ML19340A623
| ML19340A623 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden, Yankee Rowe  |
| Issue date: | 05/27/1975 |
| From: | Dance H, Harpster T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19340A621 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-010-75-09, 50-10-75-9, 50-237-75-14, 50-249-75-12, IEB-75-04, IEB-75-04A, NUDOCS 8009020573 | |
| Download: ML19340A623 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000010/1975009
Text
_
h.
,m.
.
,
o
.
.
.
.
,
.
. .
.
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0F0iISSION
~
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
-
(s
REGION III
Report of Operations Inspection
\\
-
IE Inspection Report No. 050-010/75-09
IE Inspection Report No. 050-237/75-14
IE Inspection Report No. 050-249/75-12
Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company
P. O. Box 767
Chicago, Illinois
60690
i
Dresden Nuclear Power Station
License No. DPR-2
Units 1, 2, and 3
License No. DPR-19
Morris, Illinois
License No. DPR-25
Category:
C
Ty;,e of Licensee:
-
Type of Inspection:
Special, Announced
.
Dates of Inspection:
April 28 and May 12, 1975
Dates of Previous Inspection:
April 21-24,1975 (Operations)
/
l.(,. h fc
b
p3
L.
2
Principal Inspector:
T.'L. Harpster
5'
7
6
Y
(Date)
Accompanying Inspectors: None
.
Other Accompanying Personnel:
None
Reviewed By:
H. C. Dance
Y
Senior Inspeccor
- (Date)
Nuclear Support
Operations Branch
,
.
.8009020 N O
'
,
,
..
.
o-
-
.
'
.
.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
-
-
- ,
.
Enforcement Action: None.
~
Licensee Action On Previously Identified Enforcement Items:
None required.
Unusual Occurrences: None.
\\
.
Other significant Findings
A.
Current Findings
1.
"nresolved Items
The inspector questioned the cable separation in areas of the
-
RPS and ESS Systems,
This matter is considered to be unresolved
~
pending further investigation.
(Paragraph 5, Report Details)
B.
Status of Previously Reported Unresolved Items:
Not inspected.
.
Management Inte rview
4
The following subjects were discussed at the conclusion of sae inspection
-
on May 12, 1975, with Messrs. Roberts, Butterfield, Hausman, and Jurecki.
A.
The inspector summarized the findings of his visual examination of
penetrations. The inspector stated that:
,
1.
Penetrations had been identified which had not been sealed,
_. ,
had not been resealed, or had not been sealed / resealed in
conformance with specifications.
2.
Combustible material'wa.s identified both in penetrations and
cable trays.
3.
Many fire stops were deteriorating because of material shrinkage.
(Paragraph 4, Report Details)
B.
The inspector questioned whether cable separation was adequate in
areas of the RPS and ESS Systems.
The inspector stated that this
would be considered an unresolved item pending further investigation.
(Paragraph 5, Report Details)
'C.
The licensee discussed parts of the reply to IE Bulletin No.75-04A
with the inspector. The Bulletin reply is in preparation.
-2-
-
.
\\
.
I
,
.
,,
,
,
_m
_
_
_ .-
-,e
_m
- .
.
. - . - . - . .
-
.
- -.
.-- .
.
-
..
.-
o
.
.
.
.
.
,
D.
The inspector di'scussed the licensee's modification control procedures.
.
The licensee acknowledged that there was presently no procedure for
.
. '
,
f
maintaining fire stops on a continuing basis.
(Paragraph 3, Report
Details)
'
.
.!
i
I
<
g
S
e
$
e
$
6
e
),
e
j
b
,
i
,
.{ -
'
.
.
1
.l
3-
-
,
4
'
s
,
!
-
'
i.
l
I
, r ' 2.._
1
-
$
- . . . . ._
_
._
_ _ _
.
_
.
..
o
.
,
-
.
.
REPORT DETAILS
.
f
-
.
1.
Personnel Contacted
,
.
A. Roberts, Assistant Plant Superintendent
D. Butterfield, Administrative Assistant
J. Jurecki, Staff Assistant to Maintenance Engineer
s
\\
J. Hausman, General Engineer
2.
Construction Specifications
a.
The inspector reviewed Sargent and Lundy Standards.
The
following summary is provided.
(1) Cable Pan Fire Stop and Air Seal Through Wall (STD-EA-175)
.
The opening and void between cables is' filled with Thermal
Insulating Wool.
A 1/4 inch layer of Flamemastic is
applied over the Thermal Insulating Wool to form the
seal.
(2) Fire Stop in Cable Riser -(STD-EA-176)
A support for the Thermal Insulating Wool is installed at
-
the bottom of the fire stop.
The Thermal Insulating Wool
and Flamemastic is applied as in 2.a.1. above.
(3)
Control Board Cabic Entrance Seal (STD-EA-179)
Similar to 2.92 above except the bottom support is specified
.as ebony board.
b.
The inspector reviewed Sargent and Lundy Drawing 12E2079
Electrical Installation-Reactor Building, which stated:
After cables are in place, stuff Turbine Building end with
Duc-Scal and Oakum, then fill from Reactor Building side with
GE Silicon Rubber Type RV-108.
c.
The licen.see stated that it had determined through discussions
with General Electric that GE Silicon Rubber Type RV-108 is
moderately' flammable.
d.
The inspector reviewed Owens-Corning Fiberglass Customer
Acceptance Standard IN-144.13 for Thermal Insulating Wool
(.TIW) Type II.
.
.
-4-
.
9.
y
. . _ _ _ . ._
.
.
.
__
.
.
.
-
. .
