ML19331D859
| ML19331D859 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 08/14/1980 |
| From: | Tedesco R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Gary R TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8009030660 | |
| Download: ML19331D859 (10) | |
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UNITED STATES f Y
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Docket Nos. 50-445 E.'E 14 1MO and 50-446 Mr. R. J. Gary Executive Vice President and General Manager Texas Utilities Generating Company 2001 Bryan Towers Dallas, Texas 75201
Dear Mr. Gary:
SUBJECT:
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATI0';, UNITS 1 A';D 2 Enclosed is a request for additional infomation which we reovire to complete our evaluation of your application for operating licenses for Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2.
This reouest for additional information is the result of our review by the Instrumentation & Control Systems Branch and their consultants at Argonne National Laboratory. We anticipate that a limited number of additional questions will be forthcoming as the review continues. Please amend your FSAR to include the information requested in the Enclosure.
Your schedule for responding to the enclosed request for additional information should be submitted within three weeks.
Should you have questions concerning this request for additional information, please contact us.
Sincerel k
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i Robert L. Tedesco, sistant Director for Licensing Division of Licensing
Enclosure:
Request for Additional Information cc w/ enclosure:
See next page 8009030660
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Mr. R. J. Gary Executive Vice President and o
^UG 141980 General Manager Texas Utilities Generating Company 2001 Bryan Towers Dallas. Texas 75201 cc: Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esq.
Mr. Richard L. Fouke Debevoise & Liberman Citizens for fair Utility Regulation 1200 Seventeenth Street 1668-B Carter Drive Washington, D. C.
20036 Arlington, Texas 76010 Spencer C. Relyea, Esq.
Resident ; ipector/ Comanche Peak Worsham, Forsythe & Sampels Nuclear Power Station 2001 Bryan Tower c/o U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Corxtission Dallas, Texas 75201 P. O. Box 38 Glen Rose, Texas 70642 Mr. Homer C. Schmidt Manager - Nuclear Services Mr. Ira Charak, Manager i
Texas Utilities Services, Inc.
NRC Assistance Project l
2001 Bryan Tower Argonne National Laboratory Dallas, Texas 75201 9700 South Cass Avenue Argonne, Illinois 60439 Mr. H. R. Rock Gibbs and Hill, Inc.
393 Seventh Avenue New York, New York 10001 Mr. A. T. Parker Westinghouse Electric Corporation P. O. Box 355 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 David J. Preister Assistant Attorney General Environeental Protection Division P. O. Bcx 125'S, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711 M.s Juanita Ellis, Precident Citizens Association for Sound
}
Energy i
1426 South Polk I
Dallas, Texas 75224 Geoffrey M. Gay, Esq.
West Texas Legal Services 406 W. T. Waggoner Building 810 Housten Street Fort Worth, Texas 76102 1
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i ENCLOSURE REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 & 2 032.0 INSTRUMENTATION & CONTROL SYSTEMS f
QO32.75 Subsection 7.2.1.2.2 lists generating station variables required to be monitored in order to provis!e the reactor trips described. The list is incomplete. After an audit is performed to determine the re-quired variables, modify the FSAR to provide the co=plete list.
QO32.76 Subsections 7.2.1.2.3 and 7.3.1.2.3 refer to spatially dependent variables and specifically to reactor coolant te=perature. The. dis-cussions presented do not seem to apply to the Co=anche Peak Steam Electric Station Design. After an audit is performed to determine whether these discussions on reactor coolant te=perature are appli-cable, modify the FSAR to reflect the results of the audit.
QO32.77 Subsection 7.2.1.1.2 items 2.a and 2.b give equations for the calcu-lation of the Ovetcc=perature and Overpower N-16 setpoints. Provide a reference to or a detailed discussion for the bases by which these equations were derived and how these trip settings are equivalent to the nor=al Overtemperature and Overpower AT trip setpoints.
C032.78 Subsection 7.2.1.1.2 item 5 states that the los-low stea= generator water level is actuated on two out of three logic. The functional logie diagrams, Figure 7.2-1 Sheet 7 shows a two out of four logic.
This subsection also refers to a low feedwater flow reactor trip that cannot be found on the functional logie diagra=s. After an audit is performed to determine the correct Reactor Trip System logic, modify the FSAR to provide the consistent description.
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T 8 QO32.79 The instrumentation operating conditions for engineered safety features given in tables 7.3-1 and 7.3-2 do not agree with the logie diagrams of figures 7.2-1 and the logic diagrams do not agree with the descriptive. text found in Chapters 6, 7 and 10. Af ter an audit is perforned to determine the correct configuration of the engineered safety features actuation system, correct the FSAR to provide a con-sistent description and configuration throughout including a signifi-
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cant reorganization and rewrite of Section 7.3 to reflect the responses to all of the questions related to this section.
QO32.80 Figure 7.6-1 appears to disagree with other single line drawings sub-
=itted for review. The alternate Class 1E A.C. power sources supply three instrumentation panels from source 1 and one fres source 2.
