ML19329D522
| ML19329D522 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 10/11/1968 |
| From: | Evertz H, Snapp R FLORIDA POWER CORP. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8003160122 | |
| Download: ML19329D522 (31) | |
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m g-UNITED _ STATES OF AMERICA ATOMIC' ENERGY COMMISSION In the M2tter af:
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y FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION
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Docket No. 50-302
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(Crystal River Unit 3
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' Nuclear Generating Plant)
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EXCEPTIONS TO INITIAL DECISION AND SUPPORTING BRIEF OF APPLICANT In accordance with 32.762(a) of the Commission's " Rules of Prac-tice",10 CFR Part 2, the Applicant, Florida Power Corp' oration, respectfully excepts to the Initial Decision dated September 24, 1968,.of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board in this proceeding as set forth below:
Statement of the Proceedings Florida Power Corporation (Applicant) filed its Application and five amendments thereto, under Section 104b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), for a provisional construction permit to construct a closed cycle pressurized water reactor, to be known as Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generating Plant, to operate initially at 2452 thermal megawatts and to be located directly on the Gulf of Mexico, Citrus County, Florida, approximately 7 miles Northwest of the town of Crystal River and 70 miles I
from Tampa, Florida.
"'he Application was reviewed by the Regulatory Staff (Staff) of
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the Commission which concluded that the Applicant has satisfied aik Co:nmis-sion requirements for the issuance of a construction permit. The Safety
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. Evaluation of the Application by the Staff, dated June 6,1968, constituted the, direct testimony of the Staff at the public hearing in this proceeding.
It is incorporated into the transcript of the proceedings following Page 276. - The Application was also -reviewed by the Advisory Co:nmittee on Reactor p160%
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Safeguards (ACRS) which concluded that the Crystal River Unit 3 :!uelear Generating P' nt can be constructed at the proposed site with reasonable assurance tha tt can be operated without undue risk to the health and.
cafety of the Public. The ACRS report
~.o the Com:tission is attached to the Staff's Safety Evaluation as Appendin A.
On May 29, 1968, the Co= mission issued a " Notice of Hearing on Application for a Provisional Construction Permit" in tha captioned matter which set out the issues to be considered. On June 14, 1968, the City of
.Gainesville, Florida, and the Gainesville Utilities Departacni (collectively called "Gainesville") filed a " Petition for Leave to Intervene cid Motion to Broaden Issues". On June 28, 1968, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (AS&LB or the Board) entered its order denying Gainesville's Motion to
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Broaden the Issues, but it granted the Petition to Intervene, limited solely to contesting the jurisdictional issue of whether or not the nuclear reactor t
facility proposed to be constructed and operated by the Applicant can be e
authorized pursuant to Section 104b of the Act.
(Page 4 of Order.)
A Public Hearing was held in Crystal River, Florida, by the AS&LB on July 16 and 17,1968, to consider the issues sycified in,the Notice of Hearing and to consider the.further questica raised by Gainesville as to whether the Application was properly filed under Sectio:i 104b of the Act.
At the Public Hearing no contest was made by Gainesville as tc, any of the
. issues set forth in the Notice of Hearing regarding the Applicant's quali-fications to design the facility in accordance with and including necessary engineered safety features to assure the protection of the health and safety of the public'.
On September 24, 1968, the AS&LB issued its Initial Decision and made the requisite findings of fact and conclusions of law and it ordered f
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the Director of Regulations to issue to the Applicant a provisional con-struction permit pursuant to Section 104b of the Act. On September 25, 1968, a Provi:.onal Construction Permit (Construction Permit No. CPPR-51)
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was issued to the Applicant and it was substantisily in tho fo rm of Ap-pendix A to the Notice of Hearing.
1 Position of Applicant All of the exceptions to the Initial Decision by the Applicant
. relate to the sam-tuestion, that is, whether or not the AS&LB properly re-fused to affirmatively conclude, without conditior.s, that there is reason-able assurance that the. App 1'icant's proposed research and development pro-gram (R&D) will be successful in developing a chemical spray system which will remove radioactive iodine from the reactor building atmosphere in the unlikely event of the so-called maxhamn hypothetical accident in sufficient quantities so that the criteria contained in 10 CFR 100 will be met.
It is the Board's refusal to make an affirmative finding of reasonable assur-ance regardins iodine removal by the Applicant'a proposed chemical spray system that has led the Board to recommend that a condition be attached to the Applicant's Provisional Construction Pecnit requiring that the data y
to be developed by the Applicant be upon a record made at a public hearing.
The Applicant.r,t-ognizes by its Application and the record made
"- r at the Public Hearing that it must' evelop, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.35, s
, the necessary data and design information by virtue of its R&D program in order to assure that the iodine removal system will be entirely adequate to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 100. The Applicant expects to review the supporting information and the design details with the Staff. It is the Applicant's position that sufficient evidence was presented prior to and again at the Public Hearing to provide reasonable assurance that an 3-
adequat'e spray iodine removal design can be^ developed by the operating stage and, accordirgiv, there is no need~for the imposition on the parties of the added burden of second public hearing on this matter.
GROUND ::0. I The recommendation of the AS&LB that a condition be cttached to the Applicant's Provisional Construction Permit by*the Commission requiring
. that data be developed upon a record made at a public hearing concerning the use of either a chemical spray as an " iodine fixing additive" or other devices for the purpose of controlling the release of radioactive iodine as a consecuence of the maxi =um hypothetical accident is contrary to and_
unsupported by the uncontroverted evidence.
Exception No. 1.
