ML19331B875
| ML19331B875 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Allens Creek File:Houston Lighting and Power Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 08/06/1980 |
| From: | Wermiel J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19331B836 | List: |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-CP, NUDOCS 8008130463 | |
| Download: ML19331B875 (24) | |
Text
. _ _ _
9 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
_B_EFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY Docket No. 50-466 (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1)
AFFIDAVIT OF JARED S. WERMIEL REGARDING FRAMSON CONTENTION 1 AND DOHERTY CONTENTION 11 My name is Jared S. Wenniel.
I am employed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the Auxiliary Systems Branch of the Division of Systems Safety.
I have been so employec since 1978. My professional qualifications are attached to this affidavit.
The purpose of my affidavit is to address Framson Contention 1 and Doherty Contention 11, which read as follows:
Applicant has not provided adequate design characteristics and operating safeguards to protret the integrity of stored spent fuel during unattended opr ration of the spent fuel pool.
In addition, the Final Environmental Statement is inadequate in failing to consider the consequences of a spent fuel pool design basis accident.
The spent fuel pool is located in the fuel handling building in an area designed for human occupancy at any time during plant operation including postulated accidents and transients with the exception of the postulated l
.8008130463 t..
fuel handling accident as indicated in PSAR Section 9.4.5.M The integrity of the spent fuel during storage is maintained by the design of the spent fuel pool and its associated systems as identified below, and their ability to maintain a satisfactory pool water level and temperature when unattended.
This contention is based upon the assumption that the spent fuel pool area must be attended in order to monitor and control its safe operation.
- However, j
I continuous attendance at the spent fuel pool is not required to monitor and i
i maintain satisfactory pool water level and temperature (1) because of the l
monitoring and control capability for the spent fuel storage facility pror j
vided in the control room and (2) because operator action is not nomally f
required to naintain facility operations.
(
Automatic functioning of the spent fuel pool cooling system (which, as described in SER Section 9.2.2 and PSAR Section 9.1.3, is designed with redundancy of active components), the nonnal fuel handling building heating, i
ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) system (described in SER Section i
9.4.3 and PSAR Section 9.4.5), and the emergency standby gas treatment system (described in SER Section 6.23 and PSAR Section 6.2.3) will not be affected by an inability to enter the spent fuel storage area. These systems will continue to maintain spent fuel storage parameters (pool level and temperature, and building temperature) within their design ranges. The i
y It should be noted that the fuel handling accident, as described further infra, is the design basis accident for the spent fuel pool, and is not a consideration in this contention since it cannot occur unless the pool is attended during movement of fuel.
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I spent fuel pool cooling system recirculates the pool water for cooling through heat exchangers. A pool water temperature of 125*F maximum is maintained for nomal storage conditions. A level cor. troller on the pool will automatically cycle a valve on the makeup supply line, which is nomally aligned to the condensate storage tanks, to provide additional water to the pool as required to maintain proper pool level. The fuel handling building HVAC system maintains the normal environment in the pool area by supplying outside air and is automatically isolated on detection of radiation in the fuel' handling building. The standby gas treatment system is started auto-matically on the same radiation signal to maintain a negative pressure in the building for prevention of release of radioa tivity to the environment.
The necessary pumps, valves, fans and instremeatation for these systems are powered from essential power supplies to further assure their operability.
Monitoring of the above-described systems is provided in the control room.
The operator is provided with redundant pool water level and temperature
}
indication and fuel handling building environment (temperature and radia-tion) indication.
Fuel pool leakage is monitored from the control room by a system of leak collection channels located behind the pool liner.
Fuel pool low level alams in the control room will annunciate a pool water loss of less than two feet of the total 25-foot nomal level.
In addition, the operator can adjust fuel pool water level, and control cooling system and building HVAC equipment operation manually from the control room. These monitoring and control capabilities are all that is necessary to maintain safe spent fuel storage.
N t-
L.
- If the nomtl source of makeup for the spent fuel pool (i.e., the condensate transfer pumps taking their suction from the condensate storage tanks) should become unavailable, the RHR Service Water System would serve as a backup source (PSAR, Section 9.1.3.2).
That system is a seismic Category I safety grade system.
