ML19326B174

Applicants Responses to Issues Raised by Limited Appearors.

ML19326B174
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	02/25/1971
From:	TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML19326B172	List: ML19326B171 ML19326B174
References
NUDOCS 8003060969
Download: ML19326B174 (47)

Text

.

~' DUChLi hUniULR M & R fAc. 50-3 4/r APPLICANTS' RESPONSES 'IO ISSUES RAISED BY LIMITED APPEAR 0RS MR. CHARN0FF: Mr. Chairman, we are prepared to respond to the issues and questions raised by the people who made limited appearances earlier in the hertri ng.

'Ihc limited appearance statements do not constitute testimony or evidence in this proceeding and in many instances concerned, subjects not properly at issue before this Board. Nevertheless , for the information of the limited appearors and the public, we vill endeavor to include in our '

responses replies to the matters of concern to the appearors to the extent that such matters were not disposed of by the earlier testimony in this pro-ceeding relating to the matters in controversy established by the intervenors' admitted contentions or in reply to questions by your Atomic Safety and Licensing Board.

g Q g 00ctETED D

suEc ,

h FEB251971 *

=

12

~

W {

c* UTA.

A "

g 8003060 b

, MR. CHAPJIOFF: Miss Pausic on pages 167 and 168 of the transcript of this hearing and Mr. Webb on page 198 raised the question of protection of the station against sabotage and acts of war. These matters have been carefully considered by the Commission in the Turkey Point proceedings (In the Matter of Florida Power is ' Light Company, AEC Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251) and in the prcmulgation of 10 CFR Section 50.13 of the Commission's regulations.

Section 50.13 specifically provides that it is not the Applicant's responsi-bility to design the pla5t for protection against attacks and destructive acts , including sabotage , by an enen of the United States. The Commission held in the Turkey Point case that this is more properly the responsibility of the nation's defense establishments and of Ute various agencies of our ,

government having internal security functions. The Commission noted that while many engineered safeguard features of the plant, including the massive containment and the procedures and systems for rapid shutdown of the reactor, would certainly se- .alul purpose in the event of enew attacks and destructive acts , the defense and internal security capabilities of this country constitute, by necessity, the basic safeguards with regard to possible hostile acts by an enew of the United States.

The Applicants realize, however, that they must assume responsibility for taking appropriate security measures for protection against industrial sabotage.

The Commission held in the Turkey Point case that this is a matter to be dealt with at the operating license stage rathe- than in a construction permit pro-cee ding. Toledo Edison is developing an elaborate internal security program and has described its preliminary planning in reply to the Regulatory Staff's Question 8.2, Volume 4, of.the PSAR.

1 LAl-1

MR. CHARNOFF: A number of limited appearors have expressed their concern over the storage and disposal of high level radioactive vastes. I am refer-ring to Miss Pausic on page 170 of the transcript, Mr. Brickner on page 189, Mr. Webb on page 198, Mr. Lucas on page 239, Mrs. Brown on page 268, Dr. Davies on page 273, and Mrs. Stebbins on pages 397 and 399 Dr. Goldman, would you .

please comment?

4 DR. COLDMAN: High level radioactive vastes are not produced at the Davis--

Besse Station, or at any other light water nuclear station. These vastes are produced at another facility which processes spent reactor fuel for recovery of the unused uranium and the plutonium or other valuable. products which may remain in the spent fuel. At the present time, only one commercial fuel re-processing plant is operating, in upper New York State, although others are under construction in Illinois and South Carolina. In fuel reprocessing, an early step separates from the recoverable uranium and plutonium about 99.9% of the fission products and this constitutes what is usually referred to as high level vaste. At the AEC facilities wherr. *hese processes were developed and used for handling AEC fuels , these vastes have been stored, as an interim measure, in liquid form in underground tanks.

The experience with tank storage at AEC sites has been good. Over 80 million gallons of vaste are being stored in cbout 200 tanks in the U.S. and, although there have been nine instances of tank failure reported, none has resulted in a significant release of activity, or any potential radiation exposure to the publi c. ,

For the past 15 or more years, however, research and development activities have been under way to determine means of ultimate disposal of these vastes which would not create potential public health problems, and would not depend l

l LA2-1

7 -( .,

on continued human curveillance to assure safety. Two objectives have been desired; the first, to' convert these vastes to a solid form which would sub-E ctantially reduce their ability to migrate through the environment; the cecond, t.o develop a storage medium or location which would provide the icolation'from the human environment for the long time periods necessary to provide for radioactive decay. Both of these objectives had, of course, to meet reasonable cost criteria.

In the intervening years and prior to any significant vaste load frort nuclear power plants, these research programs have been working on various alterna-tive methods for vaste solidification and investigating potential stora6e sites, aqd have reached satisfactory conclusions. As a result, the AEC has recently announced (November 14,1970) a policy of requiring solidification of high activity wastes , and their delivery to the AEC for ultimate storage.

The initial storage location vill =ost probably be in a deep salt bed which' is impervious to water, geologically stable, self-sealing and is unaffected by the radiation or heat from stored vastes. as shown by studies conducted over the past ten years.

Sn this basis, concerns about the health implications of the ultimate disposal of high activity wastes have no foundation, since they will be isolated from the biosphere in a physical form and in a geological formation both of which prevent their migration, without depending on human surveillance or control'.

8 LA2-2 l

1

_ .~ . _ _

-MR. CHARNOFF: Mr. Lucas on pages 238 and 239 expressed concern about lake floods on the safe storage of radioactive wastes. He also expressed concern that the intake canal would contribute to the lake floods. Mr. Roe, would you please comment?

MR ROE: The intake canal is being constructed from the shoreline into the station to provide for a water intake supply and a barge canal for large com-ponents. he present beach barrier dike which rises to an elevation of about 575 feet above mean sea level vill be replaced after all large pieces of equipment have been shipped to the station and before the station goes into i

service . As a result, the station's intake canal will not be open to the lake.

To supply water to this closed canal, a submerged intake pipe will extend into the lake approximately 2500 feet to a submerged intake crib.

'Ihe station's grade floor level and openings into the station will be at 585 feet above mean sea level and the station will be designed for normal power generation at any static water level up to this elevation. In addition, the elevation area around the station will be protected along the north and east

. sides by an earth-filled dike built up to an elevation of 591 feet above mean sea level to protect against waves and wave run-up.

A probable maximum meteorological event was used at Davis-Besse to determine the maximum probable flood level at the station. his meteorological event will have a maximum east-northeast vinds at the. station of 100 miles per hour for a ten-minute period and the wind speeds will exceed 70 miles per hour during the six-hour period both before and after the maximum vind speed. We have cal-culated that this probable maximum meteorological event would cause a maximum water level at the stction of 583 7 feet above mean sea level, which is 15.1 feet above L*ke Erie's mean low lake level of 568.6 feet. By comparison, the maximum recorded lake level at Toledo during the past 50 years was 577.1 feet LA3-1

.. , . , , - , , . , - - - e-.. .u - ,~r-w e , , - , - , -

or 8.5 feet above the mean lov lake level. .

