ML19329A125
| ML19329A125 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 02/15/1977 |
| From: | Gulbert J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Goller K Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19329A126 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7912300146 | |
| Download: ML19329A125 (5) | |
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l MEMORANDUM FOR: Karl R. Goller, Assistant Director for Operating Reactors NRR FROM:
John Guibert, Project Manager, ORB #3, DOR
SUBJECT:
TURBINE Bull. DING Ft.00 DING g -pg,9 j.
As requested by your memorandum of January 17, 1977 on this subject.
ORPMs have conducted an investigation into the potential for turbine building flooding incidents at operating dacilities similar to that which occurred at Oconee Nuclear Station on October 10, 1976.
En-closure 1 is a sumary of the results of this investigation.
The potential for an "Oconee-like" flooding incident could exist at i
a particular facility if (1) the circulating water systeis piping is
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located at an elevation lower than that of the source of circulating i
water, and (2) the circulating water system piping is susceptible to
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a postulated unisolable leak (i.e. the_ piping is non-seismic. category I).
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tm ien in the c9thth N10 ' '
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Based on the results of thSs'linvestigation and,in consideration of the above-mentioned criteria',Uthe'~ potential for this type of flooding incident exists at tem operating facilities: Palisades. Trojan, Zion Units Nos.1 & 2. D.C. Cook Unit No.1, Monticello, Pilgrim Unit No.1, Nine Mile Point Unit No.1. Humboldt Bay, and Rancho Seco. However, in each of these cases, facility design features and protr. Aion systems mitigate the impact of turbine building flooding i
due to a postulated circulating water system break such that the operability of safety-mlated equipment required to safely shut down
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the reactor would be assured. The applicable design features of each t
of these ten facilities are described below:
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t 1.
_ PALISADES _ - Safety-related equipment is located at an' elevation higher than that of the postulated flooding level. Syphon breakers are installed in the circulating
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l water system line to minimize water discharged through a VW postulated break.
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2.
_ TROJAN - The turbine building was constructed with twenty-two 2-foot high slots in the West side which will pass k.
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500,000 gpa to the yard should flooding occur.
3.
ZION UNITS N05.1&2 - No safety-related equipment is located in_the turbine building. The auxiliary building k
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is separated from the turbine building by barriers.
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4.
D.C. COOK UNIT N0_.1 - Safety-related equipment is located at an elevation higEer than that of the postulated flooding
- level, 5.
MONTICELLO - At least one train of the redundant safety related equipment is located at an elevation higher than that of the postulated flooding level.
6.
PILGRIM UNIT NO. 1 - Safety-related equipment is located j
at an elevation higher than the postulated flooding level.
7.
NINE MILE POINT UNIT NO.1 - Safety-related equipment I
is located at an elevation higher than the postulated flooding level.
i 8.
HUMBOL'OT BAY - Analysis demonstrates that the facility
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can withstand the consequences of a 20-foot tsunami.
l Such an event bounds other postulated flooding iodidents.
9.
RANCHO SECO - The turbine and condenser are located out-I doors. The condenser pit is vented to the yard and the grade slopes away from safety-related e,quipment.
In addition to the operating facilities hnt o ababove,15 operating i
facilities would be susceptible to an "Oconee-like" occurrence during I
conditions of maximum probable flood. Based on this limited investi-gation, it does not appear that the consequences of a circulating water system pipe break during maximum probable flood conditions has
- l been evaluated. However, in general, the consequences of a maximum i
probable flood would most likely conservatively bound the consequences of the simultaneous occurrence of these two events. Most of the j
affected facilities have Technical Specification requirements and/or l
emergency operating procedures which require reactor shutdown before the onset of maximum probable flood conditions.
(Quad Cities Unit 6
Nos.1 & 2 and Nine Mile Point Unit No.1 apparently do not have such requirements / procedures).
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n As a result of this investigation, which was limited to circulating N
water system piping breaks, several general observations can be made i
l ragarding the generic review of " Flooding of Equipment Important To h
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Safety":
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a.
Two facilities (Vemont Yankee and Kewaunee) have not
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taken circulating water system piping breaks / failures of t
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any type into consideration.
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b.
