ML19326C336

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Discusses Util Understanding of Status Re Offsite Power Design,Control & Computer Rooms Subfloor Design,Emergency Feedwater Sys & Steamline Break Instrumentation & Control Sys.Discussion Based on AEC 731214 Meeting W/Util & Telcons
ML19326C336
Person / Time
Site: Arkansas Nuclear Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 01/15/1974
From: Phillips J
ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: Anthony Giambusso
US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
References
NUDOCS 8004220884
Download: ML19326C336 (9)


Text

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AEC ']IBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET l'9 RIAL (TDiPORARY FORM)

CONTROL NO: 484 FILE:

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DATE OF D0.

DATE REC'D LTR MEMO RPT OTHER l

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J. D. Phillips 1-15-74 1-17-74 X

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Mr. Giambusso 3 signed CLASS UNCLASS PROP INFO INPUT NO CTS REC'D DOCKET NO:

a XXXX 70 50-313 DESCRIPTION:

ENCLOSURES:

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Mr. A. Giambusso Deputy Director for Reactor Projects saat A

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20545 Subj ect: Arkansas Power S Light Company Arkansas Nuclear One-Unit 1 Docket No. 50-313 Supplementary Information - Electrical

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

On December 14, 1973, Arkansas Power S Light Company (APSL) representa-tives met with representatives of the AEC Staff in order to present analyses and designs related to certain aspects of the electrical design of Arkansas Nuclear One-Unit 1 (ANO-1).

These electrical designs and analyses had been documented pri~ r to the meeting in Amendment No. 42 o

to the ANO-1 FSAR and in letters submitted to you on November 30, 1973, and December 3, 1973.

Based on the above meetings and subsequent telephone conversations with the Staff, it is our understanding that the status of these electrical items is as follows:

1.

Offsite Power System Design - resolved.

2.

Control Room and Computer Room Subfloor Design - resolved.

3.

Emergency Feedwater System -

A.

In order to resolve specific concerns of the Staff on this system, APSL commits to make the following addi-tional design changes:

(1) The power supply of emergency feedwater pump discharge control valve, CV-2620, will be changed from a " swing" bus to a " green" vital bus.

TAX PAYING INVESTOR OWNEO MEMBE A MIDDLE SOUTH UTILITIES SYSTEM

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Mr. A. Giambusso January IS, 1974 (2) The Integrated Control System (ICS) is utilized to actuate specific components of the Emergency Feedwater System.

In order to preclude any failures or events in the ICS from rendering inoperable the Class IE components in the Emergency Feedwater System or their power supplies, qualified control isolation devices will be installed between the ICS and these Class IE components.

These quali-fied control isolation devices will be designed to meet all Class IE requirements and analyses and/or tests will be made to show that no failure at the input of the isolation device, including the application of the maximum credible a-c or d-c potential, will prevent _the Class IE system from accomplishing its intended function.

Both of the above design changes will be made and installed prior to fuel load.

B.

As a result of recent discussions with the Staff concern-ing the electric motor driven emergency feedwater pump, APGL feels it necessary to provide its position and reasons for this position in regard to the power supply for this pump.

This pump, which is a backup to the steam driven emergency feedwater pump, is connected to non-vital bus A1, which can be manually connected to vital bus A3 should all off-site power fail and the steam driven pump fail.

Examining the basis for this design and its history of review, it should first be pointed out that ANO-1 received a construction permit on the basis of meeting the AEC's General Design Criteria in existence at that time.

APSL responded to that criteria in Supplement No. 1 to the i

ANO-1 PSAR on January 22, 1968.

Criterion No. 6 of that criteria states:

"The reactor core shall be designed to function throughout its design lifetime without exceeding acceptable fuel damage limits which have been stipulated and justified.

The core design, together with reliable process and decay heat removal systems, shall provide for this capability under all expected conditions of normal operation with appropriate margins for uncertainties and for transient situations which can be anticipated, including the effects of the loss of power to recirculation pumps, tripping out of a turbine generator set, isolation of the reactor from its primary heat sink, and loss of all off-site power."

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Mr. A. Giambusso January 15, 1974 It should be noted here that this criterion did not mention a design based on single failure criteria, nor did APSL commit to such a design basis.

