disclose Safeguards Information to any other person except as set forth in paragraph (c)(1) of this section.
(d) Protection While in Use or Storage - (1) While in use, matter containing Safeguards Information shall be under the control of an authorized individual to preclude access by persons who do not have a need-to-know or are otherwise not authorized access in accordance with this section.
(2) While unattended or not in actual use, Safeguards Infor-mation shall be stored in a locked security storage container within a locked room or building. Knowledge of lock combinations pro-tecting Safeguards Information shall be limited to a minimum num-ber of personnel for operating purposes who have a "need-to-know" and are otherwise authorized access to Safeguards Infomation l
in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(e) Preparation and Marking of Documents - (1) Each document that contains Safeguards Information as defined in Appendix E of this part shall contain on the face of the document (i) the name, title, and organization of the individual authorized to make a Safeguards Information deteruination, and who has determined that the document contains Safeguards Information, (ii) the date the document war t
originated or the determination made, and (iii) an indication that the document contains Safeguards Information. Each page shall be marked in a conspicuous fashion at the top and bottom with the legend SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION.
(2)
If the document contains any form of Restricted Data or National Security Information, it shall also be marked in accord-ance with the provisions of 10 CFR Part 95.-
(3) Transmittal letters or memoranda which do not in themselves contain Safeguards Information shall be marked to indicate that attachments or enclosures contaia Safeguards Information.
(4)
In addition to the information required on the face of the document, each item of correspondence to and from the NRC that contains Safeguards Information shall,by marking or other means. clearly indicate which portions (e.g., paragraphs or pages) contain Safeguards Information and which do not.
(Portion marking s
is not required for the specific items of information set forth in Appendix E other than correspondence to and from the NRC.)
(f) Reproduction and Destruction of Matter Containing Safeguards Information - (1) Safeguards Information may be reproduced to the minimum extent necessary consistent with need wi,thout permission of the originator.
- 52) Docurents containing Safeguards Information say be destroyed by burning, pulping or other methods that assure com-plete destruction of the information they contain.
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(g) External Transmission of Documents and Material -
(1) Documents containing Safeguards Information,when transmitted outside an authorized place of use or storage,shall be enclosed in two sealed envelopes or wrappers. The inner envelope or wrapper shall contain the name and address of the intended recipient, be marked both sides, top and bottom with the words SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. The outer envelope or wrapper shall contain the intended recipient's name and address with no indication that the document inside contains Safeguards Information.
(2) Safeguards Infonnation may be transported by messenger-courier, or United States first class, registered, express, or certified mail.
(3) Safeguards Infonnation shall not be transmitted by unprotected telecomunications circuits (including facsimile)
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except under emergency or extraordinary conditions.
(h) Use of Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Systems -
Safeguards Infonnation may be processed or produced on an ADP system provided that the system is self-contained within the licensee's facility and requires the use of an access code, or has been approved for security by the NRC.
(1) Removal from Safeguards Information Category - Documents originally containing Safeguards Information shall be removed from the Safeguards Information category whenever the information no longer l
meets the criteria contained in this section and Appendix E of this part.
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- 10. Section 73.80 is amended by adding a reference to Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended, as follows:
5 73.80 Violations An injunction or other court order may be obtained prohibiting any violation of any provision of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, l
or Tit 1~e II of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, or any regulation or order issued thereunder. A court order may be obtained for the pqment of a civil penalty imposed pursuant to section 234 of the Act for violation of section 53, 57, 62, 63, 81, 82, 101, 103, 104, 107, 109, or 181 of the Act, or section 206 of the Energy Reorganization 7
Act of 1974, or any rule, regulation, or order issued thereunder, or any term, condition, or limitation of any license issued thereunder, or for any violation for which a license may be revoked under section 186 of the Act. Any person who willfully violates any provision of the Act or any regulation or order issued thereunder may be gulity of s
a crime and, upon conviction, may be punished by fine or imprisonment or both, as provided by law.
- 11. A new Appendix E to Part 73 is added to read as follows:
APPENDIX E TO PART 73 - PROTECTION OF SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION
==
Introduction:==
This appendix defines the specific type of infonnation and documents that are subject to the information protection requirements of 5 73.21. I
APPENDIX E I.