Remote operated valves can be controlled from the control room to align this source with the makeup water supply lines to the i
spent fuel pool and to the transfer pool in the reactor building.
In sizing the ultimate heat sink, which is the source of water for the RHR Service Water System a capacity of 36 acre-feet was allotted for the spent fuel pool as makeup to replace water predicted to be evaporated from the pool assuming the spent fuel pool cooling system wac inoperative. A cross-tie from the RHR Service Water System will allow for water replacement to the pool as necessary. The crosstie is capable of withstanding any single active failure.
Criterion 19 - (Control Room) of the General Design Criteria (10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A) specifies that the control room design shall assure that operator actions can be taken to operate the nuclear power unit safely under normal conditions and to maintain it in a safe condition under accident conditions, including loss-of-coolant accidents. The results of our review of the control room habitability provisions for assuring safe plant operation are described in Section 6.4 of the SER and Supplement No. 2 to the SER. As noted in Section 6.4 of the SER, during long-tem radiation releases, the control room will be isolated except for short periods of time when the t.
i ope etor manually pemits intake of filtered outside air for purposes of limiting the carbon dioxide content of the control room. As noted in Sec-tion 6.4 of Supplement No. 2 to the SER, the Applicant modified the radia-tion protection provisions such that the calculated operator doses for continuous occupancy following an onsite loss-of-coolant accidents are within the guidelines of Criterion 19.
Therefore, the capability to monitor and control spent fuel pool operation from the control room is maintained during nomal operation and for any design basis accident.
Since dispersion of radioactivity occurs with increasing dister:ce a loss-of-coolant accident at another site would obviously result in a lesser duse to the operators and would not necessitate evacuation of the facility.
Further, the Intervenors are incorrect in their allegation that the Staff's FES does not consider a spent fuel pool design basis accident. The design basis accident in the spent fuel pool area is described in Section 15.3.1 of the SER as the dropping of a raised spent fuel bundle into unchanneled spent fuel in the spent fuel racks. The potential offsite doses for this postulated accident are tabulated in Table 15.1 of the SER and in Table 15.la in Supple-ment No. I to the SER. The radiological consequences of this postulated accident are tabulated as Item 7.1 in Table S.7.2 of the Final Supplement to the Final Environmental Statement, NUREG-0470.
In summary, multiple means are included in the facility design to protect the integrity of the stored spent fuel during nomal operation and during design basis accidents:
r j
15 '.
~
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- 1.
The spent fuel pool building is designed for occupancy and s:aintenance during all design basis accidents for the facility, except for the
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spent fuel handling accident within the bui'4 ding.
2.
The spent fuel pool cooling system with redundancy in active components is operable fra the control rom.
3.
The control rom is designed for ccatinuous occupancy for nomal operation and for all design basis accidents.
4.
The RHR Service Watt System series as a bh'ckup source of makeup water if the nomal sour:e frm the Condensate Storage Tanks is unavailable.
5.
Even if the redundant Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System is not available, l
water fra the Ultimate Heat Sink is available in sufficient quantities via the RHR Service Water System to make up loses due to evaporative cooling of the spent fuel pool.
6.
It is obvious that a control room designed for continuous occupancy could be continuously occupied during an accident in another facility many miles away.
Since (1) a redundant cooling systs operable with a single active 7.
failure is provided, (2) a backup safety grade makeup system is provided, and (3) a source of water available to the backup system is sufficient a
.. a.
to provide makeup due to losses by evaporative cooling of the spent fuel pool and total inoperability of the redundant cooling system, the protection for the ACNGS spent fuel is more than that normally considered to be adequate to meet the Commission's regulations, i.e., the heat renoval capability and coolant inventory requirements in Criterion 61 of the General Design Criteria.
I 8.
The consequences of the spent fuel pool design basis accident is con-r sidered in the Final Supplement to the Final Environmental Statement and in the Staff's Safety Evaluation Report.
Therefore, the Applicant has certainly provided adequate design character-istics and operating safeguards to protect the integrity of stored spent fuel during unattended operation of the spent fuel pool.
i The foregoing affidavit was prepared by me and I swear that it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, infonnation and belief..
hd Y9 Jared S. Wenniel Subscribed and sworn to before me this 6th day of August,1980.