The Applicant takes exception to the following statement on page 6 of the Initial Decision:
"...The Applicant has selected sodium thiosulfate as the cdditive. However, there are research programs which in-clude alternate chemical solutions, one of which was con-sidered at the hearing and contains a mixture of sodium thiosulfate and sodium hydroxide.
4 Argument Nq. 1.% *he Board speaks,on line 13 of page 6, of "an
. 4-iodine fixing additive" and then latyr in the' paragraph says that the "Ap-N plicant has selected sodium chiosulfate as the additive".
The Board is in-correct in speaking of a ' solution which contains a mixture of sodium thiosulfate and sodium hydroxide as a chemical alternate for a solution containing only sodium thiosulfate. The Applicant agrees,that sodium thiosulfate chemically is the iodine-fixing additive that it intends to use. However, the Applicant'has stated clearly the intent to use a chemi-r cal spray solution containing borated water with sodium thiosulfate and sodium hydroxide added to it.3 /rhis solution has been identified in the Application and in this proceeding as " alkaline sodium thiosulfate". SI 4'-
Sodium hydroxide will be used to obtain the alkaline condition. At various places in the ' Application,Sthe Summary Description of Ap-plication fo. Licensing, the Staff Safety Evaluation by the DRL, and in the record of public hearing this " alkaline sodium thiosul-fate solution" has at times been referred to as " alkaline thiosulfate solution" dnd sometimes as " sodium thiosulfate additive" and sometimes as
't just " thiosulfate". Throughout the Application and public record it has been the Applicant's intent that each of these designations iden-tify the same alkaline sodium thiosulfate solution,which is made up of borated water with' sodium thiosulfate and sodium hydroxide adued to it.
3 The fact that the Applicant intended to use " alkaline
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' sodium thiosulfate" is indicated in the answer to Question 5.13 of Docket 50-289, which was referenced in the answer to Question 1.4 of Supplement No. 1 of this Application.
It is stated on Page 5.13-1 of the referenced question, "The containment surfaces are painted carbon steel and painted concrete; both paints will be resistant to the' mild chemical attack of the alkaline thiosulfate solution.",
and on Page 5.13-2, "All of these materf.als are resistant to attack by the sodium thiosulfate-boric acid solution over the applicable ph range of 7 to 10.".
The original intent to use alkaline sodium thiosulphate was also confirmed at the hearing.S (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from the public re.ord that the Staff was aware of the Applicant's intent to use an alkaline sodium thiosulfate solution by the statement of Dr. Burley, the Staff expert witness,
on Page 363, Line 17 of the granscript, "...for an alkaline solution of sodium thiosulfate such s the applicant. proposes to use,...
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,_1/ Transcript (TR),- Page 476, Lines 2 and 3.
_2/ TR, Page 476, Lines 15 through 17.
_3/ Supplement 1 to the PSAR, Answer to Question 1.4, including reference to. Docket 50-289, Supplement No. I to the PSAR, Answer to Question 5.13.
_4f Summary of Application, Page 25, Line 20.
1_5/ DRL Safety Evaluation, Page 44, Line 1.
J/ TR, Page 473,' Lines 19 through 26.
_2/ TR, Page 315, line 19, to Page 316, line 14.
_8/ TR, Page 473, Lines 14 through 25.
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Exception No. 2.
The Applicant takes exception to the following ser *cment on the bottom of page 6 of the Initial Decision:
"...While the removal factors needed to meet site guidelines appear to be available under laboratory conditions,...."
Argument No. 2.
The exception is based upon the evidence which was introduced by the Applicant about the Oak Ridge experimental
.iork which is not just laboratory work, but engineering scale tests actually utilizing the full size spray nozzles suitable for use in the Crystal River Plant.1! Furthermore, the Oak Ridge work accomplished to date leaves no doubt as to the adequacy of the solution in question, namely, an alkaline solution which contains borated water and sodium thiosulfate to entrap and retain io' dine under temperature and pressure conditions similar to the maximum hypothetical accident conditions.
The Applicant hes presented testimony supported by current data which demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed spray system using the proposed solution.
Iodine removal experiments using chemi-cal sprays which were performed at ORNL in the Nuclear Safety Pilot 3/
Plant (NSPP),
demonstrate that the Applicant's spray system has an iodine removal rate which is about four times faster than reported in the PSAR.
This results in an iodine removal effectiveness about 50 times greater than that required to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 100.
These NSPP experiments were performed in a 1350 cubic foot test vessel using a steam-air atmosphere at temperatures and pressures up to 266* F. and 45 psig with the conditions simulating PWR, loss-of-coolant accident conditions. These are definitely engineering scale 4
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tests, and the nature and value of these tests are not properly con-veyed by the connotacion associated with the phrase "under laboratory conditions".-
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J/ TR, Page 324, Line 22, through Page 330, Line 13.
J/ TR, Page 324, Line 224 through Page 328, Line 5.
J / TR, Page 329, Line 21, through Page 330, Line 10.
_ J / TR, Page 327,' Lines 24 through 25.
- J / TR, Page 327, Line 25, to Page 328, Line 5.
. J/ -Nuclear Safety Progra:a Annual Progress Report for Period ending December 31, 1967. ORNL 4228, Page 221.
(TR, Page 330, Lines'11 through'13.)
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Exceotion No.' 3.