All tanks that contain any low level radioactive materials will be installed at locations that are prote'cted from flooding up to 585 feet above mean sea level. These tanks will be built to very strict nuclear quality control and quality assurance standards. In addition, all' floor drains in the areas under these tanks will be connected to the station's radioactive vaste treatment facilities.

I LA3-2

i i

~

~

l l

MR. CHAHNOFF: A number or comments have been made about the effects of  ;

heated water discharged from the station into Lake Erie. I refer to Mr.

Clink's remarks beginning on page 186 and 196 of the transcript, Mr. Brickner on page 190, Mrs. Finkel on page 232, Mr. Lucas on page 237, Mr. O'lalde on I

page 296, and Mrs. Stebbins on pages 398-399. Mr. Roe, would you please clarify the extent to which heated water vill be discharged and explain the effect this might have on Lake Erie?

i MR. ROE:

The original plans for the Davis-Besse Station anticipated using 1,027,000 gpm of lake water which would be passed through the condenser and then discharged back to the lake with a 120 temperature rise. The amount of i

heat added to the lake under these conditions would be about 6.8 X 109 BTU's l

per hour. This proposed arrangement was given general approval by the Ohio  ;

Department of Health. From our extensive lake studies and many other sources of information, it was determined that this hest discharged into the lake vould not cause undue changes to the total lake ecology or have any detri- ' I i

mental effect on the local lake area adjoining the station site.

We changed the station design at a later date to provide for a cooling tower system instead of an open lake system to provide for the release of this i

vaste heat. Our decision to install a cooling tower syste:: vas based on a number of factors, the most important of which were:

1. We did not know what future standards would be required for the release of heat to Lake Erie. 1 2.

The time schedule of establishing standards and a resulting delay on  !

station construction which could result from not knowing what these standards were. '

I I

3. 'Ihe higher cost involved with making a change to a cooling tower instal-lation after a considerable expenditure had been made for an open lake system.

LAh-1

With the change to cooling towers, only about 33,500 gpm will be taken from the lake, passed through the station, and discharged to the lake. The water will have a 15 temperature rise and the amount of heat added to the lake will be about 2.5 x 108 BTU's per hour. This represents less than h5 of the heat that was to be discharged using our originally planned open lake system for condenser cooling water. The water that is discharged will very rapidly mix with the adjacent lake water such that only a 0.2 acre area of the surface would see a temperature 5 or higher than the normal lake temperature. This amount of heat is insignificant in comparison to the amount of heat that is being added and removed daily from the lake through natural phenomena such as sunlight, darkness , and evaporation.

Since there will be no general area of the lake affected by any temperature rise whatsoever, there vill be no effect on the bacteria growth or the algae growth in the lake itself. We have, however, been concerned with the algal, bloom or growth problems that have been present in Lake Erie in recent years, and have been interested in determining the factors that govern the rapid growth of algae. To help obtain an understanding of these factors, we have indicated our willingness to provide support for a research program that Battelle Memorial Institute has proposed and for which they have requested some government funding. Even though our discharges from the lake with a cooling tower installation will have insignificant effect on the lake, we have continued to express our inttrest in sasisting with such a research program which would be of benefit to the understanding of the lake system regardless of the station location or type of condenser cooling system. '

l l

l 1

1 LAh-2 l

t g MR. CHARN0FF- Mr. Roe, Mrs. Finkel on page 233 of the transcript and Mrs.

Stebbins on page 308 raised questions on the appropriateness of the cooling tower deulgn selected for the station. Would you care to comment?

MH. HOE: he cooling tower system we vill be using is the best available under existing technology. he system is a closed cycle system utilizing a natural draft cooling t,cver to reject the bulk of the heat in the condenser cooling water directly to the atmosphere rather than to the lake. -

Other types of closed cycle cooling systems were considered which included cocling pond arrangements and mechanical draft cooling towers. A cooling pond in thia location was considered impractical due to the acreage required which would be considerably more than the total site area. Mechanical draft towers would be about half the cost of a natural draft tower, but the lov level dis-charge and fan noise from this type installt.tlon ruled out serious considera-tion.

The climatic effects of the natural draft cooling tower had been studied by us and this study had shown that there may be, under certain conditions , a highly visible plume coming from the cooling tower. This study had also shown that there vaa a certaln probability of some ground level fogging and icing during adverse weather conditions. We have made further studies in this area and feel that the initial work done was very conservative. Taking into account the in-creased tower height and considering the rise of the heated effluent, there is, in fact, little or no probability of ground level fcgging or icing. Even though there vill be at times a visible moisture plume coming from the tower, the tower operation vill not result in a general cloud cover or any change to the climate in any area around the station location.

1

~

l LAS-1 ,

l

MR.* CHARtl0FF: Miss Fausic on page 167, Mr. Webb on page 198, Mr. Lucas on page 239, Mrs. Brown on page 268, and Dr. Davies on page 272, raised questions concerning the transportation of spent fuel from the station. Mr. Roe, would

.ynu plence comment'l MR. ROE: The Davis-Besse Station is being designed so that spent fuel can be shipped either by rail or by t:mk. In either type of shipment, the spent fuel is conta'i ned in shipping casks which provide the radiation shielding and coti-tainment necessary for protection of the public. Rese casks must meet the rigid requirements of the Atomic Energy Commission contained in 10 CFR, Part 71, and the Department of Transportation regulations contained in k9 CFR, Parts 171-178 and must be licensed prior to being used.

Rese regulations and licensing requirements place strict limitations on the  !

I levels of external radiation occurring during shipment of spent fuel in these l casks . These regulations also require that a cask carrying spent fuel must be capable of safely withstanding damage resulting from an accident involving the rail or truck transporting vehicle, e.g. , the cask and its contents to be licensed must be able to safely withstand a 30-foot drop onto a completely un-

^

yielding surface folleved by a h0-inch drop onto a 6-inch diameter pin, followed by 30 minutes exposure to lh75 F, followed by 2h flours immersion in water. To provide additional safety, these regulations provide that no rail car contain-ing spent fuel can be handled next to a rail car containing explosives while either standing still or being moved.

Since there are several fuel reprocessing plants planned for operation in 1976 and since we have not entered into any reprocessing agreement as yet, we cannot say where the spent fuel will be shipped. In any case, normal routing for truck shipment would be on the open highway and routing for rail shipments would be along normal rail routes.

LA6-1

The rigid requirements that must be met in designing these casks, the licensing i - that must be obtained, and the requirements necessary to be met in loading casks and preparing them for shipment ensure that the health and safety of the general public will not be jeopardized by the shipping of spent fuel.

