ML19329D616
| ML19329D616 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 05/05/1976 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19329D614 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8003160240 | |
| Download: ML19329D616 (5) | |
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DOCKET NO. 50-302 ECCS EVALUATION REPORT 1.0 General As requested in the memorandum from G. Ma etis through T. Novak to T. Ippolito, dated April 8, 1976, the EIECS Branch has reviewed the
.ECCS of Crystal River, Unit No. 3.
The scope of the review was that reflected in the document " General Information Request for Review of ECCS in'the Electrical, Instrumentation and Control Areas." The FSAR through Amendment 48 for Crystal River, Unit No. 3, previously.
prepared _ safety and supplemental evaluation reports by the EI6CS Branch and other documents listed in the Appendix to this report were used as~the basis for our review.
The following sections address those items requested 'to be reviewed in the document" General Informa-
- tion Request for Review of ECCS in the Electrical, Instrumentation and Contro1' Areas."
2.0' E.CCS Actuation System Conformance to Single Failure Criterion i
We' have reviewed the new information since Amendment' 42 of the FSAR and re-examined our previous findings documer. tad in the safety and supplemental evaluation: reports. We have concluded that our previous s
findings are still valid and therefo're the ECCS Actuation System satisfies the:singic failure criterion.
3.0
-- Onsite' Emerhency Power System Conformance to Single Failure' Criterion h'e have reviewedithe new information.since Amendment 42.of the FSAR-
.andje-examined our previous-findings documented in the safety and 80 03160 tVO i
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3.0 suppl
-at:'1 ewI':, tion reportr.
We have concludeI thn.: c':r ncevi au :
andinc.s are s till s ;.iid a:.. t;.or: fore ihm can :e c:.v v. '.cy f. e.
systen satisfies the single failure criterien.
'.C Ervir_.n_r m al 09.!!fic tier. of El e trien: "w wn w
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It has been requested that the Office of Inspection aad Enforcenant of Region II conduct an audit of the records pertaining to the environmental qualification of Balance of Plant Class IE equipment.
The Division of Proj ect Management is currently pursuing the resolu-tion of this matter with the Office of Inspection and Enforcement.
The results of the audit will be reported when availabic.
5.0 Submerged Electrical Eauipment The applicant has identified six valve motors that would be subeerged following a LOCA.
One of the six valves is not considered to be safety related.
The other five valves are part of the Containment Isolation System and are employed to isolate sample lines in the inboard side of the Containment.
Although chcse valves are norna11y closed, they receive an ESF confirmatory closed signal.
The five valves are powered from the same emergency bus.
We have reviewed the electrical aspects of the design and determined that a single failure and/or f1 coding in these five valves would not result in the loss of emergency buses redundancy or the capability to isolate the containment.
We have concluded that this is acceptable.
With regard to the non-safety related valve (D%V-164), we could not estab)4 sh the source power to the valve motor based on the information 6__
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tiat uo present.ly 2-5.0 i.
We uoild consb'er the power fee f*- @2:
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- valve ' acceptable if it. emanates froa any bus axeept choae cieecrie buses identified'as Train B energency buses.
If this valve is found to be connected to the Train B buses, va will require that the power connections be'che gsd accorungly.
f6.0 Critical Single Electrically-0 cerated Fluid Systen' Components We have revicored the new information since Amendment 42 of the FSAR tuud re-examined our previous findings documented in the safety and supplemental evaluation reports.
We have concluded that our-findings are still valid with regard to the fact that a failure in any singic electrically-operated fluid system component would not result in the loss of capability.of the ECCS to perform its safety function.
l The core ficoding tank isolation valves have been identified as the only valves required by the Technical Specifications to have power disconnected.' The electrical aspects of the design for these valves
. satisfy the Branch Technical Position EI5CSB 18 (Application of the Single Failure Criterion to Manually-Controlled Electrically-Operated Valves) of Appendix 7A of the Standard ~ Review Plan and are acceptable.
17.0 -
Interlocks -Netween Redundant Portions of ECCS and Supporting Subsystens Our. review results of the interlocks between redundant portions of the ECCS and supporting: subsystems including the power supplies and sources
- uere presented in the safety and supplenental evaluation reports. Our original-review of this subject revealed ~some problem areas which vere-corrected satisfactorily.
We have reviewed the new information sub-mitted-since Amendacnt 42 of the FSAR and have concluded that i
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- r of the interlock design octs:.:n redwidan; portions oi safec) s >.n u n.>.
8.0 Electrical and Physical Separation C-iteria Oc. ori;ir.: -. Vi 0 ?.b t ? i >c. ricc.!
te ;:,:ics
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'. 12 and design conformance with the criteria revealed so;:e problem areas which were corrected satisfactorily as indicated in the safety and supplemental evaluation reports.
No cdditional infornation has been submitted since Amend.T.ent 42 of the FSAR on this subject and therefore our original findinsr-a:e still valid with regard to the adequacy of the electrical and physical separation.
i
o APPF': DIX The following documents ucre used as the basis for o ir ECCS revieu of Crystal River, Unit No. 3:
1.
F1.:.1 Safety A.nh,is Report (ES AR) through.bnic. cat - 3 for Crystal kiver,Unic No 3.
2.
Gilbert Associates, Inc. (GAI). Elt.nentary Diagrams for the Engineered Safety Features Actuation Sys ca.
3.
GAI Elementary and Single Line Diagrams for the Electric Power System and Safety Related Actuation Devices Control Circuits.
4.
EICSB Safety Evaluation Report for Crystal Riven Unit No. 3, June 6, 1974.
S.
EICSB Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report for Crystal River, Unit No. 3, October 18, 1974.
6.
FPC's responses (September 19, 1975) to NRC's request for information in July 7,1975.
7.
FPC's responses (January 13, 197 6) to NRC's request for information in December S,1975.
8.
BAW-10103 "ECCS Analysis of B&W's 177 FA Lowered-Loop NSS",
June 1975.
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