ML19340A632
| ML19340A632 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 07/18/1975 |
| From: | Johnson P, Knop R, Martin R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19340A627 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-010-75-11, 50-10-75-11, 50-237-75-16, 50-249-75-13, NUDOCS 8009020579 | |
| Download: ML19340A632 (25) | |
See also: IR 05000010/1975011
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CONIISSION
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OFFICE OF INSEECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGICN III
Report of Operations Inspection
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IE' Inspection Report No. 050-010/75-11
IE Inspection Report No. 050-237/75-16
IE Inspection Report No. 050-249/75-13
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Licensee: Com::ionwealth Edison Company
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P. O. Box 767
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Chicago, Illinois
60690
Dresden Nuclear Power Station
License No. DPR-2
Units 1, 2, and 3
License No. DPR-19
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Morris, Illinois
License No. DPR-25
Category:
C
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Type of Licensee:
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Type of Inspection:
Routine, Unannounced
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Dates of Ir .pection:
May 13-15, 19, 20, and 28, 1975
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Principal Inspector:
P . H.
o ngon
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(Date)
Accompanying Inspector:
R. D. Martin
/7/gl
7N6hI
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(Date)
Other Accompanying Peisonnel:
R. C. Knop
Reviewed By:
R. C. Knop
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Senior Reactor Inspector
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(Date)
Projects Unit 1
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS,
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Inspection Summary
Inspection on May 13-15,19-20 and 28 (Dresden 1, 75-11):
Review of
chemistry and shutdown information from semiannual report. One
noncompliance item related to reporting requirements.
Inspection on May 13-15, 19-20 and 28 (Dresden 2, 75-16):
Review
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of post-ca-
- startup testing, plant operations, abnormal occur-
rences, information contained in semiannual report, limiting con-
ditions for operation, and licensee actions in response to previ-
ous noncompliance. Five nonce =pliance items, related to reporting
requirements, use of maintenance procedures, control of materials
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during in-vessel maintenance, procedures governing control rod move-
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cents, and non-review of previously identified noncompliance items.
Inspection on May 13-15, 19-20, and 28 (Dresden 3, 75-13):
Review
of preparations for refueling outage, plant operations, abnormal
occurrences, information contained in semiannual report, limiting
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conditions for operation, and licensee actions in response to previous
noncompliance. Two noncompliance items, related to reporting require-
ments and non-review of previously identified noncompliance items.
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Enforcement Items
The following items of noncompliance were identified during the
inspection:
A.
Infractions
1.
Contrary to Paragraph 6.2.A of the Dresden 2 Technical
Specifications and Procedur.e No. FWSR 4.0 (sparger removal),
a complete roll of Nashua silver duct tape was lost into
the reactor vessel due to carelessness and failure to follow
prescribed material control procedure. The tape could not
be recovered prior to resumption of plant operation.
(Paragraph 12, Report Details)
This infraction was identified by the inspector and con-
stituted an occurrence with safety significance.
2.
Contrary to Paragraph 6.2.A of the Dresden 2 Technical
Specifications and Procedure DFP 800-1, control rods were
moved while personnel vera working on the service platform
over the onen acactor vessel.
(Paragraph 5, Report Details)
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This infraction was identified by the inspector and had
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the potential for contributing to an occurrence with
safety significance.
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3.
Contrary to Paragraph 6.1.G.2.a(5) of the Dresden 2 and 3
Technical Specifications, enforcement items contained in
inspection reports transmitted by IE:III letters dated
January 13, February 4, and March 27, 1975, and related
correceive actions planned by the licensee were not re-
viewed by the onsite review and investigati.ve function.
(Paragraph 6, Report Details)
This infraction was identified by the inspector and had the
potential for causing or contributing to an occurrence with
safety significance.
4.
Contrary to Paragraphs 6.2.A.6 and 6.2.E of the Dresden 2
Technical Specifications, the 2A recirculation pump seal
was replaced during the recent refueling outage using a
maintenance procedure which had not been approved by the
Dresden Onsite Review function.
(Paragraph 10, Report
Details)
This infraction was identified by the inspector and had
the potential for causing or contributing to an occurrence
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with safety significance.
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B.
Deficiencies
1.
Contrary to Paragraph 6.6.A of the Dresden 2 Technical
Specifications, 24-hour and 10-day written reports to the
NRC were not submitted for the following abnormal occurrences:
a.
The discovery on April 23, 1975, that control rods
were being coved while persornel were on the service
platfor=, contrary to procedure DFP 800-1.
(Paragraph
5, Report Details)
b.
The failure of the unit 2 diesel generator to start
on April 15, 1975.
(Paragraph 3b, Report Details)
c.
Inability to recover a missing roll of duct tape from
- he reactor vessel.
(Paragraph 12, Report Details)
This deficiency was identified by the inspector.
2.
Contrary to Para ;raph 6.6.A of the Dresden 1, 2, and 3
Technical Speciftcations, the July-December 1974 semiannual
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report for these Units did not contain the required infor-
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mation on primary coolant chemistry.