- ~

i 1

1 t g 1

I LA6-2 4

. s.

.MR. CliARNOFF: Mr. Webb on pages 213, 21h, and 227 or the tranacript hua mentioned the possibility of a double-ended rupture of the main coolant pipe, a cold water accident resulting from failure of an electrical interlock, and a reactivity accident as a result of rod withdrawal. Mr. Little, I would ask you to respond to this subject.

MR. L'ITTLE: All of these accidents are taken into consideration in the design of the station and are included in the safety analyses. Steps are taken in 'he t design or a nuclear power station to assure that a loss-of-coolant accident vill not occur. However, to make certain that the health and safety of the putlic is protected, the consequences of the rupture of the largest pipe in the primary ecolant system are evaluated and engineered safety systems are pro-vided to mitigate the consequences of such an accident.

Firct, extensive measures are taken to assure the integrity of the primary coolant system. The reactor coolant system is designed to meet the require-ments of industry codes as described in Section h of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report; the components are manufactured and erected under stringent quality control requirements described in Section 3 of Appendix l-B of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report; and the components are inspected through-i out the station lifetime to assure that integrity is maintained as described in Section h.h of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report. These precautions ass'ure the designer that the probability of a catastrophic piping failure vill be very lov.

I Second, even though every reasonable precaution is taken to assure that ruptures of the primary coolant system vill not occur, the consequences of such accidents i

are analyced and engineered safety systems are included in the design to miti-gate the consequences of such accidents. Section 14.2.2.3 of the Preliminary  ;

l LAT-1 i

h g

safety Analysis Report presents two analyses of the consequences of loss-of-coolant accidents for primary coolant system rupture sizes of the largest type in the system (lk.1 square feet) down to very small rupture (0.h square feet).

The decign of the redundant and highly reliable engineered safety systems is described in Section 6 of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report and the ability of these syste=s to mitigate the consequences of the loss-of-coolant accident are described in Sections 14.2.2.3 and lb.2.2.6 of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report.

Mr. Webb is also concerned about the potential for a cold water accident r7d suggests that electrical interlocks are required to prevent a cold water accident . A cold water accident is one in which a large quantity of rela-1 tively cool water is injected into the reactor core resulting in a temporary; power increase. Among other things, the potential for a cold water accident varies wi th the amount of water involved, its temperature relative to the normal operating temperature, and the rate at which the water is added.

The answer to Question 12.1.3 in the PSAR, Volume h, addresses itself to this problem. Mr. Webb's concern does not apply to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Pcver Station.

The reactor coolant loops are not isolated by valves and hence, cold water cannot accumulate in the system. In the event a reactor coolant pump is not in operation, the reactor coolant vill back flow through the idle 4

portion of the system and vill prevent excessive cooling of the water in that region. When a pump is then restarted, the reactor coolant average temperature decreases only slightly and only a small reactivity addition occurs . Analysis has shown that this small amount of reactivity addition vill increase pcVer clowly and that the integrated control system vill control the power level of the reactor without any appreciable change in power level and without exceeding LAT-2

.. ~

any safety limits. As a standard procedure to maintain tation reliability, power.will be reduced prior to starting the idle pump. The procedure is to encure keeping the station on the line and is not n ::afet.y procedure.

A6 ain, with regard to a resetivity accident au a result of rod withdrawal,

, this pctential is recognized in the safety evaluation of the stati<>n as a tated in Section 1h.1.2.2 and Section lb.l.2.3 of the PCAR. The reactor protection system incorporates those features necesscry to prevent fuel damage and re- -

leases of fission products for such occurrence::. Protection agtinst rea with-

-drawal accident is designed into the reactor by limiting the control roa with-drawal rate, limiting the maximum worth of any single centrol rod, and providing control rod withdrawal stops and alarms for abnormal conditions. ~

l l

LAT-3

__a_____.-_m.___

MR. CHARN0FF: Mr. Roe, both Miss Pausic on page 107 of the transcript awl Mrs. Drcwn on pace 267 are concerned that radioactive releases increase due f.o concrai deterioration of the station over its lifetime. Could you help clari fy t.his cett:.cr?

MB. ROE: 'de would expect to be releasing no = ore radioactivity in thirty or forty years after station start-up than we would be releasing when the s tation is new. In accordance with Station Technical Specifications , approp.-

riate radiation monitoring will be continually conducted not only to directly control releases from the station, but to maintain up-to-date performance data on staticn radwaste systems and their components. Such information will aid in determining requirements for renewing resins in radwaste deciner-alizers and for replacing filters in gaseous radwaste systems in crder to maintain radwaste systems at desirable efficiency levels.

Preventative maintenance, an axion in electric power plant operation, will be continually performed on virtually all station systems and cc=ponents (includ-ing radwaste-sys wms) to minimize potential equipment railures. As a minimum, refueling outages will afford opportunities for such procedures on systems normally in service.

Proposed annual reactor refueling vill result in approximately one-thirl of the fuel being replaced each year, so that maximum fuel residence time in the reactor will be approximately three years. Therefore, over the periods in questica, continued deterioration of fuel cannot lead to radioactivity release

' incre ases .

Station operating personnel and the Applicant's technical staff will continu-ally apprise themselves of the latest developments in areas of nuclear power station radwaste control it, order to incorporate such developments whenever warranted.

LA8-1

MR. CHARN0FF: On page 169 of the . transcript, Miss Pausic was troubled by a quotation in the Applicants' environmental reports which su6gested that the

\

Applicants may have been unable to understand a mathematical model used.

Mr. Roe, vould you provide clarification?

MR. ROE: Miss Pausic's quotation is frem page C-24 of Appendix C to Appli '

cants' Environmental Report. This Appendix is a report by Dr. John C. Ayers and Robert F. Anderson of the results to date of the limnology study that is being conducted in the lake area adjoining the station site. This n g was ecmmenced in 1968 and is being conducted by the Great Lakes Researen Divi-sion, The. University of Michigan, under the direction of Dr. Ayers. The quo-

• ation is simply Dr. Ayers' statement that the computations presented were not his own work, but that of Dr. Huang who should be addressed directly con-cerning any questions . I might add as a further point of clarificat. ion that Toledo D11 son has a number of enrineers with advanced degreen in nucienr tech'-

nology who are certainly able to perform computations or the type used in thia mathematical =odel describing a continuous point source release.

LA9-1

MR. CHARNOFF: Miss Pausic on page 169 has also asked why intervenors are not allowed to subpoena witnesses. I believe she is referring to the same -

problem the Coalition has raised during this hearing, that of' being unable to

. locate expert witnessec who are villing to testify in opposition to the plant.

