ML19340A379
| ML19340A379 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee, Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 07/24/1978 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19340A378 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8003250688 | |
| Download: ML19340A379 (7) | |
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UMTED STATES j
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION p
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SAFETY EVALUATION AND ENVIRONMENT.tl IMPACT APPRAISAL BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMF7T NO. 15 TO LICENSE NO. OPR-72 FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION, ET AL CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-302 Introduction Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generating Plant (CR-3) is currently shutdown to repair damage caused by the failure of Burnable Poison Rod Assemblies.
As part of the repair effort, the reactor was defueled.
On June 9,1978, a plant-fabricated rigging hook on the missile shield crane failed, dropping a test weight on fuel assembly A-48 in the spent fuel pool.
Inspection of this assembly revealed that deformation had occurred sufficient to preclude its further use as fuel.
In light of the abe re, additional fuel must be obtained for CR-3 to restart and complete Cycle 1.
By letter of June 28, 1978, Florida Power Corporation (FPC) requested a license amendment which would allow them to obtain four fuel assemblies previously irradiated at Oconee Nuclear Station Unit No.1 (0conee-1), for this purpose. These would replace the damaged assembly and its th.ee symmetrical assemblies to minimize quadrant variations.
Our evaluation of FPC's possession of
'the four Oconee-1 assemblies at CR-3 follows.
Our evaluation does not address the use of the Oconee assemblies as fuel in the CR-3 reactor.
This will be handled as a separate action.
In a separate application, dated May 30, 1978, FPC proposed changes to their Appendix A Technical Specifications to modify the reactor vessel surveillance capsule removal and installation schedule. We nave also reviewed,this chance.
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e I-Safety Evaluation 1j A.
Possession of Four Oconee-1 Fuel Assemblies Paragraph 2.B.(6) of the CR-3 license currently reads as follows:
B.
Subject to the conditions and requirements incorporated herein, the Consnission hereby licenses-l (6) Florida Power Corporation, pursuar.t to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30 and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the facility.
FPC has proposed to modify paragraph 2.B.(6) to read:
(6)
Florida Power Corporation, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30 and 70, to possess, but not separate, such by-product and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the facility and that by-product and special nuclear materials associated witt four (4) fuel
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assemblies acquired by Florida Power Corporation from Duke Power Company which were previously irradiated in the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit One.
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\\ t In their June 28, 1978 submittal FPC states:
"It is our intent to transport these four (4) assemblies to Crystal River Unit No. 3 and receive them for use in the reactor for the remainder of Cycle 1..."
The safety considerations associated with this change are limited to
- activities associated with the handling and storage of the four Oconee I
assemblies at CR-3.
1 As discussed in n ction 4 of the NRC staff's Safety Evaluation Report (SER) (issued July 5,1974) suppnrting issuance of an operating license for CR-3, the fuel used at CR-3 and Oconee-1 are similar in design.
Dimen, ions of the Oconee-1 and CR-3 fuel assemblies are identical and there-k' fore the Oconee fuel will fit in the spent fuel storage locations at CR-3.
In addition the initial U235 enrichment of the Oconee fuel (2.10 w/o)
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is less than the average enrichment of CR-3 Cycle 1 fuel (2.44 w/o, j
FSAR Table 3-2).
Therefore, we have concluded that the Oconee fuel can be stored safely in the spent fuel storage configuration at CR-3 (> 21" l
center to center spacing).
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Section 9.6 of the CR-3 Final Safety Analysis. Report (FSAR) addresses the handling of spent fuel, including an analysis of dropping a 100 ton-1 ten element shipping cask in the cask storage area and in the spent fuel j
pool adjacent to the cask storage area.
Section 9.1.2 of our July 5, 1974, SER presents our review of the cask drop accidents and our conclu-(,r sion that the design of the CR-3 spent fuel storage facility and the I
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consequences of a cask drop acc^ident are acceptable.
Technical Specifications which require that (1) no fuel be in the pool adjacent to the cask storage area, (2) the watertight gate between storage pools be in. place and scaled; and (3) the crane interlocks which prevent cask travel over the storage pools be operable, insure that our previous evaluation and conclusions are still valid.
FPC's submittal references an FSAR analysis of a 100-ton 10 element cask drop from 43 feet in the cask loading area for rail shipment.
This analysis concludes that the release of all gap activity from the fuel elements (120 days decay) could result in site boundry doses of 0.23 rem (whole body) and 0.14 rem (thyroid) which are well within 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines.
FPC also states that a 25 ton-one element cask will be used to transfer the Oconee fuel and therefore the FSAR analysis bounds the use of this cask.
The above FSAR analysis did not address the potential for loss of fuel element cooling and subsequent fuel melting. Therefore, we perfonned an independent analysis of the one Oconee element cask drop assuming loss of cooling,120 days fuel decay, and the fraction of noble gases and iodines released as 1007 and 50%, respectively. The results of our analygis are exclusion. area boundary doses of 0.5 rem (thyroid) and 5x10-rem (whole body).
These consequences are well within 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines.
Since the Oconee fuel has been decaying since the end of the Oconee-1 first cycle (greater than 1300 days), the above ana]ysis is. conservative.
Based on our evaluation of the cask drop accidents and the spent fuel storage capabilities at CR-3, we conclude that the storage and handling
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of the four Oconee fuel elements at CR-3 are acceptable.
- We have also reviewed the indemnity considerations related to the location I
of the Oconee fuel assemblies at CR-3.