The Applicant takes enception to the fol-lowing statue at on the botten of page 6 and continuing on page 7 of the Initial acision, includir p d.e fcornote therete:
"... the scability and ccmpu M.bility cf the addi-tives under accidant condit_^73 hree not yet been proven. 1/ "
" 5/ The Staff statement. is to the effect that the stability and compatibility of chemical additives to entrap radioactive iodine has not been proven under accident conditions. The Staff, houever, does not submit a specific conclusion relative to thic
. lack of proven chemical ability to control the 10-
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dine releases. It may be assumed the Staff view is that it is enough that something will be later
. considered by the Staff that will accomplish this
.necessary control of radioactive gascous iodine.
The Board cannot accept this assumption for de-cisional purposes in this public hearing proceed-ing."
Argument No. 3.
The well-known physical and chemical prop-erties of boric acid, sodium hydroxide, and sodium thiosulfate are such that mixing a solution of boric arid with a solution cont ining sodium thiosulfate and sodium hydroxide result,s in no incompatibility This is explicitly stated in the record.- /
1 During or instability.
the initia1' spraying period (approximately 35 minutes) during which
. essentially all of the iodine is removed, there is no probicm with regard to -the radiation effcets because fresh sclution: is being sup-plied to the spray nozzles frcm the storage tank.
When the initial' spraying period is terminatc'd by the dis-charge of the boric acid solution availabic in-the Lorated water storage tank the solution for the containment spray is supplied by.,
(recirculation of the original solution collected in the containment
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sump.
Since.some of this solution passes thrcugh the core and also
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4 since it now contains the iodine absorbed from the containment atmos-phere it receives ra'diation at a higher rate than during the initial period. Hot -rer, it requires an appreciabic length of time to acquire a radiation dose large enough to be significant.
Experimental results have indicated that alkaline sodium thiosulfate solutions have suffi-cient radiation and thermal stability to perform as a satisfactory M!
iodine removal solution during the post accident period.
While the sodium thiosulfate solution would be subject to some rsdiation and thermal decomposition, adequate effectivenc'ss will be maintained because there is a several hundred-fold excess o# sodium thiosulfate initially present in the solution.i b!
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_1/ TR, Page 484, Lines 18 through 22..
_2/. TR, Page 328, Lines 6 through 23.
_3/ TR, Page 330, Lines 8 through 13.
_4,/ TR, Page 328, Lines 20' through 23.
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,T;<ception No. 4.
The Applicant takes exception to the fol-lowing statement in footnote 7 on page 8 of the Initial Decision:
'i'/- The Staff thus recognizes that if the chemical spray additives do not work under accident condi-
'tions that the radioactive thyroid doses at the ex-clusion boundary would be approximately 990 rem, rather than the guideline value of 300 rem."
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'Arghment No. 4.
At no time has either the Staff or,the Ap-plicant stat d that the factor of 3.3 at the exclusI6n boundary is 1
calculated. on the basis that the " chemical spray additives do not work"
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as implied by the referenced footnote 7.
While the staff in two places in their analysis has indicated that they have made calculatio-with-out the spray system operating 1/or without iodine reduction, A they have not indicated that this forms the basis for an assumption that the spray " additives" do 'not work.
1/ Staff Safety Evaluation, Page 56, last paragraph.
(TR, Page 276.)
,2/ Staff Safety Evaluation, Page 43, last paragraph.
(TR, Page 276.)
e J TR, Page 313,,Lineg.1 through 14.
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Exception No. 5.
The Applicant takes exceptioh to the following i
statements on pago 8 of the Initial Decision:
"" 2a foregoing Staff review expresses the hope that the necessary iodine reduction factors can be ach_eved.
Upon the basis of this record, however, it cppears that even i
this hope is open to some question....."
Argument No. 5.
The reference by the Board to the " foregoing Etaff review" is to the Staff Safety Evaluation which the Board does correctly i
quote (on Page S of the Initial Decision) as follows:
"'... As discussed in Section 6.3 of this report, we be-lieve that the experimental work performed to date and the resecrch e.nd development program outlined by the ap-plicant provide reasonable assurance that reduction fac -
tors on the order of those described above can be achieved.'"
(Emphasis supplied.')
The Board converts this Staff statement of " reasonable assurance" to a " hope". 'Once the Board characterized the uncontroverted " reasonable assurance" of the iotine rew.al.r,ogram as a " hope", the Board concluded that it could not determine on the Eksis of the record made in the present i
proceeding the issue of reasonable assurance as required by 10 CFR 50.35(a) as to whether the Applicant has described the " principal crchitectural and engineering' criteria for the design, and has identified the major features or components incorporated therein for the protection of the health and safety of the pu'slic", as well as "such further technical or design infor-4 mation as may be required to complete the safety analysis, and which can reasonably be left for later consideration, will be supplied in the final safety analysis report;...." (Emphasis supplied.)
The evidence introduced by the Staff and the Applicant throughout the entire record (and not controverted by any party) is that a chemical spray system for the removal of iodine is a principal design criteria, that such a system will be incorporated into the plant for the protection e -
4 of the health and safety of the public, and that the further technical and design information en thrs.
.tcy can reasonably be left for later consider-
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ation in view 'f the research and dhvelopment program the Applicant, B & W, and the AEC have under way.
The position of the Board on this catter is not merely against'the weight of the evidence (had the evidence been in conflict), but its position is completely contrary to the uncontrovertea evidence submitted by the Applicant and the Staff.
Exception No. 6.
The Applicant takes exception to the follouing
, statement on Page 8 of the Initial Decision:
"...The work which has been undertaken to this time ic,ds doubt whether the sodium thiosulfate alone, or sodium thiosulfate including a solution of sodinn hydroxide will achieve the necessary iodine reduction factors.
Argument No. 6.