While I can sympathize with this characteristic problem of intervenors , I should note that the Commission's Rules of Practice are not designed to favor or discriminate against any party to the proceeding, whether it be the applicant, the AEC regulatory staff, or an intervenor. The Commission's rules do not preclude the issuance of subpoenas.

s 4

e IA10-1

MR. CHARN0FF: Mr. Brickner on page 189 of the transcript, stated that the AEC should be prohibited from licensing the construction of the plant until

.the plant "has been approved by the Federal Water Quality Administration, the National Air Pollution Control Ad=inistration, and the corresponding authorities of the s tate . . . "

In response, I note that the Commission's regulations in Appendix D,10 CFR Part 50 provide that a construction permit will contain a condition requiring the licensee to abide by all applicable standards and requirements of other State and Federal regulatory agencies. It should also be noted that under the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Toledo Edison will be required to obtain certification from the appropriate state agencies that there is reasonable assurance that operation of the station vill not violate applicable State and Federal water quality standards ,

l 1

l l

l 1

l l

' l T.A11 1

MR. CHARN0FF: Mr. Webb on page 198 has raised the question of proper training for reactor plant operators and of possible mismanagement. Mr. Roe, would you please comment with respect to the training and experience of your people who will be involved with the Davis-Besse Station?

MR. ROE: The Davis-Besse supervisory personnel will consist of graduate engi-neers with backgrounds in nuclear, electrical, mechanical, and industrial engineering, and a graduate radiolog'ical health physicist with radiochemical research experience. Advanced degrees in nuclear, mechanical, and industrial engineering, and radiological health will be among their credentials.

Over ko years of electric power plant operating experience will be represented by the station supervisory staff; many more years will be represented in the remainder of the staff.

The supervisory staff, along with th2 remainder of the station staff, will sup-plement their existing expertise with a continuing program of training in preparation for initial operation of the station.

Training will be conducted as briefly outlined below:

(1) Nuclear theory - Local college and/or vendor and nuclear consultants will conduct training in the areas of nuclear reactor theory, health physics ,

and nuclear power plant fundamentals.

(2) FWR observation - In-plant observation experience will be gained during three months exposure in similar operating pressurized water reactor s

nuclear power stations .

(3) PWR technology - The nuclear steam supply system vendor (B & W) will con-duct about a six-weeks course covering the design and basic functions

]

of the components and systems furnished by that vendor.

l e

(h) PWR operation - This phase of training will consist of a three-months period at B & W facilities where classroom work, pool reactor training, and huelear reactor simulator shift operation will be conducted.

(5) On-t.he-job t.rai ning - The final phase of training will occur on-site in conjunction with station checkout in order to gain intimate familiarity with the station and its components and systems prior to initial fuel leading.

t. Appropriate AEC nuclear reactor operator licenses will be obtained by desig-nated members of the station staff prior to operation cf the nuclear reactor.

Specialized training vill be provided engineers , technicians , and maintenance

~

personnel by vendors , colleges, and government facilities to further prepare.

them for their assigned tasks.

To provide for replacements for the initial station staff resulting from re-tirement, promotion, etc. , additional employees will be added to the station staff as needed and will receive training similar to that outlined earlier.

A continuing progrean of refresher training will be conducted by the station staff with outside assistance so that all station personnel will maintain proficiency in their assigned duties.

? A10_O

MR. CHAJti!OFF: Mr. Lucas on page 239 of the transcript, Mrs. Brown on page

?67, and Dr. Davies on page 273 expressed concern about maintaining radio-rai t.1 ve wrui t.e d i a cha r re a t a mi nimmn. Mrc. Brown rtit:0 inqui red rtbout the requirementa for comi-annual discharge reports.

He Commission has recently published a rule in the Federal Register of '

December 3,1970, to be effective at the end of this month, which imposes the requirement that radioactive discharges from nuclear plants be maintained "as lov as practicable." he plant operator is not allowed to routinely dis-char 6e vastes up to the permissible limits in 10 CFR, Part 20, but rather he is required to make etvery reasonable effort to maintain releases of radic-active materials as far below the specified AEC limits as is practicable.

Under this regulation, a license authorizing the operation of the Davis-Besse Ctatien include conditions requiring the operator to adhere to proper proced-ures for the control of liquid and gaseous effluents and for the maintenance and use of the effluent control systems and equipment. he licensee vill also be required to submit semi-annual reports to the AEC of the quantities of radioactive materials released.' On the basis of these reports and independent surveillance of the plant operations by AEC's Division of Compliance, the AEC will be stble to take whatever action as may be appropriate to ensure minir.=4 releases to the environment.

he regulation has been published as a proposed rule since April 1,1970, and has- been taken'into account by the Applicants who vill install systems for the control of liquid and gaseous radios::tive vastes which are the best proven, systems that existing technology now affords for use with pressurized water reactors .

LA13-1

~

MR. UllARNOFF: Mr. Lucas on page 2hl of the transcript has asked if the geo-legten) bhse' Is adequate for a nuclear power plant. Mr. Wahl, will you plense comment?

Mit. WAllL: All major building structures for this station are founded directly upon or within the limestone bedrock that underlies the entire site area. A detailed foundation investi'gation was commenced in July 1968, prior to any design- of these structures . This investigation covered both regler.rtl nni site geology, seismology, and hydrology. As' a result of the initial invec ti-cation carried out in 1968, e. detailed investigation was conducted at the site to verity the adequacy of the bedrock. '1his verification program is described ira concielerable detail in Appendix 2C, Section VB of the PSAR. The program may briefly be described as consisting of the following verification proced-ures for determining that no significant solution activity or cavities exists :

(1) Detailed inspection and mapping of the bedrock as it is exposed during construction.

(P) The drilling, logging, and inspection of k9 core borings in the bedrock.

Forty-six of these borings exter.d 90 feet into bedrock, three extend 1h0 feet into bedrock.

(3) Additional rock probes 20 feet into bedrock in those areas where surface mapping indicates the possibility of solution activity.

(h) Geophysical surveys consisting of:

a. Seismic velocity measurements.

b. Gravity survey.

c. Resistivity survey.

(S) Cuspected colution activity located by the above procedure is subject to a detailed local exploratory program consisting of closely spaced borings and borehole television camera inspection.

LAlb-1

t Se above verification procedures were conducted during the summer and fall of 1969 and 1970 and are now complete. Bis exhaustive program has produced 4 ' no evidence of significant solution activity or cavities and confirms the i

nuitability of the bedrock for support of the station.

1 4

n

~

s l

l 4

4 LAlk-2

MR. CHARN0FF: Several speakers expressed concern about the effects of pro-lone,ed exposure to low doses of radiation, and the absecce of a threshold for nuch effects. Dr. Goldman, would you comment on these concerns expressed by Dr. Perrin on pages 156-157 of the transcript, Dr. Davies on pages 271-272, Mrs. Dewitz on pages 245-2h6, and Mrs. Stebbins on page 3937 Would you also consider the remarks of Mrs. Brown on page 268 and Mrs. Stebbina on page 397 concerning the effects of additional nuclear plants which might be installed in the future?