(Paragraph 2.a, Report
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Details)
This deficiency was identified by the inspector.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Items
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A.
The licensee has co=pleted corrective actions re, lated to nuclear
engineer qualifications and rod drive maintenance procedure
as
identified in his letter dated April 17, 1975.
(Paragraphs 6.a
and 6.b, Report Details)
B.
The licensee has co=pleted corrective actions related to adequacy
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of procedure review as identified in his letter dated February 20,
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1975.
(Paragraph 6.c, Report Details)
C.
The licensee has completed corrective c;tions related to excessive
containment at=csphere oxygen concentration, as identified in his
letter dated January 31, 1975.
(Paragraph 6.d, Report Details)
Other Significant Items
A.
Systems and Cceponents
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1.
Four valves in Dresden 1 found by the licensee to have less
than design wall thickness were determined to be acceptable
for continued operation.
(Paragraph 15, Report Details)
2.
Dresden 3 fuel sipping results showed 113 fual bundles to be
leaking, located predominant?.y in the vicinity of control
rods which were withdrawn in regions cf high local power on
October 31, 1974.
(Paragraph 13, Report Details)
B.
Facility Items (Plans and Procedures)
None.
C.
Managerial Items
None.
D.
Nonco=pliance Identified and Corrected by Licensee
None.
E.
Deviation.
None.
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F.
Status of Previously Report Unresolved Items
Not re~ieved.
Management inserview
The inspectors conducted a management interview with Mr. Stephenson
(Station Superintendent) and members of his staff at the conclusion
of the inspection. The following matters were discussed:
A.
The inspector informed the licensee that a selective review of
facility records was conducted for Units 1, 2, and 3 to compare that
information with that presented in the semiannual report for those
units. No discrepancies were found during this comparsion.
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However, an apparent item of noncompliance was determined when
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comparing the content of the semiannual report against the require-
ments of Technical Specification 6.6.A for all three units. The
semiannual report does not contain tne required information on
primary coolant chemistry. The licensee indicated that the
appropriate information had been accumulated and that the problem
would be researched further to determine the appropriate action.
(Paragraph 2.a, Report Details)
B.
The inspector informed the licensee that he had perforaed a review
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of the actions taken by the station with respect tc selected ab-
normal occurrences reported to the NRC, with no discrepancies
noted.
(Paragraph 3, Report Details)
C.
The inspector stated that he had conducted a review of selected
aspects of routine plant operation including checksheet and log-
book reviews, control room manning, and a tour of the Unit 2 and
Unit 3 reactor buildings. He informed the licensee of the follow-
ing:
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1.
The tour of the faciIlity disclosed a number of instances of
poor housekeeping practices. On one occasion, a tour of
the Unit 2 drywell just prior to closure at the end of the
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outage had. disclosed poor housekeeping conditions.
In
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considerable debris was seen in the downcomers
to the torus, which contains reactor grade water.
(Paragraph
4.d, Report Details) The inspectors requested and r_ceived
a commitment from the licensee that a tour of the facility
would be conducted by senior staff personnel to evaluate
facility housekeeping practices.
2.
The review of the shif t engineer's logbooks disclosed that
during the period of April 21-23, 1975, control rod friction
tests were conducted while personnel were on the service
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platform. The operating staff became aware on April 23
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that this activity was contrary to procedure DFP 800-1
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and took steps to prevent a recurrence.
However, these
steps were inadequate, and another instance of rod move-
ment with personnel on the service platform occurred on
the morning of April 24. This failure to follow procedural
requirements was noted to be an item of noncompliance. The
licensee failed to recognize this as a reportable event
until after discussions with the inspector during this inspec-
tion. This failure to report the event within the required
time period was stated to also be in noncompliance with
Technical Specification requirements.
(Paragraph 5, Report
Details)
3.
The review of the shift engineer's log also revealed an
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instance of the Unit 2 diesel generator failing to start on
April 15, 1975. This failure to start was not related to the
maintenance work which had been performed on the unit prior
to this test. The licensee failed to recognize this as a
reportable event until after discussions with the inspector
during this inspection. This failure to report within the
required time period was noted to be contrary to Technical
Specifications requirements.
(Paragraph 3.b, Report Details)
D.
The inspector requested and received a co=mitment from the
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licensee that an evaluation would be conducted to determine the
need for the jumpers (1-72 and 2-72) placed in 1969 which defeat
the rod block interlock on the service platform hoist.
The
licensee also stated that if their continued use is indicated,
a design change would be considered ratt.er than the continued,
prolonged use of jumpers.
(Paragraph 4.e, Report Details)
E.
The inspector stated that previous enforcement items ideatified
in three licensee responses had not been reviewed by the Dresden
onsite review function, in 9oncompliance with Technical Specifi-
cations requirements. The licensee stated that steps would be
taken to provide th'e required reviews. The inspector noted that
this was a repeat offense, in that a citation had been issued for
the same omission within the previous year.