As stated in the preceding argument addressed to Exception No. 2, it is the Applicant's position that the record in this proceeding fully supports the conclusion that there is reasonable assurcnce of the ability of an alkaline sodium thiosulfate solution to achieve the necessary iodine reduction factors required to meet 10 CFR 100 criteria.
Exception No. 7.
The Applicant takes exception' to the following statement on Pages 8 and 9 and to footnote 8 on Page 9 of the Initial De-cision:
"...These two chemical additives are those considered by the Applicant here, based upon the record made at the hearing, although the application and the analysis made bytheStaffg7fgrredtotheproposeduseofsodium thiosulfate.
"_8/ At the hearing, inquiry was made why the Applicant was apparently proceeding with only sodium thiosulfate for the chemical additive, when from a review of other
- proceedings, other applicants presumably had abandoned sodium thiosulfate because it was ineffective.
The Applicant here then stated that the solution it in-tended to use included sodium thiosulfate and sodium hydroxide." a
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Argument No. 7.
As state 1 in the preceding argument addressed to Execpti;a'3. 1, it is the Applicent's position that the Application, the Applict
's Suenary Description of Application for Licensing, the "n.3 Safety Evaluation by the DRL StaaC the record mado at the public
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ing all refer to the use of a chemical aprm. salution containing boratc3 water with sodium thiosulfate and sodium hydronide added to it, contrary to the above quotation uhich states that cely at the hearing was this co-lution considered.
Exception No. 8.
Tne Applicant takes exception i the following statement on Page 9 of the Initial Decision:
"...The Oak Ridge N2tional Laboratory reports indicate that neither of the Applicant's proposed chemical addi-tives for sprays will achieve the necessary reduction factors.
Argument Io. 8.
As stated in the preceding argument addressed to Exception No. 2, it is the Applicant's position that the OR13, reports referenced therein fully support the conclusion that there is reasonable
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assurance of the ability of alkaline sodium thiosulfate to achieve reduction
' factors 3_ cater than that required to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 100.
(TR, Page 329, Line 21, to Page 330, Line 10.)
Exception No. 9.
The Applicant takes exception to the following statement on Page 9 of the Initial Decision:
"...The data developed by ORNL are to the offect that both sodium thiosulfate and sodium thiosulfate with sodium hy-r droxide undergo radiation decomposition ubich limits their useful life uhen exposed to gamma radiation during recircu-lation cooling of the reactor.
The decenposition products include colloidal sulphur, hydrogen sulfide, hydrogen and oxpgen, the latter tuo from net water rr.diolysis.
In addi-tion, radiation will destroy approximately 977. of sodium thiosugfate's ability to react with iodine by exposure ~ to 1 x.10 roentgens, whereas radiation sill destroy approxi-mately 437, of the ability of sodiu.a thioculfate mixed with sodium hydroxide to ricct uith iodine.
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Argument No. 9.
The above-mentioned data are from ORNL-4228v ! n this ORNL work, there were two solutions containing l
I sodium thiost fate and borated water. One of these was acid (pH 4.9) and the other was made alkaline (pH 9.2) by the addition of sodium hydroxide. The solution referred to as sodium thiosulfate with sodium hydroxide would generally be tanced " alkaline sodium thiosul-fate".
The Applicant has only considered the use of " alkaline sodium N thiosulf ate"; therefore, the ORNL data on sodium thiosulfate, which was acid (pH 4.9), may be of academic interest, but are irrelevant to this proceeding. Regarding the " alkaline sodium thiosulfate" which the Applicant intends to use, the ORNL data referred to above did not i
observe the formation of colloidal sulphur nor the formation of meas-urable amounts of hydrogen sulfide.
The " alkaline sodium thiosul-fate" solution's 43% loss in its ability to react with iodine after 8
exposure to,1 x 10 roentgens must be evaluated in terms of what use-ful life is required of the solution and in terms of how much excess iodine capacity is actually remaining after irradiation.~~
During the initial spraying period of approximately 35.
minutes where essentially all of the iodine is removed, there is no problem with regard to the radiation effects because fresh solution is being supplied to the spray nozzles from the storage tank.
I During the recirculating phase subsequent to the initial spraying period, while the sodium thiosulfate solution would be sub-
- ject to some radiation and thermal decomposition, adequate effective-ness will be maintained because there is a several hundred-fold excess of ' sodium thiosulfate initially present in the solution. 37 0.
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Thus, after losing 437. of its iodine capacity, there will still be a very large excess of sodium thiosulfate. Furthermore, as stated in'the record, "a series of irradiations performed at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory demonstrated that a chemical spray solution l
containins alkaline sodiu'm thiosulfate and boric acid recains suffi-cient ' iodine absorption capacity after absorbing radiation doses comparable to tPose received during the post accident.".S.
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4 J/ TR, Page 330, Lines 11 through 13.
J / PSAR, Section 6.2 and Section 14. 2. 2,. 3. 5.
J / TR, Page 328, Lines 20 through 23.
t J / TR, Page 328, Lines 6 through 11.
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i Execption No. 10.
The Applicant takes exception to the follow-ing statement on Page 10 of the Initial Decision:
"...
- th these data so far developed, it is somewhat diffi-cult.o share the Staff's hope that furt.ter research and development vill produce better results which must be had in order to provide control of radioactive gaseous iodinc.
Argument No. 10.
As stated in the preceding argument addressed to Exception No. 5, the Staff's position is not one of " hope",.but it clearly expresses reasonable assurance,that reduction factors necessary to provide adequate control of radioactive gaseous iodine will be fully demonstrated by the research and development program outlined by the Ap-plicant.
