ML19340C225
| ML19340C225 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 10/28/1980 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19340C224 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8011140270 | |
| Download: ML19340C225 (4) | |
Text
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NUCLEAH REGULATOHY COMMISSION
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e.....P SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF flUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 79 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-57 AllD AMEtlDf1EllT NO.18 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE N0. NPF-5 GEORGIA POWER COMPAllY OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKETS fl0S. 50-321 AND 50-366 I.
INTRODUCTION By letter dated September 15, 1980, the Georgia Power Company (the licensee) proposed changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) appended to Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-57 and NPF-5 for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units Nos. 1 and 2.
The changes %volve the incorporation of certain of the TMI-2 Lesscns Learned Catenory "A" requirements.
The licensee's request is in direct response to the NRC staff's letter dated July 2,1980.
II.
BACKGROUND IhFORitATION By our letter dated September 13, 1979- we issued to all operating nuclear power plants requirements established as a result of our review of the Three Mile Island Unit 2 accident.
Certiin of these requirements, designated Lessons Learned Category "A" requirements, were to have been completed by the licensae prior to any operation subsequent to January 1,1980.
Our evaluation of the licensee's compliance with these Category "A" items was attached to our letter to Georgia Power Company dated February 26, 1980.
In order to provide r'asonable assurance that operating reactor facilities are maintained within the limits determined acceptable following the implementation of the TMI-2 Lessons Learr.ed Category "A" items, we requested that licensees amend their TSs to incorporate additional Limiting Conditions of Operation and Surveillance Requirements, as appropriate.
This request was transmitted to i
licennees on July 2, 1980.
Included therein were model specifications that we had determined to be acceptable.
The licensee's application is in direct response to our request.
Each of the issues identified by the NRC staff and the licensee's response is discussed in the Evaluat ion below.
III.
EVALUATI0tl 1.
Emergency Power Supply / Inadequate Core Cooling As applicable to Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs), we indicated that water level 80u 140 278
C.
. instrumentation is important to post-accident monitoring and that surveillance of this instrumentation should be perforned. The licensee's response to this request stated that the current surveillance requirements for the reactor water level instrumentation at Hatch meet or exceed our guidance.
We have reviewed the current specifications (Tables 3.2-11 and 4.2-11 for Hatch I and Tables 3.3.6.4-1 and 4.3.6.4-1 for Hatch 2) and determined that water level instrumentation is included.
The specifications provide ACTION statements for inoperable instrument channels.
Surveillance requirements i
for instrument checks and calibration are also included. The frequency of surveillance meets or exceeds our guidelines.
Based on this review, we conclude that no changes are required to satisfy our request.
2.
Valve Position Indication Our requirements for installation of a reliable position indicating system for relief and safety valves was based on the need to provide the operator with a diagnostic aid to reduce the ambiguity between indications that might indicate either an open relief /fafety valve or a small line break.
Such a system did not need to be safety grade provided that backup methods of determining valve position are available.
The licensee's request would add both the primary indicating system (tail-pipe pressure switches) and the secondary indicating system (downstream temperature detectors) to the specifications. Actions have been specified for the condition of an inoperable channel and for inoperability of both primary and backup detector channels. Additionally, surveillance require-ments have been included. Based on our review, we find the licensee's recommended changes satisfy our guidelines and are acceptable.
3.
Containment Isolation Our request indicated that the specifications should include a Table of Containment Isolation Valves which reflect the diverse isolation signal requirement of this Lessons Learned issue.
The licensee's request stated that the current specifications include a requirement for diverse isolation signals and that no changes are required.
We have reviewed the current specifications (Tables 3.2-1, 3.2-3, 3.7-1, 4.2-1 and 4.2-8 for Hatch 1 and Tables 3.3.2-1, 3.3.2-2, 3.3.2-3, 4.3.2-1 and 3.6.3-1 for Hatch 2). These tables include a listing of valves, actuation signals and surveillance requirements.
Based on this review, we have determined that the current specifications satisfy our request and that no changes are necessary.
4.
Our request indicated that the TSs related to minimum shift manning should be revised to reflect the augmentation of an STA.
The STA function includes both accident and operating experience assessment.
. The licensee proposed the addition of an STA to the minimum shift crew composition and the specific qualifications of this individual.
These qualifications state that the STA shall have a bachelor's degree or equivalent in a scientific or engineering discipline with specific training in plant design, and response and analysis of the plant for transients and accidents.
Since our position does not require degreed STAS until January 31, 1981, the licensee requested that the effective date for the STA requirement be delayed until that time.
Our evaluation of the adequacy of the licensee's actions to provide STAS, including the interim period from January 1,1980, to January 1,1981, was contained in our letter dated February 26, 1980.
That evaluation concluded that it was acceptable for the interim period to use, as STAS-Senior Reactor Operators with added training.
In view of the above, we have determined that the requirenent to augment shift manning with an STA even during the interin period should be imple-mented; deferral to January 1,1981, of the requirements for a degreed individual is acceptable. We've discussed this with the licensee and he agreed. Therefore, the licensee's request as modified by the NRC staff satisfies our request and is acceptable.
5.
Integrity of Systems Outside Containment Our letter dated July 2,1980, indicated dat the license should be amended by adding a license condition raa;ed to a Systems Integrity Measurements Program.
Such a condition would require the licensee to effect an appropriate program to eliminate or prevent the release of signifi-cant amounts of radioactivity to the environment via leakage from engineered safety systems and auxiliary systems, which are located outside reactor con-tainment.
The licensee's application did not address this issue.
Discussions between members of our staffs indicated that (1) the licensee has implemented a leakage reduction program, as reported in our evaluation dated February 26, 1980, and (2) the application did not address this issue since TSs are not involved.
The licensee's representatives indicated that they did not object to including such provisions. They suggested that they be incorporated into the Adminis-trative Controls Section of the specifications. Accordingly, we have included the requirements and determined that our request has been satisfied.
6.
. Iodine Monitoring Our letter dated July 2,1980, indicated that the license should be amended by adding a license condition related to iodine monitoring.
Such a condition would require the licensee to effect a program which would ensure the capa-bility to determine the airborne iodine concentration in areas requiring personoci access under accident conditions.
4 t The licensee's application did not address this issue.
Discussions between rembers of our staffs indicated that (1) the licensee has implemented a program to satisfy this issue, as reported in our evaluation dated February 26, 1980. This program includes the training of personnel, procedures for monitoring, and provisions for maintenance of sampling and analysis equipment; (2) the licensee's application did not address this issue since TSs are not involved.
The licensee's representatives indicated that they did not object to including such provisions as part of the Administrative Controls Section of the TSs. Accordingly, we have included the requirement and determined that our request has been satisfied.
IV.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS We have determined th'at the amendments do not involve a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further ccncluded that the amendments involve an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environ-mental impact and pursuant to 10 CFR Section 51.5(d)(4) that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmentil impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.
V.
CONCLUSIONS We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) because the amendments do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and do not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Dated: October 28, 1980 l
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