Five facilities (Connecticut Yankee, Palisades, Peach Bot-
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tom 2/3, and Three Mile Island Unit No.1.) limited con-l siderations of circulating water system failures to seal f j 4' i
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For four facilities (Zion Units Nos. 1&2 and Calvert Cliffs Units Nos.1&2) documentation is not available to determine what failures, if any, were considered.
d.
In several cases the SER write-offs for this generic l
concern are too sketchy to determine what failures
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were considered.
j!
John Guibert ORB #3 l
Division of Operating Reactors
Enclosures:
j 1
Sumary of Turbine Building 2
Flooding Investigations i
for Operating Reactors l
l cc:
V. Stello
..E Si j
J. Reece L. Nichols
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D. Eisenhut 7
D. Davis l
W. Butler B. Buckley D. Elliott ORBCs 1
DISTRIBUTI0ft:
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i Central Files ORB #3 Reading File i
J. Guibert b0 ?
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ORd3 o rr ec.,
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J. G jbert_
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211[D7.
g NRC FORM 31s (p.76) NRCM 0240 W u. s.oovannuswr ensurine orricas sets-sao.eae
..i' SUPEARY OF TURBINE BUILDING FLOODING _INVESTIG_ATIONS_ - 0_PERATING REACT PREVIOUSLY CONSIDERED CONSIDERATIONS WERE LIMITED ELEVATION OF CIRCULATING BREAKS IN CIRCULATING TO FAILURE OF SEALS AND/0R WATER SYSTEM PIPING IS LOWER
-FACILITY WATER SYSTEM PIPING EXPANSION BELLOWS THAN THAT OF WATER SOURCE III No
. Browns Ferry 1, 2, 3 Yes No No SER Write-Off Brunswick 1, 2 Connecticut Yankee Yes Yes No No(I)
Yes No Ginna No Not Applicable No Kewaunee Yes(2)
Yes Yes' Palisades San Onofre 1 Yes No No SER Write-Of M -
Yes(2 Trojan Yankee Station Yes No No Yes(2)
Not Known Not Known Zion 1, 2 No FSAR Only Info. Avail.
Arkansas 1 Yes No No Big Rock Point Calvert Cliffs 1, 2 Yes Not Known No SER Write-Off Yes(2)
Cook 1 II)
No SER Write-Off Cooper No(I)
Yes No Dresden 1 No(
No Yes
, s. f.
Dresden 2, 3 Yes(2)
Yes No Yes(2)
Montice't ', o No Yes Pilgrim 1 Vermont Yankee
'No Not Applicable No (1)
Except during maximum probable flood conditions (2)
Facility design protects safety-related equipment e
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1
.a.
SUMMARY
OF TURBINE BUILDING-FLOODING'_ INVESTIGATIONS
_0PERATING REACTORS-(Cont'd.)-
PREVIOUSLY CONSIDERED CONSIDERATIONS WERE LIMITED ELEVATION OF CIRCULATING BREAKS-IN CIRCULATING TO FAILURE OF SEALS AND/0R.-
WATER SYSTEM PIPING IS LOWER FACILITY-WATER-SYSTEM PIPING EXPANSION BELLOWS THAN THAT OF WATER ~ SOURCE-II)
' Prairie Island 1, 2 Yes No NoII)
-Quad Cities 1. 2 Yes' No No
.St. Lucie-1 Yes No No No(I)
..Duane Arnold Yes No No(I)
Fort Calhoun~
'Yes No SER Write-Off No Hatch 1-No M111 stone'1 SER Write-Off No SER Write'-Off Millstone 2 Yes(2)
SER Write-Dff
- Nine Mile Point 1
'No(I Yes
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No
'0yster Creek Yes No Peach.; Bottom 2/3 Yes
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No No Point Beach 1, 2 Yes Turkey: Point 3, 4 Yes NE No No SER Write-Off
" Beaver Valley 1 Seismic ClassrI Piping No Fitzpatrick.
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Yes(2)
Humboldt. Bay Yes
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No Indian Point 2, 3
-Yes No No c
No No Lacrosse Yes
.3 Maine Yankee Yes
'__ 5 No No Yes(II Y~
No Rancho Seco Yes No.
No i
. Robinson 2 Yes Su.~ y 1, 2 SeismicClass{IPiping 3
i Three Mile Island 1 Yes Yes No
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