SUMMARY
TO GRCUND NO. I A careful review of the above-referred-to portions of the record of the proceedings and the transcript of the public hearing conclusively demonstrates that the Board has either misconstrue'd or taken out of context the Applicant's above-quoted exceptions to statements in the board's Initial Decision.
There is a considerable amount of evidence in this proceeding, all uncontroverted, which concludes that there is reasonable assurance that the Applicant's proposed chemical spray iodine removal system will demon-strate its effectiveness and will protect the health and safety of the public.
GROUND NO. II s
The recommendation to the Conaission (added to conclusien 1. (b) of the Initial Decision) "... that a condition be attached to the authority or license for construction of the proposed nucicar facility that data be developed upon a record made at a public hearing in this contested case concerning the use o~'cith'e; che,tcal spray as an ' iodine fixing additive' s
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or other' devices for purnoses of control'11ng the release of radioactive
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iodine as a consequence of the maximum credible accident;" is unwarranted in considerati n of the record established in this proceeding and the absence of any request for such a second public hearing by any party.
-Exception "fo.
11.
'he./nplicant takes exception to the follow-
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ing recommendations of the Board on pages 10 and 11 and to footnote 11 on page 11 of the Initial Decision:
"...In tha t view, it is recopmended that a condition be added to the construction permit hereinafter authorized to provide that further data be presented when further research and development has occurred to eytablish the necessary cor. trol of radioactive iodine,w and before c-at the time that a request is made for an operating license.
"11/ The addition by the Commission of the condition, as requested, will yet permit the Applicant to go forward with the major and basic construction while further con-centration can be directed to the necessity of devising a process or mechanism to control t!.e gaseous radio-active effluents. The record at tl.e present time is inadequate in this regard."
Exception No. 12.
The Applicant takes exception to the limitation the Board has placed on its conditional acceptance of the Applicant's and Regulatory Staff's conclusions of law as set forth on page 18 of the Initial l
Decision:
" Applicant's and the Regulatory Staff's conclusions of law have been accepted except by way of the recommen-dation to the Co= mission for the addition of a condition in reference to sodium thiosulfate, all as set forth in this Initial Decision." (Emphasis supplied.)
Exception No. 13.
The Applicant takes exception to the Board's adding of the following language to conclusion 1.(b), as proposed by the Applicant, on page 19 of the Initial Decision:
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"...except that it is recommended to the Commission that.
.a condition be attached to the authority or license for construction of the proposed nuclear facility that data 4
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be developed upon a record made at a public hearing in this contested case concerning the use of either a chemical spray as an ' iodine fixing additive' or other devices for purposes of controlling the release of radio-acti e iodine as a consequence of the maximum credibic acciuent;"
Exception No. 14.
The Applicant takes exception to the Board adding of the following language to conclusion 1.(d), as proposed by the Applicant, on page 20 of the Initial Decision:
"...provided that it be established that either a chemi-cal spray or other devices can be used to reduce the quantities of iodine that are computed to be released in the event, though unlikely, of a maximum credible accident."
Argument for Exceptions No's. 11, 12, 13 and 14.
Applicant's Ex-ceptions numbered 11, 12, 13 and 14 relate to the Board's recommendation to the Commission that it require a second public hearing for the purpose of making a record on the matter of iodine removal. As fully set forth in this brief under Ground No. I, supra, it is Applicant's position that the existing record of the proceedings, including the transcript of the public hearing, is more than sufficient to support the conclusion of reasonable assurance required by Section 50.35(a) of 10 CFR, Part 50, insofar as Ap-plicant's proposed chemical spray system for the removal of iodine is con-cerned.
The Applicant does not dispute the Board's discretionary power, if the facts and circumstances of a proceeding warrant, to hold a proceed-ing open for the submissioh of additional evidence to complete the record so that it may make the findings of fact and conclusions of law required by 850.35(a) for the issuance of a Provisional Construction Permit; nor does the Applicant dispute that the Board may, in its discretion, reco==end to the Commission that it impose a condition upon the issuance of a Pro-visional Construction Permit.
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In several recent decisions of the Commission in Section 104b li-censing proceedings, it was held that *he facts and circumstances warranted the recommende :lon of the Board that conditions be attached to the Construc-tien Permic requiring the formal submission of additional data at a sec. ii public hearing.
U the Applican.: had not designed its contain-In the Malibu case ment building to withstand or resist a pernianent ground displacement in the unlikely event of an earthquake. The Board declined to make a finding of reasonable assurance that the proposed design of the containment building would be adequate to protect the health and safety of the public. The
~ Board issued its Initial Decision directing that the Construction Permit be issued, but it imposed the condition that the design criteria for the containment building be modified and supplemented to include adequate pro-vision for permanent ground displacement from carthquake activity. The data was, to be mad.e available for such review procedures as the Commission 2
might direct.
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In its Decision of March 27,19677the Comission agreed with the Board that the reasonable assurance requirement of 550.35(a) was not met k
because the containment building was not desip,ed to withstand ground dis-placement from earthquake activity. The Commission set aside the issuance of the Provisional Construction Permit because the conclusion of "reasonabic assurance" required by Seedion 50.35(a) had not been met.
Both the Applicant and the Staff in the Malibu case, supra, had admitted that the design criteria for the containment building was inade-quate to withstand ground displacement from carthquake activity. Their conte.stion, with which the Board and the Commission disagreed, was that
" reasonable assurance" under Section 50.35(a) did not require that the
containment building be designed to this standard because of the exerc=e remoteness of an earthquake causing ground displacement under the reactor during its use.1 life.
The facts and circumstances of Florida Power's case are in not, similar to the Malibu case.