LR. GOLDMAN: There has been an unfortunate misunderstanding of our state of' knowledge of low level radiation effects as related to nuclear power plant emissions . Many people have the impression, first, that radiation from nuclear plants is novel; that is , it differs somehov from the radiation arising from natural sources , or from x-rays, in its effect on people; and second, that the concept of no-threshold for radiation effects is also quite new. Both of these I t

impressions are false. 1 I

l The effects of radiation, from whatever source, are the same. That is , for a 1 l

given dose to all or part of the body, the effect will be the same whether the radiation comcc from x-rays, from naturally occurring radioactive materials incorporated in our bodies, from cosmic rays, or from radionuclides released from human activities. Thus, the effects. of very low levels of radiation ex-i posure continued over many, many generations can be seen all over the world at the present time, since natural radiation levels vary quite widely from place to place, over a. range of values much greater than those contributed by nuclear power plants. Since we do not see any statistically significant difference in occurrence of such radiation induced effects as cancer, leukemia, genetic effects, etc. , between populations in areas of greatly different natural radiation levels ,

we know that any effects which are due' to radiation at these low levels are LA15-1

e.xtremely small in comparison to those due to other, non-radiation causes, hus , radioactivity is not at all like DDT, which did not exist before man created It.

With regard to the "no-threshold" or " linear" dose-effect theory, it should.

be pointed out that this is not a new concept in the radiation protection field, having first been published in the Recommendations of the International Commission of Radiological Protection in 1950 (published as National Bureau of Standards Handbook 47), and by the National Committee on Hadiation Protec-tion in 1954 (NBS Handbook 59) in which they stated:

"It is, therefore, necessary to assume that any practical limit of expos-ure that may be set up today, vial involve some risk of possible harm."

In 1965, the ICRP stated (Publication 9) that:

"The assumption is made that, down to the lowest levels of dose, the risk of inducing disease or disability increases with the dose accumulated.by the individual. his assumption implies that there is no wholly " safe" dose of radiation. he Commission recognizes this is a conservative

~

assumption, and that some effects may require a minimum or threshold

• dose."

Thus, the standards recommended by both of these groups for the population-at-large, consider that any amount of radiation would imply some small degree of risk, and are established at values which restrict these risks to insignificant l levels. Since these risks are all detemined from experience at very much higher dose levels, this is the same as assuming that, because there is a re-lationship between lung cancer and emphysema occurrence in three-pack-a-day smokers, there is also a definable risk of these diseases for someone who smokes one pack of cigarettes per year. Most knowledgeable individuals would agree LA15-2 -

that the tick to health from smoking 1-2 cigarettes per month is so small as to be essentially non-existent, although probably few would assert that there is absolui.cly no risk of health effect.

j,,

Hevertheless, upper limit risk estimates can be made for low dose exposures

of the degree. to be expected as a result of the Davis-Besse operation, based on this sort of risk extrapolation as published by ICRP in 1965 and 1969

' mis has been done with the following results:

Calculated Number of Cases Within 50 Miles Effect Without Plant With Plant Leukemia 197.58/ year 197.5801/ year Other Cancers k ,301. 37/ year h ,301. 3706/ year .

" Genetic Deaths" over 6,27k,500/300 years 6,27h,500.01/300 years next 10 generations On the basis of these calculations, the maximum effect of Davis-Besse opera-tion on health can be seen to be essentially non-existent. Furthermore, any additional nuclear. plants discharging similar minute quantities of radioactive materials into the same Lake Erie environment would have a simile.r negligible impact. For example, it would take 100 nuclear plants , all equally affecting the immediate ares of Davis-Besse to add just one additional genetic death in 300 years , about 1600 plants to add, as a maximum, one additional cancer case to the expected 4300 per year, and about 10,000 equivalent plants to add at most one additional leukemia case to the approximately 200 expected per year without any nuclear plants,

~

i l

LA15-3 1

MR. CHARN0FF: On page 269, Mrs. Brown stated the recommendations of the i

regional League of Women Voters that environmental survey programs be imple-mented for detectioit of radioactivity levels in the surrounding land and water ynvironment. Mr. Roe, would you please describe your plans for post-operational monitoring?

MR. ROE: An environmental monitoring program which includes analysis of ,

radioactivity le' vel in representative samples of the environment such as ,

soil, vegetation, water, lake bottom sediments, and 12ke aquatic life will commence prior to start of station operation and will continue throughout the station's operating life. 2he purpose of this continuing program is to establish a base line of naturally occurring radioactivity level in the en-vironment prior to station operation and then continue to monitor the radio-l activity level to see what, if any, changes might be occurring due "a statio'n operation.

All of the station vastes will be monitored which would permit the probable -

effect on the environment to be calculated and the environmental monitoring program provides the assurance that the station is operating within the appli-cable regulations.

This environmental monitoring program will be carefully planned in conjunction with the Ohio Department of Health and gM U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.

Lu6-1

l .

NR'. CHARNOFF: Mr. Clink on page 180 of the transcript and Mr. O'Inlde on page 297 have suggested that environmental studies nhould be completed prior to licensing rather than waiting until 15 months prior to operacion of the ctation. Mr. Roe, would you please comment?

MR. ROE: We have discussed in the PSAR and the Environmental Report, two sepa-rate but related studies concerning the environment. Be one which will commence about Ib years before station operation is called the environmental monitoring program and its purpose is to obtain representative samples from the environ-ment such as , soil, water, vegetation, aquatic life, etc. , and analyze them for radioactivity level. This vill be started well before station operation com-mences to establish a base line of the naturally occurring radioactivity level and will continue throughout the station's operating life to determine what, if any, changes in radioactivity level are caused by station operation.

The other study referred to is the limnology study of the local lake area ad-Jacent to the station. This study was commenced in 1968 and has continued through this past summe.r. We purpose of this study was to determine the physi-cal character of the lake area and the nature of the aquatic life in the lake' to determine insofar as possible what effect the construction and operation of the station, including the use and discharge of lake water, would have on the lake environment. This study was also necessary to provide information required to design the station to withstand lake effects such as lake level and wave action and to provide a basis for design of such items as the intake and discharge-canals to minimize any possible potential adverse effects to lake from station coratruction or operation.

Based on the results of this study, review of similarly located operating sta-tions, results of other studies, and a carefully designed water intcJte and discharge system, we firmly concluded that the station could be built and 7417 1

operated without ur due adverse effect on the lake envirotunent while using the Inke as a cource and sink for condenser cooling vnter. We have since changed our plans to provide for a cooling tower system as a heat sirA for the condenser vaste heat and will be discharging only h% of the water and heat to the lake that was originally planned and we feel that this small quantity will have negligible effect on the lake or lake life.

