ML19330B829
| ML19330B829 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 05/19/1980 |
| From: | Russell W Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Levin J PENNSYLVANIA, COMMONWEALTH OF |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8008070040 | |
| Download: ML19330B829 (22) | |
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Docket 50-334 Tir. John.t.evin, Assistant Counsel Commonweal th 'of. Pennsylvania,
Pennsylvania Public Utilities' Commission
. P.'0. Cox 3265 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120
Dear ?!r. l.evin:
Enclosed herewith are the definitions that were requested in your letters of liay 5 and 23,1989 for use in the depositions concerning Beaver Valley I!uclear Generating Station, t! nit 1.
Sincerely, Cri inal ti;ncd by:
2 1-!illian T. Russell, Chief Technical Support Uranch
Enclosure:
As stated i
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Mr. John Levin May 19, 1980 cc: Gerald Charnoff, Esquire Mr. James A. Werling Jay E. Silberg, Esquire Plant Superintendent Shaw, Pittran, Potts and Trowbridge Beaver Valley Power Station 1800 M Street, N.W.
P. O. Box 4 Washington, D. C.
20036 Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077 Karin Carter, Esquire Mr. John A. Levin Special Assistant Attorney General Public Utility Commission Bureau of Administrative Enforcement P. 0. Box 3255 5th Floor. Executive House Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Mr. J. D. Sieber, Superintendent Mr. Roger Tapan of Licensing and Compliance Stone and Webster Engineering Duquesne Light Company Corporation Post Office Box 4 P. O. Box 2325 Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077 Boston, Massachusetts 02107 Irwin A. Popewsky, Esquire Mr. F. Noon Office of Consumer Advocate R & D Center 1425 Strawberry Square Westinghouse Electric Corporation Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Building 7-303 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 B. F. Jones Memorial Library 663 Franklin Avenue Aliquippa, Pennsylvania 15001 Mr. John Carey, Director Nuclear Operations Duquesne Light Company 435 Sixth Avenue Pittsbu rgh, Pennsyl vania 15219 Mr. R. E. Martin Duquesne Light Company 435 Sixth Avenue Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219 Marvin Fein Utility Counsel City of Pittsburgh 313 City-County Building Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219 O
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i DEFINITIONS OF TECHNICAL TERMS RELATED TO NRC STAFF TESTIMONY SEFORE THE PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION Tems related to dynamic stress analysis. The word " system" used below includes structures and components, sucn as piping. The word " response" includes force, stress, and displacement.
" Dynamic stress analysis" is a detemination of the response of a system to a load that varies with time.
" Static stress analysis" is a detemination of the response of a system to a load that does not vary with time.
"Intemodal combination" means combining the responses of a system for its various modes of vibration.
"Intramodal combination" means combining the responses for a single mode of vibration of a system node to loads in one direction, which are caused by excitation from different di,rections, such as, horizontal and vertical earthquake components.
" Shock spectrum" is a plot of the response of a system as it varies with frequency of vibration when the system is subject to a sudden load of short duration.
"Two directional analysis" assumes that the earthquake has two components. one horizontal in either the east-west or the north-south direction and the other vertical.
"Three directional analysis" assumes that the earthouake has three cocoone.nts, tuo horizontal in the east-west and north-south directions and one vertical.
" Single and multiple pulse quakes" is not known teminology since all earthquakes have multiple pulses in sequence.
"RMS" means root mean square and is a way of averaging response quantities in time by adding their squares, dividing by the number of quantities, and then taking the square root.
For example, if the quantities were 1 and 7, the result would be the square root of (1 + 49)/2 or the square root of 25, which is 5.
" Algebraic sumation" of a set of quantities means adding positive quantities and subtracting negative quantities.
For example, if the quantities were +6 and
-4, the result would be (6 - 4) or 2.
" Square root sum of the squares (SRSS) su =1ation" means combining quantities by adding their squares and then taking the square root.
For example, if the cuantities were 3 anc 4, the result would be the scuare root of (9 - 16) or the square root of 25, which is 5.
" Absolute summation" means adding the magnitude of quantities without regard to whether they are positive or negative.
For example, absolute summation of +2 and -3 would be (2 + 3) or 5.
" Response spectrum analysis" plots the peak response of a set of systems having one degree of freedom to a load varying with time versus the frequency of vibration of the set of systems in order to detennine the maximum response.
means American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code that defines acceptable methods of detemining and combining responses of structure "ASME Code" and components to loads of various kinds and the corresponding allowable
" Regulatory Guides" are NRC publications that define acceptable criteria design, construction, and analysis of nuclear facilities.