7A Iull y
Notary /Public
/
My Commission expires:
July 1. 1982 i
A.
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Jared S. Werniel Professfonal Qualifications Auxiliary Systems Branch Division of Systems Integration Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation J
I am a Reactor Engineer in the Auxiliary Systeris Branch in the Division of Systems Safety, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission.
In this position I perform technical reviews, analyses, and evaluations of reactor plant features pursuznt to the con-struction and operation of reactors.
I' received a Bachelor of Science Degree in Cherr.ical Engineering from Drexel University in 1972. Since 1972 I have taken courses on FWR and BWR System Operation, Reactor Safety,'and Fire Protection.
My experience includes seven years with the Bechtel Power Corporation as a Systeme Design Engineer engaged in the design of various nuclear power plant auxiliary and balance of plant systems. These have in-cluded cooling water systems, water treatment systems and fire protec-y tion systems.
'I joined the Auxiliary Systems Branch of the Comission in March, 1978.
Since joining the Comission I havE perforWed safety evaluations on nuclear power plant auxiliary systems including spent fuel storage uti coolina systems for the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 4 and 5, Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2. Byron /Braidwood Stations and Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant Unit 2.
I have also reviewed various topical reports and provided coments on proposed ANSI Standards dealing with various auxiliary systems.
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I have responsibility for the review of the following nuclear power plant auxiliary systems: new and spent fuel storage, spent fuel pool cooling, fuel 4
handling, service water, component cooling water, condensate storage, ultimate -i heat sink, instrument air, chemical and volume control, main steam isolation valve leakage control, heating ventilating and air conditioning, fire protec-tion, portions of the main steam system, main feedwater, and auxiliary feed-water.
I am a registered Professional Engineer in the State of Maryland.
I am an Associate Member of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers.
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DOHERTY CONTENTION 11 1
A.
If there's no T. e d e s t a l concrete, I don't 2
think I have a contention.
.O 3
C.
If applicant rrovides redestal concrete,_
M 4
what is there to your contention?
5
/..
that the in the event of an accident,
'(
F pedestal will be damaged, it may -- ney I see my 7
contention?
j C
C.
- / 2 s.
?
- t..
I have a n o ti.e r set of then.
I haven't 10 lost then all but okay.
Now, your cuestion is?
11 I alnost got it, tch a t was it again?
12 c.
If applicant provides pedestal concrete --
9 t
t i
13 A.
Yes.
i j
la C.
-- what unacceptable consequences of
+
15 applying heat to that concrete j
16 A.
It would sinply whatever value having 17 the concrete in the first time before an accident IE on restart, that value would be gone.
la C.
All right.
2C A.
That's a fair completion.
J-21 C.
Le t's turn to your contention on the 22 spent fuel pool.
Your number 11.
22 A.
tkay.
24 C.
hhat-even,ts would require unattended 25 operation of the spent fuel pool?
INTLRFATICNA L CCURT REPCH7ERT, INC.
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I! c t' F. T o b. TrrAs til t) r.c 7
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l 3
A.
bell, of courso, thoro could bo nony, 2
but I think the one I put in the contention was 3.
an accident, a nuclear pl an t accident nearby A
e night necessitate a fairly rapid evacuation of 5
ACECS.
6 c.
Are there 9 o 16:9 to be nuclear rower 7
plonts nearby ACNGF?
8 A.
There is going to be the Eouth Texas C
Project.
10.
O.
Which is about 60 miles away?
11 p.
Yes.
22 c.
So yb u believe that an occurrence at FTP 23 could cause a coeplete evacuation of the A c N C.c ?
It A.
Yes.
25 O.
to that every one will have to le.ve the 1"
pl an t?
17 A.
Yes.
18 C.
Can you t h i ri k of any other incidence any of the kinds 19 A.
Just another plant 20 of the of things that er. Elshop wants to bring 21 up.
Cas releases, industry near by.
22 0
khat exactly is unattended operation?
22 A.
That no one is there at all.
It C.
khat happens if no one is there?
hhat 25 operations 13 'a c n.' A 1 I G N A L CLUH3 FLPCRTFRS, INC.