After an audit is performed to check the accuracy of the figure, jus-tify the present arrange =ent or correct the figure to present the correct configuration.
QO32.81 The description of the conditions required for a stea= line isolation signal to be generated in subsection 10.3.2.3.1 doer not agree with the infor=ation in either the logic diagra=s of figures 7.3-1 or the infor=ation in Table 7.3.1.
After an audit is perfor ed to determine which description is correct, modify the FSAR to censistently reflect the design.
QO32.82 Subsection 7.3.1.1 states "The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESTAS) is a functionally defined systen described in this section". Sufficient detail is not presented, however, to allow a safety evaluation to be perfor=ed. Define such terms as steam break protection signal and provide greater detail of the ESTAS design.
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I QO32.83 Manual reset and block functions for the Engineered Safety Featurps Actuation System are shown on figure 7.2-1 sheet 8.
Describe all of these functions and provide a discussion on how they are used and why they are necessary for the system operation.
QO32.84 The description of the Component Cooling Water System operation follow-ing a safety injection signal ("S") and containment spray signal
("P") in subsection 9.2.2.5.3 items 9 and 10 and the description of the sa=e operations in subsectitn 7.3.1.1.4 item 4 do not agree.
Af ter an audit is performed to determine the correct operations of the cocponent cooling water system operation following a generation of "S" and "P" signals, codify the TSAR to reflect the correct con-figuration. Also provide an analysis that shows that the system meets the criteria of IEEE Standard 279 as requested by QO32.50.
QO32.85 Subsection 6.2.5.2.1 states:
(1) That Table 6.2.6-2 gives the hydrogen recombiner design parameters.
Table 6.2.6-2 cannot be found. Provide a correct table reference.
(2) That the electric heater section of the hydrogen recombiner must heat the warred air to a temperature between 1150 and 1400 F before reco=bination occurs. Yet it goes on to state that a single thermo-couple is used to monitor the te perature. Also Table 6.2.5-1 gives the applicable codes and standards used in the design of the hydrogen reco=biners. Justify why the hydrogen recombiners are not designed to meet the criteria of IEEE Standard 279, since it is an Engineered Safety Teature, how the single thermocouple used meets the single failure criteria, and provide an analysis of how the hydrogen re-combiners meet the applicable safety criteria.
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t I (3) That Tigure 6.2.5-2 shows a schematic diagram of the hydrogen re-combiners. This figure appears to be more of a block diagram of the total system. Provide a detailed description and electrical schematics of the hydrogen recorbiners.
QO32.86 A detailed description of the design of the hydrogen analyzers could not be found. Provide this description and an analysis of how these instruments meet the applicable safety criteria.
QO32.87 Subsections 9.4A.2.5 item 2 and 9.4%.2.6 state that purge and contain-ment pressure relief isolation valves are designed to close automati-cally on the detection of high radiation levels by the exhaust monitor or on a phase A isolation by a "T" signal as discussed in subsections 6.2.4 and 7.3.
A detailed discussion of the purge and containment pressure relief isolation valves or the radiation detection instru-centation cannot be found in either subsection 6.2.4 or 7.3.
Pro-vide a detailed description and discussion of this part of the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation system.
QO32.83 A lisc of Senerating station variables required to be monitored for the automatic initiation of safety injection is given in subsection 7.3.12.
The list is incomplete and should ir.clude all generating station variables, such as radiation levels, monitored by the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) and.chould in-clude all actuations produced by the ESFAS. Correct the list to be consistent with the ESFAS.
QO32.89 In subsection 6.5.1.5, it is stated that the detailed design and system logic for the Engineered Safety Features (E3F) atmospheric c1*.r.aup systems instrumentation are shown on drawings listed in a
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subsection 1.7.
Provide the specific drawing numbers that show the detailed design and system logic for this ESF instrumentation.
QO32.90 Subsection 10.4.7.5 item 2 states that the Feedwater Preheater Bypass Valves (FPBV) are automatically opened whenever the Teedwater Isolation Valves (FIV) are closed due to the absence of the water hammer parmis-sive signal described. It also goes on to state that the FIVs are provided with three position close-auto-open control switches on the control board. Are these switches for the FIVs or the FPBVs being des-cribed? Also provide a description and discussion including function-al logic diagrams of how the FPBVs operate for isolation on a feed-water isolation actuation signal.
Q332.91 In subsection 6.5.1, it is stated that the Engineered Safety Features (EST) Fuel Building exhaust units are designed to service the Fu. L Building during refueling or a fuel handling accident, and to mai.i-tain the primary plant at a slightly negative pressure during a loss of of fsite power or a 1.0CA.
Justify why the ESF Fuel Building exhaust units are not listed as Balance of Plant (BOP) Engineered Safety Features in subsection 7.3.1.1.4.
Provide a detailed description and discussion on this ESF in subsection 7.3.