In the ANO-1 FSAR dated April 19, 1971, APGL again responded to this criterion 6, which was exactly the same as previously responded to.

In Amendment No. 25 to the FSAR, dated March 31, 1972, APSL commented on a new revised AEC General Design Criteria and in this revision, for the first time, Criterion 34 - Residual Heal Removal, specified as a design basis, among others, single failure criterion.

In its comments on this criterion, APGL discussed its residual heat remcval system, but did not commit to meeting the new single failure criterion.

On November 15, 1972, the AEC requested more specific information on this system in Question 14.12, which questioned the ability of this system's design to meet single failure criterion in regard to valve failure, pump (s) location, and control system failure. APSL responded to this question in Amendment No. 33 dated December 31, 1972.

During a site visit by the Staff, November 29-December 1,1972, the Staff stated that they had confirmed that the electric motor driven pump was connected to non-vital bus Al and therefore in the event of an emergency, bus Al must be manually connected to bus A3.

In the AEC's letter of February 7,1973, APSL was provided with the conclusions and requirements of the Staff's safety review of the electrical, instrumentation and con-trol systems for ANO-1.

In these findings the Staff t

concluded in regard to the Emergency Feedwater System -

"We consider the whole subject of ISC to the EF system including the steam system failure as an area of concern that must be resolved."

In the AEC's letter to APGL dated April 20, 1973, the Emergency Feedwater System was listed as an area of concern and the " lingering concerns" listed were:

- Sh, wing by analysis that the time estimate of j

5 minutes to connect bus Al to bus A3 was accept-able or critical.

- The manual tie of the electric pump to the diesel still uses bus A1; bus Al is not sesimic category 1.

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Mr. A. Giambusso January 15, 1974

- The electric pump has a 700 H.P. motor; if this load is placed on an emergency bus, will the diesel generator be able to handle the additional Joad?

This letter also stated the AEC desire to resolve these concerns along with the review of the high energy line rupture outside containment, which was requested by June 1,1973.

On May 11, 1973, APSL responded to the AEC letter of April 20, 1973, and in this response, APSL provided justification for leaving the electric motor driven pump on bus A1.

A followup APGL submittal on December 3,1973, provided an analysis which showed that the electric motor driven pump could be connected via bus Al to bus A3 and that the loading and the associated diesel generator response would meet the requirements of AEC Regulatory Guide 1.9 and General Design Criterion 17.

Subsequent to the APSL/AEC meeting of December 14, 1973, the Staff asked for an analysis and engineering study as to what it would take to put the electric motor driven pump on bus A3 Items to be considered were schedule, description of the existing design, description of the conversion, engineering and construction difficulties, scheduling problems and cost effect.

The following are the results of that study:

DESCRIPTION OF EXISTING DESIGN:

As it is presently designed, the electric motor driven emergency feedwater pump (P7B) is fed from non-engineered safeguard bus Al which in turn is. supplied frcm the Unit Auxiliary Transformer and the two off-site power sources through Start-up Transformers No. 1 and No. 2.

Bus Al is located at elevation 372',

which is well above the maximum design flood level.

In the event of a main unit trip and the coincidental failure of both off-site power sources, the electric motor driven Emergency Feedwater pump can be powered from engineered safeguard bus A3 and its emergency diesel generator, DG1, by manual operation.

(See the response to AEC question 10.2 for the procedure for manually connecting and feedi.ng the electric motor driven emer-gency feedwater pump from diesel generator powered bus).

q Mr. A. Giambusso January 1; 1974 This _ procedure has been performed in the ANO-1 preopera-tional test program in_ less than 2.5 minutes, which is far below the 14 minutes available under worst case

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conditions.

DESCRIPTION OF Ti!E CONVERSION Conversion of the power supply from bus Al to the engineered safeguard bus A3 would require the following installations:

a)

Installation of a new 4 KV switchgear compartment with all safety and quality assurance require-i ments including seismic qualification in the ES switchgear room.

i b) Installation of about 1000 feet of new conduits routed in Class I protected areas.

c)

Installation of about 350 feet of power cable.

d)

Installation of about 650 feet of control cable.

These installations would provide a fully qualified

' engineered safeguard power supply for the electric motor driven Emergancy Feedwater Pump.

