05000346/LER-1978-080-03, /03L-0:on 780718,breakers to Feedwater Stop Valves Found Open.Caused by Personnel Failing to Restore Valves to Operable Position After Test.Power Restored by Closing Circuit Breakers.Personnel Formally Reprimanded

/03L-0:on 780718,breakers to Feedwater Stop Valves Found Open.Caused by Personnel Failing to Restore Valves to Operable Position After Test.Power Restored by Closing Circuit Breakers.Personnel Formally Reprimanded

ML19326A348
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	08/15/1978
From:	Siebenaler S, Zell J TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML19326A267	List: 05000346/LER-1978-080, Forwards LER 78-080/03L-0 05000346/LER-1978-080-03, /03L-0:on 780718,breakers to Feedwater Stop Valves Found Open.Caused by Personnel Failing to Restore Valves to Operable Position After Test.Power Restored by Closing Circuit Breakers.Personnel Formally Reprimanded
References
LER-78-080-03L, LER-78-80-3L, NUDOCS 8002030165
Download: ML19326A348 (3)

LER-1978-080, /03L-0:on 780718,breakers to Feedwater Stop Valves Found Open.Caused by Personnel Failing to Restore Valves to Operable Position After Test.Power Restored by Closing Circuit Breakers.Personnel Formally Reprimanded

Event date:
Report date:
3461978080R03 - NRC Website

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['5TT] [ On 7/18/78, at 2250 hours0.026 days <br />0.625 hours <br />0.00372 weeks <br />8.56125e-4 months <br />, it was discovered that the breakers to the feedwater stoo i

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TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY DAVIS-BESSE UNIT ONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-78-96

.DATE OF EVENT: July 18, 1978 FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Inoperable status of Main Feedwater Stop Valves Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 3, with Power OSe'T) = 0, and Load (MWE) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: On July 18,1978 at 2250 hours0.026 days <br />0.625 hours <br />0.00372 weeks <br />8.56125e-4 months <br />, the Shift Foreman while on a routine tour of the Control Room, noticed that both feedwater isolation valves to the steam generators had no position indicating lights. Further investigation revealed the breakers to the feedvater stop valves were open. The two feedwater stop valves are required to be operable as required by Technical Specification 3.6.3.1 in Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4.

These valves plus redundant valves prevent leakage of possibly radioactive material out of containment in the event of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), into the steam-feedwater system. The occurrence also placed the unit in excess of the surveillance requirements of Technical Specification 3.3.2.2 which requires the main feedwater stop valves to have a response time of sixteen seconds or less when in Modes 1, 2 or 3.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: Personnel error is attributed as the cause of this occurrence. On July 17,1978 at 1342 hours0.0155 days <br />0.373 hours <br />0.00222 weeks <br />5.10631e-4 months <br />, Phase II of ST 5031.18,

" Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System Integrated Test", was signed off as completed. Prior to this time, the main feedwater stop valves' circuit breakers were opened to prevent accidental actuation during the test. As stated in the pro-cadure, these valves should have been restored to operable status upon completion of Phase II.

Operations personnel failed to complete a test step which required restoration of equipment affected by the test and independent verification of re-storation. The plant's status changed to Mode 3, " Hot Standby", at 0755 hours0.00874 days <br />0.21 hours <br />0.00125 weeks <br />2.872775e-4 months <br /> on July 18, 1978.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public i

or to unit personnel. During the time the main feedwater stop valves were inopera-

'ble, Reactor Coolant System pressure never exceeded 675 psig. The unit did not advance beyond Mode 3.

There are redundant valves in series which would have isolated if a steam line or feedwater line rupture had occurred.

1

['}LER 78-080 V

ICLEDO EDISON C(2fPANY DAVIS-BESSE UNIT ONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-78-96 PAGE 2

Corrective Action

Power was restored at 2300 hours0.0266 days <br />0.639 hours <br />0.0038 weeks <br />8.7515e-4 months <br /> on July 18, 1978 to the main feedwater stop valves by closing their circuit breakers.

This placed the unit in compliance with Technical Specifications 3.6.3.1 and 3.3.2.2.

The responsible individual is to be formally reprimanded for this occurrence.

Failure Data: On July 27, 1977, motor control center E11C tripped which caused one of the main feedwater stop valves to be inoperable. Design error was attri-buted to the cause of this previous occurrence (see Licensee Event Report NP-32-77-11).

LER #78-080 1