There is no claimed deficiency in Florida Fewar
principal architectural and engineering criteria for the desi;n of the pro-posed facility. The only deficiency in the present record asserted by.the Board pertains to the Applicant's proposed chemical spray system for the removal of iodine. With regard to this matter, the record is uncontroverted and more than sufficient to meet the " reasonable assurance" requi-ements of Section 50.35(a). The second distinction to be made is that the inter-venors in the Malibu case vigorously contested the sufficiency of the con-tainment building design. In the present case.the only Intervenor, Gaines-ville, has not controverted or contestd the uncontroverted conclusion of the Applicant' And Staff that there is reasonable assurance the proposed chemical spray system will adequately remove iodine from the reactor build-ing in the event of the maximum hypothetical accident.
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The Commission's recent decision in the Turkey Point cast is of utmost significance to Applicant's position since it appears that the Board is relying upon that decision as a predicate to its recommended condition in this case. In the Turkey Point case it developed at the public hearing that some 19 acres of the p'roposed exclusion area was owned by Intervenor Seadade Industries (Scadade). The Statf anticipated that favorabic meteor-ological data, yet to be developed, would permit a redudtion in the size of the exclusion area so as to bring it within the boundaries of lands o n d by Florida Power & Light Company. The Staff stated that if the site meteorology should prove less favorable than expected, se"eral t
alternative safeguards features (i.e., installing chcccoal filters, use of sodium thiosulphate (alkaline?) in tne containment sprays, lowering the permissible let-rate of the containments) are available for reducing the quantities of radioactive icdine which could be released in the hypothet~e -
maximum credible accident.
The. Staff argued that the additional meteorological data in qucs-tion and any determination as to the need for the identified alternative engineered safeguards can reasonably be Icft for later consideration at the operating license stage, in accordance with Section 50.35(a)(2) of the Commission's regulations. The Intervenor,Seadade, opposed the issuance of the construction permits until these matters had been resolved and implied that it was being denied a full hearing on these matters.
In its Turkey Point decision of August 4,1967, supra, the Com-mission stated:
"...from our assessment of the record, we are'.ut left with a belief that the matters which are yet to be definitively resolved with respect to the exclusion
, area present a substantial safety problem. As the iritial decision itself indicates, the ' precedent ***
for reactor cases has been to defer many of the metsorological and site criteria determinations developments that occur during the construction. age.
Moreover, the alternative encineered safeguards, which apoear to be the nub of Scadade's argument as regards application of Section 50.35(a)(1), are hardiv ccmpa-rable, either in their basic relationship to the structure of the facility or in their safety implica-tions, to the matter of protection against dif ferential ground displacement dealt with in our Malibu decision.
Of some relevance here, is our observation in Matter of Jersey Central Power and Light Company (citations omitted) that 'Section 50.35 does not require.that all design details of the facility must be supplied, nor that at the construction permit stage every safety question shall actually have been satisfactorily re-solved.'" (Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the procedure to be followed by a Board if it
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O feels a record for a proceeding-is inadequate or incomplete, the Co= mis-sion stated in its Turkey Point Decision, supra,:
"...If the board here desired further information re-garding the alt.arnative safeguards (as it evidently did) such ad/.itional information should have be9n re-quested prio:, to the completion of the board proceedings.
a Because thg record in the Turkey Point proceedings was obviously
?
deficient insofar as the exclusion area and the proposed alternative en-gineered safeguards were concerned, and the fact that Intervenor Seadade was contesting this specific issue, the Commission remanded the case, stating:
"Notwithstanding our reservations as to the timing of the request for further information, we believe that the present posture of this matter is such as to make it desirable to clarify the record with respect to that in-formation. Accordingly, we are remanding the proceedings to the board so that it may receive additional evidence with regard to the alternative engineered safeguards and then render a determination thereon in a supplemental initial decision. The Commission expects, of course, that the board, in receiving and evaluating the addi-tional evidence developed, will continue to appreciate that the ultimate finding under Section 50.35(a) is whether there is reasonable assurance that the proposed facility 'can be' constructed and operated without undue risk and that, at the construction permit stage, the emphasis is not on the specific details of design imple-mentation." (Emphasis supplied.)
SUmfARY 70 GROUND NO. II The posture of the present proceeding is not similar to either the Malibu or Turkey Pcint proceedings. As the Commission stated in its
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Turkey ~ Point Decision, the 3 engineered safeguard featute, proposed $
ppli-cant (the iodine removal chemical spray system) is not a matter presenting t
- a substantial safety prc )1em at the Construction Permit stage. No substan-tial deficiency exists in the present record with respect to any proposed engineered safeguard as uas the case in both the Malibu 'and Turkey Point proceedings. The last d: stinction is that there is, no intervenor in the 4
- i
present proceeding contesting or controverting this matter nor dezanding that further information be developed at a second public hearing.
Durin. the entire period between the issuance of the Provic lons Construction Permit and tne issuance of a provisional or final operative license, the u.. resolved health and safety problems are subject to compier -
review by the Commission's Staff as required by Statute and Commission Rules and Regulations. The recommendation that the Co= mission impose a condition on Applicant's Provisional Construction Permit is cor.pletely un-
~
warranted under the facts and circumstances in this proceeding and should be disregarded by the Commission.
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_1,/
In the Matter of Depardm6nt of Water and Power of the City of Los Angeles, Decision, Atomic Energy Commission, March 27, 1967, 3 AEC (2 Atomic Energy Law Reports Par. 11,248.03).