" Regulatory Guide 1.92" describes methods currentl loads in three directions, two horizontal and one ver,tical.
"FSAR" means Final Safety Analysis Report, which is submitted by an app a license for a nuclear facility in order to describe the facility design basis.
or other documents related to licensing actions by th
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findings and conclusions.
" Linear combination among nodes" and " absolute combination among nod known teminology in this context.
" SHOCK I code"perfoms response spectrum analysis of a piping system for an earthquake loading in only one direction at a time.
" SHOCK II code" perfoms response spectrum analysis of a piping system for an earthquake loading in three directions simultaneously with an algebraic s of intramodel responses.
"NUPIPE code" perfoms response spectrum analysis of a piping system for an earthquake loading in three directions simultaneously and combines responses by methods in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.92
" Phasing and earthquake phase relationships" refer to the representation of the time record of an earthquake as the sur. nation of a series of sinusoidal oscillations having different frequencies, magnitudes, and phases (shif ts in the oscillations along the time axis). E1trthqeakes are assumed to be randomly phased.
Tems related to turbine soindle cracking.
" Parts of turbine spindle" are the turbine shaft, the turbine discs that fit arcund the shaft, the keys that lock the discs to the shaft, and the turbine blades that are attached to the discs.
" Low-pressure versus high-pressure turbines." Steam flows directly from the steam supply system into the high-pressure turbine where energy is extracted and then into the larger low-pressure turbine (on the same shaft) where additional energy is extracted.
" Spindle" is the rotating portion of the turbine consisting of the parts listed above.
" Rotor" refers'to the rotatin~g~ portions of tne In some designs
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" rotor" an,d," spindle" are used interchangeably. generator.
" Shaft" is the axle of the turbine transmitting mechanical energy to the generator.
" Disc" is a wheel-shaped component of the rotor which is attached to the shaft and holds a row of blades.
" Outer discs" are those discs furthest from the steam inlet in the middle of the spindle.
" Keyway" is an axial groove in each turbine disc and in the shaf t, designed to accomodate a key that locks the disc to the shaft to prevent the disc from slipping on the shaft.
" Blades" are airfoil-shaped attachments to the turbine discs that cause the
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spindle to rotate when steam flows through.
" Stator" consists of stationary blades attached to the turbine casing for the purpose of directing steam from one row of rotating blades to the next row.
" Stress corrosion cracking" is failurec by cracking under combined action of corrosion and stress.
In the case of turbine components, stress corrosion arises because small amounts of corrosive impurities are carried into the steam phase and precipitate out of the steam as it is cooled and expanded in the turbine.
"Intergranular cracking" occurs between the grains of the metal, as distinguished from "transgranular cracking" which occurs within or across the grains of the metal.
Other metallurgical terms.
" Fatigue"'is the phenomenon leading to fracture under repeated or fluctuating stresses having a maximum value less than the tensile strength of the material.
" Tensile strength" is the ratio of maximum load to original crossesectional area.
" Brittle crack propagati.on"is a very sudden propagation of a crack with the absorption of no energy except that stored elastically in the body.
" Brittle fracture" is fracture with little or no plastic deformation.
" Plastic deformation" is deformation that remains permanent after removal of the load that caused it.
"Turb.ine missiles" are any loose or broken parts of the turbine which penetrate the turbine casing.
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4 Tenns related to cooling systems "LOCA (loss-of-coolant accident)" is an accident involy-ing a broken pipe, stuck-open valve, or other leak in the reactor coolant system that results in a loss of reactor coolant in excess of the capability of the makeup system.
"ECCS (emergency core cooling system)" is a safety system designed to supply cooling water to the reactor core following a loss-of-coolant accident.
" Low head safety injection system" is part of the emergency core cooling system and is intended to inject water into the reactor core at low pressure to cool the fuel elements in case of an' accident involving a iarge break in the reactor coolant system.
a "High head safety injection system" is part of the emergency core cooling system and is intended to inject water into a reictor core at high pressure to cool fuel elements in case of an accident involving a small break in the reactor coolant system.
" Cold Watt:r Injection"
^ is intentionally injecting or adding cold water to hot water to reduce the vapor pressure of the mixed water.
"RS (recirculation spray)" is a system that draws water from the containment sump and sprays it in the containment building following a loss-of-coolant accident in order to lower the temperature, condense steam, lower the containment pressure, and reduce the leakage of gases to the environment.