Federal Aid Project F-kl-R involves a lake study sponsored by the Ohio Depart-ment of Natural Resources , Division of Wildlife, and has , as its stated purpose, been formulated to evaluate environmental effect of the operation of the sta-tion.

This project was initiated prior to our decision to use a cooling tower system, but we assume that this study will still continue.

The results of the above study that will be useful for planning the environ-mental monitoring program will be to determine the most representative type-of aquatic life organisms and the best location where these samples would be obtained.

l LA17-2

MR. CHAPl!CFF: Mr. Lau raised a question relating to the water table level and flow in the vicinity of the site. Mr. Roe, would you please comment?

MR. RUE: As pointed out in the PSAR, the soil deposits which overlay the bedrock in the vicinity of the station are about 17 feet in depth and are quite impervious to water. This mcans that the surface water from rain or whatever source does not penetrate this soil to any extent and runs along the surface to drainage ditches , streams , and thence to the lake.

The upper layer of rock which underlies the soil cover is fractured and per-mits a ready pathway for the flow of water beneath the soil cover. This path-way, or aquifer, is exposed to sources of water further inland where the rock layer is at or closer to the ground surface and is also exposed to the lake i ts elf. Frort test borings and checks of wells in the vicinity of the site, it was determined that the gradients and resulting flow of water in tnis a'q;.ifer is small and generally the gradient and flow is in the direction of the lake, but it does vary with the fluctuation in lake level.

During the present stage of construction, and continuing for some months yet, the ground water in being pumped out of the excavation for the a tation utrue-tures to keep the excavated area free from water. This has depressed the water table in the immediate vicinity of the station location. However, to minimize the flow of ground water into the excavation and thereby minimize the area vi-hir.

which the water table is lowered, a grout curtain was installed around the sta-tion's construction area. The curtain largely seals this jointed rock ctrata and blocks , to a great extent, the flow of water into the excavated area.

With tL.: addition of this curtain, the effect on the ground vnter, at any dis-tance away from the excavation, is small, but the pumping could lower the water level'in wells close to the site boundary.

LA18-1

. Very few wells would be affected since the normal supply of potable water for residences in this area is from water that is trucked to the residence and stored in cisterns. The ground water is generally not suitable for human consumption or household use due to the very high sulfate content, hardness and high total dissolved solids content.

After all of the below grade construction is completed, this pumping will be stopped and the ground water conditions will return to the same levels as they were prior to start of construction. Operation of the station will have no effect on the ground water condition.

k LA18-2

?1. CHARN0FF: Mr. Noblitt on page 230 and Mr. Samuel Howerth on page 387 would like to see two of Toledo Edison's top nuclear physicists, under a five-year employment with Toledo Edison, required to live within 20 miles of the site. Mr. Roe, while I realize Toledo Edison does not require five--

year employment commitments of its employees and does not dictate where its employees must make their homes, perhaps you would like to comment on your predictions about where the members of your operating staff are likely to make their homes after the station is in operation?

MR. ROE: Presently, one member of the Davis-Besse administrative staff which will be responsible for managing the station's nuclear operations lives with his family within the 20 miles referred to; another lives within one-half mile of this distance. A third has be en searching for a home for his family in the Oak Harbor area for several months and will move into that area well .

in advance of station operation. s We anticipate that additional members of the station's administrative staff will find it convenient to live near the station, as will many of the opera-tions and maintenance personnel assigned to the station.

l 1

1 l

1 l

1 T.A1Q 1 '

l i

MR. CliARNOFF: Mr. Lucas on page 239 of the transcript and Dr. Davies on

- page 273 mentioned disch'arges and emissions from spent ruel reprocessing l'1 ants. The licencing of these plants is conducted by AEC under proceedings ident.ical to the proceedings for licensing nuclear power plants, including a mandatory public hearing to determine the issuance of a construction por-

. mit for the processing plant. Radioactive discharges are governed by the same Part, 20 standards , including the requirements that discharges be "as -

-' low as practicable." .

s 9

m 4

4 a

4 5

- LA20-1

s.

HlI. * *Ittsittl* >VV 14r . * *

• f in t *I* *on gr a ny': :")') wret t'ranc':Tucal Lhn t. t.he rr: h n:5 huen er ' ta rc.r::$ tlii,ra *:*,w triaine nucierar powcr nnel the pianu for t hr Duv i n-lte: ce

f.rt.i..n t

availribic in the Cpanish languare so that the Opanish-cr.eaking

. i .9.. . t : , r,y l,I be t,< tteer informed on thic project.

L'Jt . Hvi:,: A cluantity of three different booklets from the AEC Public Infor-mation Geries printed in the Spanish language have been obtained and are available for distribution to any interested group or individual. A G;'anish-

. speaking individual who 13 currently obtaining an advanced degree at The University of Michigan ha.s been contacte4 by 'us and is willing to speak before any group. This individual has 1 ad extensive work in the health physics area and is well qualified to speak on nuclear power and radiation.

We have transmitted to Mr. O'1alde copies of the booklets and have offered to arr c:, e for an information program, to be presented in the Spanish lan-r uage, il' requested.

4 LA21-1

9 s

, MR CHARNOFF: After our preparation of the foregoin6 anuvers, Mr. Frit:

e presentec a limited appearance into the record at page 926 of the trans-script. Some of Mr. Fritz's questions have just been answered in our re-sponse regarding transportation of spent fuel and storage of radicactive vasten. Dr. Goldman, would you respond to Mr. Fritz's concern about the adequacy of solidification as a method of liquid vaste disposal on page 927?

CR. GOLDMAU: Mr. Fritz (Tr. p. 926 et seq. ) expressed some concern about tne residual heat associated with the storage of solidified hir.h activity vastes', indicating that the problem had been ignored or minimized. Thic

~ is incctreet. Studies of storage of solidified wastes in salt au preseritly e' .aidennt were reported as early as 1958, in the t'econd Geneva Contwrence en Peaceful Uaes of Atomic Energy, and indicated that natural convection air re aling of these solids would be entirely feasible. In the intervening yeura ,

these calculations have been verified by both laboratory experiments and by.

field tests conducted by Cak Ridge National Laboratory under Project Salt Vault.

There is no possible way in which these vastec can become " molten lava and gases" after storage in salt cavities in the manner proposed.

LA22-1 i

I'

. ~

~

~

MR.*CEARNOFF: Mr. Fritz on pages 929 and 930 of the transcript of this hearing questibned why ve had compared Davis-Besso in the PSAR to other reactors not in service. Mr. Roe, would you please comment on his ques-tion?

