ML19329D782

Forwards Questions Re Instrumentation & Control Sys, & Electrical Power Sys Prepared by Electrical Sys Branch for Submittal to Util

ML19329D782
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	12/09/1971
From:	Case E US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To:	Morris P US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
References
NUDOCS 8003170727
Download: ML19329D782 (13)

Text

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eau c, UNITED STATES J q y 0,

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ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION i

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,e W ASHINGTON. O.C.

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DEC 0 C7]

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P. A. Morris, Director, Division of Reactor Licensing l,

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FLORIDA PCUER CORPORATION - CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 UUCLEAR GENERATING l'

PIudfr DOCIGT-ikh-50-302 v

The enclosed questions were prepared by the DRS Electrical Systems Branch

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for submittal to the applicant.

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ESB-103 Edson G.

se, Director g

DRS :ES3 :IV Divisien of Reactor Standards

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Enclosure:

Questions j

cc w/cncl:

S. Hanauer, DR f

R. DeYoung, DRL R. Doyd, DP1 i

A. Schwancer, DEL H. Faulkner, DEL f

V. Moore, DRS j

T. Ippolito, DRS I

I. Villaiva, DRS I

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FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT DRS ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS BRANCH OUESTIONS g

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i.u INSTRUMENTATION ANirCONTROL--SYSTEPS 7.1 Profide information requested in the Comission's Information Guide 2,

" Instrumentation and Electrical Systems" (10/27/ 71).

If the requested l-information is presently contained in the FSAR or its amendments, the response _should._ identify the _ specific. location.of_. the.in_ formation and l

augment same, as required, to meet the requirements of the Information Guide. The response to the following questions of the Information Guide should:

a.

Question I.C. - Describe the degree of conformance of the protection I

I system to the provisions of IEEE S td 338-1971, "IEEE Trial Use Criteria for the Periodic Testing of Nuclear Power Generating Station Protection Systems." Describe and justify all exceptions to this standard.

b.

Question 3

' Describe the degree of confomance of your seismic testing program to IEEE Std 344-1971, "IEEE Cuide for Seismic Qualification of Class I Electric Equipment for Nucicar Power Generating S tation." Describe and justify all exceptions to this s tandard.

The restense should include the results of tests of the M MN * $ 7 4.6%=' Web.'

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batteries (cells), in addition to those of auxiliary equipment l

l such as racks, and any necessary extrapolation that accounts for all s

i degradation due to time.

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Question 4 - Describe the degree of conformance to.IEEE.S td 336-1971 i

"IEEE Standard Installation, Inspection, and Testing Requirements i

for Instrumentation and Electric Equipment During the Construction I

of Nucicar Power Generating Stations" during the construction phase

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I of the plant.

Describe and justify all exceptions to this standard.

i d.

Question 5.a. - Discuss your criteria regarding maximum percentage fill in trays and wireways, and mini.um spacing between same.

I Describe and justify all exceptions to the criteria.

I e.

Questien 5.c. - Deacribe the methods used to preserve the indepen-dence of safety related loads served by E.S. Bus 33.

The response i

should account for all potential conflicts created by using E.S.

Bus 3B to serve safety and non-saf ety related loads.

f.

Question 11 - Discuss the indications available to the control room operator which allow him to recogni::e that a protection system or subsystem has been placed on test, bypassed for operation or mainte-

~%-..w nance purposes, or removed from service for any cause.

The response should list all such bypasses and verify that they have been i

designed to meet the recuire:'ents of Paragraph 4.12 of IEEE 279.

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Question 12_ - Refer to IEEE Std 308-1971 in lieu of IEEE 308 as E

stated in the Guide.

(Note: Where a conflict exists between the "eight hour" provision of Section 5.2.3.4 of IEEE Std 308-1971 and y

i General Design Criterion 17, the applicable provisions of Criterion s{

17 govern.)

Also discuss the use of automatic transfer sw[tc5Es (Figure 8-9), and the effects of the stated voltage dips (30 percent) t of the diesel-generators on loads that recuire high starting torcue such as cotor operated valves.

t 7.2 Identify and provide justification for any asocets of 'tihe design that

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t do not ecnform to Safety Guide 11, " Instrument Lines Penetrating l

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Primary Reactor Centainnent" (3/10/71).

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7.3 Describe the methods for periodically testing the reactor protection l

I system's response time for the trio parmeters.

Tne rsponse should be

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paracetric in nature to show the change in response time as a function e

i of the level of the parameter and as a function of the rate of change l

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of the paraceter.

Include a discussion of the response times in relation to the safety limits and state the worst case margin in terms of tiee.

7.4

. State the criteria and design bases which established the heat tracinNequirements, temperature control, monitoring, and power requirements for the boric acid tanks, barated water storage tanks, g

- and spray additive tanks, and related oiping of the chemical addition system.