(Paragraph 6 Report
Details)
F.
The inspector stated that during review of plans for the Dresden
3 outage it had been noted that the 2A recirculation pump seal
had been replaced using an unapproved maintenance procedure, in
ncncompliance with Technical Specifications requirements. The
licensee replied that the station staff had been writing many
maintenance procedures, and that the effort would be expanded
to cover this and other areas.
(Paragraph 10, Report Details)
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G.
The inspector stated that the carelessness involved in the
loss of a roll of tape into the Unit 2 reactor vessel
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represented noncompliance in that precautions required by
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the governing maintenance procedure had not been taken.
The inspector noted that the event also had not been
formally reported as required by the Technical specifications.
(Paragraph 12, Report Details)
H.
The inspector stated that several recent events at the
Dresden station, including the loss of the roll of tape,
rod movements with personnel on the equipment platform,
withdrawal of two adjacent control rods during refueling,
and fuel damage caused by i= proper rod movements caused con-
cern with respect to the adequacy of co'ntrol of plant
activities. The inspector stated that action was needed
to bring about a noticeable increase in middle-manage =ent
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awareness of plant activities. The licensee replied that
a new engineering assistant had been assigned to the dayshift
Shif t Engineer, but that the Shif t Engineer was still a very,
busy man during a refueling outage.
I.
The inspector summarized the followup review of previous
enforecnent items. With respect to the licensee's response
of February 20, 1975, which identified the addition of three
senior licensed operators to the technical staff as part of
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the licensee's corrective action, the inspector noted that
one of these senior licensed operators was now scheduled f<r
transfer away from the Dresden Station. The licensee stated
that this was made necessatf by manning requirements for the
new La Salia County Station.
J.
The inspector noted that Dresden 2 was being returned to
power operation faster than initially scheduled, and ex-
pressed concern that all required activities be accomplished
prior to and during the return to operation. The licensee
acknowledged the inspector's co= ment.
K.
The Unit 3 fuel sipping results were discussed, with respect
to the October 31, 1974, rod withdrawal event.
In response
to a question from the inspector, the licensee stated that a
followup report discussing the October 31 event and its
consequences would be provided to the NRC by June 20, 1975.
(Paragraph 13, Report Details)
L.
The inspector noted that another off-gas detonation had occurred.
with no cause identified. He stated the* the licensee should
consider actions v .ich would aid in the investigation of any
future detonation. The licensee acknovledged the inspector's
co==ent.
(Paragraph 11, Report Details)
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REPORT DETAILS
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PART I
Prepared by P. H. Johnson and R. D. Martin
1.
Persons Contacted
B. Stephenson, Station Superintendent'
A. I ,berts, Assistant Superintendent
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D. Butterfield, Administrative Assistant
G. Abrell, Unit 2 Operating Engineer
D. Adam, Rad / Chem Supervisor
G..Bergan, Chenist
E. Bussean, Engineering Assistant
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R. Cozzi, Engineering Assistant
J. Dolter, Leading Nuclear Engineer
R. Dyer, Job Planner
G. Heintz, Nuclear Station Operator
W. Hildy, Instrument Engineer
E. Johnson, QC Inspector
J. Kolanowski, Unit 2 Leading Engineer
G. Lamping, Maintenance Staff Assistant
C. Lawton, Office Supervisor
C. Maney, Engineering Assistant
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J. Marshall, Unit 3 Leading Engineer
Lt. Hayer, Pinkerton Guard Force
R. Meadows, Engineering Assistant
E. Petrowsky, Nuclear Engineer
R. Ragan, Unit 3 Operating Engineer
R. Thomas, Instrument Maintenance Foreman
T. Watts, Technical Staff Supervisor
M. Wright, QC Engineer
2.
Rev!.ew of Semiannual Report
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Tha inspector conducted a selective review of the operating and
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maintenance section of the Semiannual Report for Dresder. Station
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for the psriod of July 1,1974 through December 11, 1974.
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a.
Conten: Review.
The report content was compared against the
required content discussed in Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide
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1.16.
The report contained sections on:
(1) Operations Summary
(2)
Power Generation
(3)
Shutdowns
(4) Maintenance
(5)
Changes, Tests, and Experiments
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However, the inspector did not find any data which provided
a tabulation on a monthly basis of the maximum, average,
and
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minimma values of selected primary coolant system chemistry
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parameters as called for in Section C.1.a. (3)(f) of Regulatory
Guide 1.16.(Rev.1). A review of the data in the Semiannual
Report dealing with radioactive waste, environmental monitor-
ing, and occupational personnel radiation exposure also failed
to disclose this information on coolant chemistry.
This
omission was pointed out to the licensee as an item of non-
compliance.
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b.
Shutdowns Review. The inspector compared the shutdown in-
formation contained in the Semiannual Report with Shift
Engineer Logbook entries.
