ML19326D182

Forwards Info,Supplementing Util 751201 Response,In Response to NRC 751030 Addl Info Request Re Reg Guide 1.59 Implementation

ML19326D182
Person / Time
Site:	Midland
Issue date:	02/03/1976
From:	Bauman R CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
To:	Boyd R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
2124, NUDOCS 8006090604
Download: ML19326D182 (5)

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Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 'l IN P Attention: Mr Ro6er Boyd, Director ,, M *Wg=

Division of Project Management Q'y Da=**

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Coc: mission Washington, DC 20555 ,p-

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MIDLAND PROJECT DOCKET IEEERS 50-329, 50-330 REGUIATORY GUIDE IMPLDENTATION FILE: 0505 SERIAL: 2124 The enclosed information supplements our December 1,1975 respoase to Mr A. Schwencer's October 30, 1975 letter requesting additional infomation ,

on !c:plementation of Regulatory Guides for the Midland Plant. The attached material responds to Question 321.2 on Regulator / Guide 1.59 t_

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321.2 Reg. Guide 1.59 Provide a list of structures, systems,~and components necessary for cold shutdown and maintenance thereof. Identify each on a map showing the entire site. Estimate the elevation and duration of the Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) plus wind and wave (maximum) runup on each of the structures. Discuss the methods of waterproofing that you propose, and the advantages or this method when compared with other methods.

Response

The following is a list of structures and systems necessary to achieve and maintain a cold shutdown. Structures are identified on the attached drawing SK-C-468 Rev. A and the location of systems necessary to achieve and maintain a cold shutdown are given below.

Structures-Reactor Building Auxiliary Building Diesel Generator Building Service Water Pump Structure Emergency Cooling Water Reservoir Systems Location Reactor Coolant System Reactor Building Portions of the Makeup and Purification System Auxiliary and Reactor Buildings Decay Heat Removal System Auxiliary and Reactor Buildings Auxiliary Feedwater System Auxilinry and Reactor Buildings Portions of Atmospheric Steam Dump System- Auxiliary Building Roof Portions of the Corponent Cooling Water System Auxiliary Building Portions of the Service Water System Service Water Pump Structure and Auxiliary Building and Buried Connecting Piping

[ .321.2 cont'd (. .

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3 Systems Location Emergency AC Power Distribution System Auxiliary Building Emergency 125V DC Power Distribution System Auxiliary Building

! Emergency Diesel and Fuel Supply Diesel Generator Building and Buried Tanks Portions of the Engineered Safeguards Auxiliary Building Actuation System (ESFAS)

Reactor Protection System Auxiliary Building i

Control Room Auxiliary Building (including its habitability systems)

Certain ventilation systems, control instru Reactor, Auxiliary, ments, actuation equipment, electrical cable Diesel Generator and and raceways associated with the above listed Service Water Pump systems are also considered essential. Structure Building As indicated in Section 8 of the Probable Maximum Flooding (PMF)

Study Rev. 3, submitted as Amendment 31 to the Midland Preliminary Safety Analysis Report, calculations on wave runup associated with the PMF are based on a stillwater level of 631 with dike slopes of 3:1. The maximum water surface elevation on the site due to wave runup was conservatively calculated to be 635.5. This elevation is reached between the evaporator building and warehouse and is due primarily

< to the funneling effect across the railroad at that location. This is illustrated in Figure 13 of the PMF report. The amount of water on plant. grade once the water has passed between and beyond the initial buildings and has dispersed over the site will be considerably lower than elevation 635.5, and will be of such a shallow nature that wind induced wave action on plant structures will not occur.

As indicated on Figure 12 of the PMF report, the duration of this high water level will not exceed one day.

Due to commitments to a site elevation of 634.0 and threshold elevations of 634.5 for rail access and entrance doors to several structures, in the unlikely event of a PNF, approximately 12 inches of flood protection around several entrances would be required.

Both manpower and material will be available onsite for a sandbagging operation. Requirements of a technical specification fully describing flood protection procedures will be provided in the Final Safety Analysis Report. Alternative methods to sandbagging are employed where practical to provide permanent PMF flood protection. These include berming of one radwaste building entrance and raising of numerous entrance thresholds, where permitted by current stages of f

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design, to elevation 635.5. Watertight doors are provided between the auxiliary and turbine buildings at elevation 614.0. The enclosed drawing, SK-C-468 Rev. A, shows proposed protection type and location along with building identification. Permanent protection of those entrances which would require sandbagging is not considered feasible due to access requirements for trucks or train cars, or due to the current stage of construction and building design.

A waterproof membrane is provided on the exterior building surfaces up to elevation 632.0. The amount of water that would seep through

-the exterior concrete walls above elevation 632.0 will be insignificant because of low external hydrostatic pressure and because the duration of water levels above elevation 632.0 is less than one day.

Other alternatives which were considered but ruled out consisted of providing a seawall or providing armor stone of approximately 17 inch diameter on the plant dike. The seawall concept was ruled out due to space limitations between the dike and service roads. The rip-rap layer of armor stone was dismissed on the basis that the cost of this alternative for 12 inches of flood protection from an event of low probability was not justified when compared to the acceptable method of sandbagging several entrances.

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• NRC PNTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKc' MATERI AL

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,4 : Consumers Pwr Co DATE OF DOC DATE REC'D LTR TWX RPT OTHER

, Jackson, Michigan R C Bauman 2-3-7g 2 s-76 XX TO: ORIG CC OTHER SENT NRC PDR XX DL one signec SENT LOCAL PDR. XX CLASS UNCLASS PROPINFO INPUT NO CYS REC'D OCKET NO:

XXX 1 -32 /330 DESCRIPTION: ENCLOSURES:

Ltr re our 1-13-70 ltr....trans the'following: Accl into en implementation or Reg Guides cealing with mechanical engineering. . . . . . .

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. PLANT NAME: Midlanc 1 & 2 .

SAFETY FOR ACTION /INFC RMATION v en n,n 2-10-/o ent AS'SIGIED AD ASSICEED ERANCll CHIEF BRANCII ClllEF PROJECT MANACER PROJECT MANAGER // ' a :-

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