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" Sump water vapor pressure" is the vapor pressure of water that collects in the sump at the botton of tha containment building following a loss-of-coolant accident.
" Pressure Flash" assumes liquid being expelled from a break flashes at the saturation temperature corresponding to the containment total pressure. This assumption maximizes the temperature of water entering the sump and would I
give the lowest NPSH available.
" Temperature Flash", as used in the original NPSH calculations, assumes the liquid being expelled from a break flashes at the dew point temperature of the containment atmosphere. This assumption would result in a higher con-tainment pressure and lower sump temperature and is therefore non-conservative (i.e., a higher NPSH available is calculated).
" Dump cavitation" occurs when the pressure of the water entering a pump drops below the saturation pressure at the existing ternperature, so that vapor fonns and erosion of the pump may result.
"NPSH (net ' positive suction head)" refers to the pressure above the saturation value for the temperature of the water entering a pump to avoid cavitation, a-,
Tems related to nuclear reactor regulation
" Goals of the NRC in licensing and regulating nuclear reactors" are to protect the public health and safety, to protect the quality of the environment, and to assure compliance with the anti-trust laws in civilian nuclear activities.
"The reactor licensing process" is centered in the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Rigulation which reviews, evaluates, and processes applications for licenses and amendments to such licenses for the construction and operation of nuclear reactors and applications for reactor operator licenses.
" Defense in depth." Nuclear power plants are designed to prevent accidents.
with protective systems provided to place and hold the plants in a safe condition if deviations from nomal operations occur.
In addition, engineered safety features are installed to mitigate the consequences of certain postulated accidents. Further, censiderations of safety are involved in evaluating the i
suitability of proposed sites for nuclear power plants.
Finally, the NRC has endorsed the use of Emergency Planning Zones having a radius around a nuclear power plant of about 10 miles for airborne exposure (where emergency actions such as sheltering or evacuation could be taken if necessary) and about 50 miles for contaminated fdod.
" Quality assurance"is the application of disciplined engineering practices and thorough m'anagement and programmatic controls to the design, fabrication, construction, and operation of facilities.
In the case of nuclear power plants, the NRC equires that all organizations perfoming work important to safety conduct such work in a preplanned and documented manner, independently verify the adequacy of completed work, provide records that will confim the acceptability of work and manufactured items, and assure that all individuals are properly trained and qualified to carry out their responsibilities.
" Responsibility of licensees for design and testing." Ea ch NRC licensee is held responsible for assuring that its nuclear power plants are built and operated safely and in confomance with NRC regulations.
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OFFICE OF INSFECTION AND ENFORCEMENT The Office of Inspection and Enforcement (OIE) is responsible for the development and administration of programs and policies for:
inspecting Itcensees to ascertain whether they are complying with NRC.
regulations, rules, orders, and license provisions, and to determine whether these licensees are taking appropriate actions to protect the nuclear meierf als and facilities, the environment, and the health and safety of the public; inspecting applicants for licenses, as a basis for reccmmending issuance or denial of limited work authori:ation const uction permit, or an operating license; inspecting suppliers of safety related services, components, and equipment to determine whether they have established quality assurance programs that meet NRC criteria; investigating incidents, accidents, allegations, and unusdal circumstances including those involving loss, theft, or diversion of special nuclear material; enforcing Ccmmission orders regulations, rules, and license provisions; reccamending changes in licenses and standards, based en the results of inspections, investigations and enforcement actions; and notifying licensees regarding generic prcblems so as to achieve appropriate precautionary er corrective action.
The responsibility assigned to OIE by 10CFR1 establishes the fcundation upon which the reactor inspection program is structured and confers to GIE the authority to inspect the activities over which NRC has jurisdiction.
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NRC INSPECTION FUNCTIONS The NRC inspection program is based upon two distinct elements:
preventive inspection and reactive inspection.
The preventive element is based upon pro-ceduralized inspection on a scheduled and repetitive basis. The reactive element involves inspection or investigation of actual events and conditions to assure that a significant risk to the health and safety of the public does not exist or develop.
NRC inspection functions, pursuant to these elements include:
Rcut.ine onsite inspection of records and direct observation of licensee activities with respect to the requirements of the facility license. 'Re-quirements of the facility license which are used as inspection acceptance criteria also include national codes and standards, NRC documents, and other sources which are either directly cited by the license and license application or which are considered to be appropriate industry practices.