Dates reviewed were:
Unit 1
Unit 2
Unit 3
7/3/74 @ 2148 hrs
8/23/74 G 0230 hrs
7/1/74 @ 0001 hrs
7/5/74 @ 0125 hrs
9/1/74 0 0900 hrs
7/22/74 9 0421 hrs
10/15/74 @ 1238 hrs
9/3/74 @ 0504 hrs
8/15/74 i 1620 hrs
10/15/74 @ 2211 hrs 10/19/74 @ 0320 '..s
11/8/74 @ 1858 hrs
10/16/74 @ 0418 hrs
11/2/74 @ 0327 hrs 11/9/74 @ 1110 hrs
No deficiencies were noted between the information in the
report and that contained in the Shift Engineer's log.
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3.
Abnormal Occurrence Review (Units 2 and 3)
A review of reporting, corrective actions, licensee review and
evaluation, and co=pliance with regulatory requirements was
conducted for the following abnormal occurrences and unusual
events related to Units 2 and 3:
Event Title
Event Date
Licensee Report Date
Unit 2
1.
Failure of Core Spray Valve MO-2-
2/28/75
3/10/75
1402-24A To Open
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2.
Main Steam Line Low Pressure
3/17/75
3/27/75
Instrument Drift
3.
Unit 2 Diesel Generator Fa11cr to Come 3/19/75
3/27/75
up To Voltage
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4.
Violation of Secondary Containment
3/21/75
3/31/75
5.
Unit 2 Diesel Generator Field Failed
4/5/75
4/15/75
To Flash
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Freon Leakage 1%
4/16/75
4/23/75
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Event Title
Event Date
Licensee Report Date
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Unit 3
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2/28/75
3/7/75
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Failure of Core Spray Valve 3-1402-4A
2/25/75 ;
3/19/75
To Close
3/1/75 and
3/4/75
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Thermal Trip of LPCI Valve 3-1501-5A
3/4/75
4/3/75
10.
Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor
3/18/75
3/27/75
setpoint Drift
11.
Core Spray Valve M0-3-1402-4A Failure
3/24/75
4/4/75
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12.
Broken Test Line on Penetration X-105D 4/16/75
4/25/75
The inspector's review included discussions of each event with
licensee representatives and an examination of the report ref-
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erenced above as well as other documents related to the parti-
cular areas reviewed. The following corments resulted from the
inspector's review:
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a.
Event No. 1 - This event referred to the inability to open
valve M0-2-2402-24A with an operator-initiated signal from
the control room whenever valve M0-2-1402-25A is open. The
licensee's report indicated that at the time of the report,
it was not possible to verify their conclusion because the
motor operators were removed from the valves in question.
The inspector reviewed WR 2870 and 2753 in which the con-
clusions were verified and the conformance of the installa-
tion to the original design was also verified. This inter-
-locking of the valves was intentional and the operator
checked the valves in the wrong sequence. During the inte-
grated ECCS test conducted on May 13-14, 1975, the licensee
verified that this interlock design does not interfere with
the automatic actuation of core spray.
The interlock causes
difficulty only when operator-initiated valve checks are
conducted. The inspector had no further questions on this
matter.
b.
Events No. 3 and 5 - These two events were related in that
they both involved the failure of the Unit 2 diesel genera-
tor to develop output voltage.
Event 5 was the determination
of the actual cause (a capacitor failure) whereas event 3
related to the apparent cause (a relay malfunction). The
inspector reviewed WR 4330 (Job No. 591) under which the
condensers were replaced. He also reviewed the successful
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test results of procedure 6600-S-I conducted on April 18,
1975. The time delay between the event (April 5, 1975) cnd
declaring the diesel operable (April 18,1975) was caused
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by an additional malfunction of the air starting motor
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system on April 15, 1975. On that date, the diesel genera-
tor was returned to service for testing following the
capacitor repairs. The diesel, however, failed to start
because of starting motor problems, and it was taken out of
service to repair those motors.
The failure of the licensee
to recognize this starting failure as an abnormal occurrence
was noted to be in noncompliance with Technical Specifications
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requirements.
c.
Event No. 6 - This abnormal occurrence related to a Freon
leak rate test performed on Train 'A'
of the Standby Gas
Treatment System (SBGTS) which gave results in excess of the
limits in Technical Specification 4.7.B.l.b.(2).
The inspector
reviewed WR 4638 which called for replacement and r< testing
of tne units. He also reviewed the test results of procedure
38-7500-S-I, II, and III conducted on April 18,, l??5, after
the repairs had been completed. The inspector had no further
questions on this matter,
d.
Event No. 12 - This event related to a broken leak test line
to the bellows seal for drywell penetration X-105D. The
inspector reviewed WR 4671 which governed the repair of the
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line and included copies of the approved procedure for the
veld repair along with copies of the certifications of the
welders used in the repair. He also reviewed the results of
procedure 38-1600-S-1 which retested the leak rate and no
leakage was measured. This event apparently occurred
because personnel stood on the penetration while conducting
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maintenance in the X-area. To prevent this kind of activity
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frcs recurring, the licensee, in his report, stated that
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grating would be installed in the area. As of the date of
this inspection, the grat1ng was installed in Unit 2, and the
installation was in progress on Unit 3.