The following items shall be considered Safeguards Information.
A.
Physical Protection at Fixed Sites Information not otherwise Cla:sified as Restricted Data or National Security Information relating to the protection of (i) power and non-power reactors, (ii) facilities that possess special nuclear material of moderate and low strategic significance, and (iii) facil-ities that possess formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material. Specifically:
The composite physical security plan for the nuclear facility (1) or site.
(2) Site specific "as built" drawings, diagrams, sketches, or maps showing the identity, barrier construction, internal layout, and location of facility safeguards features including alarm stations, guard posts, defensive positions, and patrol routes.
(3) As installed details of alam system layouts showing location of intrusion detection devices, alarm assessment equipment, system wiring, normal and emergency power sources, and duress alams.
(4) Written orders and procedures for guards and other security personrel, duress codes, and patrol schedules.
(5) Details of the on-site and off tite comunications systems.
(6) Lock combinations and mechanical key design.
(7) Plant specific composite listings and locations of vital safety-related equipment at production or utilization facilities as contained in physical security plans, safeguards contingency plans and plant specific safeguards analyses..
t (8) The composite safeguards contingency plan for the facility or site.
(9) Response plans to specific threats detailing size, disposition, response times, and armament of responding forces.
(10) Size, armament, and disposition of on-site reserve forces.
(11) Size, identity, armament, and response times of off-site response forces.
B.
Physical Protection In Transit
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Information not otherwise classified as Restricted Data or National - _ _ _ _
Security Information relative to the protection of shipments of (1) spent fuel, (ii) special nuclear material of moderate and low strategic significance, and (iii) formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material.
Specifically:
(1) The composite transportation physical security plan.
(2) Schedules and itineraries for specific shipments.1/ 2/
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(3) Details of vehicle immobilization features, intrusion alarm devices, and communications systems.
(4) Arrangements with and capabilities of local police response forces, and locations of safe havens.
-1/ Routes and quantities for shipments of spent fuel are not with-held from public disclosure. Schedules for spent fuel shipments nmy be released 10 days after the last shipment of a current series.
(Reference 5 73.37(e)(3)).
-2/ Schedules and itineraries for shipments other than those involving spent fuel or formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material may be released if it becomes necessary to disclose such information to common carriers or other persons not subject to the general license provisions of 10 CFR 70.20(a)..
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(5) Details regarding limitations of radio-telephone communications.
(6) Procedures for response to safeguards emergencies.
C.
Limits of Error of Inventory Differences Infomation not othemise classified as Restricted Data or National Security Infomation relat.:90 to calculated limits of error i.s,ociated with inventory differences (LEIDs at facilities that possess one effective kilogram or more of special nuclear material.
D.
Inspections, Audits & Evaluations Infomation not othemise classified as National Security Infomation or Restricted Data relating to.eafeguards inspections and reports.
Specifically:
f (1) Portions of safeguards inspection reports, evaluations, audits, or investigations that contain details of a Ifcensee's or ap-I l
plicant's physical security system or that disclose uncorrected defects, weaknesses, or vulnerabilities in the system.lf (2) Portions of safeguards inspection reports, evaluations, audits, or investigations that contain limits of error associated with inventory differences (LEID), or that disclose uncorrected de-l fects or weaknesses in a licensee's accounting system that could directly affect the LEID.
1/
-1/ Information regarding defects, wehknesses or vulnerabilitiet to be released after corrections have been made. Reports of investi-gations to be released after the investigation has ber.n completed, unless withheld pursuant to other authorities, e.g., The Privacy Act... -. - -.
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E.
Correspondence To and From the NRC Portions of correspondence to and from the NRC insofar as they contain Safeguards Information specifically defined in paragraph A
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through D of this Appendix.
(Secs. 53, 147, 161b, 1611, 1610, 181, Pub. L.83-703 as amended, 68 Stat.
930, 948, 949, 953; Sec. 201, Pub. L.93-438, 88 Stat.1242-1243, Sec. 207 Pub. L.96-295, 94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2201,, 2231, 5841)).
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Dated at Washington, D.C. this /'f d
For the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission.
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Samuel J Chilk Secretary of e Comission l
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