!! C U E T C N, TFXAS (713) G52-5011
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l 1
.all, I'n not certain at shot atoto you 2
sould leave things there.
hhat would he the 3,
operating procedure.
- h a t was the thina again?
4 4
I ' r.
sorry.
5 C.
I just asked wh a t would he operating C
when the crent f t:e1 pool is abandoned.
7 A.
kell, there's eventue13y a cooling
?
syrten.
9 C.
Is it your contention thet this coolin; t'
10, s y s t er.
.m u s t continue to operate to avoid eny 21 adverse consequences?
12 A.
Yor.
10 C.
kny must it continue to operate?
14 A.
1c11, it foesn't have to run every 15 second, but it sceningly can't shut off for good i
IG or for long.
l 17 0
Why is tha t?
t 18 A.
Fecause there will be beat up from the 19 spent fuel.
2r C.
Yes.
Icating te what?
23 A.
Evaporation of the sFent fuel pool.
22 C.
All right.
I!o w long a period of tine 22' will it take to evaporate fuel in the spent fuel 24 pool?
j i
25 A.
I don't know.
And I've lost sere of my INTEP.NATICFAL CC"RT REPCRTTFS, 1 :. C.
- f rtC TC K, TEXAE (712) 552-5011 T
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I r. f o.
2 c.
Fut you would i m a g i r. e that it would cvarorate in a feriod of tir.e that one would 4
I expect a general evacuation of the plant?
5 A.
It's conceiveble that the evacuation for 1
6 a nucicar i r.c i d e n e c - uld
.e in; o r ta n t.
7 C..
60 miles avoy 1
i P
A.
Yes.
Cr in a nuclear attack by our f-friends.
1 0. ~
C.
Would you be =criously concerned l
11
.'s.
Ices tnat fall in the rules er not.
rot I
IT that desn.
1.-
C.
I.11 r i v le t.
1/
A.
!!u c l e a r attack or war.
IT C.
to you think the s r. e n t fuel pool should i
i le he built to survive
- a. nuclear attack?
l 17 A.
Yes.
1r C.
I had a feeling you might.
But you have 19 no idea how Icng it would take to evaporate all 20.
the water in t r. e fuel pool.
Fould it he a nonth 21 or two c.o n t h s ?
22 A.
I think it would be fairly rapidly.
22 c.
If it took a conth for it to evaporate, 24 would you still contend that there is t
75 insufficient Frovision for uncttended crer4 tion?
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i I N T E R !:;. 7 I c i:AL C (e i F 1 R f PLliT ZE F, INC.
~~
11 c t' 5 T 0 9, T r X A T.
(713) 952-5011
1
/.
Yes.
I ' t.
lee 6.
..s11y s c y i r.g t !.s t 2
unattended option is just narardous.
I,ean it's 3
like a
t C.
Fhy is it u r. e c c. ; t c o l e if it's lorsible E
for the fuel rool,to cit
- t. tere in a stab 3e C
condition for a e c r t." ?
7 A.
vell, the c o n s e t; u e n c e s of sonething f-h a t=1.e n i n g there are too e.reet
- s. i t t.
no one there
\\
9 to fix the situation.
I r.
C.
what are t.5 e prehebilities of a serious 11 consequence that you c.. v e in nind?
s 4
12 A.
ihey are hich after the evatoration of I
10 water.
j-It C.
! hat h e p r.e n s 15 A.
You'd have to get rid of 25 feet of I r-water above.
lj 17 C.
How many gallons?
IS A.
I don't know.
10 C.
All right.
20 A.
Put you're naking a lot of heat.
21 C.
How nuch heat is generated?
22 A.
I don't know that.
It depends on 22 C.
What basis do you assert that it's e lot?
77 A.
1.e l l, because it's been doing a great 25 deal of work aircady.
C e r t c i r. l y, t r.e first fuel J.v a t r s A 'i l e t. A L ccth; h r. F e 81 L a s, I :. C.
L-h00STON, TEXAS (713) '. 5 2 - 5 9 1 1 i
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1 out of the racetor is olt.:
...c
,lar.ty of v
2 heat.
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3, C.
Iov nuch heat?
4 I
- r..
I don't know.
a 5
O.