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4.
Review of Plant Operations (Dresden 2 and 3)
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The inspector conducted a review of selected aspects of plant
operation. The results of this review are summarized in the
following paragraphs.
a.
Logbook Entries. The inspector reviewed logbook entries
covering the period of March 1, 1975 - May 15, 1975, con-
tained in the following logbooks:
(1)
Shift Engineer Log
(2)
Control Room Log
(3) Unit 2 Operator Log
(4) Unit 3 Operator Log
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No significant deficiencies were noted with regard to
clarity of entries, adequacy of detail, or accuracy of
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logbook entries. The logbooks examined showed evidence
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of review by senior staff personnel. However, entries in
Volume 234 of the Shift Engineer's Logbook made the inspec-
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tor aware of a procedural violation regarding the move-
ments of control' rods on Unit 2 while personnel were on
the service platform. This subject is discussed further
in paragraph 3 of this section of the report,
b.
Routine Checks. The checklists (shift, daily, weekly, and
monthly) completed by Operations-personnel for the months
of March and April, 1975 were reviewed for Units 2 and 3.
No discrepancies were observed by the inspector.
c.
Plant and Control Room Staffing. The staffing for the
plant as recorded in the Control Room Log was selectively
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co= pared against the " Minimum Shift Manning Chart" contained
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in Section 6 of the Technical Specificat1ons for Units 1, 2.
and 3.
The dates selected for the review were:
April 6,1975
April 21, 1975
April 12,1975
May 3, 1975
April 14,1975
May 8, 1975
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In the cases reviewed, the plant staffing met or exceeded
the minimum shif t manning require =ents.
d.
Plant Tour. The inspector conducted a tour of portions of
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the Reactor, Turbine, and Radwaste Buildings for Unit 2 and
3.
The following observations are considered noteworthy:
(1) Preliminary visual inspection of the feedwater spargers
for Unit 3 had been completed. Cleaning of the spargers
to permit dye penetrant inspection was just being com-
pleted.
(Later in the inspection, a visual reexamina-
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tion after this cleaning revealed the existence of
several cracka in the sparger.)
(2) The existence of a number of housekeeping problems was
noted, including trash in cable trays, excessive pu=p
packing leakage, water on floors, and oil soaked com-
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bustibles under the oil coolers at the recirculating
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pump motor generator sets.
A tour of the Unit 2 drywell
shortly before scheduled closure also showed poor house-
keeping conditions, particularly debris in the
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downcomers ; to the torus, which contains reacter
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grade water. These conditions led to the request
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for a commitment from the licensee that senior. staff
would conduct a housekeeping inspection of the facility.
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(3)
Fuel sipping of the Unit 3 fuel was essentially com-
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pleted.
e.
Jumper Log.
The Jumper log was reviewed and no deficiencies
were observed as to the manner in which jumpers were being
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placed and the entries made. However, it was noted that
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several entries were related to jumpers which had been in
place for a substantial period of time.
Fo'r example, Jumpers
1-72 and 2-72 were placed in 1969 to eliminate the rod block
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from the service platform. Discussions with facility staff
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members showed that there was general agreement that these
ju=pers were still necessary.
Because of a feature of the
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control wiring for the service platform, disconnecting the
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control cables for that platform would establish a rod block,
Thus, without the jumpers, removal of the service platform
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in preparation for reactor start-up would, in fact, prevent
that start-up.
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This condition led the inspector to obtain a commitment
from the licensee that jumpers which have been in use for
extended per1ods of time be reevaluated as to their con-
tinued need.
If their continued use is indicated, the
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licensee should consider appropriate design changes in
place of the prolonged use of temporary connections.
(See
paragraph D of Management Interview section of this report)
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5.
Control Rod Movenent With Personnel on Service Pla_tform
4
As mentioned in paragraph 4.a. of this report, a review of the
,
Shif t Engineer's Logbook revealed an instance of a procedural
violatica in that control rods on Unit 2 were moved while per-
sonnel were on the service platform. The pertinent details are
,
summarized in the following paragraphs:
a.
At 2130 hours0.0247 days <br />0.592 hours <br />0.00352 weeks <br />8.10465e-4 months <br /> on April 21, 1975, friction testing of the
control rod drives vcs begun. Friction testing consists
of fully. withdrawing a control rod and then inserting it
continuously and measuring the differential pressure across
the drive piston necessary to achieve this insertion. This
,
differential pressure is a measure of the total forces
'
(including friction) necessary to procuce movement. Values
of differential pressure outside c-
allowed limits call
for further testing and evaluation.
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b.
Section D " precautions" of Procedure DFP 800-1, Revision 0,
April 1975, (approved April 18, 1975), which is the controlling
-
procedure for unit refueling, requires that personnel evac-
.
uate all areas from which the grid of the reactor vessel may
be viewed any- time a control rod is to be witndrawn.