Discuss the consecuences of a single failure in the heat

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m 4-7.5 The FSAR ststcc that pump interlocks insure against accidental startup of a cold loop if reactor pcuer is greater than 15 porcent.

N Discuss the consequences of an interlock failure and the criteria to l

uhich these interlocks are designed.

t 7.6 Identify all trip set points of the reactor protection system and engineered safety feature system instruments uhich are uithin 107.

of the high or lou cnd of the calibrated range.

Provido a uorst case error analysis that verifies that each output signal is aluays con-servative uhen vicued from a safety standpoint.

i 7.7 The FSAR, in describing the core flooding system, states that the i

l cicetric motor-operated stop valves betueen the cora flooding tanks I

I and the primary coolant system are open during reactor pcuor cperation, E

I and.that valvo position is indicated in the control room.

Discuss the design features of the control circuits of these valves, including the assurance provided by the design that the valves vill be open uhen required. The inclusion of the follouing features vould provide an acceptable design:

Automatic opening of the valves uhenever the primary coolant a.

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system pressure exceeds a preselected value (specified in the j

Technical Specifications).

b.

Automatic removal (override) by a safety injection signal of any bypass feature that =ay be provided to allou a motor O

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operated valve to be closed, for short periods of time, when 8

the primary system is at pressure (in accordance with the e

provisions of the Technical Specifications).

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Valvo position visual indication that is actuated by sensors on the valves ("open" and " closed").

d.

Audible alares, independent of item c.,

that are actuated by sensors on the valves when the valves are not in the fully open position.

9 If the design, or planned,cdifications, are based en criteria g

1 different frem those stipulated above, submit the criteria and I

necess.ary documentation that verify that the equivalent degree l

1 of protection is af fe-ded, f

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7.8 The FSAR atates that ficxibility of controlling reactivity rate f

is provided by a patch panel that permits the patching of any rod into any group cxcept those of Group 8.

Describe the interlocks and/or administrative procedures used' to insure that the resultant changes of rods between various groups are correct, and the consequences of a failure in the interlock system.

7.9 Describe in more detail the design features and administrative procedures used to insure nroper operations of the residual heat I

removal (RHR) system isolation valves. Your description should

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verify that these valves remain closed during nomal operation.

The inclusion of the following features would provido an accept-able design:

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At least two valves in serics, with each valve interlocked to prevent valve opening unless the primary system pressure i

is below the RHR systen pressure.

I b.

Interlocks of diverse principles, and designed to =ect the in te n t-o f--I EEE--279.

l c.

Automatic closure of the two series valves whenever the pressure in the primary coolant systen exceeds a selected j

fraction of the design pressure of the RHR cystem. Thes e i

closure devices should be designed to the intent of IEEE 279.

8 If the design, or planned modifications, are based on criteria different from those stipulated above, submit the criteria nnd necessary documentation that verify that the equivalent degree of protection is afforded.

7.10 Several sections of the FSAR (s.g., 1.4.19, 1.4.38, 7.1.1.1) restrict the scope of GDC 21 and IEEE 279 by using torns such as

" single cocconent failures" and " single failures of an active co=conent" rather than the more extensive term " sin:;1e f ailures".

All relevant sections of the FSAR should be revised to conform with

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r l1 7-7.11 The FSAR (Section 1.6) states that the protection and control s'ystems

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are being analyzed for possible coccon failure modes.

Identify and discuss the results of the analyses.

If the analyses have not been I:

completed, state the scheduled cocpletion date, and indicate your i.

i,l commitment to modify the design, if required, as a consequence of the_

analysos.

7.12 The discussion of the operational sequence of the engineered safeguards system is incomplete and not sufficiently detailed to permit evaluation.

Submit a more cceprehensive description and logic diagram, uith i

L nomenclature that is consistent uith the other subordinate-drauings,

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that delineate all the required inputs and sequential actions. The q

discussion should be c::plicit uith regard to the timing natuork for the 4

various lead biochs, including the effect of a sustained lou voltage

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condition on the diesel-generator (i.e., lev voltage for a period g

i longer than that of the 15 secend timins natuork).

Discuss the

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i consequences of such a condition and the means used to prevent the i

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simultaneous energi:stion of load blocks 2, 3 and 4.

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7.13 In your design, either lou reactor coolant pressure or high reactor building pressure will initiate safety injection; heucver, of these tuo signals, only the lou reactor coolant pressure initiates reactor trip**lS,in,cc your analysis of the effectiveness of safety injection

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takes credit for reactor trip, discuss the bases for not using high building pressure to trip the reactor.

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rb8 8-It 7.14 Identify and discuss the selected alarm conditions mentioned in I

I Section 7.1.3.2.5 that are annunciated.