You assert there is a great deal and a 6
Ict.
I sont to know the basis 7
A.
It's just been used generally in a.; r e a t S
- c. e a l of electric rower.
E C.
What ha p t.e n s after you evaporated all of I
10, this 25 feet of water off of the tor. of the roc 17 11 A.
1 ell, ence some of the spent fuel is 17 uncovered, it VII1 heat up and
- e. e l t.
12 C.
Yhy will it heat ur. and relt?
It A.
recause it has residual heat in it.
IS 0
It has enough residual heat in melting I,
16 the fuel?
17 A.
Yes.
Also it has eno uc h residual heat 13 note importantly to melt the clad.
IS C.
Where do you derive the infor=ation that 2C serves as a basis for the assertion that there's 21 eno ug h residual fuel in a fuel assenbly to cause 22 m el t i ng of the clad?
23 A.
Cr. Kebb's submission to the Salem 24 nuclear plant.
25 p.
Ei s submission, l'e filed contentions I N" ERNATIO! A L C C t' H T RErCETEPU, INC.
l' C U S T C N, TFXAS (713) r,52-5911 r-tA" 1
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1 A.
Yes.
I O.
You've never read the t e s t i r. o n )
!. e trote?
2 A.
No.
I have reed a paper l' c wrote.
I 4
don't think it wa s testimony, but it 6.a s n ' t in
~
5 conversation f o r r..
6 C.
To you have copios?
i 7
A.
I don't know if I have it nok or not.
F C.
Eut the basis I
f 5
A.
The F r a ra p s o n s '
r, a y have it.
i 10 O.
You're the lead party in this contention?
i 31 A.
Put I can cbtain thines from ti:o 3:
Trampsons.
12 0,
rut you're oiligated 14 A.
At the time I haven't received a n y t h i r. c 15 fron the Frampsons.
I r.
16 c.
I understand.
17 A.
If I recover it, I will give it to you j
18 or Xerox it.
l 1e C.
Thank you.
The basis of your belief l
20 that residual heat will cauce m el t i ng of the fuel 21 clad is a Faper derived fron the testirony 22 derived from rr. kebb?
23 A.
Yes.
24 C.
Is that the only becis for your belief?
25 A.
At the moment, t ha t's all I can call ut.
I
l 1
C.
Ckay.
After tne clad nelts, t ! e r.
writ 2
happens?
3 A.
Fell, it hits the water beneath it and M
4
. explodes.
~
5 c.
khat causes it to explode?
f A.
A netal-water recction.
I 7
C.
Is this the sa..e reaction that o.n e a
discusses in Lcco and an LCCS 9
A.
No, it's not.
It's called a nolton 10 It's called a col ton netal explcsion.
Thct's not I
13 a good solid tern, but it is different.
12 C.
Phat exactly explodes?
?
)
13 A.
' ** e l l, there's a debate coaut an i.
14 explosion like that.
Oc=c people believe that 15 the fundenental problem is that the water la there's just several theories.
i 17 C.
What is your theory on the explosion?
IC khat do you intend to file testi any on?
19 A.
I may follow just some other theories.
2C fome of t h e -- some other tbecries.
21 C.
Describe the theories that you intend to 22 testify about?
23 A.
I'll try.
22 A.
Cne is that the netal on hitting the
)
25 water is forced in some way to chenge it's
)
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l INTEitNATICFAL CCURT P E P C E 1 E R.C, 1 :. C.
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IIC US TO N, TE7AS (713) CF2-5511 A-
I 1
cotecular kc11, c!enged f r e e.
l i c, u l d back to 2
solid caterial.
And that in that process there 3,
is 4 just too great a force on the naterial.
4 I think that's one theory.
5 The other theory ray be that it sicply 6
results frco so nuch heat reaching water that 7
rulse water takes apart the a t e.- s of the wa t e r nolecule, e1 tho ug h I'n not too stre about that.
9 C.
hell 10 A.
Easically, et t h r. t I cvel, there are r
11 vcriebles which include the anount of.-aterial.
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12 They cet reasonable pre'ictions about varying the f
amocnt of "ateriel drop
+d.
T *. e y get t ?. e r e ' s I
{
It ot to Sc c sufficient quality of noterial of 1
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15 metal.