The licensees for CR-3 currently have in effect with the Commis, ion an Indemnity Agreement (No. B-54) in the form specified in 10 CFR 5140.92. Article I, section 9, of this regulation defines the radioactive material subject to the Indemnity Agreement as " source, special nuclear, and byproduct material which (1) is used or to be used in, or is irradiated or to be irradiated by, the nuclear reactor or reactors subject to the license or licenses designated in the Attachment hereto, or (2) which is produced as the result of operation of said reactor (s)."
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' q Since the four fuel assemblies to be transferred to CR-3 are to be used as fuel in the CR-3 reactor, no change to the CR-3 Indemnity Agreement is necessary for this action.
We have revised the wording of the license amendment, as prooosed by FPC, to state the authorization for FPC's possession of Ocone' '
fuel in a separate paragraph, to specify, by B&W identification numbers, the Oconee-1 fuel to be possessed and to limit this authori-zation to possession of the Oconee-1 assemblies for use as fuel in CR-3.
These changes have been discussed with and agreed to by the licensee.
B.
Surveillance Capsule Removal and Installation Schedule FPC proposed that CR-3 Capsule B be removed at 270 EFPD in lieu of at the end of the first fuel cycle and that CR-3 Capsules A, C, E and F be installed at 270 EFPD in lieu of at the end of the first fuel cycle.
This change would allow FPC to take advantage.of the access to the capsules provided by the current outage.
Appendix H of 10 CFR Part 50 requires the first capsule to be withdrawn when the aRTNDT reaches 500F or 1/4 of service life, whichever is earlier.
For CR-3, a 500F shift in RTNDT has already occurred.
There-fore, withdrawal of Capsule B at 270 EFPD will meet the requirements of Appendix H and will provide the necessary information to check the temperature-pressure limit curves of this plant.
Also, the installation of capsules A, C, E and F at 270 EFPD will give these capsules approximately 200 EFPD of additional exposure. This additional exposure will provide us with~ radiation damage data on these capsule materials at slightly higher fluence levels than the original schedule would.
- This additional exposure will in no way reduce the usefulness of the surveillance data that will be obtained from these CR-3 capsules.
- Also, this schedule chance will not adversely affect the Integrated Ret.ctor Vessel Material Surveillance Program that CR-3 is committed to.
Based on the above, we conclude that the proposed change in the capsule fI removal and installation schedule is acceptable'.
Conclusion on Safety i
We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
i (1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by ope.ation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities f
will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and k
security or to the health and safety of the public.
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II.
Environmental Impact Appraisal Regarding Transfer of Oconee Fuel Assenblies to CR-3 We have evaluated the potential environmental impact associated with the license amendment proposed on June 28, 1978, as required by the National Environmental Policy Act and Section 51.7 of 10 CFR Part 01.
There will be four separate shipments by truck of a single irradiated fuel assembly from Oconee to CR-3.
Each of the four fuel assemblies has decayed at least 1300 days.
Tne distance each shipment will travel between Oconee and CR-3 is about 480 miles.
The thermal power level per fuel assembly for Oconee is about the same for CR-3.
Shipment of spent fuel from CR-3 to the reprocessing facility in Barnwell, South Carolina, was considered in the Final Environmental Statement (FES) dated May 1973.
We estimated 10 shipments per year to transport the irradiated fuel from CR-3 with six fuel assemblies per cask and one cask per shipment.
The shipments were to be made by rail, a distance of about 350 miles. The irradiated fuel would be shirped after a 120 to 150-day cooling period.
L'e also estimated in the FES that there might be cumulative dose of 0.16 man rem, during each rail shipmer.;, to the general public along the route and to the workers transporting the spent fuel.
We have reviewed the basis for this estimate and conclude it is a conservative estimate of the man rem exposure for a shipment of a single fuel assembly from Oconee to CR-3.
Therefore, we estimate that the radiation exposure during the four shipments from Oconee to CR-3 should be less than 0.7 man rem to the general population and workers 1
transporting the fuel.
This is a small fraction of the fluctuations in the annual dose this population would receive from natural back-ground radiation.
- ' Wo have also estima12d tre exposure to the workers removing the spent fuel from the Ocont.e spent fuel pool and placing the spent fuel in the CR-3 pool.
This exposure should be less than one man rem.
This is based on relevant assumptions for occupancy times and dose rates in the spent fuel pool area from iadionuclide concentrations in the water.
This additional exposure is less than 0.2% of the total annual i
occupational radiation burden at either facility.
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Based on the above, we conclude that the shipment of four assemblies from Oconee to CR-3 will not result in any significant increase in doses received by the public or by occupational workers.
4 The four shipments of spent fuel from Oconee to CR-3 are estimated to be 1% of the total number of shipments of spent fuel f,om CR-33 during its 40-year lifetime, considered in the FES. This snell increase in the number of shipments of spent fuel associated with e
the operation of CR-3 will not change the conclusions of the FES and will not have any significant environmental impact.
Conclusion and Basis for Negative Declaration On the basis of our evaluation and information supplied by the licensees, it is concluded that the implementation of this proposed change will have no significant impact on the environment other than that already predicted and described in our FES and subsequent environmental impact appraisals.
Having reached these conclusions, the Commission has determined that an environmental impact statement need not be prepared for this proposed change and that a Negative Declaration to that effect should be issued.
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s III.
Environmental Conclusion Regarding Surveillance Capsule Schedule Change We have determined that '.his change does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact.
Having made this determinatior., we have further concluded that this change involves an action which is insignificant # om the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 551.5(d)(4), that an environmental inpact statement, or negative declaration and environ-mental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this change.
Dated: July 24,1978 E.
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