Inspection findings are documented in inspection reports and followed to resolution via subsequent inspection of licensee corrective and preventive actions.
Matters which cannot be resolved through routine correspondence and ccmmuni-cation with the licensee are referred to appropriate NRC ir.anagement for further evaluation and action.
Safety matters which are not addressed by existing criteria are similarly referred to NRC managegment.
Inspector: or investigators are dispatched to facilities when necessary to provide prompt review of response to actual incidents or licensee activities which require imediate attention.
SELECTIVE INSPECTION This term relates to the planned, sampling apprcach to inspection of licensee activities.
This approach is based upon the follcwing general considerations:
Sampling inspections rely on selection of a limited number of generic and o
specific licensee activities wnich are representative of the requirements of the facility license.
Samples are selected, whe'e possible, on the basis of focusing en areas of greatest risk, i.e. inspection of activities which may have the greatest potential risk to the health and safety of the puolic if improperly per-fomed or managed.
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2 The inspection program specifies a broad range of program areas from which samplos are to be selected to ensure that the spectrum of licensee acti/i-ties are inspected on a regular, planned basis.
The inspection program includes written guidance en the perfomance of inspection activities to ensure that the regulatory and safety aspects of 4
an activity can be consistently addressed with respect to existing. agula-tory requirements.
The program also includes guidance for review of unique or new issues ard pursuit of such issues to resolution.
NRC inspections do not supplant the extensive inspection and cIntrol activi-ties required by the licensee but separately sample licensee control and actions for adequacy.
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OEFICIENCIES, INFRACTIONS, VIOLATIONS OEFICIENCY A Deficiency categcry item of nonccmpliance is cne in which the threat to the health, safety, or interest of the public or the cembon defense and security is remote and no undue expenditure of time or resources is required to implement corr:ctive action. Deficiencies include such items as noncompliance with record requirements, posting requirements, or labeling requirements wnich are not serious enough to warrant categorization as infractions or violations.
INFRACTION An Infraction category item of nonccmpliance is one shich resulted in a reduction of preventive capability below requirements but redundant controls precluded an item of nonccmpliance of the violation category, or, an item which caused or centributed to, or aggravated an incident or occurrence. Examples of Infractions include failure to establish, implement, or maintain procedures which are required to assure the quality of operation.
VIOLATION A Violation category item of noncompliance is one which has caused, contributed to, or aggravated an incident of the type listed belcw or which has a substantial potential for causing, contributing to, or aggravating such an incident or occurence:
a.
Exposure of an individual to a whole bcdy radiation dose in excess of 25 Rem, b.
Radiation levels in unrestricted areas which exceed 50 times the regulatory limits.
c.
Release of radioactive materials in effluents which exceed 50 times the regulatory limits.
d.
Failure of a safety system to function when required.
e.
Divorsien or theft of Plutenium, Uranium-233, or enriched Uranium.
f.
All secdrity barriers or centrols removed or inoperative and there isunimppdedaccesstoavitalarea.
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ABNORMAL CCCURRENCE An abnormal occurrence is an unscheduled incident or event which the Commission determines is significant frem the standpoint of public health or safety.
rep 0RTABLE OCCURRENCE A reportable occurrence is any unscheduled or unanticipated ocerational event reported to the Ccamission.
Included in these are (1) events which could or did have significance from the standpoint f public health and safety and (2) events reported to the NRC for performance evaluation s
and trend determinations.
Reference:
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LICENSEE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS Notification of Significant Events As of February 29, 1980, licensees are required to make immediate notifi-cation to the NRC of significant events within ene hour of the occurrence.
This requirement, implemented via 10CFTE0.72 identifies 12 types of events which require notification as discussed in IE Information Notice No. 80-06, Notification of Significant Events (attached).
Reports of events pursuant to 10CFR50.72 that are similarly required by facility technical specifications to be reported within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> are considered to satisfy the correspondent technical specification requirement except that technic 11 specifications also require written confirmation via telegram, facscimile, etc.
The reports pursuant to 10CFR50.72 are generally made via the NRC's dedicated Emergency Notification System direct phone line to an NRC Duty Officer who is available 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day.
1,1censee Event Reoorts Licensee Event Reports are the vehicle by which the licensee reports cccurrences to NRC. Facility technical specifications (excerpt attached for: Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1) provide the categories of items to be reported as either prcmpt (24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) or thirty day notifications, prcmpt notifications required by technical specifications (other than those discussed under Notification of Significant Events) are recuired to be reported via telephone within twenty four hours and confirmed via telegraph, mailgram or facsimile transmission. A written folicwuo report is required within 14 days which discusses additional information a
which may not have been available at the time of prompt notification.
