ML19340A235
| ML19340A235 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 08/08/1974 |
| From: | Thies A DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | Moseley N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8001140848 | |
| Download: ML19340A235 (3) | |
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13U s(E l'OWEn GonPAxy PowEH DUtt.DINO 4bb SO1TTit CHttHCH STHP.rT, CII AntDTTE, N. C. rnoo
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A. C. De e rs B O. Box un7e 5: neon vs E Pac n+t ne Pwooxv o= a=o 1 manse,st. eon August 8, 1974 Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director Directorate'of Regulatory Operations U. S. Atomic Energy Commission Region II-Suite 818-230'Peachtree Street, N. W.
Atlanta, Georgia ;0303 Re:
R0:II:FJ 50-270/74-4
Dear Mr. Moseley:
Please find attached our response to Items I.A.1.a and I.A.2.a & b contained in
-RO Inspection Report 50-
/74-4.
Duke Power Company does not consider any information contained in RO Inspection Report 50-270/74-4 to be proprietary.
Very truly yours,
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OCONEE UNIT 2 RESPONSE TO R0 INSPECTION REPORT 50-270/74-4
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1.A.1.a MODIFICATIONS IMPLEMENTED WIT 110DT ' REVIEW BY NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW COMM During a June 4-5, 1974 meeting, the Nuclear Sa.fety Review Committee dis-cussed with Mr. Frank Jape, AEC/RO:ll, the committee's review of modi-fications involving an unreviewed safety question.
As a result of that meeting the committee concluded that modifications or changes that involve an unreviewed question should be reviewed by the committee; however, the NSRC should not be the agency which makes the determination that a proposed modification or change does or does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.
While the USRC did not agree with Mr. Jape's interpretation of Technical Specification 6.1.2.2, it did recommend that the wording of the specification be changed to better reflect their understanding of its intent. On June 19, 1974, a proposed change.qo Technical Specification 6.1.2.2 was transmitted to AEC/ DOL for approval.
Simultaneously, ongoing discussions were held with company management to consider what methods might be appropriate for the NSRC to review specific,ations and changes until the technical specification change was approved.
On July 19, 1974, AEC/ DOL issued the revised technical specification.
Consequently, Technical Specification 6.1.2.2.1.2 requires the committee to review " proposed changes in equipment or systems which constitute an unreviewed safety question.
. or which are referred by the operating organization".
Under the present administrative c~ontrols only changes and modifications which are deemed to constitute an unreviewed safety question by the station superintendent or items which the superintendent may wish to submit are being reviewed by the NSRC.
The NSRC, however, will selec-tively and periodically audit station modifications to assure that the determination by the station superintendent is accurate.
1.A.2.a TRANSFER OF BYPRODUCT MATERIAL To assure full compliance with 10CFR30.41 (c), prior to any shipment of non-exempt quantities of radioactive material, station personnel will verify that the type, form, and quantity of material can be received by the transferee, using the verification methods listed in Paragraph (d) of 10CFR30.41.
I.A.2.b ACTIVITY IN THE COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM Technical Specificativa 6.2.1 requires, in part, that abnormal occur-rences, as defined in Section 1.0 of the technical specifications, be-reported to the AEC.
Paragraph f. of Section 1.8 of the technical specifications defines abnormal occurrence as the occurrence of any plant condition that results in abnorrn] degradation of one of the several boundaries designed to contain radioactive caterials resulting from the fission process.
In this instance, abnormal degradation would involve a boundary between the Reactor Coola: t System cad the Component Cooling j
System.
Thus far, there is no evidence that this is the case. No
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. correlation can be made' between the activity in the Component Cooling System and reactor power or Reactor Coolant System activity. Nor cars any correlation be made between the operaticn of a particular cooler which interfaces the Component Cooling System and the Reactor Coclant System.
It appears that the source of this activity ir the liquid waste disposal header, which has a piping tie to the Component Cooling System drain tank. Valve leakage would allow waterborne activity from the waste dis-posal header to enter the Component Cooling System.
Preparations are being made to isolate this piping tie between the tank and header to determine if this is the source of activity in the Component Cooling System.
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