ML19331C092
| ML19331C092 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000112 |
| Issue date: | 06/24/1980 |
| From: | Seyfrit K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Jischke M OKLAHOMA, UNIV. OF, NORMAN, OK |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8008140154 | |
| Download: ML19331C092 (1) | |
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UNITED STATES PDR NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION m
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June 24, 1980 In R ply Refer To:
Dockat No. 50-112 The University of Oklahoma ATTN:
Dr. Martin C. Jischke, Director School of Aerospace, Mechanical and Nuclear Engineering 1000 Asp Avenue Norman, Oklahoma 73069 Gentlemen:
The enclosed IE Circular No. 80-14 is forwarded to you for infornation.
If there are any questions related to your understanding of the suggested actions, please contact this office.
Sincerely,
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%t,p Karl V. S yfrit s
Director I
Enclosures:
1.
IE Circular No. 80-14 2.
List of IE Circulars Recently Issued 8008310\\5%
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SSINS.: 6830 UNITED STATES Accession No.:
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSICN 8005050074 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D. C.
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IE Circular No. 80-14 Date: June 24, 1980 Page 1 of 2 RADI0 ACTIVE CONTAMINATION OF PLANT DEMINERALIZED WATER SYSTEM AND RESULTANT INTERNAL CONTAMINATION OF PERSONNEL This circular describes an event which occurred at a nuclear power facility; however, the generic implications may be applicable to research reactors, and fuel cycle facilities.
On March 17, 1980, a licensee infonned the NRC resident inspector that portions of the plant demineralized water (DW) system were found to be radioactively contaminated. A temporary hose used to add demineralized water to the spent fuel pool was the pathway for the cross-contamination.
After this fuel pool makeup was completed on March 14, the temporary DW line (still connected to the DW header) was inadvertently left submerged in the #uel pool.
Since the DW header pressure at the point of supply was relatively low (a DW booster pump had been sectred), a siphoning action occurred, resulting in radioactive contamination of portions of the DW header.
On March 17, 1980, while perfonning routine secondary system chemical analyses, the licensee discovered that the demineralized water tap in the chemistry lab contained high levels of boron and had activity of 1.5 x 10-4 uCi/ml (mainly Cs-134, Cs-137, Co-58, Co-60 and Mn-54).
It was subsequently discovered that demineralized water from the chemistry laboratory supply tap had been used to make five (5) pots of coffee.
The remaining coffee was confiscated and the twenty-three (23) individuals who had consumed this coffee were whole-body counted.
All involved individuals showed no intake greater than an equivalent l
0.01 MPC-HRS. Analysis perfonned by the licensee's radiation consultant, based i
on the maximum concentration of radioactivh.y found in the coffee, indicated I
that the resultant 50-year dose comitment to an individual drinking eight ounces of this coffee would be less than 1 millirem.
Further licensee investigation revealed that the non-radiological chemistry DW supply tap was the only DW supply point outside the Auxiliary Building controlled area.
This DW supply tap was tagged prohibiting human consumption to prevent a similar event in the future.
1 It is reconsnended that you review your facility's use of demineralized water (DW) via temporary connections and give attention to the following:
1.
Provisions should be made to assure that radioactive materials are not inadvertently introduced into your facility's DW system via the improper use of temporary connections.
A temporary cross connection between contaminated systems and the DW system without adequate physical controls to prevent cross-contamination should be prohibited.
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IE Circular No. 80-14 Date:
June 24, 1980 Page 2 of 2 2.
In addition to some physical means of preventing backflow into the DW system, appropriate administrative controls should be established to ensure that the DW supply valve is secured and temporary hosing is disconnected from the DW supply header after use.
3.
Use of plant-supplied DW for human consumption shoula be prohibited.
The potable water system should be the only authorized source of water for human consumption.
4.
Examine potable and demineralized water systems to determine if pathways exist allowing or having the potential to allow contamination of these systems including temporary connections whereby siphons could cause situations described above.
No written response cc this Circular is required.
Your review of this matter to determine its aaplicability to your facility a/J any corrective and preven-tive actions taken or olanned, as appropriate, u?il be reviewed during a subsequent NRC insoection, If you desire additional information regarding this matter, contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
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IE Circular No. 80-14 June 24, 1980 RECENTLY ISSUED IE CIRCULARS Circular Subject Date Issued To No.
Issued 80-09 Problems With Plant 4/28/80 All holders of a power Internal Communications reactor Operating License (OL)
Systems or Construction Permit (CP) 80-10 Failure to Maintain 4/29/80 All holders of Reactor Environmental Qualifi-Operating Licenses (0Ls) cation of Equipment and Construction Permits (cps) 80-11 Emergency Diesel Generator 5/13/80 All holders of a power Lube Oil Cooler Failures reactor Oper ting License (0L) or Construction Permit (CP) 80-12 Valve-Shaft-To-Actuator 5/14/80 All holders of Reactor Key May Fall Out of Place Operating Licenses (OLs)
When Mounted Below and Construction Permits Horizontal Axis (cps) 80-13 Grid Strap Damage in 5/18/80 All holders of Reactor Westinghouse Fuel Operating Licenses (OLs)
Assemblies and Construction Permits (cps)
Enclosure
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