There h:s to be in sc=e instances f
10 sufficient heighth to drop it.
1 17 C.
Ijow nuch force is liberated in these i
10 explosions, and wha t's the consequence of these IS ex plo s i o n s?
20 A.
Fell, the consequence would be to 21 frobably destroy or cause explosions cl o s e by 22 fuel rods'such that you have a general disbursal, 23 breaking up of the additionci clad all around, 2r and that that would cause additional heat 25 generation ca u s i ng additional evaroration, so 1.*v i i..M IM '. l C A /. L C L t h 's 1 i l ti a ". a.s. 5, I '. C'.
I' C UT. T O N, TEX.43 (713) 152-$f11 w-
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1 I
that eventually you vir.d up with e er.rty rool; 2
the water being driven cut of it.
The material 2
is in the molton s ta te at the botton, so you'd a
e have just the pl a i n old Jane ro nd a nelt down.
E C.
Is this a cl a s s 9 accident for spent
^
fuel rool that you've described?
7 A.
I dor.'t think so.
r:
C.
Isn't it correct C
A.
I don't k n o w-that there is a class C.
I t
t r, C.
Isn't it true that the frampsonc' 11 a t t enj.ted to l' i l e, and ! believe you nay have as 17 well, such a contention reaching these prorortions in that the I-c a r d die not a6 cit tFat 1:
le portion of the ecn:ention?
15 A.
I'm not certain.
Cne of the things 10 that's important to consider is that there vould 17 be very little loss of li fe since the place is Is evacuated already.
In C.
khat are the ultinate adverse 2r consecuences of this scenarin?
21 A.
kn11, rainly disbursal of a great deel 22 core radioactive naterial.
22 C.
khere is that material disbursed to?
t.k o forewinds will take it.
24 A.
'Wh e r e ever 25 C.
Pow does it leave the building IN1EnNATICNAL CetP1 FirLR1ERS, I:lC.
!! C l* S T O N, TFXAF (713) C52-5911 f
Ls t
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c o r. t a i r. i ng spent fuct r;el?
)
2 A.
The heat generated would probab1y
,2 destroy 6eII, the c o c l i n.3 systen, the fans and that kind of t t: i n g sould frobably bring the I
5 general breakdown or degradation of the building s
(.
such that you'd have a release.
7 C.
So you allege the force of the E
explosions are sufficient to breach t i.e building 9
and release all the rad ioac tivi ty con ta ined?
5 10 A.
hell, muen of it.
Il C.
All riqht.
Pave you dono any 12, calculations or other studies to show that this s
s.
I
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12 scencrio is either pro!,ahle or possibla?
a 12 A.
No.
I haven't done any studies l
35 C.
Have you done any calc ula t ions on the Ira actual amount of force of the explosions, or 6
t 17 whether or not the explosions.are actually --
IP A.
No.
19 Q.
So right now the scenario is just 6'
2C speculation?
l l
21 A.
It's never happened before, and I 22 haven't calculated it.
22 c.
All right.
to you have any factual 24 basis?
there's f a c tua l basis I think.
25 A.
As 1 :M C F N A T I C N/' 1.
COUF7 E l: F C b 7 F E f, IFC.
H C t'S T C N, TEyAF (713) 452-5911
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e 5
r.
& ha t's the factez! La is?
2 A.
cn the melting point of 21 r c e r. f un.
2 C.
That is a fact.
Is there eny W
conc on i tan t fact, to your kno wl edg e, on the heat 5
g ene ra ted by -- excuse
- r. e, heat generated i n, this A
spent fuel by cecay?
7
.A.
Yes.
I think it's pretty well known P
that if you take spent fuel and just leave it in o
with no cooling, it will start to self destruct.
co.ron t r. e w l e d g e ?
10 C.
You sa y tha t's m
11 A.
Yes.
12 C.
Fhat's the derivation of this couron 12 knowledge?
l e.
A.
Tne fact t r.a t it is k e r.t in wa te r.
15 C.
So tha t's the sole source of your connon i
IC knowledge as to the relationship between decay 17 heat and the molting tenperature of the clad.
1 i
l IP A.
Th a t's all I have here.