_2/ In the Matter of Florida Power & Light Company, Memorandum and Order, Atomic Energy Commission, August 4, 1967, 4 AEC (2 Atomic Energy Law Reports, Par. 11,259.3).
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GROUND NO. III The ' c.'.L3 abused its discretion in refusing to accept the urco,-
troverted exp technical ev!denen put into the record by the Ar311cfy' and the Staff with reard to oreof of 'c"rk accompliched to due timt ty s reasonable assurance that the' Applicant's proposed research and dev no ment program will be successful in developine a chemical spray syster._:..i_ j _
will remove radioactive iodine from the :eactor buildir.2~atmosohere in t"
_unlikelv event-of a maximum hypothetical accident in sufficient cuantiti_a t
so that the criteria contained in 10 CFR 100 will be met.
Argument -- Applicant's argument on Ground No..III inc roorates by reference its exceptions and arguments set forth above on Grounds Mo's.
I and II as if fully re-stated here.
While it is true that this case is a " contested proceeding" with-in the definition set forth in Section 2.4(n) of the Commission's " Ruler of Practice" because of the allowed intervention of Gainesville, the cr.te,t
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of the intervention and contest was " limited to the issue whether the nuclear reactor facility proposed to be constructed and operated by Florida Power can be authorized pursuant to Section 104b of the Act," (Page 4, Order Granting Petition Seeking Intervention and Denying Motion to Broadca Issues). The Board specifically recognized in its Initial Decision the narrow limitations imposed upon Gainesville's participation as an inter-4 venor. It is seated on Page 3 of the Initial Decision:
"...The Ga tnesvi. - intervention was related to the jurisdictional issue ildt.ner a provisional construc-s tion permit may_ be grantet. pursuant to the authority granted to the Commission in Section 104b of the Act which permits such a license to be granted 'for a production or utilization facility involved in the conduct of research and development activities lead-
. ing to a _ demonstration of practical value. '"
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Within th2 accps'of its limited intervention, Gainesville could.
. have contest:d any matter having to do with the Applicant's proposed re-search and de ilopment programs. Gainesville did'not offer any evidence whatsoever, for or against, any of the Applicant's proposed research and development programs, including the chemical spray system for the removal of iodine. As a matter of fact, Gainesville in its proposed finding of a
fact No. 4(h) did not controvert, but accepted, the evidence of the Appli-cant and the Staff pertaining to the use of sodium thiosulfate in a
, chemical spray system to remove iodine.
The Commission's " Rules of Practice" recognize that a croceeding for the issuance of a construction permit for a nuclear facility may be only partially contested. That is, that an intervenor may only contest and controvert certain matters and as to all other matters not controverted the proceeding shou $d he'c. ' tyy th by the AS&LB as in other uncontested
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proceedings.
_sSection VI(d) of Appendix A to Part 2 of the Commission's " Rules of Practice" recognizes that a proceeding may only be partially contested and sets forth the Comnission's policy for the conduct of s'uch a partially-contested proceeding.
Section VI(d) of Appendix A provides:
. "(d) Participation by board members: In contested proceedings, the board will determine controverted matters as well as decide whether the findings required by the Act and the Commission's regulations should be made. Thus, in'such proceedings, the board will deter-mine the matters in controversy and may be called upon to make technical judgments of its own on those matters.
As to matters which are rot in controversy, boards are neither reouired nor expected to duolicate the review already performed by the regulatory staf f and the ACRS and they are authorized to rely upon the testimony of the regulatory staff and the conlicant, and the con-clusions of the ACRS, which are not controverted by any party.
Thus, the board need not evaluate those s 26 -
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matters alreadv eveluated hv the staff which are not in cor.trowers v>-
Ippjussis rupplied.)
In e riving at its decisi;n to recommend to the Commissien tha*
a condition be attached to the pr wistonal construction permit, the 1:^1 made a. technical judgment en a matter act in controversy by any party a contrary to the expert testimony of the Applicant and Staff and the conc'u-sions of the ACRS. The Chairman of the Board stated quite frankly that ne did not have any particular knowledge about sodium thiosulfate except what he had read in so=a unspecified reports and transcripts.
(TR, page 471.)
Contrary to the above stated Ccamission policy appliceble to un-controverted matters in a contested proceeding, the Board abused its dis-cretion in choosing to disregard uncontroverted evidence in the record and in substituting its own technical judgment and evaluation for that of the expcre witnesses of ths Applicant and Regulatory Staff.
The testi-mony of the expert witnesses for the Applicant and the Staff was fully documented in Ground No I in this brief.
SU>SRRY TO GROU'!D NO. III It is the position of the Applicant that in consideration of the entire record.the Board was bound to accept the uncontroverted evidence and should have affirmatively concluded that t'.
re is reasonable assurance that the Applicant's proposed research and development program will be successful in developing a, chemical spray system which will remove radio-active iodine from the reactor building atmosphere, in the unlikely event of the so-called maximum hypothetical accident, in sufficient quantities so that the site criteria contained in 10 CFR 100 will be met and 'that the proposed facility can be ccastructed and operated without undue risk.
GROUND NO. IV The condition recommended to the Conmission by the Board in con-clusion 1.(b) of its Initial Decision is contrary to and in conflict with its' conclusion 1. (c) in the Initial Decision.
Exception No. 13. Applicant incorporates by reference its E::cz,-
tion No. 13 pertaining to the Board's reco= mended condition added to con-clusion 1.(b) of the Initial Decision as fully set forth in Ground No. II of the brief.
Argument for Ground No. IV.