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7.15 Describe : cre conpletely the red position-display system. The FI discussion should as a mininum address:

(1) the capability to display sint.ltaneously the position of each rod including any constraints therein, and (2) the display and annunciation of an out-of-symmetry condition.

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i 7.16 The FSAR states that control rod-drive motor rotation in the wrong direction is detected by a notor rotation fault detector.

Discuss the capability to detcet failure to rotate upon a denand signal, and the provisions which prevent such an occurrence from bein, errencously I.

I displayed and from being cumulative.

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7.17 Section 7.4.6 states that several actions occur autonatically upon loss of offsite pover, including the tripping of the main feeduater pumps and the reactor coolant pumps.

In light of the above, discuss the consequences of loss of offsite power and how full load rejection is accomplished.

7.18 Discuss more completely the protective system with regard to partial loop operation. As a mininum, the response should address the following:

(1) the envelope of the permissible operating limits for the three pump and the two pump (one per loop) case as a function of

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N reactor trip to a power level comensurate with the number of pumps i

in operation, actual flow, and power inbalance; (3) the method used g

i' to discriminate between only two pumps operating in one loop and one s

i pump in each loop; (4) whether the operating limits (trip) delineated I

t in Table 7-4 should be restricted when operating in a partial loop mode; and (5) the basis for apparently not using breaker auxiliary i

contacts to provide the logic for reactor trip and operating limits.

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1 7.19 The schematic diagram for motor operated valves (Figure 7-10) shows g

that overload protection (0/L) is used.

Discuss the bases for the j

0/L's and any provisions for bypassing the 0/L's, especially during crergency cenditions.

Discuss the e ffect of low bus voltage (e.g.,

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i during dicac1 overation) on motor torque, and the possibility for causing 0/L trip prior to valve operation.

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8.0 ELECTRICAL p0*JER SYSTEMS 8.1 Describe more fully the auxiliary equipment of the emergency t

diesel generator system.

The description should include the C

e fuel storage and transfer system; the source of powcr for con-g) tro1T iihe starting system and number of start attempts provided; l

method of cooling and warming the engine; and the control and

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protection system including relevant schematic diagrams.

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.i 8.2 The tabulation of connected loads to the diesels, as shown in g

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Table 8-1 of the FSAR, is not sufficient to evaluate the adecuaev 4

1 of the design with. rcspect to regulatory pod tion 4 of Safety l

Guide 9.

Data that are required include actual s tarting KVA 4

loads rather than the nameplate data and the time recuired for j

i ene various loads to reach full speed.

To correlate these data I

with the capability of the diesel generator, the follcuing information should be provided:

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I a.

A load profile during a LOCA showing the timine; secuence and the time duration of the various loads subsequent to dicsci start.

The anticipated s tarting KVA recuirenents for the

.various loads should be superimposed on the load profile at the appropriate time, and the computed ef fect of each load transient (system voltage and speed, and voltage and sneed recovery time -for each s ter) should be indicated.

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The maximum loads that can be increnentally added to the various block plateaus, without exceeding the recontr.cndations of Safety Guide 9.

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The continuous. 2000 hr.. and 30. min. rating of diesel engine.

d.

The generator's X, X}, X", and SCR and the unit's WR~.

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type of excitation system provided should be discussed, g

I including the response tine of same for voltage regulation g

I during -the-various s tep -load changes.-----

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8.3 Discuss the design criteria for the diesel generator roots with j

i respect to ability to preclude missiles, explosions and fires O

in one unit fron affecting the redundant counterpart.

s 8.4 Identify the sources of centrol nc*ier to the 239 and 500 KV switchyard breakers. Submit an analysis to show that no singic failure in these neuer sources, control circuito and protective relaying will negate the ability to provide offsite power to the i

engineered safety features.

8.5 Describe the monitoring features provided to continuously ensure that the capability of a battery to supply power is not degraded.

Consider the relevance of the monitored parameters to the actual charge stored in the battery, and discuss the limitations of the system to ensure disclosure of battery degradation, including g

protection agains t overcharging. - ----

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8.6 Discuss your plans for converting the 500 KV bus from a ring 8

configuration to a breaker-and-a-half systen.

8.7 The design of the 6900 volt auxiliary systen initiates automatic b

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transfer from the preferred source to an alternate source-upon.-----.--

i loss of the preferred power' source.

Discuss the effect on availability r

of offs'ite power resulting from switching four 9000 !!P pump motors from

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one source (dcad) to another (live).

Address the effect of the transfer t

i occurring before the :.otor field has collapsed but at such time that y

the back DfF does not oppose that of the source. The concern here is L

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that such transfer could approach that of naralleling generators that L

are out of phase.

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