QO32.92 Subsection 7.4.1.2.1 item 6 indicates by Amendment 10 that the fi st sentence is in response to QO32.30. Indicate how this subsection and answer relates to a question on steam line break accidents.
QO32.93 Detailed layout drawings and a description of the hot shutdown panel cannot be found in subsection 7.4.
Provide the description of the hot shutdown panel in enough detail to allow a safety evaluation to be performed.
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. QO32.94 One of the subsystems displayed on the Bypassed and Inoperable Status Lights is identified on a list of subsystems in subsection 7.1.2.6 as Isolation Override Containnent Sample / Purge. A description of this sub-system cannot be found.
Provide a table that indicates for each of the l
inoperable status lights on the list those components comprising the inoperable or, bypassed subsystem. Also justify why the Reactor Trip System is not included in the Bypassed and Inoperable Status Lights system.
QO32.95 Drawings 2323-El-0067 she'ets 51 to 90 represent light monitor boxes.
A description of these light conitor boxes, their purpose and safety functicn cannot be found. Provide a detailed description and dis-l cussion of the light monitor boxes.
QO32.96 Subsection 7.7.1.1 provides an equation showing how the T,yg for the Reactor Control System is calculated using the N-16 power and cold g
les temperature signals. Justify and provide an analysis that shows that the T, signal produced by this calculation is equivalent to the T
calculated from actual T and T neasurements in the refer-Md ence plant design. Also justif y how the use of the N-16 power =easure-cent for a te=petature calculation meets the intent of IEEE Standard l
279 section 4.8 since the T, signal is also used in the protection f
syste:.
Q332.97 A list of balance of plant control systems thr.t are not required for safety but interface with the prot, active system is given in subsection 7.7.1.11.
The list did not include the N-16 transit time flow =eter or the ex-core neutron detector axial flux distribution surveillance i
system. Af ter an audit is performed to determine all systems in this l
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class, correct the list and provide detailed descriptions of all these I
systems, including the plant computer, N-16 transit time flow meter l
and ex-core axial flux distribution surveillance systems.
In addition, discuss how the protective system functi*on is assured, such as the isolation of signals, from these syste=s.
QO32.98 A response to QO32.47 has not yet beca provided. Provide a schedule as to when a response will be received.
QO32.99 Subsection 6.3.5 discusses E=ergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) instru,
mentation requirements and states that the Boron Injection Tank is supplied with duplicate tempcrature control channels for the tank elec-tric strip heaters while the Boron Injection Surge Tank is supplied with only one ter perature detector and heater. The trace heating,and temperature control is not described at all. Since it is necessary to prevent precipitation of the boric acid in all parts of the ECCS, provide a discussion of how the entire ECCS beron recirculation-injec-tion system ceets the criteria of IEEE Standard 279 and provide a de-tailed description of all of the heating tracing instru=entation and control including electrical' sche:atic diagrams.
l QO32.100 Subsection 8.3.1.1.5 discusses briefly the safety injection and I
blackout only c: ode sequencers. Provide a detailed description in-ciuding layout, functional logic, and electrical schematic diagrams of the two sequencers so that a safety evaluation cf the system can be performed.
4032.101 The design of the Comanche Peak Stea= Electric Station inoperable li U
and bypass status light circuits uses a set of contacts on the con-trol panel hand switches when in the " pull out" position to indicate l
an inoperable condition of the co=ponent within the subsystem. For l
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exa=ple, contact 1-HS/5672A on drawing 2323-El-0071 sheet 48 in the Safety Injtetion System (SIS) Inoperable light circuit indicates an' inoperable SIS Pu=p Room Tan.
If, however, the power for the fan t
l and control circuit is unavailable by opening the breaker (32) shown on drawing 2323-El-0053 sheet 43, the fan would still be inoperable even when the hand ssitch is used to try to actuate the ec=per.ent..
Justify that this design it, in confor=ance with the reco==endations of Regulatory Guide 1.47 position C.3 and Branch Technical Position ICSB 21.
QO32.102 The following referenced topical reports have not been reviewed and accepted by NP.C and cannot be used as a generic bases for approval
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of any portion of the TSAR.
1.
Reid, J. B., " Process Instru=entation for Westinghouse Nuclear Stea: Supply Syste=s", WCAP-7913, January 1973.
2.
Lipchak, J.
B., " Nuclear Instru=entation Syste=", WCAP-8255, January 197,4 3.
Swogger, J. W., " Testing of Engineered Safety Teatures Actuation Syste=", WCAP-7705, Eevision 2, January 1976.
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4 Ganglof f, W. C. and Lof tus, W.
D., "An Evaluation of S >1id State.
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Logic Reactor Protecticn In Anticipated Transients", WCAP-7706-L (Proprietary) and WCAPr7706 (Non-Proprietary), February 1971.
Provide references in the TSAR of those pages of the topical reports which are necessary to provide the basis for your design or sub=it appropriate =aterial in lieu of the topical reports as a:end=ents to the TSAR.
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