I MR. ROE: As stated in Section 1.3 of the PSAR, Table 1-2 presents design and ' operating parameters of the Davis-Besse Station and compares this data

, with other units. This information and' comparison is asked for by the AIC 4

Regulatcry Staff in their document "A Guide for the Organization and Contents cf the Safety Analysis Reports."

The comparison with.other units is to show principal similarities and dif-ferences. The units chosen for comparison are normally those that have just preceded the particular unit under consideration in the AEC regulatory review to provide ready comparison and reference to the most recently approved designs.

The PSAR statement . hat is quoted by Mr. Fritz which reads, "The design of each of these stations is based on infor=ation developed from operation of commer-cial and prototype pressurized water reactors over a number of years. The Davis-Besse unit design is based on this existing power reactor technology and has not been extended beyond the boundaries of known information er operating experience," is most certainly true.

LA23-1

, - - +

l 1

)

l

)

MR. CHARN0FF: Dr. Goldman, would you respond to Mr. Fritz's concerns about the on-site plutonium inventory on Tr. p. 931?

DR. GOLI$UJI: f4r. Fritz's concern at the apparent neglect of the hazarua associated with the plutonium produced during the operation of the Davis-Besse station is without foundation, since the bases for the apparent " neglect" of this hazard are first, that the plutonium is retained within the fuel ma-trix and fuel rod cladding, as are the other fission products; and second, that the volatility of plutonium is extremely low in the metal form (a boil-ing point greater than 3000 C), and even lover as plutonium oxide which would be the most likely form in the fuel. For this reason, no plutonium escapes from the fuel, even in case of the loss-of-coolant accideng and its hazard to the public is non-existent.

LA24-1 r

,' MS.'CHARN0FF: Mr. Fritz also asked on page 933 about the inventory of solid fission products in the reactor and why only 1% of the solids are presumed to be released in a " maximum hypothetical accident." Mr. Wahl, would you please comment?

MR. WAllL: The fission products assumed to be released from the core to the containment vessel for purposes of dose calculations for the "MMA" are those prescribed in the AZC document TID-lh8hh. These are given in that document as 100% of the noble gases, 50% of the halogens, and 1% of the solids in the core fission product inventory. In arriving at these values, the referenced document states that experiemental data vould indicate that they are conser-vative for hypothetical accidents of the type usually visualized. The maximum solid fission product inventory in the core is conservatively calculated to be 1.795 x 100 curies. The use of the filters, in conjunction with Davis-Besse type double containment,would greatly reduce the quantity of solids actually escaping to the environment. With the 95% filter efficiency conservatively assumed at Davis-Besse, the percent of the total source strength released as solids, and, therefore, the percent contribution to the whole body dose would be considerably less than 15.

LA25 MR'. CHARNOFF: Mr. Cock presented a late limited appearance on January ..";

in which he asked a nu=ber of site-related questions (Tr. 944-52). We have covered Mr. Cook's questions concerning evacuatiun, ;tatie.n ::afeguardu , algue growth, and background =onitoring in ansvers to previous limited appearance questions and in testimony. Mr. Roe, will you respond to Mr. Cook's questions concerning the behavior of the discharge plu=e?

MR. ROE: The report " Currents and Dilution" referred to by Mr. Cook is part of the result of a li=nolagy study which began in 1968 on the lake area ad-Jcining the site. This study is being conducted by Dr. John C. Ayers and hcbert F. Anderson of the Great Lakes Research Division, The Univeruity of Michigan. The results of the study will not be needed to predict the tehavior of the heated water discharge plume, as the Applicants decided in the summer of 1970 to use a closed cycle cooling tower.

The tower will reduce the heat rejected to Lake Erie to less than h% of the heat that was to be discharged using our originally planned open lake system for condenser cooling water. The greatly reduced quantity of heated water that is discharged vill rapidly mix with the adjacent lake water such that only a 0.2 acre area of the surface vould be 5 F or higher than the normal lake temperature. The results of Dr. Ayers ' study on dilution in the lake has been used to determine the radioactive concentrations at the Camp Perry water intake as reported in Volume 4, Page 2.h-1 to 2.h-7 and Page 11.4-1 of the PSAR.

The Applicants have analyzed the effects of vind tides on Lake Erie water levels.

Our analysis 'of bcth the high and lov lake levels due to vind tides is given in Section 2.h l.2 of the PSAR. The discharge outlet for the station vill be lo-cated about 1,300 feet offshore in water about six feet deep at mean low lake level. The discharge flow will be about 33,000 gallons per minute and its tem-0 perature vill be about 15 F above the ambient lake temperature. This temperature LA26-1 ,

s 6

' ank flow data was included in our response to the Depm tment of int.erior letter on our Environmental Report. The. velocity at the discharge point vill be about six to seven feet per second.

Any radioactive liquid

• effluents from the-station vill be well below the 10 CFR Fart 20 limit before it ' enters the discharge cysten.. Arter any radiu-actlye effluent enters the 33,000 gpm discharge flow,. its concentration is t'urther reduced by a factar of 5 x 10-3 before it entera Ide Erie. -there-fore, due to the extremely low concentrations at .the point. of discharge into Lake Erie, the radioactivity that would be cairihd into the Sand beach area during high water ecnditions would be an extremaly small fraction of the 10

~

CFR 20 limits' 'Also, during low water conditions no concentrations higher than at the. discharge point can occur in any shallow channels between uund bars.

At normal or high water levels, the discharge of 33,000 gpm at a depth of six

- feet below mean lov lake level and at a velocity of. cix to seven feet per aecend will not produce any navigational hazards.

I i

r t

.1 i

4 y

-['

e'

, LA26-2 y n y w y - em 4

. s NR. CHARU0FF: Mr. Roe,' would you respond to Mr. Cook's questions relating to t'heinature"of the exclusion area?

MR. ROE: The station'a exclusion area includes all of the station's property owned by the Applicant as described in Section 2 of the. PSAR. 'It has been established to meet the criteria of 10 CFR 100 and will require no further extension even when the station is put into operation. In compliance with 10 CFR 100, activities within the exclusion' area must be controlled by the Applicant primarily to allow direct c'ontrol of this area during the unlikely event of a hypothetical accident. During normal station operation, the ex-clusion area presents no hazard as exhibited by. the fact that station person-nel will have accesa to this area without restrictions related to radioactivity.

The Bureau of Sporta Fisheries and Wildlife will manage the marsh areas at the station. Details cf acceas through these areas have yet to be formulated through mutual agreement between the Bureau and the Applicant. After completion of barge shipments to the site during the construction phase, the arrangement of the station intake and discharge systems will not alter the contour of the

, shoreline along the carsh areas.

No releases from the station will be =ade into the waters of the r oation marsh areas. Therefore, the marsh waters contiguous with the Sand Beach area will present no hazards to that area. The storm or rain water drainage from the station area vill rot flow into any of the marsh areas.

y LA27-1

, s

.!6t.' CllARNOFF: With respect to Mr. Co.ok's question about whether a safe-

. cuard railure was responsible for the Fermi difficultics, Mr. Roe, would you please clarify? .