In
discussions with staff members, it appears that fuel handling
personnel brought this requirement to the attention of opera-
tions personnel on April 23, 1975. The friction testing
procedure, 38-300-S-I (Revision 0, February,1973) does not
contain the above precautionary comment.
,
c.
By entry in the Shift Engineer's Log (Volume 234, page 94)
and a Daily Order covering the period 23 April to 24 April
1975, friction resting was halted.
Neither of these entries
was specific as to indicating that friction testing must
not be undertaken whenever people were on the platform or in
),
the line of sight of the core.
d.
From entries on page 99 of Volume 234 of the Shift Engineer's
Log, personnel lef t the platform at 0001 hours1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, on April 24,
and frictirn testing was resumed. Another entry indicated
that at 0100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br />, the Shift Engineer was informed by the
contractor working that no one would be on the platform for
the remainder of the shift. However, when fuel handling per-
sonnel returned from a lunch break at 0435 hours0.00503 days <br />0.121 hours <br />7.19246e-4 weeks <br />1.655175e-4 months <br />, they found
_
contractor personnel on the service platform. The logbook
entrics are such that the inspector concluded that rods had
been moved during this period (0100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> - 0435 hours0.00503 days <br />0.121 hours <br />7.19246e-4 weeks <br />1.655175e-4 months <br />),
while personnel may have been on the service platform.
The licensee was informed that the violation of the requirements
of procedure DFP 800-1 constituted an item of noncompliance. The
inspector also noted that the occurrence was reportable under the
require: nets of Section 6.6A of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications,
and failure to report this occurrence within the required time
period is an item of nonco=pliance.
(This item was later reported
to the NRC while the inspection was still in progress.)
6.
Followun on Previous Ncncompliance (Dresden 2 and 3)
The inspection included review of the licensee's corrective actions
in response to certain previously identified noncompliance items,
as discussed below. During this review, on additional noncompliance
item was noted, in that the onsite review function had not reviewed
the items of noncompliance and recommended actions to prevent recur-
rence, as required by Paragraph 6.1.G.2.a(5) of the Technical
Specifications.
Enforeccent items reviewed were as follows:
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Nuclear Engineer Qualification.f/ Related corrective actions,
a.
lj
as described in the licensee's letter dated April 17, 1975,
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were verified to have been completed.
.
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b '.
Control Rod Drive Maintenance Procedures.,2_/ Corrective actions
were.found to have been accomplished as descr,1 bed in the
licensee's April 17, 1975 letter. The inspector reviewed a
i
revised and DOSR-approved maintenance procedure which was to
be used for Unit 3 control rod drive maintenance.
Throughness'of Procedure Reviews.:3_/ The inspector's review
c.
determined the licensee's corrective actions as described
in his letter dated February 20, 1975, to have been' completed.
The inspector noted, however, that one of the three engineers
possessing senior reactor operator licenses who had been added
to the technical staff, as stated in the licensee's letter,
1
was scheduled to be transferred to La Salle County Station
following the Unit 3 refueling outage.
d.
Containment Inerting Requirements.4/ The inspector verified
,
nitrogen inerting procedure 8500-1 to have been revised as
discussed in the licensee's January 31, 1975, letter. The
revised procedure specifies (1) a check of the nitrogen tank
level prior to inerting, (2) ordering additional nitrogen if
'
required, and (3) initiating unit shutdown if additional
nitrogen is needed and has not been received within sixteen
,
!
hours after placing the reactor in the run mode.
7.
Safety Limits and Limiting Safety System Settings
(Dresden 2 and.3)
Selected safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and
limiting conditions'for operation were reviewed for the reactor
coolant system, reactivity and power control systems, and reactor
core and internals, as follows (numbers in parenthesis indicate
.
technical specifications references):
!
,
a.
Low reactor level scram setpoint (2.1.C) - reviewed for
January 1975, Units 2 and 3.
b.
Reactor vessel shell-flange differential tnmperature limit
(3.6.A) - verified for Unit 2 cooldown performed in November
-
1974.
1/ IE Inspection Rpt. No. 050-249/75-06.
2/ IE Inspection Rpt. No. 050-237/75-06.
3/ R0 Inspection Rpt. No. 050-237/74-11.
4/ RO Inspection Rpt. No. 050-249/74-12.
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Reactor vessel venting requirements (3.6.B.1) - reviewed
c.
during initial period of current refueling outages, Units
2 and 3.
.
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d.
Stud tensioning limitation (3.6.B.2) - verified for portions
of current refueling outages, Dresden 2 & 3.
Verification of jet pump flow indication (3.6 G.2) - reviewed
j
e.
verification prior to initial post-outage startup of Unit 2.
f.
High pressure' scram setpoints (2'.2.A) - rev'iewed for February -
April (Unit 3) and May (Unit 2), 1975.
g.
APRM scram and rod block settings (2.1.A and 2.1.B) - reviewed
for April - May (Unit 2) and February - April (Unit 3),1975.
No discrepancies were noted during review of the activities listed
above.
8.