4 ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION DIFFICULTIES:

a)

Installation of the new 4 KV switchgear cubicle i.

will require temporary removal of a cable tray section outside of the engineered safeguard switchgear room. This tray contains some 27 non-safeguard caSles. Rerouting of at least one conduit with its contained cables will also be required.

These actions are necessary because 1,

the new switchgear cubicle must be brought in from a hallway outside the engineered safe-guard bus A4 room, through the A4 room and then finally into the room housing the A3 engineered safeguard switchgear.

b) Top entry to the new switchgear cubicle for installing new raceways is not'possible.

Accord-ingly, ' core drilling in the floor under the switchgear cubicle is a necessity.

c)

Due to the space limitations, the new cubicle can only be added at' the north-end of the switch-gear A3.. This will result in an alteration of the s

Mr. A. Giambusso January 15, 1974 A3 bus configuration.

Installation of a transi-tion section will be required for matching the existing bus.

d)

The necessity of removing the existing lighting as the switchgear is brought through the A4 room and in the vicinity of the A3 switchgear is highly probable.

e)

Installation of approximately 1000 feet of new conduit will regnire floor and wall core drill-ing in several locations.

f)

New safeguard control cables for the control of the motor need to be pulled to and terminated in the control room.

Under existing conditions, extreme difficulties would be encountered when adding new raceways in the control room, consider-ing that the existing raceways are filled to the limit.

This would cause major engineering' and construction problems.

SCHEDULING PROBLEMS a)

Delivery of the new switchgear cubicle will take fifty (50) weeks.

This is based on acquiring the cubicle from the same vendor who supplied the A3 switchgear.

An investigation has revealed that such a cubicle is not available among those bought for ANO-2.

b) Acquiring the required 350 feet of power cable is possible from ANO-2, but would not be avail-able until mid summer 1974.

c)

The time required for the construction of the conversion is at least eight (8) weeks.

During this period, plant shutdown and de-energization of the entire switchgear Bus A3 will be required.

COST EFFECT Installation cost due to this conversion will be about $90,000.

This figure represents the procure-ment of new equipment, engineering and labor cost.

Cost of the replacement electrical generation due to the extended shutdown period related to this installation is not included.

This replacement power would cost $23,900,000.

Both the capital cost and the cost of the replacement power are significant, 1

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Mr. A. Giambusso January IS, 1974 but the loss of the generated electricity in this time of an energy crisis would be a far greater impact.

In conclusion, AP6L feels that it has demonstrated and documented the acceptability of leaving the electric motor driven emergency feedwater pump on bus A3 and that the costs, difficu? ties and possible impacts of putting this pump on bus A3 far outweigh any advantages.

4.

Steam Line Break Instrumentation and Control System (SLBIC) -

APSL is presently redesigning and evaluating this system in view of the comments madd by the Staff at the December 14, 1973, meeting and during subsequent phone conversations.

We are confident that we can convince the Staff through analyses that the most severe steam line break accident without an operational SLBIC system does not produce unacceptable con-sequences until quite late in the first cycle.

This is based on the value of the negative temperature coefficient, which is the key factor in this analysis.

We expect to provide such an analysis to the Staff on or about February 8, 1974, which should allow sufficient time for review prior to the presently expected decision date for the operating license.

Based on the results of that analysis and the review by the Staff, we would expect to work out with the Staff a reason-able schedule for system design and Staff review to ensure an operational SLBIC system prior to the required date in the first fuel cycle.

APSL hopes that the commitments and comments made in this letter will resolve all remaining items of concern so that there will be a clear path to the granting of an operating license for ANO-1.

If you or the Staff has any questions, please contact us.

Very truly yours, h ;l,a /,

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D. Phillips Senior Vice President JDP:lt l

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STATE OF ARKANSAS

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J. D. Phillips, being duly sworn, states that he is a Senior Vice President of Arkansas Power G Light Company; that he is authorized on the part of said Company to sign and file with the Atomic Energy Commis-sion this Supplementary Information; that he has read all of the state-ments contained in such Information, and that all such statements made and matters set forth therein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, infomation and belief,

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J. D. Phillips-SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public in and for the County and State above named, this

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Notary Public My Commission Expires:

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