I?.. RCE: The partial melting of several of the Enrico-Fermi reactor fuel assemblies was caused by coolant flow blockage to those fuel assemblies rather than failure of any safeguards. Similar coolant flow blockage at Davi:t-becce 'is impossible due to differences in reactor design. Addition-ally, reactor safeguards are entirely different for the two reactors due to. differences in their. reactor coolant systems including cooling media.

9 LA28-1

m'*

Md. t'llAltrJf WV: 74 . it. .c . w i 1.1 you niaiswe r fir. Cook 'rs que n t.inaus coiu e s*:il ev the effect of the station on the ' area's wildlife?

o MR. ROE: 'Use of the existing Davis Besse site,will result in the additiori, in the Port Clinton ~ area, of about 500 acres of wildlife' refuge under manage-4- .

ment of the Bureau of Sports Fisheries and Wildlife. O'nly about 50 acres of the ' marsh area at .the station site vill be used for the -station intake canal.

., - As stated earlier, nems1 station activity will not result in any~ radioactivity hazards' vithin the exclusion area to either. individuals or wildlife. 3either

. e vill marsh land bottoms nor its vegetation become contaminated since no station releases are made to the marsh areas. '

E o

?

t 9

e O

b d

4

', , LA29-1 l

., j

MH$ .CNARNOFF: Dr. Davies of the Audubon Council has raised questions con-cerning- , the impur4. ties content and possible detrimental behavior or impuritieu

' ~

in the uranium fuel, the Zircaloy-4 fuel cladding and other materials (Tr.

Pp. 88k-912 and 1064). Please discuss the work which has been done to evaluate

~these aspects and to assure 'the proper chemical content of the materials of

[ conc [ern. Mr. Little, vould you please comment?

MR. LITTLE: As Dr[ Winters stated in the public hearing on January 7, 1971 (Tr.,Pp'. 890-894 and 906-908), these are basic questions about the fundamentals of cladding and fuel design which are accepted as standard basic knowledge today after_ having been studied in detail over a long period of time. Mcst of Dr. Davies' questions can be answered by referring to standard textbooks and handbo' o ks such as , " Reactor Handbook, Volume 1 - Materials ,1960, Inter-science Publication Inc." References 27-h9 in Section 3 of the PSAR describe so=e of this basic work which hits been done to qualify these materials for power reactor use.

One result of all'of this work has been the establishment of specifications which very carefully specify impurity content. The Zircaloy-4 fuel cladding meets the requirements of American Society 'for Testing Materials ( STM) desig-nation B353-6hT, " Tentative Specification Wrought Zirconium and Zirconium Alloy Seamless and Welded Tubes for Nuclear Service," for Grade RA-2.

In the transcript on pages 908-910, Dr. Davies expressed concern of carbon dicxide and moisture content in uranium dioxide fuel at concentrations of approximately 0.2h-0.29 veight percent and 3.lh weight percent, respectively.

The behavior of- these impurities has been studied and current fuel specifica-1 tions require a total carbon content approximately 20 times less than the

)

l values of concern 'and a total moisture content approximately 1000 times less  ;

LA30-1 i

I-

~.

than the value Dr. Davies mentioned. In addition to carbon and moisture, the fuel specifications also carefully control the maximum concentrations of fluorine,,nytrogen, chlorine,'and rare earth.

Dr. Davies also asked =any questions about other materials used in the reactor design. The behavior of these materials in a nuclear reactor en-

~

vironment has been the subject of studies for many years and is reported in textbooks, handbooks, and technical reports. The impurities in these i

materials are carefully specified. For example, the containment vessel vill be fabricated of steel plate conforming to ASME Specification SA-299 For Dr. ' Davies areas of concern, impurities are not presented in amounts which could be detrimental. Also, the reactor is designed so that tempera-tures and pressures during both operating and assumed accident condi?. ions do not reach the values required to favor many of the reactions which Dr.

Davies is concerned about.

l LA30-2

~

t MR. CHARNOFF: On page 32 of Dr. Davies' statement, he expressed concern that we had edited the Limnology Report prepared by Dr. Ayers from the

' Great Lakes Research Division of The University of Michigan before it was included in our Environmental Report and that we may have edited this Lim-nology Report before it was placed in the PSAR. Mr. Roe, vould you please comment?

MR. ROE: Dr. Ayers' report on the Lake Erie Limnology has been submitted to us in four parts. The total contents of Parts I, II, and III were added to the PSAR in Amendment No. 5, except for the following sections of Part I:

1. THE PROBABILITY OF TORNADO DAMAGE (P. 25 of Part I).

This section was not included in the PSAR as tornado frequency calcula-tions had also been made by our meteorologists, The Research Corporation (formerly Travelers Research Corporation), and were included in the Meteorology Section 23 of the PSAR. It is interesting to note that both reports give a recurrence interval for tornadoes in a one-degree square adjacent to the station site equal to 1,587 years.

2. SI".E AND STRUCTURE OF THE THERMAL PLUME (Pp. 26-36 of Part I).

This section was also not included in our PSAR as Dr. Ayers had used float-ing plumes to develop his plume model equations. These floating plumes produced little or no mixing with the surrounding water at the point of discharge. After we received Dr. Ayers ' report, we decided to use a relatively high . velocity heated water discharge into the lake. This vould produce rapid mixing with the adjacent lake water and, as a result,

. reduce the plume temperature faster than by the floating plume method.

Dr. D. W. Pritchard from Johns Hopkins University had developed the =athe-matical models for thermal plumes where high velocity discharges had been used and we retained him to analyze this type of discharge for Davis-Besse.

ra71 1

8 n -s

• .- - r PJt. ClfAltf!OU: .On. pay,e 39 or Dr. Davies' statement, he exprecced concern

f. hist known uranium reserves are not adequate. Mr. Roe, would you please comment?

MR. ROE: The exploration economics and policies of the uranium mining in-dustry are in many ways similar to the oil and gas industry. Traditionally, the oil and gas industry have found it economically feasible and justifiable during the past 60 years to maintain an exploration program that would pro-duce proven reserves adequate for the next six to ten years. On January 1, 1971, the AEC published figures shoving the proven U3 0g reserves at about 2h0,000 tons. This reserve vill provide the needs for all presently announced reactors for the next eight or nine years.

Historically, uranium reserves increased rapidly during the 1950's when the U.S. Government was stockpiling uranium, and re=ained fairly constant during

• the early 1960's when the stockpiling was ceased, and has again started to rise during the past two years to meet the power industries needs in the late 1970's. There is no economic justification to step up the exploration rate

~

to increace the number of years of proven reserves.

LA32-1