Prompt notification is required for items such as:
-- failure of the reactor protection system or other safety system o
to initiate a required safety function.
-- personnel error or precedural inadequacy which could prevent, by itself, operations required to cope with accidents analyzed in the i
safety analysis report.
-- errors discovered in transient or accident analyses.
A written report and/or licensee event report fora is required to be submitted within thirty days of an occurrence such as:
safety system settings which are fcund to be less censervative than the recuired limits but do not prevent fulfillment of the system's required functions.
-- conditions leading to apa-ation in a degraded mode of operation.
administrative or a.cocedural inadequacies which threaten to reduce the redundanc" i.tded in the safety systems.
Prempt and " thirty day" licensee event reports are submitted to the NRC regional offices for review and followup during subsequent inspections and are distributed to other NRC offices for review and analysis.
The reports are to include information concerning the description of the avent, its causes, potential health and safety consecuences, correct-tve and preventive actions, and the effect.of the e,ent en overall plant operatien.
Monthly Oceratino Recorts The monthly operating report is a reutine report of operating statistics and shutdcwn experience which includes information on each outage or forced reduction in pcwer and safety related maintenance.
Other Recorts Several other categories of reports which provide radiological and enviror. mental data and experience are also required by various license conditions.
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Reference:
l ENCLOSURE 1 UNITED STATES SSINS No.:
6870 "r
NUCLEAR REGULAT0itY CCMMISSION Accession No.:
0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 7912190679 WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 IE Information Notice No. 80-06 Date:
February 27, 1980 j
Page 1 of 1 NOTIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT EVEN~5 Description of Circumstances:
On February 29, 1980, an immediately effective amendment to the Nuclear Regula-tory Commission (NRC) regulations is to be published in the Federal Register that sets forth requirements for the reporting of significant events at operating reactors. A copy of the NRC Notice of Rulemaking is enclosed.
The reporting requirement in the new section 50.72, " Notification of significant events," to 10 CFR Part 50 will be effective immediately under the authe 'ty of GAO clearance R0072 (Emergency Generic Clearance -Expires 7/31/80), and i. ;eing submitted to the General Accounting Office for review under the Federal Reports Act for permanent approval urder NRC's existing GAO clearance for 10 CFR Part 50
(#R0071).
Paragraph (a) of s50.72 requires, in part, that the licensee notify the NRC Operations Center as soon as possible and in all cases within one hour by
.e 4
telephone of the occurrence of any significant event listed in the paragraph.
Reports of events pursuant to $50.72 that are similarly required by Technical Specifications to be reported by telephone within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> are considered to satisify the Technical Specification requirement for prompt telephone notifi-cation.
Technical Specification requirements for confirmatica reports by telegraph, mailgram, or facsimile transmission still apply.
The primary channel for telephone notification of significant evenb should be through the dedicated telephone line established between the licensee and the NRC Cperations Center.
An NRC Cuty Officer is available, 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day, in the NRC Cperations Center.
In case the licensee is unable to report a signif-icant event over the dedicated telephone line, the licensee should contact the e
NRC Operations Center directly by commercial line.
Attachment:
Notice of Rulemaking a
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DUPLICATE DOCUMENT 1
Entire document previously entered into system under:
nuo J9919 o 6~7 9 a
i No. of pages:
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ACMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS according to work and jcb functions.E e.g., reacter cperations and surveillance, inservice inspection, reutine maintenance, special maintenance (describe maintenance), waste processing, and refueling.
The ~ dose assignments to various duty functions may be estimated based on pocket dosimeter, TLD, or film badge measurements.
Small expa:ures totalling less than 20 percent of the individual total dose need not be accounted for.
In the aggregate, at least 80 percent of the total whole body dose received frcm external sources should be assigned to specific major work functions.
MONTHLY OPERATING REPORT i
6.9.1.6 Routine reports cf cperating statistics and shutdcwn ex;erience shall be submitted on a monthly basis to the Director, Office of Manage-ment Informatien and Fr: gram Centrol, 0.5. Nuclear Regulatory.Ccmmissien, Washington, D.C.