Startuo Testing (Dresden 2)
,
The inspector reviewed records of selected startup testing activities
,
as follows:
b
t
a.
Control Rod Scram Time Tests.
No comments.
_
b.
Shutdown Margin Demonstration. The reactor was demonstrated
to be suberitical with the three highest worth rods fully
withdrawn.
c.
Rod Worth Minimizer Checks. The original test records for
this test could not initially be located, but were subse-
quently seen to have been filed in the startup test file.
Acceptable performance of the rod worth minimizer for rod
sequences Al and B1 was verified on May 18, 1975.
d.
Jet Pump Operability. Flow ' indication from all jet pumps
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was verified prior to startup as required by Paragraph
3.6.G.2 of the Technical Specifications. This verification
was documented by an informal memorandum signed by the
shift engineer.
9.
Post-Refueling Review of Plant Operations (Dresden 2)
The inspector reviewed without comment the following documents
related to the return of Dresden 2 to operation:
a.
LPRM Resistance and Plateau Checks
,
b.
Control Rod Withdrawal Sequence, Approved 5/16/75
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10.
Maior Maintenance Activities (Dresden 3)
The inspector reviewed approved procedures for control rod drive
maintenance, repainting of the torus, replacement of 3B recircu-
lation pump seals, and modification of the scram discharge volume.
The torus painting procedure was noted to provide for coating
portions of the wetted surface of the torus using' six different
protective coatings to determine which coating provides the most
effective protection. No Unit 3 discrepancies were noted.
<
During examination of procedures for replacement of the 3B recir-
culation pump seal, the inspector examined a completed work pack-
aga for replacement of the 2A recirculation pump seal, completed
on December 30, 1974.
The maintenance procedure used for this
replacecent was noted not to have been approved by the Dresden
Onsite Review (DOSR) function. A representative stated that the
procedure had been taken from the vendor's manual; however,
examinntion of the vendor's manual show that significant amounts
,
of additional detail had been added to the procedure, to the
effect that it was a procedure prepared by station personnel.
The inspector stated that use of the procedure without DOSR
approval represented noncompliance with Paragraph 6.2.E of the
Technical Specifications.
11.
Off-gas detonation (Dresden 2)
-
A licensee report 5/ discussed an off-gas detonation which
occurred on May 26, 1975. Review of the control roca log and
discussion with licensee representatives showed the detonation
to have occurred approximately 8 minutes after the recombiner
outlet valve was opened to bleed off a pressure of about 15
psig whi:h had accumulated in the recembiner and its condenser
due to air purge. Whether the detonation occured before or
after opening of the recombiner inlet valve was not clear. The
control room log showed a power reduction to have commenced one
minute after the detonation. Based on review of recorder charts
and discussion with a licensee representative, the stack release
rate was determined to have peaked at approximately 1500,cCi/sec
following the detonation, returning to near its original value
of 300suci/sec within approximately 30 minutes.
5,/
Ltr.,Stephenson to Keppler, dtd 6/5/75
(A0 Rpt No. 75-35).
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12.
Loss of-Tape Roll in Reactor Vessel (Dresden 2)
,
-Prior to the inspection, a licensee representative discussed with
the inspector efforts being taken to recover a missing roll cf
,
Nashua silver duct tape lost in the reactor vessel .
Review of
this event during the inspection resulted in the following find-
ings:
a.
The roll of tape was lost in the reactor vessel on January
16 while' failed feedwater spargers2/ were being removed.
General Electric contractor personnel. were working in the
reactor vessel on a temporary platform seated on the steam
separator supports. The platform was smaller than the
reactor vessel internal diameter, such that an open annulus
was lef t between the platform and the reactor vessel wall.
Representatives stated that one worker in the reactor vessel
requested an additional roll of duct tape from another
worker who was present on the refueling floor. The latter
then responded by throwing a complete roll of tape into the
reactor vessel. The roll of tape was not caught by any of
the individuals on the work platform and was seen to dio-
appear over the edge of the platform into the reactor
vessel, in the vicinity of a recirulation suction line.
-
b.
Internal licensee reports discussed efforts cade to locate
the roll of tape, inacdiately following its loss and con-
tinuing through the end of April. These efforts relied
principally upon the use of binoculars and underwater TV
cameras, and included internal inspection of the recircu-
-
lation suction piping and inspection of portions of the
shutdown cooling system (which was in operation at the
time of loss, with' inlet flow from the recirculation pump
suction line). The search for the roll of tape was
unsuccessfully terminated on May 5, and the reactor vessel
head was reinstalled shortly thereafter.
c.
A licensee representative assigned to follow the feedwater
sparger replacement stated that tool control inside the
vessel had generally been good, although he had pointed
out to contractor personnel on a limited number of occa-
sions that items in the reactor' vessel were not secured.
In particular, an unsecured roll of tape had been noted on
two occasions.
6/
IE Inspection' Rpt No. 050-237/75-01.
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d.
