ML19340B106
| ML19340B106 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1980 |
| From: | Novak T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Hancock J FLORIDA POWER CORP. |
| References | |
| TAC-42062, TAC-48921, NUDOCS 8010210252 | |
| Download: ML19340B106 (4) | |
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A jo UNITED STATES g
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f7 g
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 j
T3 of September 30, 1980 Dock'et No. 50-302 Mr. J. A. Hancock Director, Nuclear Operations Florida Power Corporation P. O. Box 14042, Mail Stop C-4 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733
Dear Mr. Hancock:
As you know, the NRC with the assistance of its contractor (Science l
Applications Incorporated) has been engaged in an Interim Reliability Evaluation Program (IREP) study of Crystal River, Unit No. 3 (CR-3).
l Recommendations and comments, which were an outgnwth of this study, have been enclosed for your consideration.
We view recomendation No. 6, on operator training and procedures, as l
one which should be implemented in the near term. We, therefore, request your views on timely implementation of this recomendation.
In this regard, we would point out that FPC should assure that they have considered the dominant IREP sequences in their development of operator training and procedures. The operator actions that should be stressed are:
a)
Initiation of feed and bleed; b) Local actuation and operating of the turbine-driven EFW pump, and c)
Switchover from injection to recirculation phase following a LOCA.
We would appreciate receiving your coments on the enclosed recomenda,
l tions within one month.
Sincerely, h
J7 Thomas M. Novak, Assistant Director I
for Operating Reactors Division o f Licensing
Enclosure:
IREP Study Recommendations cc w/ enclosure: See next page 8016210 252
d Crystal River-3 50-302 Florida Power Corporation cc -/ enclosure (s):
Mr
- 5. A. Brandimore Mr. Robert B. Borsum Vice President and General Counsel Babcock & Wilcox P. O. Box 14042 Nuclear Power Generation Division St.. Petersburg, Florida 33733 Suite 420, 7735 Old Georgetown Road Bethesda, Maryland 20014 Mr. Wilbur Langely, Chairman Board of County Commissioners 4
Citrus County Iverness, Florida 36250 Bureau of Intergovernmental Relations U. S. Environmental Protection Agency 660 Apalachee Parkway Region IV Office Tallahassee, Florida 32304 ATTN:
EIS COORDINATOR 345 Courtland Street, N.E.
Mr. Tom Stetka, Risident Inspector Atlanta, Georgia 30308 U. S. Nuclear Kegulatory Comission P
o Dire
. Technical Assessment River, Florida 32629 Office of Radiation Programs (AW-459)
.U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Crystal Mall #2 Arlington, Virginia 20460 Crystal River Public Library Crystal River, Florida 32629 Mr, J, Shreve The Public Counsel Room 4 Holland Bldg.
Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Administrator Department of Environmental Regulation Power Plant Siting Section State of Florida 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The' Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Dr. William R. Stratton Los Alamos Scientific Lab Box 503 Los Alamos, New Mexico 87544
1 1
i Enclosure RECOMMENDATIONS T CR-3 IREP. STUDY i
1.
Ensure that the licensee's vcluntary action to eliminate the AC power dependency in the steam-driven emergency feedwater train is properly implemented.
l 2.
Verify the. existence of or add to the Technical Specifications l
a limiting condition for operation that requires prompt shutdown if the steam-driven emergency feedwater pump train and the electric-l l
motor-driven emergency feedwater pump train are both inoperative.
l 3.
Verify the adequacy.of the licensee's procedures regarding the checking of check valve position for those valves who=e failure would cause a LOCA that blows down outside containment and require appropriate testing in the Technical Specifications.
4.
The common DC power dependency between one diesel and the emergency feedwater system turbine admission valve should be eliminated.
We note, however, that one of the suggestions made by our contractor (to power the admission valve from both DC trains) may not be desirable since it may compromise DC l
power redundancy.
An EFS turbine steam admission valve that fails open upon loss of DC power may be appropriate.
5.
Additional investigation of the diesel-generator failure history is recommended.
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6.
We recommend ope'rator training and procedure review based on the IREP sequences.
It is our understanding that this is now l
~ underway.
The adequacy of this training and procedure review should be ascertained.
l r
l 7.
The decay heat closed cycle cooling water system (DHCCCS) hag l
two trains which are completely redundant.
This system pro-j vides component cooling to several engineered safety features.
l Thus, a single failure would disable not only one train of DIICCCS but also one train of multiple engineered safety features..
It may be prudent to modify the Di!CCCS to include one or more properly engineered cross-over points to reduce this common coupling of multiple systems.
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8.
Review the steam line rupture matrix. circuitry for actuation or failure modes which might disable both trains of emergency feedwater.
It may be appropriate to conduct a risk tradeoff study of these systens to see if they do indeed reduce overall risk.
i 9.
Consider the possibility of further modifications to the Emergency Feedwater System.
The Crystal River 3 plant has a two pump EFS arrangement.
With action on items 1, 2, 4 and 8 above the Crystal River 3 EFS is not notably unreliable.
~
Huwever, here, as well as in other EFS studies we find inherent linitations in the two pump configuration.
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