(1) The product is designed for use on all heated Industrial
-
Applications at temperatures up to 1000 F.
~
.
I '
(2) The product meets the following standards and specifications:
(a) Federal Specification HH-1558B (Amendment 2)
(b) Form B, Type I, Class 7 and Class 8;
i
l
(c) Form C, Class 10;
f
(d)
Form D, Type IV, Class 14;
(e)
-
Military Specification MIL-I-2818B (requires waiver
of LOI)
(f)
U. S. Atomic Energy Specifications and Guides Develop-
ment
(g) RDT Standard M 12-1T
(h)
U. S. AEC Regulation Guide 1.36
The inspector reviewed a Factory Mutual Research Corporation
.
e.
Evaluation of Flacemastic 71A".
The following conclusions
-
were reached.
(1) The Flamemastic when applied in accordance with the
manufacturers specifications did not cause excessive
,
cable heating for the maximum cable current permitted by
the National Electric Code.
(2) The Flamemastic coating prevented the spread of fire when
exposed to a moderate intensity ignition source.
,
f.
The inspector reviewed a Franklin Institute Research Laboratories
Report of Flamemastic.
The following summary is provided:
SamplesofelectricalcableswerecoatedwgthFlamemastic.
Part of the samples were exposed to 2 x 10 rads of gamma
irradiation.
All of the samples were then given a flame test.
In all cases, the Flamemastic prevented propagation of the
flame away from the ignition source.
3.
Maintenance and Modification Procedures
The licensee stated that there are ne specific modification procedures
to ensure that fire stops and compartment boundary seals are maintained
on a continuing basis.
.
.
-5-
,
'
-
'
.
~ ~ . . .
- - . .
..
.
,
-
.
_ . . . _ ._.
_, m
. ..
.
. -.
.
.
-
- -
-
. - . .-
I-
-
.
5 -:
-e
-
,
.
9
4.
Visual Examination
,
-
.
The inspector toured the facility with Messrs. Hausman and Jurecki
i
f.
'
~
to determine the extent of conformance with the specifications in
Paragraph 2, Specific areas examined were the Control Room, Auxiliary
Electric Room, Computer Room, Turbine Building, Reactor Building,
j
and Diesel Generator Rooms.
'
,
The following areas of interest were identified.
.
a.
A large number of penetrations were not sealed.
Eaamples are:
(1) Unsealed conduit sleeves in control boards.
(2)
Horizontal cable tray wall penetrations in Auxiliary
Electric Room, Computer Room, and Turbine Building.
~
(3) A large cable bundle penetration in the wall between the
Auxiliary Electric Room and the Computer Room.
,
.
(4) Unsealed openings in the Auxiliary Electric Room wall for
conduit runs.
(5) Vertical risers without fire stops in the Turbine Building.
b.
Several- penetrations were identified which had cables added
-
i
and were not resealed.
c.
A large number of. penetrations were not sealed /rescaled in
conformance with specifications.
(1) There were 4 basis types of seals in control board floor.
panels:
(a) Thermal Insulating Wool and Flamemastic (This seal
is in conformance with specifications).
(b) Thermal Insulating Wool and an unidentified tan
grouting compound.
(c) Thermal. Insulating Wool and an unidentified asbestos
fiber and' plaster like material mixture.
(d) Combinations of the above.
(e) Unit I control board floor panels were solid concrete.
,
.
A
.
.
-6-
.
s
.
!-
. . . . _ . .
_ . .
.
l
-
,
_
,
,
.
.
O
.
=
.
(2)
Control board floor panels had been resealed with Duc-
.
Seal and Silicon Rubber (RTV).
,
,
(3)
Sleeve penetrations across the secondary containment wall
were generally 100 percent RTV.
(4) Two penetrations across the seenndary containment wall
were stuffed with rags on the Turbine Building side.
The
Reactor Building side of these penetrations was not
accessible.
'
(5) Horizontal cable tray penetrations in the Turbine Building
were covered with wood or masonite boards.
d.
Both the Flamemastic and Asbestos Fiber plaster like mixture
had shrunken considerably causing deterioration of the fire
stops.
,
,
.
Combustibles were noted both in trays and penetrations.
e.
(1)
Combustible materials in penetrations include RTV and
Duc-Scal, both of which may be moderately flammable.
Rags
were found in 2 penetrati6ns.
Wood or masonite boards
covered a large number of horizontal cable tray penetrations
_
in the Turbine Building.
(2) Paper, rags, and wood were found laying in cable trays
at various locations in the plant.
5.
Separation
The inspector considers the following matters to be unresolved
pending further investi,gation.
'
a.
Cables from separate divisions of the reactor protection
system are tied together in common bundles within the control
boards,
e.g., Panel 903-10.
.,
b.
Cables from different divisions of the engineered Safeguards
Systems come together in panels in the Auxiliary Electric
Room; e.;,, panels 902-33, 902-38, and 902-47.
6.
Control Boards
The inspector noted during the visual examination thrt many control
boards were open on top and in back. An open ladder type cable
!
"7_
'
i
-
,
_ ~ _ _ _
.
,
, . . . . .
.
.
o
.
..
.
.
tray ran direct y over open Unit 2 and 3 panels.
The licensee
-
r-
stated that the panels were supplied without tops and backs.
-
7.
Bulletin Status
.
The licensee submitted the reply to IE Bulletin No. 75-04 on
.
April 25, 1975. The licensee is preparing a reply to IE bulletin
No.75-04A.
.
.
4
em
4
h
.
.
4
e
8-
-
.
s
+
'
i-
,
f
.
~ .__
'I
-