The Board specifically concluded on Page 19 of its Initial Decision, in paragraph 1.(c):
"(c) Safety features or comoonents which recuire re-search and development have been described by the Appli-s, cant and the Applicant has identified, and there will be conducted, a research and development program reasonably designed to resolve any safety questions associated with such features or components;...."
(Emphasis supplied.)
(Substantially similar to Section 50.35(a)(3).)
On pages 11,12 and 17 of the Initial Decision the Board made a specific finding of fact that Applicant's proposed use of a (alkaline) sodium thiosulphate chemical spray system for the removal of radioactive iodine was a bona fide research and development program within the purview of the Commission's
- rules and regulations.
SUSDfARY OF ARGUMENT ON GROUND NO. IV There is a material conflict between the conclusions reached by the Board in paragraphs 1.,(b) and 1. (c) of the Initial Decision.
In view of Grounds I, II and III of the brief, conclusion 1.(c) is also contrary to the Board's declining to make an affirmative finding of reasonabic as-surance with respect to Applicant's proposed chemical spray system. The only reasonable thing for the Commission to do to resolve these conflicts is to disregard the reco==endation of the Board and not impose the requested
. condition on Applicant's Provisional Construction Permit.
I GROUND NO. V s
g..
The condition recomended to the Co= mission by the Board in its In'itial Decisicc. is contrary to and in conflict with the Initial Decision rendered May i 1968, in the Matter of Metropolitan Edison Cenpany, Doc?:e
_No. 50-289, and its acceptance by the Comission would constitute an un: rec.-
sary act of discrimination against the Applicant.
Argument for Ground No. V.
As previously documented in the ar-gument addressed to Exception No. 1, under Ground No. I, and on Page 491 of the Transcript, the research and development program pertcf.ning to the chemi-cal spray syst'em using alkaline sodium thiosulphate proposed ay the Applicant is the same R & D program that is also being developed for.use in :::tropolitan Edison Company's Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station Unit 1.
The Initial 1/
Decision was entered in the Metropolitan Edison Co=pany proceeding on May 16, 1968, and the AS&LB in that case did not see fit to recommend to the Commis-
, ton that it impose any condition whatsoever to the Provisional Construction Permit. The Three Mile Island facility is scheduled for completion at or about the same time as Applicant's proposed facility.
It would most certainly be an anomaly to require Florida Power to develop upon a record made at a public hearing the same research and develop-ment data that Metropolitan Edison Company is developing infor= ally with the Commission's Staff as contemplated in the Commission's rules and regulations.
Such an unnecessary formal duplication of effort would, in fact, constitute 4
regulatory discrimination against the Applicant.
J In the Matter of Metropolitan E6 s esmpany, Initial Decision, May
~-16, 1968, 2 Atomic Enerdy Law Reporter, Par. 11,271.01.
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O CONCLU370M The l;ficaet has full, satisfied __t_he racuirements of Fe:tice.
- 50.35(a) goverr 2 tha iscur.nce of orovisional con =true ion ne ef ts and the Board erred in recernendine a coc die nn to,pge pe
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e, er, cu.
mission of further data at a public henrine.
Section 50.35(a),10 CER 30, governs the isroan:e of provisf orm construction permits and provides in pertinent part:
"(a)
When an applicant has not supplied initf.al y all of the technical information required to comp _ ne the application and support the issuance of a con-I struction permit which approves all proposed design features, the Commissien may issue a provisionc1 cc.n-struction permit if the Ccaraission finds that (1) the applicant has described the proposed design cf :ha facility, including, but not limited to, tha principal architectural and engineering criteria for the design, and has identified the major features or compenents incorporated therein for the protection of the health and safety of the public; (2) auch.f rther technical or desien inforration as may be rief:ircl te :emplete the safety analysis, and which can re a s e n:.b l y be left for later consideration. will be ez-ol!14 ft the final' safety ancivsis reoort; (3) safecy features or com-ponents, if any, which require research and develop-m nt have been described by the applicant and the applicant has identified, and there will be conducted a research and development program reasonably designed to resolve any safety questions associated with such features or' components; and that (4) on the basis of the foregoing, there is rendenable assure.nce that (i) such safety questions will be satisfactorily resolved cc or before the latest date stated in the cpplication for completion of construction of the propesed facility and (ii) taking into consideration the site criterte.
contained in Part 100, the proposed facility can be cen-structed.and operated at the proposed location eithout undue risk to the health and safety of the public."
' (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 50.35(a) does not require that all design details be pro- [_,,__
-vided at the construction permit stage.
Section.30.35(a)(2) makes clear that such further technical er design inforuation as may be required to
- co=plete the safety analysis and tchich can reasonably be Icft for Icter 4
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as
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t consideraticr -ty be reviewed at the operating license sta;e.
RELTEF~R50U235ED The Applicant respectful.."
-aits that its Exceptions to ch-Initial Decision be grante ' and that the Cc= mission order the d_letien irom the Initial Decision of the 2oard's rece==cadation for a condition cdded to conclusion 1.(b) as set forth in Exception No.13 cad the Socrd's provi-sion added to conclusion 1.(d) as set forth in Exception No. 14 Dated: October 11, 1968 Respectfully sub=itted, Of Counsel!
/s/ F.arry A. Evertz, III S. A. BRANDIMORE PARRY A. EVERIZ, III General Counsel Florida Poser Building Florida Power Corporation 101 - 5th Street South Florida Power Building P. O. Box 14042 101 - 5th Street South S t. Petersburg, Florida 33703 P. O. Box 14042 S t. Petersburg, Ficrida 33733 ROY 3. SNAPP 1725 "K" Street N.W. -
Washington,.D. C. 20006 Counsel for Florida Power Corporation e
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