Procedure No. FWSR 4.0, feedwater sparger removal, stated
in Paragraph 5.8, " Care shall be exercised to prevent in-
advertent loss into the reactor pressure vessel of any
piece of tooling, material, or equipment." The inspector
,
informed the licensee that the loss of the roll of tape
~
represented noncompliance with the procedure, in that care
was not taken to prevent its inadvertent loss. To the
contrary, the likelihood of loss was greatly increased by
the negligence involved in throwing the roll of tape into
,
the reactor vessel.
,
The safety evaluation performed by the licensee and reported
e.
7
in an abnormal occurrence report / concluded that "it is
highly improbable that the tape residue could cause flow
blockage of any given fuel asse=bly of 90%.
Blockages
greater than 90% must result before critical heat flux
first occurs." Tests performed by the licensee and by
General Electric Company showed that the roll of tape can
be expected to deteriorate to a brittle residue within 2 to
3 days at reactor conditions; the residue would subsequently
be expected to break apart and be removed by the reactor
water cleanup system.
f.
During the management interview conducted on May 20, the
inspector noted that the licensee was also in noncompliance
with reporting requirements in that the loss of the roll of
tape had not been formally reported as an abnormal occurrence'
-
as required by the Technical Specifications and P.egulatory
,
Guide 1.16, which defines abnormal occurrences to include
]
" observed inadequacies in the implementation of administra-
tive or procedural controls such that the inadequacy causes
!
or threatens to cause the existence or development of an
a
unsafe condition in connection with the operation of the
l
plant." The inspector noted that although he had been
I
informally advised of the occurrence, prompt and ten-day
I
written notifications had not been made.
The inspector
j
"
acknowledged that upon its initial loss into the vessel,
the event could rersonably not have been considered an
l
abnormal occurrence, in that recovery was at that time
anticipated. However, the event should have been reclassi-
fied an abnormal occurrence when recovery efforts were
terminated and the reactor vessel head was installed.
,
2/
Ler..Stephenson to Keppler dtd 5/23/75
(A0 Rpt No. 75-44).
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13.
Fuel Sipping Results (Dresden 3)
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Out-of-core fuel sipping results obtained from a licensee repre-
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sentative during and subsequent to the inspection showed 113 of
!
the installed 724 fuel bundles to be Icaking
(Iodine-131 greater
i
than background). Approximately 20 of these appeared to be ran-
j
domly dispersed throughout the core, with the balance of the
failed bundles located in the vicinity of control rods which were
withdrawn under high' local power conditions during the event which
occurred on October 31,1974.8/ A core diagram' showing the loca-
tion of the failed fuel bundles and the involved control rods is
]
attached to this report. The licensee representative stated that
no 8 x 8 or i= proved 7 x 7 (GE3) fuel bundle was included in the
,
'
112 bundles found to be leaking.
In response to a question from
.
'
the inspector during the management interview, the licensee stated
-
'
that a followup report on the October 31, 1974, event would be
submitted to the NRC by June 20, 1975.
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8/
Ltr., Stephenson to Keppler dtd 1/17/75
(AO.Rpt No. 74-38).
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REPORT DETAILS
.
Part II
-
Prepared by:
f5
Ead'[
7//I/I
C. M. Erb
./(Date)
h'M'
M8
7//f/7 5'
Reviewed by: f
ha
J. C. LeDoux
V(Date)
,
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14.
Persons Contacted
'
2
Commonwealth Edison Ceepany (CECO)
.
,
i
J. Wujciga, Technical Staff
i
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15.
Valve Wall Thickness Measurecents (Dresden 1)
f
a.
Historv
1
During the valve wall thickness verification program at
!
D-1, four stainless steel Globe valves purchased by General
-
Electric in 1958 from Chapman Valve Co. indicated wall
thickness below the 0.719" thickness which was the lower
li=it for 900 lb. valves.
Investigation shows that these valves were in a special
category, which derives from a 100% radiographic inspection
at the source of the pressure retaining walls prior to
assembly.
b.
Desi9n Review Actions
These valves were procured to be used under design conditions
,
of 1250 psig and 573 degrees
F., and operating conditions of
,
'
1035 psig and 575 degrees F.
Chapman has submitted and CECO has verified, calculations
>
for these special valves showing that they meet the require-
'
ments of the Manufacturer's Standardization document,
,
MSS-SP-66, which is accepted by the valve industry.
These
calculations show that a minimum wall thickness of 0.515
would be adequate for the design conditions.
s
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The minimum wall thickness actually found was 0.641" which
~
occurred in Valve No. MO-173.
The inspector verified that
-
the calculations were on file and that these valves are
acceptable for continuing service.
Attachment:
Dresden 3 Fuel ' Sipping Results
e
s
O
e
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IRESDEN U! TIT
3
ow
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Fuel failures, based upon out-of-core sipping conduct'ed during 3rd refueling
.
outage, April-May 1975
Rods withdrawn at high local power on October 31, 1974:
C-6, C-10, N-6, N-10 and (to lesser degree) C-8, G-8, J-8, N-8
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