19 C.
Am I to gather from this scenario that 7e all that is essential to I;r e v e n t it from reaching 21 it's u l t i.m a t e consequence is a supply of water so 22 that the-spent fuel pool de no'; Ocil dry; is that 23 currect 24 A.
kell, my believe is t!!: & if you can kick you shouldn't have any 25 water above it, you con 1.N T E R N A01 t !! A L C C t!. 7 F E PO F.1 E E E, INC.
9
- encteu. TJ.u s (713) s=2-5911 w,
_1
I fifficulty.
If you can keep wotor obeve it.
2 C.
I!ow many sources of water are there 2
I..
There's a back up water besides the
/
spent feel pool cecI ! ng, but it's not alsays j
E available, rnd that's from the residual heat 6
renoval systen.
7 C.
So there are two sources of water here?
E A.
S o:s e t in e s.
i S
C.
There are two sources of water, to your (1
10 k.osledge?
23
.n.
- o.
There's one source, to my knowledge.
And one possible source.
The tack up a
r
}
1*
Iossible back up source.
9' le C.
that determines t i.e availebility or non-15 evailability of the back up source?
16
- r..
Tnis I don't know.
It would depend on i
17 how the reactor wa s left.
Shat the rule ses,
' ha t the operating procedure was.
Whether the IE 19 ill:n wa s to be left in that code or the other roda.
2C C.
Is it your contention that the spent 21 fuel pool chould be designed so that it can be 22 left una t tend ed for en indefinite Feriod, years 22 perhaps?
24 A.
Th a t sounds okay.
25 c.
Is that your contention?
To you think INTERNA 1IUNAL CCUR7 R F P C R T C.4 T, INC.
HOUSTON, TrXAS (713) 652-5911 4
=
i i
1 tt.ct's o plausiblo thing Isr ::.c
- gzu to 2
consider?
3 A.
I think extending the length of t i rs e to 4
the longest pessible time is e good idea for
}
5 unattended use.
r-2 In your testleony.- for vhnt length of 7
time vill you advocate a design carecity for E
unottended operction?
9 A.
Probably something the half life of 30 l
I C.
years.
11 C.
You believe that the spent fuel pool
?
l 12 should be designed for 30 years of unattended i
i 12 operation?
it A.
Yes.
15 c.
bhat do you intend to propose that will 16 keeF this access of the spent fuel pool extended 17 for 30 years?
la A.
The fact that everybody will leave it.
19 c.
All right.
What would cause total 2r evacuation of the plant fo r 30 years?
?!
A.
- bell, I think I pointed out an accident i
2 '2 at another plant.
22 c.
What sort of accident would cause an 24 evecuation for 30 yeers?
25 A.
A release of the radioactive contents of I~
l IJ 'i i R N A T I C N A L C C U i< 7 icFPCA*IrltF, I !- C.
L ICLSICN. TEXAS (7171 GE? EC11 V?
e-
I the reactor.
2 0
A class 9 accident at another plant SC 3
niles away?
A.
That would do I think.
l 5
c.
Is that it?
A Class 9 accident ce r!!cs 6'
away will be abandoning Allens creek for 30 yerrs?
7 A.
A lo er accident might also do it.
O C.
Let's cc to your last contention on 1
i welder training.
Tha t's n u.m b e r 35.
j 20,
!!o w did you surmise that there's a 11
. shortage of trained e.e pl o y e e s?
12 A.
There aren't any e.mpicyees.
12 C.
It's your contentien,
.r.
Doherty.
Id A.
Wo.
I said there will be.
- ell, up in 15 Dallas there's a stertage of trained employees, Ic and there's been sono poor we l c i ng reported at 17 C.
Le t's deal with these in incriments.
1 IF A.
These are,to employ your cuestion, 19 0
The fact that they've had w :ld ing 20 problets at Feath icxas indicates that there's a 21 shortage of welding enployees?
22 A.
It may be well to go in and find out 23 that tha t's not the case.
That they are well j
l 24 trained, but they are not doing their job.
25 C..
to you have any other factuct basis that IN"iRNATICNAL CCURT RF.PCFTERC, INC.
~
!! O U S T O.N', T E.v A S (T13) 652-5011
?
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