20555, with a c:py to the Regicnal Office, submitted no later than the 15th of each month folicwing the calendar mcnth covered by the report.
rep 0RTABLE OCCURRENCES 6.9.l.7 The REPORTABLE OCCURRENCES of Specificatiens 6.9.1.8 and (s
6.9.1.9 below, including corrective actions and measures to prevent recurrence, shall be raported to the NRC.
Supplemental reports may be required to fully describe final resolution of cccurrence.
In case of corrected or su:plemental reports, a licensee event report shall be ccmpleted and reference shall be made to the criginal report date.
PROMPT NOTIFICATION WITH WRITTEN FOLLCWUP 6.9.1.8 The types of events listed belcw shall be reported within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by telephcne and confirmed by telegra:h, mailgram, or facsimile transmission to the Director of the Regional Office, or his designate no later than the first werking day follcwing the event, with a written follcwup report within la days.
The written folicwup report shall include, as a minimum, a ecmpleted cc:y of a licensee event report form.
Informaticn provided en the licensee event report for=
shall be su:plemented, as needed, by additional narrative material to provide c:molete explanation of the circumstances surrcunding the event, 3
a.
Failure of the reactor protection system er other systems subject to limiting safety-system settings to initiate the required protective function by the time a mcnitored parameter UThis tabulation sup:lements the recuirements of 120.s07 cf 10 CFR Part 20.
3EA'!ER VALLEY - UNIT 1 6-14 Amendment Nc. 1 9 5 g **
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f.
ACMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS reaches the setpoint specified as the limiting safety-system setting in the technical specificaticns or failure to c:mplete the required protective function.
b.
Operation of the unit or affected systems when any parameter or operation subject to a limiting condition for opeation is less censervative than the least conservative aspect of the limiting condition for operation established in the technical g
specificaticns.
- c.
Abnormal degradatien discovered in fuel cladding, reactor coolant pressure beundary, or primary c:ntainment.
d.
Reactivity ancmalies involving disagreement with the predicted value of reactivity balance under steady-state c:nditiens during power operation greater than or equal to 1% ak/k; a calculated reactivity balance indicating a shutdown margin less conservative than specified in the technical specificatiens; short-term reactivity increases that correspend to a reactor period of less than 5 seconcs cc, if subcritical, an unplanned reactivity insertien of more than 0.5t ak/k; cr occurrence of any unplanned critictlity.
e.
Failure or malfunction of cne or more ccmpenents wnich prevents er could prevent, by itself, the fulfillment of the functional requirements of systems required to c:pe with accidents analy:ed in the SAR.
f.
Personnel error or precedural inadecua:y which prevents or could prevent, by itself, the fulfillment of the functicnal requiraments of systems required to ccpe with accidents analy:ed in the SAR.
g.
Conditiens arising frem natural er man-made events, that, as 8
a direct result of the event, require plant shutd wn, ocera-icn of safety systems, er other protective measures required by technical specificaticns.
1 h.
Errors discovered in the transient or ac:ident analyses er in the methcds used for such analyses as described in the safety analysis report or in the bases for the technical specifications that have or could have permittee reactor operation in a manner less c:nservative than assumed in the analyses.
3EAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 5-15 Amendment N:.
ACMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS
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1 Performance of structures, systems, or components that i.
requires remedial action or corrective measures to prevent operation in a =anner less conservative than that assumed in the accident analyses in the safety analysis report or technical specificaticns bases; or discovery during plant life of conditions not specifically considered in the safey analysis report or technical specifications that require remedial action or corrective measures to prevent the existence or development of an unsafe condition.
THIRTY-CAY WRITTEN REFORT-The types of events listed belcw shall be the subject of T
0 days written reports to the Director of the Regi nal Office within 3 6.9.1.9 The written report shall include, as a In formation of occurrence of the event.
minimum, a comp!eted copy of a licensee event report form.
prcvided en the If:ensee event report form shall be supplemented, as needed, by additional narrative material to provide complete explanation of the circumstances surrounding the event.
Reactor protection system of engineered safety feature instrument settings which are fcund to be less conservative a.
than those established by the technic:1 specifications but which do not prevent the fulfillment of the functional requirements of affected systems, Conditiens leading to operaticn in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition f:r operation or plant shutdown b.
required by a limiting conditien for cperation.
Observed inadequacies in the implementation Of Idministrative or procedural controis which threaten to cause reduction of c.
degree of redundancy provided in reactor protecticn systems or engineered safety feature systems.
Abnormal decradation of systems other than d.
g' resulting from the fission process.
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3EAVER VALLEY - L' NIT I 6-16 Amendman-N:. 12
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